Friday, March 31, 1995

A job for the private sector

SIR, Dr Quiggin refers to my proposals to reduce net government spending on education and health ("Categories set up hurdle in savings debate", AFR, March 20).  He claims that I justify such proposals by "critiques of human capital theory", by arguing that "education is really a form of consumption" and by claiming that "reductions can be made without affecting either the quantity or quality of output".  Such sweeping and unjustified assertions are difficult to rebut in a short letter.  Dr Quiggin fails to understand the basis of my proposals.

First, there is a need to increase national saving.  Reductions in net government spending on, say, tertiary education and health that are achieved by requiring most middle- and higher-income groups to meet their tertiary education and health costs will reduce government dissaving, and also tend to increase private saving, regardless of whether or not education includes an investment element (which it does).

Second, such action will avoid the need to increase taxation and the adverse effects which that would have on the incentive to work and save.  Dr Quiggin seems to assume (wrongly) in all his writings that existing levels of taxation, let alone higher levels, have no adverse effects on economic activity or unemployment.

Third, my approach would, I submit, be more equitable in that it would focus government tertiary education and health assistance on lower-income groups.

More broadly, contrary to the assumption implicit in Dr Quiggin's analysis, a reduction in the provision of health and education services by government does not necessarily mean a reduction in total spending on such services.  Australia has substantial private-sector involvement in such services and there is little doubt that, particularly if tax burdens are reduced, these will grow.  Total Australian health and education spending (that is, both government and private) is broadly in line with total spending in other countries with comparable income levels.

Government has proved a relatively inefficient provider of education and health services.  The more that such services are left to the private sector to provide, the better we are all likely to be.


ADVERTISEMENT

Friday, March 24, 1995

Evatt report flaws exposed

The States -- how they rate

THE Evatt Foundation's attempt to assess the performance of State Governments, in its The State of Australian Government 1994-95, is an excellent idea, but as a piece of research it is seriously flawed.

The report endeavours, among other things, to assess and compare the performance of the States and Territories on a broad range of policy areas, and to produce an overall ranking of State performance, using published data.

The task is a worthy one, but the exercise is only as good as the methodology and data employed.  The old adages of "garbage in, garbage out", and "lies, damned lies and statistics" both apply.  Unfortunately, the Evatt Foundation's assessment runs foul of both.

Its main conclusion, that governments that spend most -- SA, ACT and NT (Victoria, the pariah of union movements, is the exception) -- perform the best, may be what the report's main sponsors (the Community and Public Sector Union) wanted to hear, but it's a statistical delusion.

The report relies mainly on data from the latest Commonwealth Grants Commission Report.  This data has been used extensively over the last half-decade, in a number of studies including audit commissions in Tasmania, Victoria, WA and SA.  Surprisingly, these studies have, using the same data, reached conclusions opposite to those of the Evatt report.

The trouble with the Evatt Foundation's use of these figures is that above-average levels of spending, as measured by the Commission, may arise from "better" services or greater inefficiency.  Likewise, below-average levels of spending could arise in the converse way.

For analysis to be credible, one must look beyond the Commission's data to assess the relative policy position of the States.  The Evatt Foundation report failed to do this.  Instead, it assumed that above-average spending is good and below-average spending bad.

Numerous studies have looked beyond the Commission's data, and, not surprisingly, found that efficiency and effectiveness are major determinants of the spending differentials identified by the Commission and that much of the above-average spending is wasteful, particularly in the States the Evatt report ranks highly.  They have also found that many areas of under-spending, particularly in Queensland, which is accorded a low rank in the report because of its low spending levels, are justified on efficiency grounds.

Enough research has now been done in areas such as health and education to confirm what common sense always indicated;  that high spending does not mean better or more services.

The report makes a big song and dance about the high level of spending on culture and recreation by the SA Government (66 per cent above the all-State average), and claims that because of this public-sector largesse SA is the cultural capital of Australia.  However, the Grants Commission does not adjust for the differences in private-sector supply.  Victoria and NSW, which have relatively large and profitable private-sector entertainment industries, are justified in spending less public funds than does the relatively isolated SA.

Similarly, the report's assessment of public transport provision is flawed.  It gives the smaller States poor assessments on public transit services, because they spend substantially less than is spent on such services in Sydney and Melbourne.  Of course, it would be absurd for Tasmania to adopt a mass transit system designed for a large city.

The Evatt report does not canvass the full range of available and relevant data, and its failure to do so materially affects its conclusions.  It does not consider public sector capital expenditure, user charges, or a whole range of other revenue-raising measures.

It also fails to consider data, provided by all governments, on forward estimates of spending, taxing and deficits, and important transition factors.  It is therefore judging governments on their inheritance rather than their own policies.  The report weights factors in a manner that is clearly absurd.  It says it applies no system of weights so as to avoid imposing judgements about the importance of categories, but value judgements are necessary, have been made, and lack credibility.

The Evatt Foundation's 1994-95 assessment is not worth the paper it is printed on.  The project is well worth doing but only if done well.  So back to the drawing board they should go -- and next time ideology should not get in the way of methodology.


ADVERTISEMENT

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Jobs growth caution

SIR, Publication of the February employment figures has led to much throwing of hats into the air by ministers, on the basis that the Government has met, a year ahead of time, its February 1993 Accord "commitment" to increase jobs by 500,000 over three years.  But one wonders whether it is, in fact, a cause for celebration to produce such a rapid rate of jobs growth.  The last time that happened was in the 1980s -- and we all know what happened at the end of it.

Employment has been growing much faster than the labour force, and, with unemployment beneficiaries now exceeding the ABS figures for unemployed, it appears that it is now considerably easier to stay on the dole.  This makes it more difficult to "attract" those on the dole into employment than it was in the 1980s.

Thus a continued rapid growth in employment would have to come largely from increased participation in the workforce, which now stands at 63.7 per cent.  There are limits to how far this can go, at least in the short term.  The present level is moving close to the peak reached at the end of the 1980s (64.1 per cent in June 1990).

This reinforces the case for quickly slowing down the growth in domestic spending by, at the very least, eliminating the Budget deficit of $7.4 billion now said to be in prospect for 1995-96.  Failure to do so will raise the real prospect of a repetition of Australia's disastrous experience under the Accords of the 1980s.


ADVERTISEMENT

Wednesday, March 08, 1995

More "competitive" but it's at a high cost

FOLLOWING his election as Opposition Leader, John Howard was soon involved in a head to head parliamentary debate with Prime Minister Keating in which both participants made claims about their own, and their opponent's, record in Government.

One of Mr Keating's proudest boasts in that debate has been to claim that "the Australian economy today is 40 per cent more competitive than when he (John Howard) was in office".  Allowing the Prime Minister some parliamentary debate licence in rounding up, this claim is broadly correct:  the Treasury's index of international competitiveness based on changes in relative unit labour costs shows an increase of 37 per cent between March 1983 and September 1994 (an average increase of about 3.2 percentage points a year).

Note that, on Mr Keating's basis, Australia's international competitivness also increased during the period of the Fraser Government, in which John Howard was a senior minister (though not Treasurer until 1978).  Australia's "competitiveness" then increased by about 11.3 per cent (about 1.6 percentage points a year) between December 1975 and March 1983.

The more important observation about the Prime Minister's claim relates to the way in which the increase in competitiveness has been achieved.

Changes in international competitiveness mainly occur in one of two ways.  First, Australia's costs (or prices) can increase at a faster or slower rate than those of our trading partners;  secondly, our exchange rate can depreciate or appreciate relative to the (average) rates of our trading partners.

Taken in isolation, $A depreciation tends to increase our international competitivess by making it easier for Australian producers to compete against higher priced imports and by making it more profitable to export because of higher prices (in $A).

However, an exchange rate depreciation-induced improvement in competitivess also indicates that Australians have experienced a relative decline in living standards because we have to sell an increased quantity of exports in order to purchase the same quantity of imports.

In point of fact, this is exactly what has happened under the Hawke-Keating Labor governments.  Mr Keating's 37 per cent improvement in competitiveness is more than accounted for by the depreciation of 45 per cent in the $A.  He can hardly claim credit for an improvement in "competitivess" that simply reflects the response of financial markets to changes in Australia's external trading position and changes in our relative prices and costs.  Indeed, about 15 per cent of the 45 per cent depreciation was needed just to offset the faster growth in Australia's unit labour costs than in our major trading partners -- more a cause for hanging one's head in shame rather than boasting about it.

Thus, on closer analysis, Mr Keating's boast turns out to be a hollow one.  Labor's policies of wages restraint under the Accord actually resulted in a continuing rise in our labour costs and a deterioration in our real capacity to compete internationally.  That deterioration was recouped by a depreciation in the exchange rate, which also had to depreciate quite a lot further in order to keep our international accounts even in the poor shape they are now in.

Note that, during the Fraser Government's period in office, Australia's unit labour costs also increased about 19 per cent faster than those of our major trading partners.  However, this deterioration occurred in that Government's last two years, when the union movement deliberately engineered the wages "break-out" that Mr Keating himself later publicly condemned as a major cause of the large jump in unemployment in 1982-83.

The reality is that measures of changes in "competitiveness" such as that apparently used by Mr Keating in trying to score off Mr Howard are not necessarily a good indicator of a Government's policy performance.  Such misuse of data does not engender confidence in the Government's ability to make sound policy decisions.


ADVERTISEMENT

Thursday, March 02, 1995

The Case For Privatisation

Vol. 7 No. 3

SUMMARY

In Victoria there is a renewed debate about privatisation, centred around the Kennett Government's proposal to privatise the SECV and the State Labor Opposition's claim that this is against the public interest.

The debate occurs against the background of recent World Bank research indicating that there have been 15,000 privatisations of state-owned enterprises worldwide (most since 1990);  that most clearcut success stories come from high- or middle-income countries;  and that recent evidence suggests (contrary to earlier academic theory) that there are positive benefits from private ownership as well as from establishing a competitive market structure.  Further background includes the rapid changes now occurring in the structure of the electricity industry worldwide which involve increasing exposure to private sector competition;  the poor performance by the Victorian electricity industry (BIE data up to 1992 show Victoria then had the worst efficiency among the States);  and the fact that Federal Labor is continuing to pursue a privatisation programme.

The criticisms of the Victorian Government's privatisation programme include arguments such as that public assets are held in trust and cannot be sold;  that privatisation will increase income inequality;  that privatisation has not worked in the UK;  that there will be "exploitation" by private monopolies;  and that it would be wrong to allow foreigners to run "essential" services such as electricity.  This Backgrounder shows these arguments to be wrong or based on false reasoning.

It concludes that, properly implemented, privatisation is in the public interest and that those opposing it are supporting narrow sectional interests.  The test of whether privatisation will be beneficial is not whether there will be a net gain in State revenue, or even lower consumer prices, but whether goods and services are likely to be supplied at a lower cost in terms of use of resources.


BACKGROUND

Viewed in historical terms, the worldwide privatisation movement is not really something new but a return to the more normal situation where private enterprise was the main supplier of a range of what are now described as "government services".  After World War 11, there was an enormous expansion in the rôle of government as most economists (and many others) argued that society would benefit if governments were to intervene more to correct for what was known as "market failure".  For example, it became widely accepted in the community that lower income groups should have reasonable access to health and transport services, that the private sector would not necessarily provide this, and that the way to achieve it was for the government to become a major, if not the sole, supplier of such services.  Government monopoly was also seen as better than private monopoly because it would protect the individual from "exploitation".

However, since the early 1980% there has been a growing realisation that, while "market failure" certainly occurs in the private sector, there is also a phenomenon which has come to be known as "government failure".  The realisation came that the large expansion in the rôle of government in the economy had not overcome the problems perceived as justifying government intervention and that, in fact, new problems had emerged.

In the public enterprises area, their performance was not only poor in terms of financial results but also left a lot to be desired in terms of the standard of services delivered.  Thus, as stated in a June 1994 comprehensive review of privatisation in The World Bank Research Observer:

Since the big expansion in state ownership in the 1960 and 1970s, the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) worldwide has been shrinking at an accelerating pace:  more than 15,000 SOEs, at a conservative estimate, have been privatised, most of them since 1990.  Years of disappointing SOE performance and a history of half-hearted and ineffectual attempts at reform have impelled many governments ... to launch privatization programs. (1)

It is relevant to the current debate in Victoria that most Asian and Latin American countries have moved in recent years towards the operation of electric power stations by private enterprises;  and that the California Public Utility Commission recently announced that it is considering a similar model to that being pursued by the Victorian Government.  It is not an understatement to say that the electricity industry worldwide is going through a considerable process of change involving the exposure of the industry to the pressures of private sector competition.

The World Bank review also points out that it has not simply been that public enterprises have yielded a disappointing return on the capital invested in them, but that their inefficiency has slowed the growth in the private sector too.  It is worth recalling that the principal objectives of the World Bank Group are the promotion of economic development and the reduction of poverty.

In considering the case for privatisation, it is important to recognise why this failure of government intervention has occurred.  Public choice theory points out that, as politicians and bureaucrats benefit from building up their own empires, their natural instinct is to expand their power and influence by responding to organised pressure groups in the community that seek to obtain concessions.  For each individual in the community, the cost of granting such concessions is small and is therefore unlikely to produce organised opposition.  But the cost to the community as a whole can be considerable.

Australia has had a long history of such concessions.  For many years, parts of the rural and manufacturing sectors were recipients, to the considerable cost of the rest of the community.  But particularly in Victoria, we have also had much experience of over-manning and inefficiency in the public sector, mainly as a result of the protection which that sector has had against competition and of the capacity of the powerful trade union movement to extract concessions from governments of all political persuasions.

Just as the free trade movement fought "McEwenism" in the rural and manufacturing sectors in the interests of the community as a whole, the privatisation movement can be seen as doing the same thing -- but this time the force of conservatism resides with those vested trade union interests which are so dependent for their power and influence on retaining a strong public enterprise sector.  It is relevant that well over 60 per cent of the public sector is still unionised compared with less than 30 per cent of the private sector.


IMPROVED P.T.E. PERFORMANCE

It must be acknowledged that in Australia there has been a significant improvement in recent years in the performance of public trading enterprises (PTEs).  Productivity and profitability have picked up considerably, though analyses show that most PTEs are still performing below international best practice.  The latest Bureau of Industry Economics analysis of the electricity industry, for example, shows that the total factor productivity gap between the Australian and US industries in 1992 was still around 27 per cent, with Victoria the worst performer among the Australian States. (2)

The improvement reflects the fact that the trade union movement was forced to accept that the internationalisation of the Australian economy required large cutbacks in staffing in order to reduce the costs of services provided by public enterprises.  There is also no doubt that the threat of privatisation played an important, indeed vital, part here and, in a limited number of cases, actual privatisations have occurred. (3)  The Federal Labor Government has even been "brave" enough to pursue a privatisation programme, though union opposition has been a major inhibiting factor in the full privatisation of such enterprises as the Commonwealth Bank, Qantas and the Australian National Line, not to mention Telecom (which is not scheduled even for what I call a Clayton's privatisation -- that is, a partial sale but with the government still in control).


THE CORPORATISATION ALTERNATIVE

These improvements in the performance of PTEs, which include significant improvements in the performance of Victorian PTEs, raise the question of whether, rather than proceeding with their privatisation, PTEs can be "reformed from within" by a process of corporatisation.  Such a process gives the enterprise a greater degree of independence from political interference and, in essence, replicates a private sector business in most respects except that it remains government-owned.  In short, can the perceived deficiencies of PTEs be remedied without changing ownership?

Some analysts have concluded that competition and regulation are more important than ownership in determining economic performance.  This view is reflected to some extent in the Hilmer Report, which, while not opposing privatisation per se, emphasises "reforming the structure of public monopolies to facilitate competition" rather than changes in ownership per se.  According to media reports, the (leaked) draft report of the Industry Commission analysing the effects of implementing the Hilmer proposals suggests that they would produce considerably cheaper food, housing and electricity prices.  Electricity charges would fall by 26 per cent by the year 2000 for big business users and by 11 per cent for households.  Such a conclusion would apply to an even greater extent to a properly implemented privatisation programme.

There is, indeed, a major unanswered question here:  namely, if Hilmer and others agree that PTEs should be restructured to operate in the same way as private sector businesses, what justification is there for continuing to operate those enterprises in the public sector?  Is it not better to privatise and keep the sticky hands of government away from such businesses?


OWNERSHIP IS IMPORTANT

The World Bank researchers had little doubt about the answer.  Their conclusion was that

[M]uch experience of the past two decades shows that, in practice, markets and public ownership are linked in ways that can reduce competition, even without a significant market failure ... state ownership, created to overcome or correct market failure, can sometimes aggravate or perpetuate it.

An earlier World Bank review was even more specific, viz.:

First, private ownership itself makes a difference.  Some state-owned enterprises have been efficient and well-managed for some periods, but government ownership seldom permits sustained good performance over more than a few years.  There is a higher probability of efficient performance in private enterprise, and that needs to be considered in choosing whether to invest public funds in SOEs -- or in health, education, and other social programs.

Second, the process of privatization, though not simple, can and has worked;  this is true for a variety of enterprises in a variety of settings, including in poor countries. (4)

In short, it may not simply be a matter of, for example, breaking up a State monopoly, such as the SECV or Melbourne Water, into corporate units which engage in some form of competition against one another.  Ownership does matter, and private ownership is most likely to succeed.


WHY PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IS BETTER

This is not to deny that, by restructuring public enterprises and requiring them to operate as if they were in the private sector, considerable improvements can be obtained in efficiency, quality of service and profitability.  Nevertheless, the gains are likely to be limited by the continued operation of the enterprises within the public sector.  There is an inevitable and on-going conflict between operating on a fully commercial basis and either taking unjustified advantage of government ownership or being subjected to political pressures not to make commercial decisions.  For the Government, there are also considerable accountability problems.

The retention of an enterprise within the government sector in a corporatised form gives that enterprise the appearance and form of being a body that is outside political control and influence.  At the same time the Government, and some Minister within the Government, has to accept final responsibility for its outcomes.  In these circumstances, a situation can be created that offers the worst of all possible worlds -- a body that has the potential to exploit its privileged position as a government body and its arm's-length position from the Minister to take unjustifiable risks, to squash potential private sector competitors, or generally to pursue policies that are not in the interests of the community, and a Minister who is told that he should not interfere.  In the end, however, the Minister is accountable and has no alternative to taking action to stop the pursuit of what are judged to be politically inappropriate policies, thus destroying the image of independence and recognising the reality that the Government has ultimate responsibility.

The reality is that it is difficult for the Government and the Minister to avoid having a significant direct and indirect influence on the key policies to be pursued by corporatised public enterprises.  The Board has to be appointed by the Government/Minister, as generally is the Managing Director, and Board Members rely on the Minister for re-appointment.  There is also a tendency to choose Board appointees from among those who are sympathetic to the Government of the day, and/or who are representative of interest groups which have particular barrows to push.  This is not likely to produce the most satisfactory commercial outcomes.  Beyond that, the Government can exploit the monopoly position of a corporation by using it as a vehicle for collecting additional tax revenue through the guise of "dividend" policy, which is usually determined by the Minister or the Treasurer.

Apart from this, the Board and management of the enterprise may operate policies that are inconsistent with the underlying commercial interests of an enterprise simply because they judge it "impolitic" to change policies.  They may judge that any such change will result in the Minister directing that it not be made, or failing to reappoint them.


THE MAIN PURPOSE OF PRIVATISATION

It is important to recognise the point that the main purpose of privatisation is to improve the efficient functioning of the economy.  There is a close parallel between the privatisation of PTEs and the elimination of protection against imports, which is now accepted by all major political parties.  Both are designed to expose the respective sectors of the economy to greater competition and, through that, to allow that good or service to be supplied at a lower cost in terms of the use of resources.

That process is now almost universally accepted in the economics profession as leading to an improvement in average living standards in the community, even though the initial effects may include a reduction in employment.  The dynamic effects flowing from the encouragement to private investment, because of the lower costs which businesses face, are likely to provide additional jobs in due course.


THE EFFECT ON GOVERNMENT REVENUES

It follows from this that the test of whether a privatisation will be beneficial is not whether the State Government will have a short-term gain in revenue in net terms. (5)  While such a gain is likely in many instances, though not necessarily in the case of the much-discussed SEC, whether or not such a gain occurs is relatively unimportant in the overall scheme of things.  If the privatisation is done in a way that allows scope for improvements in efficiency, there are likely to be benefits to the Victorian community.  In the case of the SEC, for example, the unbundling of the distribution and generation arms into a number of distinct units, and the creation of a framework within which competition can occur, offer the potential for resources to be freed for other purposes and for investment to be encouraged by lower costs and improved service.


EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATISATION

In considering the potential for benefits from privatisation in Australia and Victoria, it is relevant to examine what has happened with privatisations in other countries.  The World Bank Research review points out that, until very recently, studies undertaken of industrial economies largely attributed superior efficiency in private over public firms to market structure rather than to ownership.  The review also states, however, that

[M]ore recent evidence, which compares SOE performance before and after privatisation, shows considerable economic benefits resulting from properly structured privatisation, even when the privatised firms were monopolies.  (page 251)

It also makes the points that

Most clearcut success stories come from high or middle-income countries ...

and that

the privatisation process is harder to launch in least developed countries, and the chances of failure are greater.  (page 252)

SOME CRITICISMS OF PRIVATISATION

Criticisms made about privatisation include the following:


  1. Loss of Value

    One accounting analyst sponsored by the union movement has suggested that the value of a public asset is reduced when it is sold because a private sector purchaser faces a higher cost of capital and is liable to pay company tax.  Most accounting analysts consider this to have no validity and a moment's thought would suggest that there has to be something wrong with an analysis that implies that values of assets can be increased by moving private sector assets into the public sector! (6)  Why don't BHP shareholders offer the company to the Government and take "the Paris option"?  Why hasn't anyone involved in the 15,000 privatisations that have occurred realised the "loss" that occurs?

  2. Public Assets are Held in Trust

    The argument here is that certain public assets are so "strategically" important that they must be regarded as being held in trust in perpetuity by the public sector.

    It is difficult to understand the basis of this argument.  BHP is strategically important to the economy and the welfare of the Australian people but nobody suggests it should be in the public sector.  There is certainly no legal or historical basis for the "trust" claim.  An analogy could be drawn with public assets that are held in trust as part of the national heritage, but such an analogy scarcely seems applicable to a PTE!  The reality is that it is open to the Government of the day to sell or purchase assets and, provided such action is consistent with its enunciated policies (as was the case for the Kennett Government prior to its election), it should be entitled to do so.

    It may be that, behind this argument, there is a concern in the minds of some people that privatisation will lead to a loss of some service or a disadvantage to some group.  However, if that is the case, and if the loss or disadvantage is regarded as justifying compensation or offsetting action of some sort, it is open to the Government to take such action.  In the case of job losses arising from privatisation, for example, there now appears to be an accepted policy of redundancy payments at the taxpayers' expense even though the equity of such arrangements is dubious (given that the jobs should in most cases never have existed in the first place).

    There is also widespread acceptance that, where justified, community service obligations (CSOs) should continue to be met for low-income and disadvantaged groups.  Indeed, an advantage of privatisation is that these CSOs are brought more into the open and exposed to public debate as to their justification, instead of being hidden in the accounts of PTEs.

  3. Income Inequality Will Increase

    The argument that privatisation will lead to an increase in income inequality appears to be based to a large extent on the alleged increase in income inequality in the UK under Conservative Governments since 1979.  However, income inequality as normally measured has also increased significantly in Australia since the early 1980s, and we have had relatively few privatisations compared with the UK.  The US experience has been similar to Australia's, but a recent analysis by McKinsey's reports that a smaller proportion of individuals in the US is below the poverty line than is the case in major European countries. (7)

    Analyses suggesting increased income inequality over a particular period also need to be treated with caution.  In particular, if the "income" received from free or subsidised government services or from home ownership is included, that can change the picture considerably.  Also, as most people start their working lives in lower income groups and move up as they become more experienced, many of those in the lowest income group at the start of the 1980s would not still be there today.

    The fact is that there is no evidence to suggest that privatisation increases income inequality, except in so far as there is an increase in executive salaries in new enterprises.  Within limits, such increases are an example of an increase in inequality that is justified.  The new enterprises have to compete in the market for corporate executives, and the fact that PTEs were previously run by executives on lower salaries is scarcely a good recommendation for continuing such a practice, given their generally poorer performance than comparable overseas bodies, not to mention private sector companies.

  4. Privatisation Did Not Work in the UK

    Critics of privatisation have argued that privatisation has failed in the UK and that this "proves" that it does not work.  This "line" chooses to ignore the success of privatisation in just about every other country and to overlook the fact that, as the UK was the first in the field, others have been able to learn from UK experience.  Even Victoria might do so!

    A major criticism of the UK privatisation process is that it was far too cautious in exposing former PTEs to competition, and this has limited the improvements in efficiency.  A further criticism is that, in order to widen the distribution of share ownership in the UK and to gain support for privatisation from PTE employees, many of the PTEs were sold at less than market value.  But these approaches do not have to be followed in Australia.

    In any event, it is far from clear that privatisation has not been successful in the UK, if account is taken of improvements in efficiency and in both consumer and taxpayer welfare.  As to direct benefits to consumers, there is little doubt that, even with the lower level of competition, the UK consumer has benefited from lower prices and from improved standards of service since privatisation.  There has, for example, been a large real fall in gas prices to industrial consumers and also in the main telephone prices.

    In the UK electricity industry, contrary to some misinformation put around in Victoria, comprehensive information supplied to me by the UK Treasury shows that, since privatisation in 1989, there has been a substantial real fall in average prices for industrial consumers and a modest real fall in average prices for household consumers.  The real fall in average prices overall during this period is probably greater than the real fall in average electricity prices in Victoria of about 5 per cent since 1979!  Other benefits in the case of UK electricity privatisation include:

    • Enormous improvements in productivity as a result of the elimination of excess staffing and improved work practices (employees in generation have been reduced from 47,000 to 26,000 and in distribution by 20 per cent).
    • The average lost supply-time per customer has been reduced by more than half.
    • Disconnections of customers for non-payment of electricity have fallen to a fraction of the level which previously existed, mainly due to the introduction of more flexible payment schemes.
    • There has been a significant fall in the number of complaints received by the Regulator (OFFER).

    Ironically, possibly the biggest "mistake" made by the UK Government in electricity was grossly underestimating the efficiencies that would be achieved following privatisation.  As a result, shareholders in the new companies received large gains, and consumers did not realise the potential for large price reductions.  This is not a criticism of privatisation per se but of the process of undertaking it.  The Victorian Government approach, of using the threat of privatisation to try to make the companies as efficient as possible before they are sold, should provide a better balance between shareholder and consumer gains in the future.

    The main exception to the consumer benefits story in the UK is in respect of water, where prices were considerably increased.  However, this reflected the factthat, before privatisation, consumers were not paying a sufficient price to allow adequate provisions for the depreciation of capital and to meet desired quality standards.  The increase in prices post-privatisation thus largely reflected the prior inefficiency of the public sector in operating the water supply system.

    This example illustrates, incidentally, the point that the benefits of privatisation are not to be measured simply by reference to whether prices for consumers are reduced.  In the case of British water, the benefits have come from ensuring the future provision of an improved quality of supply.

    Another benefit from UK privatisation has been the elimination in the cost to taxpayers -- who, after all, are also consumers -- of the operating losses of nationalised industries.  In 1979, losses of nationalised industries were costing UK taxpayers 50 million pounds per week;  today those industries are paying 60 million pounds in taxes on the profits they earn as private sector companies.

  5. The Dangers of Private Monopolies

    Opponents of privatisation highlight the potential problem that it could lead to the establishment of private monopolies.  However, there have been some important changes in the economy since public enterprises were first established to run various government services, and there is now a reduced risk of private sector monopolies developing in such areas.  For one thing, technological change has increased the scope for competitive units to be established.  This is particularly true in telecommunications.  Improvements in information technology have been important in creating scope for greater competition in the electricity industry, by allowing the creation of a regulated market -- such as is envisaged by the Victorian Power Exchange.  Developments in economic theory since the public monopolies were established also suggest that, where there is the threat of entry from another competitor, this can impose an effective discipline and prevent, or at least inhibit, the development of monopolistic practices.

    Also, even where the likelihood is that privatisation will lead to the establishment of private monopolies, there is now a much greater capacity and experience on the part of governments in controlling and limiting attempts by private sector companies to levy monopoly profits.  The model of an independent regulator who keeps monopolistic practices at bay, but which allows the benefits of private ownership to be obtained, appears to be a considerable success.

    It can now reasonably be argued that it is in fact better to have a private-sector monopoly than a public-sector monopoly.  A private sector monopoly faces the test of the capital market whenever it needs to raise capital, and it is subject to the threat of take-over if its performance slips.  This operates as an important discipline on management, a discipline which does not exist in the public sector.  The fear of domination by large monopolies might be somewhat diminished if it were realised that large firms often have fairly short lives.  Of the 100 firms heading Fortune magazine's list of US's largest firms in 1956, only 29 were still there in 1992.  This is a reflection of a dynamic business sector, not a failure of large businesses per se because they may have been replaced by new and often larger businesses.

    Of course, as the Hilmer Report effectively proposes, it is desirable wherever possible to avoid simply transferring a public monopoly into a private monopoly.  That goes almost without saying and it justifies the pursuit of structural changes before privatisation.  Further, if a private-sector monopoly cannot be avoided, it is important to establish an appropriate regulatory system.  But privatisation should not be avoided simply because of the possibility of monopoly.

  6. Foreigners Will Run Our Essential Services

    Concern has been expressed in some quarters that privatisation will lead to foreigners running "essential" services, particularly those (such as electricity) which require large lumps of capital.  It is not clear why such concern should exist, provided there is a competitive situation or one which is subject to an independent regulator.  Under the existing foreign investment policy of the Federal Labor Government, new foreign investment in the public enterprise sector is treated as "non-sensitive" and welcome, and is subject only to a "contrary-to-the-national-interest" test.  The precedent of the Gladstone Power Station and Loy-Yang B take-overs by foreign investors implies that a foreign "take-over" of publicly owned electricity enterprises in Victoria would not be rejected by the Federal Government as contrary to the national interest (which is the test that would be applied). (8)  Indeed, it will be recalled that the present Federal Labor Treasurer, Ralph Willis, "launched" the Loy-Yang B "take-over" by Mission Energy.  The State Labor Government's decision to sell Loy-Yang B, incidentally, was partly motivated by the desire to do something to reduce the entrenched position of the union movement.

    One aspect of the alleged monopoly "problem" from privatisation that is often overlooked is the potential for foreign investors to reduce the scope for monopolistic practices after privatisations.  As a general rule Australians should not be concerned if foreigners take over former public monopolies or units of former monopolies, provided that the result is not simply to establish a private monopoly that is protected from the threat of take-over.


CONCLUSION

Overseas evidence suggests that privatisation is to be preferred to corporatisation.  There is a high probability that privatisation will benefit both efficiency and consumers, and it is not correct to suggest that a private monopoly is as bad as a public monopoly.

Those who oppose privatisation are acting contrary to the public interest and in support of narrow sectional interests.  Much of the opposition to privatisation in Australia is, in fact, a reflection of outdated ideological hang-ups and a desire to hold on to entrenched positions of power and influence, than a concern for improving living standards, jobs and national efficiency.  In particular, the very strong opposition to privatisation by the Australian trade union movement reflects the fact that the PTEs are the power base of the union movement and that unions are resisting any undermining of that power base.

The need now is for Commonwealth and State Governments to recognise the likely benefits from privatisation and to restructure their PTEs as quickly as possible so that they can be privatised.  Australia has been dragging the privatisation chain and we need to catch up with most of the rest of the world in this important area of the economy.



ENDNOTES

1.  Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary Shirley, "Privatization:  Lessons From Market Economies".  The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 9, No. 2, July 1994, pages 241-72.

2.  "International Performance Indicators.  Electricity Update 1994".  Research Report 54, Bureau of Industry Economics, page 42.

3.  These include the State Banks of NSW and Victoria ($576m and $1.6 bn respectively), the Government Insurance Office in NSW ($1.2 bn), the Gladstone Power Station ($753m), the TAB in Victoria ($609m), and Aussat.

4.  "Privatization:  The Lessons of Experience", Country Economics Department, The World Bank 1992.

5.  Media reports suggest that the Industry Commission has concluded that the reform of the pubic enterprise sector along lines recommended by Hilmer would produce longer term gains in net revenue from the effects of faster growth on indirect tax revenues.  Such a conclusion would also apply to the privatisation of such enterprises.

6.  The true "social opportunity cost" of capital employed by the public sector is the additional wealth such funds could have earned in the private sector.  The same opportunity forgone drives the cost of capital to the private sector.  Thus, the cost of capital to both private and public sectors is the same when the projects being compared are of equivalent risk and are operated with the same degree of efficiency.  The fact that the public sector can borrow funds at lower rates of interest than private borrowers is not relevant because the real cost of capital to the public sector is more than the cost of debt.

If the investor is tax exempt then so must be the alternative investments;  therefore discount rates and net cash flows must be before taxes.  The converse is true for the taxed investor;  both net cash flows and the discount should be after taxes.  The net result is that there will be no difference between what a taxed investor and a non-taxed investor will be prepared to pay for assets, assuming no budget constraints and no other comparative advantage/disadvantage of one investment relative to another from the investor's viewpoint.

7.  William W. Lewis, "Where the Jobs Are -- And Aren't", Wall Street Journal, 7 December 1994.

8.  While the sale of a State-owned asset is not subject to the foreign take-overs legislation, in most cases it would involve the establishment of a new business and would thus be subject to foreign investment policy

Economic Irrationalism

Education and Public Policy in Australia
by Simon Marginson
Cambridge University Press, 1993.

The stated purpose of Education and Public Policy in Australia is to contest the dominance of economic rationalism in education policy.  Its author argues that under economic rationalism "the market economy is substituted for democratic politics and public planning as the system of production and co-ordination" (p.56).  He equates economic rationalism with "free-market liberalism", especially the views of Friedman and Hayek, which he claims dominate the economics profession in Australia.

The book claims that "economic rationalism has installed a free-market economic agenda at the heart of public education policy" (p.55).  This is an extraordinary claim, especially when the author gives no examples of free-market reforms introduced in Australia.  Instead he quotes the forming of the Department of Employment, Education and Training, "an interventionist and regulatory higher education policy" (p.129) introduced by Dawkins, and the emergence of "corporate managerialism" in the public service which has "brought education under the immediate operational control of ministers [and] created a more centralised and strategic approach" (p.56).  In Chapter 7, competency-based training reform, which emerged from big business and union pressure, is labelled "a new form of economic rationalism in education" (p.144).

These changes have little to do with the policy recommendations of free-market economists, who advocate decentralised decision-making.  When Friedman's reform proposals are considered, it is clear that they have not been embraced in Australia.  Friedman recommends free entry of private schools into the education system, the privatisation of public schools, and the introduction of full-cost fees in higher education and at the school level, or failing that, vouchers.  It is doubtful whether these views dominate even the economics profession in Australia.

Marginson lumps both centralist policies and free-market policies under the heading "economic rationalism", and then proceeds as if the faults of centralist policies are a criticism of free-marker liberalism.  He writes:  "there are limits to the efficacy of policies based on economic rationalism.  Governments (and economists) are nor all-seeing, all-knowing and all-powerful" (p.63).  He draws attention to flaws in the Dawkins approach, such as the assumption that government can determine subject areas that will be in demand.  These criticisms of central planning are exactly those made by free-market economists for years.


PUBLIC SPENDING

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Australian education system, which selectively presents statistics to allege "in resource terms the inputs are in decline" (p.11) and calls for more government spending on education.  Public expenditure is presented as a proportion of GDP and Marginson laments its fall since the mid-1970s.  He expands on this in a later chapter claiming that Australian education "now faces serious resource problems" (p.83) and compares unfavourably with other developed countries.  In fact, the figures Marginson presents show that Australia's public spending exceeds the OECD average, above countries like Japan and Germany.

What Marginson does not mention is that real expenditure per primary and secondary student increased markedly over the 1980s (by 35 per cent in 1984-85 prices).  In contrast, when Marginson turns to higher education he focuses on the decrease in real expenditure per student over the 1980s and compares per student funding growth in Australia unfavourably to other countries.  He neglects to mention that, by international standards, Australia spends a high proportion of its GDP on higher education.  Over the past five years, government funding (in real terms and as a proportion of GDP) has risen substantially (although not as fast as enrolments).

Of course, claiming that those who spend the most have the best education system is like awarding the Melbourne Cup to the horse that ate the most oats.

Marginson attempts unsuccessfully to refute the consistent empirical finding in the economics literature that there is no relationship between outputs (usually academic achievement as measured by standardised test scores) and inputs (such as expenditure and class sizes) under our current system.  He presents a confusing review of the literature on the relationship between class size and output.  It is never made clear what outcomes are being measured.  Teacher time per pupil and teacher attitude seem to be the "outputs" in two of the studies.

Why have extra resources not improved academic performance under the current system?  One possibility is that the extra resources are wasted -- in employing an excessive number of bureaucrats, for example.  Another possibility is that the resources benefit someone other than parents and students -- teachers, for example.  Since 1970, student-teacher ratios in Australia have fallen by about one-third;  class sizes have not fallen by as much.  Part of the increased staffing levels has been used to reduce teaching loads and to increase leave entitlements.


MISREPRESENTATIONS

The presentation of economic theory in the book is full of misrepresentations.  Marginson presents a distorted caricature of human capital theory, claiming that it measures people in terms of their monetary value and that "the practice of human capital ... began in slavery" (p.31).

Human capital theory recognises that education affects future well-being;  that is, costs are borne now for future gain, and so education is an investment.  The future benefits produced can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary.  One future benefit from education is the enjoyment gained from reading throughout a lifetime.  Economics is not only concerned with pecuniary benefits, but they have been the focus of empirical work because they are more easily measured and quantified.

Human capital is the stock of skills and productive knowledge embodied in people, the present value of past investments in the skills of people, not the value of people themselves.  The theory that people invest in themselves by acquiring skills has nothing to do with slavery.

According to Marginson, economic rationalism insists that "the purposes of education can all be traced back to one overriding rationale -- in this case the development of a productive economy" (p.233).  This is a misrepresentation.  Economists have championed parental choice in a free market.  Parental preferences, they believe, should determine the goals of schools.  Experience suggests that for some parents at least, religious matters will be paramount.  Even in the education reform literature to which Marginson refers, the economists concentrate on factors that will raise academic achievement, not on education's pecuniary benefits.

To investigate the economic value of education is not to claim priority for economic ends, but to say that the economic effects are important.  For better or for worse, many students and parents take a keen interest in the employment opportunities opened up by successive educational qualifications.

Space does not permit a catalogue of the misunderstandings, errors and inconsistencies in the book.  The failure to understand what economists mean by efficiency in the discussion of "productivity policies and eficiency policies" in chapter 5 provides a further example.

Marginson evinces a clear preference for government schools over non-government schools.  The former, he says, are "democratic and egalitarian:  They provide the broadest experience.  The high achievers help the low achievers.  Formally speaking, everyone in public education is equally valued (p.201).  He presents no evidence to back these claims.  It is not clear that the government system does much to promote social mixing or that everyone is equally valued.  In practice, government schooling involves segregation by residential neighhourhood, with the rich neighbourhoods often having the best teachers and the best schools.

It is not even clear that there really is a gain to low-ability students when pooled with high-ability students.  The result could be to increase feelings of worthlessness among the low-ability students and to reduce individual attention from teachers.  The effects on high-ability students must also be considered.  In practice, the result of grouping students of markedly mixed abilities may, depending on the teaching methods employed, be education pitched at the lowest common denominator.  In the sporting arena, streaming by performance is readily accepted.

Marginson reports that a majority of Australian parents "would prefer to enrol their children in private schools" (p.202).  He downplays dissatisfaction with government schools as a reason for parents choosing private schools, by claiming "there is no hard evidence for what used to be frequent claims about public school deficiency in achieving numeracy and literacy" (p.203).  There is, of course, no hard evidence because of teacher union opposition to its collection.  Surveys indicate that private school parents do nominate poor academic quality in government schools as a significant reason for moving their children to the non-government system.

He comes down firmly against the view that freedom is the absence of government restraint, and in favour of the view that "to exercise freedom it is necessary to have the material means to do so" (p.59).  However, on the issue of school choice, Marginson's conception of freedom implies that the legal freedom to attend a private school is not enough, and only the government providing the means to attend a private school for all provides "real freedom".  Under current policies, only the wealthy have the means (and so according to Marginson the freedom) to choose private schooling.  Yet Marginson is against extending this freedom to all through a voucher scheme, something which a long line of free-market liberals, beginning with Milton Friedman, have advocated.


PRODUCTIVITY

Marginson doubts that education raises economic productivity.  According to screening theory, which Marginson employs, the role of education is a sorting device used to categorise people, rather than to develop them.  If the theory is correct, then education expansion merely results in "credential inflation", decreasing the significance of educational qualifications, with little economic benefit.

Empirically resting whether education contributes to productivity is almost impossible, but the view that education only screens individuals according to their pre-existing talents is an extreme one, and implies that schooling teaches no vocationally useful skills.

If his view is true, the case for subsidising education is diminished and the expansion of education may actually harm equality by throwing up more barriers for a poor person to overcome in order to obtain an opportunity demonstrate his ability to do a job.

At first sight, Marginson's view that education expansion has led merely to credentialism seems inconsistent with his commitment to universal participation in higher education.  If everyone were in higher education, wouldn't that result in more credential inflation?  But, according to Marginson, "the problem in the economy-education relation lies in the economy, not in education" (p.134).  He asserts that deregulating industry policy and cutting back the public sector have depressed the demand for educated labour.  Again, no evidence is presented.  In fact, the public sector has been increasing its employment of educated labour, and not too many graduates were employed in car factories and clothing mills.  His recommendation:  "What is needed is a reconstruction of Australian industry, so that high levels of skills in science, technology and engineering become more relevant" (p.134).  So when the central bureaucrats get their skill predictions wrong, it is the rest of the economy that should be changed.


FEES

One of the few actual policy changes Marginson analyses is the reintroduction of fees in higher education, which he passionately opposes.  He claims:  "The case for the return to fees rested on the human capital assumption that education was the direct cause of earnings" (p.182).  But the debate in Federal Cabinet he quotes is all about the equity effects of fees.  Marginson's argument that higher education fees should be abolished could be no better illustration of the rhetoric of equality of opportunity and the reality of middle-class subsidies.  It is a fact that graduates have above-average life-time incomes.  It is also true that those in higher education come from relatively well-off families, whether measured in terms of socio-economic status, wealth or income.  Free higher-education involves a regressive transfer from the average taxpayer to a privileged group.

A more effective way to help the poor would be to target subsidies to them, rather than to give free higher education to all those who qualify.  In particular, subsidies could be redirected to disadvantaged primary or secondary school students, many of whom do not go on to higher education.

It is our current democratic political process that has produced the policies that Marginson disapproves of, such as an obsession with economic ends and cost-cutting.  But a market system caters for diverse viewpoints, including opposition to economic rationalism.  Under a market system, Mr Marginson could choose to send his children to a school that did not engage in cost-cutting or emphasise economic objectives if his views were shared by even a relatively small number of parents.  A market system helps avoid the social conflict that arises in a public system run through the political process.  The market system promotes diversity (a value which Marginson says he supports).  Parents are able to choose between different types of schools;  suppliers have an incentive to seek out and satisfy consumer demands, to match quality to consumer preferences, to respond to diverse needs and to innovate.  Even in Australia's current limited private sector, there is diversity in religious instruction to match diversity in beliefs, which reduces social conflict over religious instruction in public schools.

How would Marginson reform the education system?  He recommends weakening competitive selection:  "Selection is inherently competitive, and competition automatically generates inequalities of outcome.  The best contribution education policy can make to equality of educational outcomes for all social groups is to weaken the selection function, rather than focusing all efforts on trying to make selection fair" (p.243).  Of course, abolishing selection does not result in equal outcomes, it merely hides differences;  nor does it abolish society's demand for the information provided.

Marginson suggests separating academic assessment from selection for work.  He thinks that employers should determine selection for work by competency tests "administered at the point of entry into work (p.250).  This would free the schools, TAFEs and universities "to concentrate more effectively on their other tasks" (p.250).  What if an employer is interested in finding out about a potential employee's academic achievement?  Perhaps some employers may be unwilling to formulate and administer tests themselves, or have found academic achievement a useful indicator in the past.  Marginson recommends the removal of grades from transcripts.

Marginson criticises economic rationalism for being destructive of other educational objectives.  Yet he would abolish the credentialling aspect of university and any benefit employers and students get from that process.  He is not concerned whether credentialling serves any valuable purpose.  He admits that credentials are an incentive for students, but fails to explain how students would be motivated in his reformed system.  Nor does he explain how weakening selection in the education system, and replacing the credentialling function with employer-administered tests, would result in more equal social outcomes or prevent the competition for advantage.

He writes:  "In the democratic framework education is a form of common property, free to be used by all citizens for their own advantage, like common land in medieval times or common air today.  In the market framework education is a form of private property.  People are excluded (p.79).  Of course, the fact is that education is costly to produce, and more education means less of something else.  Some people may prefer less education spending and more health care, arts funding, sports facilities, housing, food or many other alternatives.  All have economic and non-economic benefits and all may be better ways of helping the poor.  Not everyone in a democracy would agree that satiation in education is the best way to spend the community's resources.

Blaming others for the shortcomings of the education system is a common tactic of the education lobby.  Marginson's attempt to incriminate free-market liberalism in the failures of our current highly-centralised, government-run education system is a blatant example.  Reading this book, particularly its destructive policy recommendations, is an exasperating experience.  Rut it does provide a useful compendium of misunderstandings and misrepresentations of economic theory, and an insight into the agenda, tactics and arguments of the education lobby.  Because weak intellectual and empirical foundations do not seem to stop the policy prescriptions derived from them being put into practice in Australia, the book will no doubt provide one more citation for influential educationalists to present as proof that their views are correct.

Liberals' Crisis Has Deep Roots

The Liberals
by Dean Jaensch
Allen & Unwin

It is easy to exaggerate the current problems in the Australian Liberal Party.  Five years ago, the prophets of doom seemed to have ample justification for their dark forebodings.  Now they have far less:  there is a Liberal or Coalition government in six of the eight States and Territories, and several of those seem likely (at least from this distance) to be returned at their next elections.  On any assessment, therefore, there has been something of a Liberal renaissance, one which seems reasonably sustainable.

Achieving sustainability is, of course, one of the problems that the various Liberal Parties must address;  and their electoral success at the State level may indeed hinder reasonable and necessary efforts at institutional reform.  But the central problem, the problem addressed here by Dean Jaensch, is the performance of the Federal Liberal Party.  With defeats in five successive Federal elections recorded since 1983, it is now probably not an exaggeration to describe it as being in crisis.  The record is still not nearly as desperate as Labor's nine successive defeats between 1949 and 1972, but there may be reasons -- perhaps mostly historical -- for believing that the Liberal Party is less able to cope with continuous defeat than Labor.

The principal strength of this study is that it does offer a historical dimension to the recent turmoil:  roughly the first third of the book is a useful thematic summary which brings us up to the Fraser years.  Jaensch's approach is clear from his first sentence, where he states that "The Liberal Party is 100 years old".  This mildly provocative beginning enables him to demonstrate how very long-standing some of the elements of the current crisis are:  the loose, quasi-federal structure of the party;  the vague and problematic nexus between the lay and parliamentary parties;  the reliance on leadership as a substitute for durable institutional structures;  and, not least, the ideological disparateness inherent in the party.

The last point is in some ways the most fundamental.  Jaensch reminds us -- most convincingly in the case of the 1909 Fusion between Deakinite and Reidite, and less so, perhaps, of the preceding years -- of the curious hollowness at the core of the successive Liberal Parties.  So much of the impetus for their foundation and continuing existence has been the need simply to have a non-socialist party.  The resulting process of perpetual loose coalitions tends to explain most of the other elements identified by Jaensch.

By one of life's grosser ironies, the ideological problem is now pressingly acute for the Liberal Party.  The effective death of socialism as an idea in good currency (however strongly it survives in practice) may well turn out to have removed the principal raison d'etre and unifying principle of the Liberal Party.  At the very least it has lent a considerable urgency to the need to settle on some acceptable ideological identity, a need scarcely felt in, say, the first five or six Fraser years.

In the longer run this phenomenon may have fatal consequences;  in the short run, the economics of party organisation will ensure that something like the present party will survive.  (Voting systems are important here:  the introduction of proportional representation in New Zealand may well see the emergence of a fairly conservative party which could form marriages of convenience with rather smaller "libertarian" or "social market" parties).  Whether by accident or design, the ALP has managed the post-socialist transition much more successfully, having succeeded so far in recreating itself -- in image if not in substance -- as the natural party of the centre, of responsible economic management, of suburban Australian conservatism.


POLICY ANALYSIS

In the meantime, the stresses of failure seem likely to continue for some time to prevent the Liberals from achieving even the flimsy policy consensus of the Fraser years.  Policy paralysis since the 1993 defeat seems nearly total;  not least because the grossly mendacious overkill of Labor's campaign has effectively sterilised some quite significant areas of policy.  (Labor is, of course, paying a high price for this:  in the light of its severe fiscal problems, for instance, closing off the option of a new broad-based consumption tax must now seem pretty stupid.  Its inability to affect the rate of unemployment by even a smallish amount of labour market deregulation must now, too, seem a high price to have paid for the ACTU's support).

Lacking other, more formal means for arriving at that consensus, and with serious tensions not only between "wet" and "dry", but also between "progressive" and "conservative", the traditional way of achieving policy unity -- essentially to impose it from the Leader's office -- still seems to be the obvious resort.  With Hewson a seriously weakened leader, the obstacles were apparently insuperable.  It is still too early to tell how Alexander Downer will cope;  but it does seem likely that the desire to avoid the Fightback! dilemma, and thus to deal only in very broad policy generalisations, may serve the second purpose of avoiding too much internal policy squabbling.  That, of course, can only be a temporary strategy.

Very much the same difficulties apply to the Party's organisational problems.  Indeed, in terms of the Party's long-term needs, John Hewson's greatest failing may turn out to be not that he lost the unlosable election but that he failed to use his immense personal authority, in 1990-91, to force reform of the Liberal Party's structures.

Personality -- not being all that amenable to the normative theoretical constructs of standard political science -- does not play much of a role in Jaensch's book.  This makes for a curiously bloodless tone throughout.  It also leads him, perhaps more importantly, to overlook the key difficulty of the last few years.  For while the Federal Liberal Party does have to reconcile its ideological problems, and to settle on a credible and appropriate ideological identity, the root cause of its instability since 1983 has been in personalities.  In this sense, the Party's essential task has been to find a way of burying forever the apparently irreconcilable rift between Andrew Peacock and John Howard.  It may well be that the elevation of Alexander Downer marks the completion of that task.

There are other, fairly basic, problems with book.

It is not well edited, nor adequately proofread.  A faint air of second-hand fact pervades it, as if there was too much hasty recourse to old newspaper files.  The grasp of fact is not always sure.  (Western Australian readers will be surprised to learn -- on page 199 -- that a "wet" Liberal Reform Movement emerged in that State in 1991).

It is not at all clear at whom the book is aimed.  It comes equipped with Harvard references, and an academic superstructure of models and taxonomy.  But it seems, on the basis of style and seriousness, to be directed at a more or less popular audience, perhaps even including concerned members of the Liberal Party, who might want to find some answers to the obvious questions.  The difficulty is that the academic models are descriptive, and far from being prescriptive of success.  The academic camouflage tends to hide from the reader the fact that Jaensch has no more good advice to offer the Liberals than most commentators, and somewhat less than a few.

Like many, he barely conceals his distaste for economic rationalism and has considerable difficulty in separating the technocratic rationalism of Fightback! from any more authentic version of liberal market economics.  And like many, he seems unable to see that his advocacy of the politics of inclusion is a poor substitute for a policy framework which actually does something about our major problems such as unemployment.  Of course the Keating ALP is better at cuddling up to every conceivable interest group and at locking in their votes, but the resulting policy paralysis -- all too evident in Labor's impotence on unemployment -- carries with it the implications of much more serious failure.

Good Sense

The Moral Sense
by James Q. Wilson
The Free Press

James Q. Wilson is a distinguished American public philosopher writing on crime, bureaucracy and many aspects of social behaviour.  His reminds one that, despite the corrupting effects of the audio-visual media and of university cliques almost at war with the sentiments of ordinary citizens, the United States can still produce writers of a spacious and commanding integrity.  The title of Wilson's latest book, The Moral Sense, is almost misleadingly modest.  He might have more appropriately adopted a Lockean title such as An Enquiry into Human Conduct.  Wilson has produced a very wise book, lucid in both argument and language and rich in well-digested reference and anecdote.

Alas, it is hard to do justice to an analysis which leaves so few elements of our moral and social behaviour unexamined, except to note that The Moral Sense achieves the rare fear of evading both undue Panglossian optimism and a Hobbesian pessimism.  It shows us that there is hope for the development of social decency, moral principle and some sense of warm social affinity in most people.  Both nature and social conditioning provide the moulds in which our plastic human clay is shaped, but the essence of that clay still defies our categories.  Wilson demonstrates that only the most damaged of men and women lack potential for a moral response.  While whole societies may periodically display psychopathic tendencies, as in the case of Nazi Germany or contemporary Yugoslavia, only a minority of individuals can be persuaded to behave amorally for more than short periods, and usually under strong outside pressure or inducement.  Wilson carefully considers the nature of these warping pressures and how far they can extend.

From a personal perspective I am convinced that tension between individual autonomy and the demands of social conformity can only be resolved by realising that the poorly-developed individual also comes to be a corruptible and unreliable citizen.  Only the sufficiently mature in judgment and moral sentiment can serve the family, institutions and the state in a sound and fairly consistent manner.  In either sharply-polarised or indolent social situations the mature citizen is forced to be a non-conformist whose aloofness is often condemned by the herd as unfriendly.  The vital distinction then to be made by society and peers is between the disruptive and criminally-alienated trouble-maker and he/she who has the courage to be solitary while working within "the system" to leaven the communal lump.  Usually lacking any strong moral sense, political messiahs are often in a hurry for a transforming upheaval.  The true redeemer has no illusions about the capacity of mass society for rapid change or high vision and works on a spiritual or psychological plane with the responsive few.  Otherwise the world would experience no difference between Jesus and Marx, Confucius and Pol Pot.

James Wilson tackles the typical relativist habit of trying to smudge over the whole concept of morality with that of "clarifying values".  From that point it is only a short distance toward believing that one system of social values is as good as another and the modern absence of commonly accepted transcendent absolutes allows us to justify any sort of behaviour which renders us socially approved.  In this the author quotes Adam Smith:  Man naturally desires not only to be loved but to be lovely.  How true.  Here lies a basis for both expedient immorality and a paradoxically ashamed return to morality.


SYMPATHY

Wilson also agrees in part with Smith that the ancient origin of most practical moral conduct is in sympathy, of imagining ourselves to be in the position of others.  When we sympathise we judge, reacting to the worthiness of other persons and their behaviour.  From this comes not only respect, but, more vitally, comparative self-respect, something which so many people in urban admass cultures never fully attain.  Self-respect, of course, has its roots in primary associations, in families and in close friendships.  From this rootedness in solid early affinities the child moves from the primitive tit-for-tat reactions of the playground to more careful judgments of human need and value.  Again, an erosion of primary sympathies and early kinship loyalties tends to preserve the tit-for-tat mode of morality into adult life.  Our prisons are full of morally primitive people who have known only how to menace others out of their lack of self-respect.

The author deals fairly but sceptically with the social Darwinist morality of necessity.  Darwinian explanations simply do not show why so many people behave altruistically in a manner contrary to their genetic programming or biological self-preservation.  Saving a grandmother who is elderly, disagreeable and long past child-bearing serves no genetic purpose whatsoever.  Moreover, adoptive parents frequently make as many sacrifices and show as much affection for children as do natural ones.  (Though it lately seems, amid the present vogue of single motherhood with serial male partners, that children are far more likely to be treated with moral indifference or even molested by step-fathers than by natural sires).  In this writer's view, the less modified by the social and moral customs of high civilisation (East as well as West), the more families are likely to revert to raw tribal imperatives with a moral indifference towards the higher responsibilities of individual nurture.  Morality becomes diluted by some real or conceived necessity.  The fashionable habit in the Christian churches of sanctifying the poor too often glosses over tribal harshness and exploitation of children as resources which linger in those traditional communities that unregulated procreation can produce.

Wilson moves to the other separate sinews of moral conduct, such as fairness, duty and self-control.  "Fairness", of course, brings us back to the tit-for-tat privileges and forfeitures which underpin our modern clamour for "rights".  Rights must be in balance with duties.

The recently fostered social guilt which prompts liberally-minded white Australians to bow to every demand for Aboriginal rights, overlooks the duty of even black Australians to obey the law and accommodate to the structures of the European culture which now strives to offer them restitution for past wrongs.  The recent bald assertion of an Aboriginal advocate that rights are intrinsic, they cannot be conferred, shows to what grotesque lengths the Jeffersonian assertion of 'inalienable rights' can now be taken.  Even Rousseau, the philosophical father of this fallacy, had to admit in The Social Contract, that all rights must stem from social consensus.

Without a primary acceptance of personal and social duties (by rulers as well as ruled), no meaningful judgment about rights can be made.  Civil duties thus have a deeper moral basis than civil rights, and also a longer history.  Rights are mainly contractual and various governments and legal systems interpret them according to different cultural norms.

The United Nations Declaration was created by the Western powers in a fit of democratic fervour, but only a few member states have ever given more than lip service to its observance.  Morality can only be demanded politically in limited situations, something which Mr Michael Lavarch and his Prime Minister appear not to have understood.  As Tacitus long ago wryly observed:

"The more corrupt the government, the greater the likely number of its laws".


THE FAMILY'S ROLE

Wilson's most important chapter relates to the role of the family and the moralities it both embodies and transmits to the wider community.  He makes an all too common sweeping judgment against Freud.  He is equally critical of the behaviourist amoralism of H.J. Eysenck that the conscience is merely a conditioned reflex.  Freud established the beneficial effect of studying infant pleasure-seeking (with or without sexual undertones) with remarkable accuracy for his time, and his notes on aggression in male children have since been amply confirmed.  Clinically, it has been repeatedly established that self-control can be a double-edged moral demand.  Too much control, as Carl Jung eloquently illustrated, and normal aggression can one day explode out of the nursery on to the battlefield.  Meanwhile, too little self-control produces the unresourceful, media-dazed youth of today, often repelled by its own lack of moral reference points while secretly craving for the reasonable ethical boundaries and ideals its baby-boomer parents never learned.

Wilson himself sagely recognises that dysfunctional families usually blunder along at one of two extremes or in the worst instances zig-zag wildly between the two.  He remarks:  "Though the human infant is a remarkably resilient creature, protected by redundant systems from many kinds of misfortune, it is vulnerable to the excesses of both rule-obsessed and laissez-faire parents".  How well supported this is by research, but how often disregarded by ideological zealots or amoral slobs at either extreme of the parenting spectrum.  Since the Greeks, we have admired moderation in theory, but so often flouted it in the most intimate of our personal transactions.  Fortunately, as the author's well-stocked references establish, most children do grow up adequately, provided that they are not forced to accept from their mentors, moral and social banalities which are quite grossly at odds with emotional and spiritual growth.

Finally, Wilson gives some space to gender and moral response.  It is true that men rend to construe moral conduct in terms of gestures, whereas women tend to embody this more in their basic attitudes.  As spouses, mothers and latterly as civil functionaries women so often Furnish the environment in which male moral activity can be advanced.  But each is an ethical agent to himself or herself and gender roles can widely vary or overlap.  In the Orient, businessmen often have a "feminine" sensibility in which the politesse of the encounter must receive equal recognition to the urgency of the transaction -- a useful trait which Australia's men might acquire.  Often the truer morality is not in winning, hut in worthily taking part.  Meanwhile this book provides a cornucopia of material for reflection and should be in the library of everyone involved in matters of public policy.

Tuesday, February 14, 1995

Cutting spending with equity

THE bureaucratic proposals for spending cuts made public by Mr Howard seem to confirm that there are relatively few painless cuts of the "waste and duplication" variety left.

However, they also point to some of the substantial savings available from the more careful targeting of government assistance and the use of moderate user-charge -- if politicians are prepared to pay the political price.

Just tightening the income test on AUSTUDY, means-testing nursing home benefits and increasing patient contributions under the pharmaceutical benefits scheme are estimated to save well in excess of $700 million over four years.

And that's just scratching the surface of the savings available.

The reduction of Medicare subsidies for the hospital care of middle- and high-income earners, and the introduction of a modest co-payment for medical services could save the Government large amounts of money.

Of course, some of the saving would be merely pushing expenditure from the public to the private sector, and it might not result in improved efficiency or even a substantial increase in the level of national saving in the short term.  However, some of the savings would be real.

The key would be to extend the co-payment to pensioners, who are the largest consumers of medical services.  As with the introduction of the charge on pensioners' prescriptions, the co-payment could be offset by an increase in the pension to ensure that no pensioner was left financially worse off.

The saving would occur because pensioners would cut unnecessary visits to the doctor.

I have estimated that the introduction of a $5 co-payment with a $400 annual safety net could save the Government in excess of $1 billion a year.

Similarly, further reductions in the level of subsidies for pharmaceuticals (offset in the case of pensioners by an increase in the pension) could produce genuine savings by reducing the unnecessary use of drugs in general, and of the new, more expensive drugs in particular (doctors would have greater incentive to prescribe generic drugs where these were appropriate substitutes).

Whether pushing middle- and high-income earners into private insurance would produce significant gains in efficiency would depend very largely on the behaviour of the private health insurance industry.  However, there are a number of reforms to private health insurance that, if implemented at the same time, certainly would encourage greater efficiency.

There are also big savings available in the area of tertiary education, especially in the longer term. Apart from tightening the means test for AUSTUDY in the short term -- and abandoning its policy of reducing the age of "automatic independence" to 22 -- the Government should look at providing all new AUSTUDY assistance in the form of loans which could be repaid through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) system.

At the same time, the Government should increase the HECS charges for all university tuition, but especially for the higher-cost courses such as medicine.  (HECS is now set at about 23 per cent of the average cost of a higher education place.

Such a reform would certainly be justified on equity grounds, since university graduates can generally expect to earn far higher incomes than non-graduates.  It may also lead to a better use of resources.  In a rather extreme application of the argument against higher marginal tax rates, the opponents of higher HECS charges claim that people would be deterred from going to university by the prospect of having to repay the HECS loan.  At the margin, a higher HECS might lead to a more efficient use of university resources.

Further efficiency gains might be achieved if individual universities were allowed to vary their HECS charges.

The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Howe, said yesterday that spending cuts of the kind canvassed in the document leaked to Mr Howard would be inconsistent with the Government's social record.

However, the tighter targeting of welfare and subsidies and the careful use of co-payments and other user charges would not undermine the Government's social objectives.

The provision of universal health insurance under Medicare would not be compromised by insisting that higher-income earners pay more towards their health care costs, or by asking everyone to pay a small co-payment (Mr Howe proposed a co-payment for medical services in 1991).

Similarly, a scheme that required middle- and high-income earners to repay a higher proportion of the cost of their still heavily subsidised university education is not likely to reduce the education opportunities of the children of low-income families.

Naturally, all of these reforms would be controversial.  But the current account deficit requires fiscal policy to be tightened over the medium term.  Fortunately for the Government, not all of the unpleasant fiscal medicine has to be taken before the election.


ADVERTISEMENT

Friday, February 10, 1995

Commonwealth Budget:  Cut Spending by $15-16 Billion

Vol. 7, No. 2

SUMMARY

There is now a serious and growing risk of another "hard landing" unless the Government reduces its reliance on interest rates by moving quickly to a substantial budget surplus.  There is scope to reduce spending by $15-16 billion over the next two years, which would produce a surplus of about 2 per cent of GDP (about $10 billion) by 1996-97.  Our attached Budget submission proposes that this be done.

The submission points out that:

  • There are structural as well as cyclical reasons for cutting spending, for example, to reduce social welfare spending and minimise the adverse effects of taxation on economic activity and employment.
  • Expenditure has not already been "cut to the bone".
  • The "Australia Already has Small Government" argument does not establish its case.
  • Australia should be looking to reduce the burden of taxation.

The Government should also appoint a panel of independent people to constitute an Audit Commission to evaluate Commonwealth expenditure.  This should not, however, be used as an excuse to postpone action.


INTRODUCTION

The debate about whether Commonwealth budget expenditures can or should be cut has been centred around the contribution which such cuts could or should make towards reducing the budget deficit for 1995-96, or even the current financial year.  However, while there is now a clear need for the Commonwealth to reduce its call on domestic savings by more -- and faster -- than presently planned, the case for cutting expenditure is by no means solely based on arguments for improved public sector savings performance as a short-term Keynesian type response to the threat of overheating.  More fundamentally, there is a need for the Commonwealth to move to a situation where it makes a substantial ongoing positive contribution to domestic savings;  to reduce social welfare dependency in order both to make individuals and families more responsible for their own welfare in their own interests, and to improve economic performance;  to lower taxation (and certainly to avoid tax increases) to improve the growth in employment and economic activity;  and to reduce the capacity of governments of whatever political persuasion to corrupt the political system through patronising of special interest groups merely as a means of securing and maintaining political power.  More generally, the experience of the last 25 years raises serious questions about the capacity of governments to solve social problems and to provide efficient and quality services.  In the light of this experience, Commonwealth expenditure programmes need to be carefully and thoroughly re-assessed by an independent Audit Commission.

It is proposed that sufficient expenditure savings be made over the next two years to move the budget into a surplus of about 2 per cent of GDP (or about $10 billion) in lieu of the deficit of 0.9 per cent of GDP (about $5 billion) presently projected for 1996-97.  That would imply only a slightly larger improvement in the Commonwealth contribution to saving than occurred between 1986-87 and 1988-89, when a deficit of 1 per cent of GDP was converted into a surplus of 1.7 per cent of GDP.  The savings outlined -- nearly $16 billion or 3.4 per cent of GDP in 1994-95 prices -- should be adequate to achieve that and would imply a reduction in 1996-97 outlays to about $115 billion or about 22.2 per cent of GDP compared to the present projected 24.9 per cent.  Excluding public debt interest, the proposed cuts imply a reduction of just over 11 per cent in 1994-95 outlays.

Additional asset sales of $24 billion are also proposed but, as these don't directly increase the Budget's contribution to saving, they are not included in the foregoing calculations.

The proposals for savings have various justifications.  They involve, in particular, proposals which would:

  • target welfare assistance more closely so as to concentrate it on the needier groups, and, with living standards rising, put greater emphasis on self-help or family-help, so as to reduce dependency;
  • reduce or eliminate programmes which provide Commonwealth assistance directly to middle and upper income groups generally, for example, for medical and hospital services, or indirectly, for example, for culture and recreation.
  • concentrate Commonwealth activities more within departmental structures rather than in separate, empire-building quangos which cater to the special interest groups;
  • reduce or eliminate taxpayer-funded assistance to special interest groups which have no or only limited justification in terms of national or welfare interest;
  • reduce duplication of activities with the States where there is no, or only a limited, national economic or welfare requirement for Commonwealth intervention;
  • expect greater private sector involvement in the promotion and support of research and cultural activities in particular;  and
  • generally seek to encourage private sector saving by encouraging and expecting greater self-reliance, and to aim for a more efficient use of national resources, including by contracting out or privatising government services.

On this basis, and for reasons outlined below, the focus of the proposed expenditure savings is heavily on reducing Commonwealth own-purpose outlays.  Thus, out of the total proposed reductions of $15.6 billion, about $13.7 billion or 88 per cent is in respect of own-purpose outlays.  The Table on page 39 shows the breakdown of Commonwealth expenditures if all the reductions were to have occurred in 1994-95 rather than over two years (as proposed), together with comparisons with 1982-83 and 1981-82.  It will be noted that own-purpose outlays after the reductions would still be about 1 percentage point of GDP higher than in 1981-82.

Total Summary

1994-95 (est.}
Outlays

Proposed Saving
$m$m%
Social Security43,4495,130    11.8
Health17,2762,324    13.4
Education10,056900    8.9
Housing and Community Amenities1,197522    43.6
Defence9,637600    6.2
Culture and Recreation1,351894    66.2
Transport and Communications1,34967    5.0
Industry Assistance3,587-    -
Labour and Employment3,5201,387    39.4
Prime Minister (a)n.a.25    n.a.
Aboriginal Affairs (a)n.a.155    n.a.
Other Economic Services
Legislative Services731-    -
Law, Order and Public Safety88188    10.0
Foreign Affairs and Overseas Aid2,212379    17.1
General and Scientific Research, n.e.c.1,072-    -
Administrative Services3,442410    11.9
Payments to Other Governments n.e.c.15,165152    -
Total Above114,92613,033    11.3
Public Debt Interest8,3852,600 (b)31.0
Total Outlays (Excl. Asset Sales) (c)123,31115,633    12.7
Privatisation (asset sales additional to those planned)
Commonwealth Bank (remainder)n.a.3,500    n.a.
Telecomn.a.20,000    n.a.
ABC/SBS300    
ANL-    
Medibank Private200    
Total Privatisationn.a.24,000    n.a.
Total Reduction In Published Deficit *n.a.39,633 (d)n.a.

(a) Expenditure under these headings is included under other functions.

(b) Including from additional privatisation.  The calculations allows for the loss of dividends of $1,100 million from the enterprises sold but does not allow for any faster growth in company tax revenue as a result of the likely improvement in profits.

(c) Also excludes Contingency Reserve.

(d) Including from additional privatisation.

n.a. = not applicable.

* Although additional major asset sales will reduce the Commonwealth Budget deficit as that is presented in the Commonwealth's accounts, the proceeds of such sales do not themselves lead to a net increase in national savings (except to the extent that they reduce the public debt interest burden on the Budget).


The preceding summarises the possible cuts to Commonwealth spending by function over the next two years, totalling about $15.6 billion in 1994-95 prices, together with possible additional asset sales of $24 billion over two years.

Before outlining the proposed expenditure cuts in detail, various questions are posed in order to address issues raised by the opponents of reducing government expenditure, and to elaborate on the justifications for reductions.


SHOULD THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT BECOME A NET SAVER?

There is now widespread agreement among economic and financial analysts that the Government needs to move more quickly to a budget surplus. (1)  If there was any doubt as to that need it was surely removed by the latest quarterly national accounts, which showed that total real domestic final demand in the September quarter of 1994 had risen at an unsustainable 8.0 per cent rate above the corresponding quarter of 1993.  The main immediate concern is that, while the deficit is projected to decline to just under 1 per cent of GDP in 1996-97, that is two years away and would still leave too large a call on savings by the Commonwealth Government in circumstances where the current account deficit is already running at almost 5 per cent of GDP, where Australia's net external liabilities are 55 per cent of GDP (up from 42 per cent of GDP as recently as 1987-88) and where the now established recovery in business investment needs to be sustained -- and at a significantly higher level -- for some time in order to raise productive capacity to a level sufficient to provide for full (or at least much fuller) employment.

With present policies, there is no prospect that the public sector's saving performance will improve to anything like the extent it did in the late 1980s -- and that improvement was, of course, quite inadequate as it turned out.  While history does not necessarily repeat itself, it is relevant that the ANZ measure of public sector saving (which gives a better guide than the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) (net) to underlying savings performance) suggests that public sector savings will barely become positive by 1996-97.

Public Sector Saving and Dis-saving as % of GDP

Note:  the ANZ measure of public saving provides a more accurate indication of the public sector's contribution to national saving than does the net PSBR.  That is because the former measure excludes investment spending (which does not detract from national saving), and is adjusted to remove the distortionary impacts of inflation and depreciation.


Most analysts perceive that there is a real risk that there will again be a "clash" between an expanding private sector and a public sector whose rate of expansion is being slowed far too gradually.  The triggers for this clash would come from an unsustainable growth in total domestic spending causing a further blow-out in the current account deficit and increased domestic inflationary pressures.  Further sharp increases in interest rates would then, as in 1990-92, put the burden of adjustment squarely on the private sector and would, in particular, inhibit or even halt the growth in business investment that is essential to sustaining economic growth, including growth in employment.  Such a clash would also again raise the possibility of a "hard landing", in which case unemployment could go to a level even higher than the 11 per cent reached in the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession.

Of course, nobody can be sure at what point the combined effect of further increases in the current account deficit and interest rates will either bring on a "hard landing" or at least cause a major slowdown in the economy.  The point is that, in view of the experience of the 1980s and the fact that this recovery commenced with unemployment and the current account deficit (and our net foreign liabilities) at a much higher level than in the early 1980s, the Government should never have been running such a high risk of a "hard-landing".  Just as importantly, it should have been giving preference to the job-creating private sector by making much greater room for that sector's expansion.

The contrast with New Zealand is striking.  There the government is making a great deal more room for its private sector to expand over the next three years by providing for government spending to fall by 1996-97 to 31 per cent of GDP from 40 per cent in 1992-93;  and by providing for the Budget surplus to be as high as 4.6 per cent of GDP in that year compared with a deficit of 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1992.  This seemingly "deflationary" policy (in Keynesian terms) is confidently projected to achieve economic growth averaging nearly 4 per cent a year (and looking likely, on more recent evidence, to exceed that).

Such a growth rate is similar to that projected by the Government for the next 3 years for Australia, though in per capita terms New Zealand's growth would be faster -- and more likely to be achieved.  In particular, New Zealand starts from a better position, with inflation down to about 1 per cent a year, the current external account now running a small surplus and a monetary policy framework that provides a much more convincing basis for containing inflation and domestic demand.  The possibility that the budget surplus for the current financial year may now be as high as 3 per cent of GDP (well in excess of that originally estimated last June) provides an important back-up for monetary policy.

As noted, part of the rationale for the Commonwealth moving to a surplus is to maximise the potential for the private, job-creating, sector to expand.  Among other things, such a move would help to reduce the upward pressure on interest rates, which operate primarily to restrain the private sector and, in particular, business investment.  This is not to suggest that a surplus will mean that interest rates will not have to rise during an economic recovery:  as the experience of the 1980s demonstrates, monetary and fiscal policy have to work together to try to keep the total growth in spending within limits consistent with sustaining inflation at minimal levels.

The Commonwealth should thus not only be reducing its dissaving, but actually moving as quickly as is reasonably feasible to making a positive net contribution to domestic saving through a substantial budget surplus.  This should not, moreover, simply involve a cyclical surplus when the cycle is at or approaching its peak:  there is also a strong case for operating a substantial ongoing surplus to help offset the lowering of private sector saving rates due to the increasing proportion of the community that is becoming eligible for various forms of government assistance.  Such increased assistance is operating to reduce the private incentive to save and, by adding to taxation levels, it has reduced individuals' capacity to do so.  (The preferable course would be to reduce the eligibility for such assistance and to confine it largely to those on low incomes.  However, that will take some considerable time to achieve). (2)

Since the early 1970s the proportion of "income units" (3) reliant on personal benefits from the government for their main source of income has approximately doubled to over 26 per cent and the proportion of household disposable income from personal benefit payments has more than doubled to 20 per cent.  Yet this has occurred over a period when average real household disposable income per head increased by more than 40 per cent, which implies a reduced need for government assistance -- that is, as the standard of living increases we could reasonably assume that the proportion of the population requiring government assistance might diminish. (4)

Household Disposal Income -- Personal Benefit Payments (a)

Household
Disposable
Income
$M
Personal
Benefit
Payments (a)
$M
% Household
Disposable
Income
%
Real Household
Disposable
Income Per Head
$
1971-7225,6482,1958.69,809
1976-7758,3317,56113.011,610
1982-83114.85016,16714.112,092
1986-87168,18524,88714.812,596
1990-91245,69937,15015.113,538
1993-94279,11449,19820.014,079

(a) To residents.  Does not include benefits from free or subsidised governments services such as Medicare.


There seems little doubt that a substantial proportion of this increase in personal benefit payments, and in the extension of free or subsidised government services, is primarily a function of "vote buying" by politicians seeking to compete for being the most "compassionate".  Indeed, as former Labor Finance Minister, Peter Walsh, has pointed out, a "compassion industry" has been created which puts enormous pressure on politicians by purporting to represent the interests of low-income groups.  In reality, this industry (sic), by pressing governments to go on expanding benefits and free or subsidised services and by paying scant regard to the desirability of confining eligibility to those who are in real need, not only detracts from the interests of low-income groups but undermines the performance of the economy. Yet even though this "middle-class welfare" syndrome involves a good deal of unnecessary "churning", (5) once established it requires considerable political resolve to break down because the withdrawal of benefits is politically difficult.

An associated point is that, as a "structural" budget surplus would be likely to reduce Australia's overall need to call on external savings to finance growth, there would be benefits from lower interest and/or dividend payments to overseas investors.  That is, there are some potential advantages in Australians' financing a higher proportion of economic development from their own rather than foreign savings.  (This is not to argue for increased restrictions on foreign investment, of course.)

The importance of reducing the draw on external savings by moving to a structural budget surplus is greatly enhanced given that the Commonwealth deficit is predominantly being used to finance consumption spending:  while there could be justification for the Government to finance capital spending by (in effect) borrowing overseas, it is surely a recipe for achieving banana republic status to be doing so to finance consumption.  Yet, over the five years to 1994-95 inclusive, the Commonwealth will have accumulated a deficit on its general government sector's current account amounting to about $25 billion.  This is in striking contrast to the experience of the early 1980s when the Commonwealth deficit was entirely on capital account (and when the current external account deficit was manageable, particularly given the much lower level of net foreign liabilities).

Thus, there is a strong case for the Commonwealth to move as quickly as possible to a budget surplus, and to endeavour to maintain a substantial ongoing surplus position other than in times of recession, when it would be appropriate to allow the natural decline in revenue and natural growth in expenditure to be "absorbed" in a lower surplus or even a small deficit.  A desirable short-term target might be a budget surplus in 1996-97 of 2 per cent of GDP, or about $10 billion.  A surplus of such a size would only be about the same as in 1988-89 and 1989-90.


IS THE BUDGET ALREADY ON TRACK TO ACHIEVE AN ADEQUATE SURPLUS?

While the 1994-95 Budget projections show a small deficit of 0.4 per cent of GDP for 1997-98, Government Ministers have suggested that the projected progressive reduction in the deficit from this year's 2.5 per cent of GDP shows that the budget is "on track" to achieve a surplus before the end of the century.  Indeed, the recent lift in the rate of economic growth (6) -- which adds to net revenue and which could reduce this year's deficit to around 2.2-2.3 per cent of GDP, or about $10-10.5 billion compared with the original estimate of $11.7 billion -- has led the Treasurer to imply that a budget surplus could be achieved within the next couple of years, even without policy action.

However, while the 1994-95 budgetary outlook has undoubtedly improved, that does not necessarily imply a corresponding improvement in later years.  The budget projections for economic growth of 4.25 per cent in 1995-96 and 4 per cent in each of the next two years now look even more optimistic than they did at the time.  Clearly, they make insufficient allowance for the certain slowdown as Australia now approaches "full capacity" quicker than envisaged, let alone the possibility of another recession.  Private sector forecasters are now starting to project a slowing in the rate of growth from about mid-1995 as the economy starts to run into capacity constraints and as the policy measures taken to date, and those now clearly in prospect, begin to bite.  Such forecasters recognise that once the economy reaches capacity it is unlikely to grow faster than 3-3.5 per cent per annum without further substantial micro-economic reforms.  Access Economics, for example, is forecasting only 3.5 per cent growth in 1995-96 and it is projecting that, without policy changes and assuming continued low inflation, the budget may not turn in a surplus until 1998-99.

Past experience is also relevant in assessing the prospects of achieving budget expenditure projections.  Thus, if we examine the changes made in the estimates for 1994-95 over the three Budgets since the last Hawke Government one in August 1991, the following picture emerges:

Estimated Outlays for 1994-95

$ billion
In 1991-92 Budget111.1
In 1992-93 Budget118,3
In 1993-94 Budget121.7
In 1994-95 Budget123.0

These figures show that, since taking office, Mr Keating has presided over a large increase of nearly $12 billion in the estimates for outlays in 1994-95.  In this year's Budget alone, new policy decisions added some $1.7 billion to outlays in 1994-95 and $6 billion over the next three years.  Those additions came on top of last year's supposedly "tough" budget -- in fact only "tough" in increasing revenue -- which added an extra $2 billion to this year's outlays and $6 billion over the same three years.

New policy decisions since the 1994-95 Budget was brought down in May have already added some $490m to expenditure over the next four years. (7)  This is before the Government even considers spending proposals such as those in the recent report of the National Council for the International Year of the Family for a raft of new or expanded programmes purporting to assist families.  Particularly with an election coming up, the Government seems certain to make net additions to spending unless there is a turnaround in Ministerial attitudes.

If there were to be a similar blow-out, in relative terms, in the estimates for 1997-98 in the next three Budgets as there has proved to be in the original estimates for 1994-95, outlays would become an even higher proportion of GDP than they are now estimated to be and the budget deficit would be about $15 billion, or 2.6 per cent of GDP, higher than now projected for 1997-98 (0.4 per cent of GDP).


HAS THE GOVERNMENT ALREADY "CUT EXPENDITURE TO THE BONE"?

The Prime Minister has consistently claimed that the Commonwealth has cut this or that amount out of the budget over this or that period;  and that there is no or only very limited scope to cut spending further.  To support such assertions, reference is often made either to the level of Commonwealth outlays in the last year of the Fraser Government (1982-83) or to the forward estimates, viz.,

Commonwealth Budget Outlays (% of GDP)

1981-8226.2
1982-8328.8
1994-95 (est.)26.2
1995-96 (projection)26.0
1996-97 (projection)24.9
1997-98 (projection)24.2

On this basis it is often suggested that Commonwealth outlays will soon be back close to the levels of the early 1970s, when they were around 23 per cent -- "the low 20s", as Mr Keating sometimes refers to them.

Such claims are inaccurate and misleading.  In the first place, a comparison of Commonwealth outlays now with such outlays in the early 1970s is not a comparison of like with like.  In the early 1970s the Commonwealth undertook significant borrowings on behalf of State Governments, and the advances of these borrowings to the States appeared in the Commonwealth's accounts as Commonwealth outlays.  Today, however, not only are such borrowings undertaken by the States themselves but they are also actually repaying all earlier borrowings as they fall due -- and such repayments are deducted from Commonwealth outlays.  In 1994-95, for example, such repayments to the Commonwealth are estimated to total about $1.9 billion, or about 0.4 per cent of GDP.  The overall effect of this change in borrowing arrangements is to reduce Commonwealth outlays in 1994-95 by around $8.0 billion or about 1.8 per cent of GDP by comparison with (say) 1971-72. (8)  Hence, on a comparable basis with the early 1970s, total Commonwealth budget outlays are closer to 28 per cent than 26 per cent of GDP, or 5 percentage points higher than the 23 per cent in 1971-72.

Secondly, whereas there were no significant asset sales in the 1970s or early 1980s, the Commonwealth is now undertaking a programme of major asset sales, estimated to yield $2,450m in 1994-95, or about 0.5 per cent of GDP.  These asset sales are not, however, treated as a revenue item but as a deduction from outlays.  The net effect, therefore, is to make ongoing outlays in 1994-95 appear to be 0.5 per cent of GDP lower than in those earlier years.

Thirdly, to the extent that there has been a reduction in Commonwealth outlays under the Hawke-Keating Governments, it has been concentrated in reduced payments to the States, not in outlays by the Commonwealth for its own purposes.  Thus, if we go back to the last Budget of the Fraser Government in 1982-83 -- a budget whose expenditure levels Prime Minister Keating has frequently (and rightly) criticised as being irresponsible and primarily designed for electioneering -- we find that Commonwealth own-purpose outlays were then 18.0 per cent of GDP.  In 1994-95 they are estimated to be 20.1 per cent of GDP excluding asset sales (the proceeds of which are deducted from outlays).  This is equivalent to about $10 billion of additional spending (in today's dollars).

The following comparison between the 1982-83 Budget outcome and the 1994-95 estimates shows that the Hawke-Keating Labor Government has effectively used cuts in payments to the States to finance not only a substantial increase in its own-purpose outlays in areas such as health, social security and welfare, and labour market assistance programmes but also to finance reductions in revenue.  Of particular interest is the fact that while the burden of Commonwealth taxation has fallen by 1.1 percentage points of GDP since 1982-83, the burden of State taxation has increased by 1.3 percentage points of GDP over the same period, so that the overall burden of taxation has actually increased slightly as a result of the Commonwealth effectively passing the tax buck to the States. (9)

A comparison with 1982-83 is also of interest because the final budget deficit of 2.6 per cent of GDP in that year of recession was about the same as is the Keating Government's estimated deficit for 1994-95, which is four years after the 1990-91 recession.  Four years after the 1982-83 recession, the budget deficit in 1986-87 was down to 1.0 per cent of GDP, which proved to be a totally inadequate tightening of fiscal policy.

Contribution To Commonwealth Budget Deficit

Change Between 1982-83 And 1994-95 (est.) (Percentage points of GDP)

Payments to/for other Governments-3.5
Own Purpose Outlays+1.5
Taxation Revenue+1.1
Other Revenue+0.9
Deficit Change-

Of course, the recovery has been much slower this time around and unemployment is only now back to about the average level in 1982-83.  This, however, serves to emphasise that the Commonwealth Government cannot claim that the higher level of its own-purpose outlays compared with 1982-83 is due to greater "recession" effects.  In fact, the average level of unemployment estimated in the 1994-95 Budget is only slightly higher than the average in 1982-83:  9.75 per cent compared to 9.0 per cent.  This accounts for budgetary spending of only about 0.25 per cent of GDP, or just over $1 billion of the increase in estimated own-purpose outlays.  Finally, as Mr Keating's strong criticisms of the 1982-83 Budget implied that he rightly considered its expenditure levels to have been too high, he should also be prepared to acknowledge that the Commonwealth's own-purpose outlays today should be below the 18.0 per cent of GDP they were in 1982-83.

The following comparison between Commonwealth own-purpose outlays in 1982-83 and the 1994-95 estimates indicates the main areas where such expenditures have increased.  It also brings out that the "problem areas" are those which have involved the extension of government assistance beyond lower-income groups, that is, in education, health and social security and welfare in particular, and in the growing public debt interest bill which is itself the product of large and persistent deficit financing policies.

Commonwealth Budget -- Own-Purpose Outlays (a) -- % GDP

1982-831994-95
(est.)
Increase/Decrease
Percentage
Points
%
Defence2.62.1-0.5-18
Education0.40.8+0.4+123
Health1.82.7+0.9+48
Social Security/Welfare8.19.3+1.2+14
Housing/Community Amenities0.20.1-0.1-66
Culture/Recreation0.30.3-+14
Transport/Communications0.50.1-0.4-76
Industry Assistance/Development0.80.7-0.1-2
Labour/Employment0.30.8+0.5+162
Other Economic/Legislative Services0.20.2--30
Law Order/Public Safety0.20.2--13
Foreign Affairs/Aid0.60.5-0.1-20
General/Scientifie Research0.30.2-0.1-32
Administrative Services0.80.8--8
Interest (b)1.11.6+0.5+49
Contingency Reserve--0.1-0.1n.a.
Asset Sales--0.5-0.5n.a.
Total18.019.5+1.5+9
Total, Excl. Asset Sales and Contingency Reserve18.020.1+2.1+12

(a) Own purpose outlays excludes only payments to or for other governments; in other words, payments to Commonwealth trading enterprises are not excluded.

(b) Excludes interest paid in respect of Commonwealth securities issued on behalf of the States.


DOES AUSTRALIA ALREADY HAVE "SMALL GOVERNMENT"?

Opponents of reducing government expenditure frequently point out that, among OECD countries, Australia has one of the smallest government sectors when measured by taking the proportion of GDP allocated to government spending.  Thus, OECD figures for 1993 put total general government outlays for Australia at 38.6 per cent of GDP, about 3.4 percentage points below the OECD average.  Of the 19 OECD countries surveyed, only the United States (34.4 per cent) and Japan (34.0 per cent) have lower proportions.

A number of points need to be made about such comparisons:

  • While in most OECD countries total government spending is a higher proportion of GDP than in Australia, this does not mean that our education, health and other services are necessarily suffering.  Higher government spending in other OECD countries usually simply reflects the fact that less of a particular function is provided through the private sector in those countries than in Australia.  This is particularly true of superannuation where the superannuation guarantee charge (SGC) arrangements have kept compulsory retirement provisions out of the public accounts in Australia whereas they form part of public sector expenditure in European and North American countries.  The SGC is now equal to 6 per cent of wages and salaries, or about 3 per cent of GDP, and that is one illustration of this effect, which is also relevant to services such as education and health.  In fact, total Australian spending (that is, both government and private) on such services is broadly in line with total spending in other countries with comparable income levels.
  • An important benefit from having a greater proportion of services provided by the private sector is that it reduces the adverse effects of taxation on productive effort, and on saving and investment.  This helps to encourage economic activity and employment.  A further benefit is that, as a general rule, the private sector tends to provide a more efficient and higher quality service than does the government.  There also tend to be fewer cross-subsidies and, hence, less distortion of resources.  Far from "worrying" about the small size of the government sector, we should be flaunting its benefits and looking for ways to reduce it further.
  • The economies of those OECD countries with large government sectors have not performed well in recent years, particularly in regard to employment growth.  It is now widely acknowledged that important contributing factors have been the adverse effects on incentives to work and to save from higher transfer payments and from the concomitant rise in the burden of taxation. (10)  As put in one recent OECD report, "The cause of Europe's high level and duration of unemployment is no mystery.  There are insufficient incentives for employers to offer employment and insufficient incentives for employees to accept many of the jobs that are offered". (11)  Many OECD countries are now seeking to cut back on welfare spending on both economic and social grounds.  The new (left-of-centre) Swedish Government, for example, has recently announced cuts in government outlays of about 12 per cent of 1994 GDP over 4 years.
  • More fundamentally, given our place in the world and the pressing need to render Australia a more competitive player in Asia, a more appropriate comparison might be with some of the Asian countries whose economic performance has been so much better than that of most OECD countries.  Those countries have significantly smaller government sectors -- generally below 30 per cent of GDP -- as indeed Australia had during most of the 1950s and 1960s when our overall economic performance was better than it has been since. (12)
  • Apart from keeping taxes low, there is also a good deal to be said on social grounds for concentrating government social security and associated assistance on those most in need rather than providing universal benefits, as tends to be the case in most other OECD countries.  Middle- and higher-income groups should generally be expected to take care of themselves, and we are likely to have a better society if they do so.
  • While Australia has a lower proportion of general government outlays to GDP than in most OECD countries, our government trading enterprise sector is one of the largest relative to GDP.  Although there has been a marked improvement in the performance of this sector in recent years, it still operates well below international best practice in most cases.  This has adverse effects on the rest of the economy, particularly on business costs and business investment.

SHOULD TAXES BE INCREASED RATHER THAN EXPENDITURES CUT?

Government Ministers are spreading the word that, if analysis of the economic outlook indicates a need to take policy measures to reduce the budget deficit, the required net savings should come from tax increases rather than expenditure cuts.  The impression which Ministers are seeking to convey through the media is that, as expenditure has already been "cut to the bone" and as "Australia already has one of smallest government sectors", there really is "no alternative" but to increase taxes.

The underlying rationale for such an approach is basically flawed once it is understood that, as pointed out above, neither of these propositions stands up to closer analysis.  But there is a further important point which is all too often overlooked, viz., the costs of additional taxation, or the so-called "deadweight losses", which tend to increase proportionately with increases in rates of taxation.

A recent study (13) estimated that, in New Zealand, for every additional dollar raised from labour (or income) taxation the deadweight loss increases by 18 cents, in other words, national income falls by 18 cents.  To put it another way, at the margin, government projects would have to earn at least an 18 per cent real return to be of net benefit to New Zealanders -- a tall order!  An earlier similar study of Australia (14) found the deadweight loss to be between 23 cents and 65 cents depending on which taxes were involved.

The New Zealand study estimated that, since 1972, the deadweight losses from labour taxation have risen from 5 cents to 18 cents and from consumption taxation from 5 cents to 14 cents.  This partly reflects the higher tax rates required to finance greater government outlays.  However, the study also found that increasing mobility of labour and capital accounted for most of the increase in deadweight losses over the past 20 years -- the more mobile the resources, the more damage done by taxes in discouraging movement to their highest-valued uses.

These high deadweight losses from taxation at existing rates confirm the commonsense view that there would be considerable benefits from reducing the overall burden of taxation and concentrating government spending in areas where there is a clear social benefit or need.  It suggests, in particular, that "churning" involves a considerable net reduction in living standards.

There is, thus, a strong economic argument for not increasing further the present burden of Commonwealth taxation, which the 1994-95 Budget papers projected to increase by "only" 1.1 percentage points of GDP between 1993-94 and 1997-98, based largely on the projections of strong economic growth "reflecting expectations that the economy will remain buoyant during the projection period".  According to the Budget papers, however, the "natural" growth in revenue is not expected to be as fast as in the 1980s due to lower inflation (and, hence, less bracket creep) and the continued relative narrowing of the indirect tax base as consumption of goods subject to tax grows relatively slowly.  (There has been a significant broadening of wholesale sales taxes, though.)

It should also be noted that Prime Minister Keating promised, on 19 December 1992, to "not put up tax".  He and other Government Ministers subsequently indicated that this was intended to mean that the Government would not raise the burden of Commonwealth taxation (per cent of GDP) during its present period in office.  Indeed, the Government's election programme included a promise to cut income taxes by about $7 billion in 1996-97.  However, only about half of those income tax cuts has been delivered. (15)  Moreover, the Government's own projections of tax revenue and GDP imply that, by comparison with 1992-93, there will be an increase in the tax burden.  The economic case for not increasing taxes is thus strongly reinforced by the case for requiring politicians to hold to their promises.

Some argue, nonetheless, that reducing the deficit is of such importance that increasing taxes would be "better than doing nothing".  However, while such an approach might be justified in a "crisis" situation (such as in a war or in the event of a political deadlock that occurred after the Government had made genuine but unsuccessful efforts to secure Parliamentary approval to expenditure reductions), no such situation exists and no genuine effort has been made to secure a programme of expenditure cuts.  Conceding the case for increasing taxes would thus simply be a means of letting the Government off the hook of electoral promises and would, in effect, concede that a forward estimate of expenditure in 1995-96 of no less than $128.5 billion could not be substantially reduced.

Total Commonwealth Tax Revenue

Tax
$ million
GDP(I)
$ million
% GDP(I)
%
1991-9287,824387,26422.7
1992-9389,234403,71922.1
1993-9493,774426,29722.0
1994-95 (est.)103,325455,49822.7
1995-96 (est.)113,600485,56023.4
1996-97 (est.)122,100520,03523.5
1997-98 (est.)129,900567,66722.9

Note:  GDP(I) figures are those published in the September Quarter 1994 national accounts to 1993-94, then assuming that rates of growth are the same as protected in Budget Paper No. 1 for 1994-95.


EXPENDITURE SAVINGS

The forward estimates in the 1994-95 Budget papers provide for a slower real growth (excluding asset sales) than has been the case in recent years.  Excluding major asset sales, total outlays in 1997-98 would only be 2.25 per cent higher in real terms than in 1994-95.

Budget Outlays

TotalExcl. Major Asset Sales
$ bnReal Growth %% GDP$ bnReal Growth %% GDP
1994-95 (est.)120.73.126.2123.12.926.8
1995-96 (est.)127.93.226.0128.51.626.1
1996-97 (est.)131.6-0.124.9132.60.225.1
1997-98 (est.]136.7-0.924.2137.10.424.2

However, as noted, the forward estimates make no allowance for any significant slowdown in economic activity, let alone a recession, between now and 1997-98.  They also make no allowance for the cost of new spending proposals.  While such proposals formally have to be offset by expenditure savings, past experience suggests that they often involve major net additions to the expenditure base.

It might be noted that, in the 1993-94 Budget, the Government put in train a wide ranging programme of reviews.  As the 1994-95 Budget papers put it:  "Extending the normal program evaluation activity and taking account of an analysis of outlays trends across all portfolios together with Ministers' own reviews of their portfolio priorities, the reviews have focused primarily on areas which have been subject to rapid outlays growth in recent years or which for other reasons are seen as offering scope for program improvements".

Areas in which review outcomes have been taken into account in the 1994-95 Budget include:

  • AUSTUDY compliance procedures;
  • the delivery of veterans' entitlements;
  • areas of substantial outlays growth in the health area;
  • nursing home efficiency gains and structure of funding;
  • the contribution of tourism to the economy and private-sector funding for the Australian Tourist Commission;
  • ABC and SBS funding;
  • Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements, including the role and functions of relevant agencies and ways of maximising cooperative effort;
  • the Commonwealth Government's overseas and domestic property arrangements;
  • National Corporate Regulation Scheme administration;
  • environment, natural resources management and energy programmes;  and
  • ABS population census frequency.

Further reviews have been commissioned and will report over the next two years.  However, it is apparent that "in-house" reviews of this type are fiddling at the edges and do not result in the sort of public accountability which is needed if the costs and benefits of the major Commonwealth programmes are to be properly taken into account in public debates.

A number of State Governments have benefited from the appointment of independent Audit Commissions to examine and report on expenditure programmes and the efficiency of trading enterprises.  Particularly as the last independent review of Commonwealth expenditures was undertaken as long ago as 1973 (the Coombs Task Force), the Commonwealth should appoint a panel of independent and qualified people to constitute an Audit Commission to evaluate Commonwealth expenditure.  The terms of reference for such a Commission should be carefully drawn up to ensure that the brief includes an assessment of the underlying objectives of expenditure programmes, whether those objectives are being met and whether alternative approaches would be preferable.


SOCIAL SECURITY

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Assistance to Aged4,9692.8612,5362.79
Assistance to Veterans/Dependants1,7090.994,0260.89
Assistance to People with Disabilities1,1900.695,1191.14
Assistance to Families with Children2,6491.5310,4322.32
Assistance to Unemployed/Sick2,5201.457,6221.69
Total (incl. other programmes)14,1978.1843,4499.65

In considering the economic effects of social security assistance it is important to keep in mind that many beneficiaries are also eligible for a range of free or subsidised government services, covering medical, hospital, housing, pharmaceutical, transport services and the like.  This adds considerably to the anti-savings and anti-employment bias which is already particularly strong in the social welfare area, because the incentives to save and work are eroded by the extension of government assistance to an increasing proportion of the population.  It encourages the attitude -- why save, and why try for a job, when the State will look after you if you don't?  The fact that social welfare is now double the proportion of GDP that it was in the early 1970s has almost certainly contributed importantly to the decline in private sector saving rates (which have not been offset by any increase in public sector saving rates -- indeed, rather the contrary) and to higher unemployment rates.

The problem is that social security is particularly susceptible to the politics of compassion and of interest groups, and to decision-making related to single issues rather than an examination of the whole picture.  Once benefits are extended to a group, moreover, it becomes difficult to withdraw them or scale them back.

Spurred on by the Year of The Family, politicians have recently been falling over themselves to think up schemes to support "the family", and, in typical fashion, have sought to count so many groupings as "families" as to make the term almost meaningless.  While the traditional family is an institution which I strongly support, this ought not to mean the extension of government assistance to all manner of groupings or for all sorts of purposes, let alone regardless of the circumstances of such groupings.  The problem is illustrated by the fact that assistance to "families with children" is presently estimated to reach almost $14 billion in 1997-98 compared with around $9 billion in 1993-94 and less than $7 billion as recently as 1991-92.  This raising of the family to the status of a political icon has to a large extent undermined the earlier efforts of the Hawke-Keating Government to improve targeting of benefits in some areas, which kept the proportion of GDP going to social welfare relatively stable during the 1980s.  Thus, social welfare is now taking a significantly higher proportion of budget outlays and GDP than in 1990-91, let alone 1982-83.

Outlays
%
GDP
%
1972-7320.74.69
1976-7726.47.29
1982-8328.78.18
1986-8727.27.85
1989-9030.07.19
1990-9131.88.09
1992-9335.19.47
1994-95 (est.)36.09.65

The increase between the recession year of 1982-93 and 1994-95 (est.) is particularly worrisome given that the economy must clearly be regarded as out of recession in 1994-95.  That increase has effectively added $6.7 billion to 1994-95 estimated outlays.  It suggests that, if the alarming upward drift is to be halted, let alone reversed, there will need to be a much more determined effort to implement structural reform of the system.  The emphasis would need to be on a marked reduction in eligibility for benefits, rather than reductions in benefits per person (which have, however, been increasing in real terms and which need to be reviewed given the interaction which exists with the labour market).  The following highlights changes in recipients of major benefits, and in the average benefit, since 1982-83.

Average Benefit Payments (per annum) And Beneficiaries

1982-831993-94% Increase
(000s)$/Hd(000s)$/Hd(000s)$/Hd
Age Pensioners (a)1,4173,1801,5547,3511027*
Invalid Pensioners (b)2773,8514227,444526*
Unemployment Beneficiaries (c)5364,2009168,3827110*
Sole Parent Pensioners1245,8383148,04715324 
Child Care Fee Relief (d)n.a.n.a.2092,380n.a.n.a. 
Families (Family Payment)n.a.n.a.1,8252,986n.a.n.a. 

* Percentage increase after allowance for increase in CPI.

(a) As both full-time and part-time pensioners are included, the per head figure is not necessarily indicative of the full-time pension.

(b) Includes Disability Support pensioners.

(c) Job Search Allowance and Newstart Allowance.

(d) Excludes the new Childcare Cash Rebate which commenced on 1 July, 1994.

Note that the number of unemployment beneficiaries is usually less than the number unemployed.

Source:  Department of Social Security, Annual Reports, and Budget Papers No 1 (various).


Unemployment Benefits

The number of unemployment beneficiaries (Job Search Allowance and Newstart Allowance) is still around 850,000. (16)  Of those on benefits around half are on the long-term (more than 12 months) Newstart benefit.  In fact, there are now more people on benefit than, according to the ABS, are actively looking for work but unable to obtain it.  This suggests that there has been an easing in determinations on eligibility for benefits. (17)

Indeed, the recession and the large increase in the number of unemployed which accompanied it, meant that review procedures were oriented to be sympathetic and "soft" to the unemployed.  However, the time has come to change from largely passively accepting unemployment benefit applications as constituting eligibility to ensuring that more of the unemployed are forced to engage in active job-seeking.  While the unemployment rate remains relatively high, the demand for labour has been increasing strongly for some time now.  Job vacancies per thousand employed in May were nearly 80 per cent higher than a year earlier and overtime hours per employee are now back close to peak 1980s levels.  Unemployment rates are down to 5-6 per cent in a number of regions (the average in Western Australia is now below 8 per cent).

Accordingly, while recognising the difficulties posed by Australia's inflexible labour market relative to, say, the US, action is needed to make it much harder to qualify for and remain on the unemployment benefit.


Tighten Work/Activity Test

For one thing, procedures now need to be toughened considerably, and the increased staff taken on in the recession should be used to tighten the activity/work test and to put greater pressure on the unemployed to seek alternative jobs to those which they prefer, including in the growing number of regions where rates of unemployment are down to relatively low levels.  Toughening the activity and work tests, especially in the early stages of unemployment, may provide that extra impetus needed to push people into jobs which, while they may prefer to avoid them, would reduce the burden on the taxpayer and increase national output.

Increased scrutiny and compliance enhancement for Job Search Allowance should be able to attain a 5 per cent saving on that allowance (over and above the fall to be expected on cyclical grounds), equal to $180m.


Time Limit on Benefits

More significant reform of unemployment benefits should also be commenced.  The United States unemployment rate is now at 5.6 per cent (compared to our 9.3 per cent at a similar stage of recovery) and it has a 12-month limit on unemployment assistance, albeit generously interpreted.  While the US has a more flexible labour market, academic analyses of other labour markets indicate that such a time limit is a significant influence on the unemployed's inclination to seek work.  Imposing such a limit would produce direct savings on welfare benefits, but also savings in the merry-go-round of labour market and training programmes of dubious merit that long-term unemployed are put through, and indirect savings to the wider community as currently restless unemployed youth gain employment, or move back home to reduce their living costs.  Newstart outlays on long-term unemployed are budgeted at $3.7 billion in 1994-95.

Those who experienced financial hardship as a result of ceasing to be eligible for unemployment benefits would be eligible for a Special Benefit (18) on a temporary basis.  However, the conditions under which Special Benefit is payable should be reviewed in order to prevent people using it as a long-term unemployment benefit.

The phasing-in over two years of a 12-month time limit on unemployment benefits would reduce unemployment benefit numbers by over 400,000 over that period, reducing unemployment benefits payments by about $3.5 billion per annum.  While there would likely be a considerable offsetting increase in Special Benefits, the fact that the eligibility test for such benefits is "tougher" should make it possible to save at least 30 per cent of this amount (about $1.0 billion) by such action.


Increased Benefits Waiting Periods

The Government also needs to ensure that unemployment benefits (Job Search Allowance) and its close substitute (Sickness Allowance) are not considered an automatic first stop for jobseekers.  There is currently only a one-week waiting period for these benefits (except for school leavers who are subject to an extra 12 weeks).  This period should be extended to at least three weeks.  Special Benefits would be available to those in immediate need of assistance.  This three-week period would provide a net saving (after allowance for Special Benefits costs) of at least $100m on Job Search and an extra $50m on Sickness Allowance.


Removing the four-week limit on the Liquid Assets Test

Raising the current four-week deferment on benefits eligibility for those in excess of the Liquid Assets Test provisions would mean that those who have large redundancy payments or other liquid funds, but otherwise qualify for benefits, would have to wait longer (dependent on the value of those liquid assets).  Removal of this cap would require individuals to use up a part of their redundancy payments (which exclude rolled-over superannuation) -- the purpose for which they are paid -- before becoming eligible to receive JSA.  Saving:  $100m.


Benefits for Migrants

Department of Social Security figures show that, as at May 1994, over 41,500 recently arrived migrants (2 years or less Australian residency) were in receipt of social security benefits (excluding Aged Pensions -- dealt with later -- and Special Benefits).  Australia is often regarded overseas as an easy welfare ride and there are insufficient incentives to encourage potential migrants to provide for themselves.  Australia is an attractive place for potential migrants from many overseas countries and we have the opportunity (and the right) to be selective.

Recognising this, the Government did introduce a couple of years ago, a six-month (residency) qualifying period for migrants to be eligible to receive benefits.  This is estimated to have saved $30m in unemployment benefits alone per year.  As a further step in that direction, the qualifying period should be increased to two years for non-refugee immigrants.  Such an extension would help improve the quality of migrants, particularly in regard to English-language skills (the lack of which accounts for a quarter of long-term unemployed), and would tend to discourage immigration by the potentially non-productive.  Savings in unemployment (and related) benefits from this measure would be $350m per annum.


Sole Parent Pensions

For sole parents, Australia offers one of the most generous pension schemes in the world and, for those sole parents who are separated from their spouses, the Government operates an expensive Child Support Agency to collect maintenance.  The USA provides pension support only for the first 12 months of a child's life, while even cradle-to-grave welfare social democracies like Sweden grant assistance for only 3 years.  Australia, however, provides income support for up to 16 years.

There is a striking contrast between the amount of government assistance to sole parents -- over $2.7 billion per annum to 300,000 sole parents -- and the amount provided to families through the Basic & Additional Family Payment -- some $5.7 billion ($3.7 billion to low-income families) to 1.9 million families covering 3.8 million children.  Sole parents receive an average of around $9,000 per annum compared with around $3,000 per annum per family.

Given that the Government also collects maintenance, provides generous child care support and family assistance for a working parent, the length of support is inappropriate and provides only limited incentive towards more responsible behaviour.  Prolonged welfare payments also serve to take the parent out of the workplace, thereby accentuating any loss in employment skills and hence adding to the difficulty in regaining work.

A tougher (but still compassionate) policy would be to cut eligibility to where the youngest child is 6 or less (only around half of current Sole Parent Pensioners).  With appropriate safety-net and phase-out arrangements, this would save at least $1 billion a year (net) (19) by 1996-97.


Age Pension

Means- and asset-tested age pensions constitute the largest single item of expenditure in the Budget at almost $12 billion, and the Government also provides assistance for retirement through generous tax concessions on superannuation as well as by requiring employers to fund contributions to superannuation funds for their employees.

With the rapid improvement in health over the past 10-15 years, and the accompanying increase in life expectancy, it is reasonable to expect that people should work for longer, or at least that others should not have to start providing them with retirement assistance until a later age.  Indeed, with the compulsory retirement age being removed, the Government should be encouraging those people able, active and willing to work to continue doing so as long as they like.  Yet the pension age is now over 12 years less than the average life expectancy for men and 22 years less for women.  It is not in the interests either of taxpayers or of older people themselves to encourage what amounts to "early retirement".

Moreover, as superannuation accumulates from the compulsory levy, the Government should be able progressively to reduce its direct Budget contribution to retirement.


Uniform Pension Age

With women living an average of 5 years longer than men, and taking a more active role in the workforce, there is certainly now no justification for the continued discrimination on age eligibility for age pensions.  Men do not receive an age pension until age 65, whereas women currently become eligible at age 60.  (Some men who have been currently unemployed for more than 2 years, but who have not yet reached the age of 65, are however now being granted a de facto "age" pension, presumably to reduce the number of unemployed as measured.  There are now about 34,000 recipients of this "mature age" pension, a move which is entirely in the wrong direction.)

While the age for women is being progressively increased to match the age for men at 65, under the Government's current proposal this equality will not be achieved for 20 years.  A faster narrowing of the age gap over 5 years, with those currently 59 having to wait 2 years, those 58 having to wait 4 years, those 57 having to wait 6 years, ..., would save at least $150m per annum by 1996-97 and over $300m by the end of the 5-year period.

Action should also be foreshadowed that, when aligned, the age for pension eligibility for all Australians would be gradually increased to 70.  This move would help to cap the growth in pension payments and, within 10 years, savings could be over $1 billion a year.  This should also encourage greater voluntary retirement contributions, thus contributing to the national saving task.  (Corresponding changes would probably also be needed to superannuation arrangements to prevent double-dipping.)


Deferred Pensions

A deferred pension scheme which granted increased pension benefits in lieu of extra years of work/deferment to entitlement could save considerable money with an ageing population.  A bonus rate of (say) 7 per cent per year of deferment, assuming an average two-year deferment for 25 per cent of newly eligible pensioners, would save $250m per annum after a couple of years and this saving would grow over time.


Enforcement of Age Pension Residency Requirements

Under present law a minimum of 10 years residence is required for eligibility for the retirement pension.  However, the Department of Social Security has been effectively flouting the law by granting Special Benefits in lieu of aged pensions to aged people who have not been Australian residents for 10 years.  Recent figures released by the Department revealed that almost 23,000 migrants who arrived in Australia after 1985 were receiving this benefit last year.  The full intention of the law should be enforced and 10 years residency should be required for retirement pensions.  This would save over $150m.


Suspension of Automatic Indexation

With inflation now under 2 per cent and unlikely to take off in the near future, there is a reasonable assurance of a low inflation environment for some time.  One contribution to maintaining such an environment -- and to creating a group in the community pressuring the Government to keep inflation low -- would be to end the practice of automatic indexation of government benefits (and charges).

The biggest saving from this would come in the area of welfare benefits.  These have in any case risen by greater than CPI amounts in the last few years due to a number of "one-off" benefit increases.  A suspension of automatic indexation of the $42 billion of personal benefit payments (up 7.7 per cent on the year previous) would save over $900m per annum.  Such suspension might continue until the pension was reduced to, say, 20 per cent of average weekly earnings (now 25.7 per cent).


Disability Support Pensions

As noted, there has been a very strong increase in the number of people on disability or invalid pensions, with the number of recipients growing by an average of 7.9 per cent per annum over 10 years.  Last year they grew by 6 per cent, following an 8 per cent jump the year before -- despite supposed improvements in review activity.  An important reason is that this pension is more generous than the unemployment benefit, and those in a position to do so are increasingly using it as a de facto unemployment benefit without the work test.

Much tougher review and targeting of this benefit is required.  More regular reviews of those pensioners with lower impairment rates would ensure the speedy return of these people to the workforce, or at least the cessation of eligibility to this pension.  Changes by the State Government in Victoria to its WorkCare system have markedly increased the return-to-work rate and reduced the number of claims incidents.  The failure of the Commonwealth to take similar action in regard to the administration of the disability pension scheme is adding to Commonwealth pension payments.  Even a meagre 3 per cent cancellation rate, achieved through targeted increased review and more frequent medical checks, would save $100m.


Align DSP Payment Rates with JSAINSA Rates

Disability Support Pension (DSP) payment rates are the same as Age Pension rates, both of which are more generous than the unemployment benefits rate.  As the DSP is often used as a substitute for unemployment benefits it should be paid at those rates.  Aligning payment rates to JSA/NSA levels would only affect singles without dependants (couples already have an aligned rate) in receipt of the DSP and would reduce their payment from around $318 to $294 per fortnight.  This measure would save around $60m.


Child Care

In a "classical" response to interest group pressures, politicians have been buying votes by expanding taxpayer-funded child care in much the same way as they did in the early 1980s with publicly-funded "free" health care.  As recently as 1989-90 child care funding was $215m.  In 1994-95, it is estimated at a whopping $960m, and is projected to reach $1.3 billion by 1997-98.  The "economic" rationale sometimes advanced for this government assistance -- that it allows the community to benefit from the output of the additional women who join the workforce -- is extremely dubious at a time when both unemployment and workforce participation rates are already at high levels.  This is not to say, of course, that at least some of the expense incurred on child caring should not be treated as deductible from income earned from employment for the purpose of arriving at the assessment of taxable income.

Publicly-funded child care, whether through fee relief, rebates, or operating subsidies has developed, however, into an insidious form of politicised middle-class welfare:  the Budget papers openly acknowledge that assistance is for "low and middle income" families.  And the Prime Minister's decision not to include a means test with the new $150m cash rebates scheme (nothing less than a bribe/pay-off to the femocrats inside and outside his office) means that the "upper classes" are also benefiting!  (Even a means test on the cash rebates along the lines of the Family Allowance would have saved $30-$40m per year.)

The publicly-funded child care sector is overly bureaucraticised and highly inefficient.  A recent EPAC seminar brought forth a number of scathing criticisms of the government's hotch potch approach and of the public-sector child care system in particular.  Considerable savings could be achieved by providing child care through a voucher system.  This would introduce a more competitive and more level playing field instead of the present arrangements discriminating against the private sector.

More generally, assistance should be provided by way of tax rebates.  Assistance to people to meet child care expenses should be based on whether they are an expense necessarily incurred in the course of earning income.  If a rebate was struck at 25 cents in the dollar and claimed through the tax system, and other fee relief was abolished, the taxpayer could save up to $500m.


Rent Assistance

In the One Nation statement the Government abolished the rent assistance waiting-period "due to the recession".  This decision goes against the grain of reforms to target better welfare to the most needy.  This decision should be reversed, saving around $40m based on estimates made when the decision was announced.

Summary$m
Unemployment Benefits1,380    
3 Week Benefit Wait150    
Removal Liquid Assets Cap100    
Migrant Benefits350    
Sole Parents1,000    
Uniform Age Pension Age150 (a)
Suspension of Indexation900    
Deferred Pension250    
Age Pension Residency150    
Disability Support Pension100    
Align DSP payment rates60    
Child Care500    
Rent Assistance Waiting Period40    
Total5,130 (a)

(a) Moving to 70 as the uniform age for pension eligibility would yield additional savings of about $1 billion p.a. (in 1994-95 prices) within 10 years.


HEALTH

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Medical Services/Benefits1,0310.596,6701.46
Hospital Services/Benefits1,7921.035,3401.17
Pharmaceutical Services/Benefits5080.292,1260.47
Nursing Home Subsidies and Domiciliary Care Seivices8570.492,1410.47
Total (incl. other programmes)4,4172.517,2763.8

Total Commonwealth expenditure on health stands out as the second most-rapidly growing major area of expenditure since the early 1980s:  although total social security and welfare spending has also increased by 1.3 percentage points of GDP since 1982-83, the percentage increase in health expenditure (291 per cent) is much greater and is only exceeded by the increase in spending on labour market programmes.  This is, of course, primarily a result of the introduction in 1983-84 of Medicare and the resultant provision of free (to the patient) medical and hospital services.  As the 1994-95 Budget papers note, "from 1985-86, the first year incorporating the full cost of Medicare, to 1993-94 real growth has averaged 3.9 per cent a year.  The growth over the period reflects, in particular:

  • a higher utilisation of medical services and pharmaceutical benefits;  and
  • a drift towards more expensive medical services and more expensive drugs".

Politics aside, a rationale for the "free" provision of medical and hospital services is difficult to discover.  Some argue that such services are so "essential" or so different that they should be provided free to all comers:  yet food and water are, in a sense, more essential.  Others argue that leaving it to "the market" to determine the demand and supply of medical and hospital services would result in inequitable outcomes and that the consumer does not have the information or the capacity to assess alternatives in a free market situation.  Yet few would argue for a completely free market or that government assistance should not be provided, for example, to individuals disadvantaged by low incomes and/or chronic illness.

At a time when governments are seeking to target welfare assistance more closely it seems particularly anomalous that nothing similar of any significance is being done in the health area.  As with the "free" provision of any good or service, the inevitable result of an absence of any form of charge is to put enormous upwards pressure on medical and hospital costs, both as a result of ever increasing consumer demand and because those working within the system tend to "capture" it, pushing staff and technology costs ever upwards.  Another inevitable result is the creation of rods for the backs of governments in the form of waiting lists:  once a service is provided without any charge that is almost inevitable.

Once a free service is established it also becomes politically difficult to restrict access to it.  However, if (for example) access to the age pension can be "rationed" by adopting a more restrictive means test and re-introducing an assets test (as the Hawke-Keating Government did), there is no logical reason why a similar approach should not be adopted for health services too.  (It is relevant that charging for access to public health services would also have more effect on older age groups, who make greater use of such services but who are also significant beneficiaries overall of social security and associated services.)

Given that the abandonment of Medicare would not be politically acceptable, what now needs to be done is to introduce charges for the use of all three of the major services funded by the Commonwealth -- medical, hospital and pharmaceutical. (20)  Such charges (or "co-payments" to use a more politically-correct term) would be payable by all those who are not in either low-income or chronically-ill groups and would be subject to an annual maximum.  If people wished to take out insurance against such potential co-payment liabilities, they should be permitted to do so -- though it seems unlikely that many would, given that there would be only a small annual maximum.


Medical Services

Sensible Medicare reform was the first victim of Paul Keating's ascension to The Lodge.  The co-payment introduced in 1991 by Deputy Prime Minister, Howe (in his then capacity as Minister for Health) for Medicare doctor visits would have been a useful start in reducing the escalating cost of public health care.  Indeed, if consumers have to pay a recognisable cost as they use the service they begin to value it more and "ration" their use of it.

A co-payment levied at $5 per visit, subject to a $400 family safety net, could yield significant savings and reduce overservicing and waste within the health system.  This charge should also be imposed on pensioners, who are the greatest users of the system.  An offsetting rise in the pension, as was done when the $2.50 pharmaceutical charge was introduced a few years ago, would ensure that they are not financially worse off, but are made more conscious that there is a cost to regular doctor visits.  The States should also be able to impose such a charge on their hospital out-patients.

The Keating reversal of the Howe co-payment proposal in January 1992 was estimated to cost $700m per annum within two years.  As that proposal had a $3.50 charge and a $300 safety net, this one at $5 and $400 respectively should save over $1 billion.


Hospitals

Another major problem in the national health system is the public hospitals.  There are two aspects to this -- the absence of any charge for the use of hospital services, leading inevitably to the development of waiting lists, and the comparative inefficiency of public hospitals' operations.

On the first, it would seem appropriate to require middle- and higher-income groups to contribute to the cost of their treatment in public hospitals.  A simple proposal would be to require such groups to meet the cost of the first day's treatment, subject to a maximum of (say) $400.  This is similar to the requirement imposed by many private health insurers.  Pensioners and other low-income groups would be exempt.  People could insure against the cost if they wished to do so.

Total public admissions to public hospitals are running at around 2.7 million per annum and the average cost per occupied bed-day was around $400 in 1991-92.  If it is conservatively assumed that a bit over half (57 per cent) of public admissions to public hospitals would be exempt, a charge covering the first day's treatment could yield savings of $460m per annum.

The other aspect relates to the economic efficiency of public hospitals.

In Victoria, the Kennett Government has successfully introduced "case-mix" for public hospitals and has, at the same time, acted to reduce the overstaffing which had developed as a result of union capture of the public hospital system in the 1980s.  The net result of these changes has been to allow the State Government to reduce its health expenditure by 11 percent over two years, while increasing the actual number of patients being treated in those hospitals and maintaining the quality of patient care.  Waiting lists for urgent treatment have been eliminated.  While Victoria started from a relatively bad situation, this suggests there is considerable scope for productivity improvements in public hospitals around Australia if the right funding signals are sent and if governments are prepared to bite the reform bullet.

This year the Commonwealth will contribute $4.6 billion in grants to the States towards public hospitals (excluding $700m for Veterans), an increase of 4.8 per cent on last year.  These grants are indexed for award wage and CPI increases as well as age- and sex-weighted population growth.  Given the scope for savings from improved productivity, there is a clear case for revising this formula so that the Commonwealth shares some of the productivity gains and encourages the nationwide development and further refinement of the case-mix funding system.  A productivity discount of 2.5 per cent per annum in the grants formula would save about $115m per annum, increasing by that amount each year for a number of years.  By 1996-97 savings would be about $230m.


Pharmaceutical

Further reform of the other major cost of health care, pharmaceuticals, is also needed.  Subject to providing a safety net for those with chronic illness, there is no good reason why prescriptions to the general public should be subsidised.  Abolition of the general subsidy would save $434m.

This would still leave the concessional payment category (which includes pensioners, the unemployed, low-income families, veterans, war widows and their dependants) at $2.60 per prescription until expenditures reach $135.20 per annum, then free.  At $1.4 billion (and climbing at almost 10 per cent per annum), this is the major component of pharmaceutical costs.  The Labor Government's earlier attempts to reform this area by introducing the $2.50 charge (now $2.60) has had a useful but essentially limited impact.  An initial approach might be to make concession holders pay the full price like all others, but subject to the continuing safety net of $135.20 per year, indexed.  This measure should be able to save at least 10 per cent or $140m.


Health Promotion Programmes

Many of these programmes are lifestyle programmes which seek to encourage better health, or safer sex or drug practices, but which focus excessively on specific issues when a broader, across-the-board approach may be desirable.  They are often targeted to buy the votes of particular interest groups (and to keep factional differences within the Labor Party quiescent) and their usefulness is questionable.  Analyses show no correlation between health expenditure and improvements in health.  Those that do not provide medical or related services, but are just advertising campaigns, should be abolished.  These include the National Health Advancement Program, Public Health Education, Women's Health Program (excluding cancer screening), and most of the grossly inflated HIV/AIDS-related funding.  The combined savings from abolishing or heavily scaling down these programmes would be $60m.

Summary$m
Medical Services1,000
Hospitals (Reduction in grants to States)690
Pharmaceutical574
Health Promotion60
Total2,324

EDUCATION

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Higher Education1,6690.964,2270.93
Vocational and Other Education2590.157510.16
Schools1,3980.813,1250.69
Student Assistance3310.191,7940.39
Total (incl. other programmes)3,7022.1310,0562.21

While the increase in Commonwealth expenditure on education has not been as large as the increases in health and social security, the justification for reductions in spending may be just as great.  This is not to deny the potential for significant returns from increased investment in human capital or that government may have some role to play in supplementing such investment by individuals.  However, as real incomes increase, the capacity of individuals to fund their own investment in education also increases.  Particularly as there is, moreover, ample evidence available to show the potential benefits in terms of higher incomes from such investment, there is a strong case on both economic and equity grounds for the Government to play a progressively smaller role in funding higher education and in providing assistance to people seeking more advanced forms of education and who are capable of making such investment decisions for themselves.

More generally, it is difficult to justify the continued direct Commonwealth funding of higher education institutions, as opposed to providing assistance to those tertiary students who, though qualified, might otherwise (for financial reasons) be unable to avail themselves of higher education.  The Government should thus move progressively towards direct student assistance and to limiting such assistance to financially-disadvantaged groups.

There is also no justification for the continued provision by the Commonwealth of large grants to the States for government schools.  There are no potential externalities from such grants and they have little influence on the total level of expenditure in these areas, which is very largely determined by the various States.  While there is a case for providing government assistance for attendance at non-government schools (this saves the taxpayer considerable amounts on pupils who would otherwise attend government schools), there is no case for intervention at the national level to achieve that.

Accordingly, the elimination of these grants and the handing back of the function to the States would reduce administration costs at both the Commonwealth and State levels, as well as improving Federal-State relations.  The States would, of course, need to be compensated by an offsetting increase in their general revenue grants.


Bureaucracy Duplication

General administration of education costs the Commonwealth taxpayer $160m.  If grants for schools were devolved back to the States and Territories, and direct funding of tertiary institutions (as distinct from financially-disadvantaged would-be entrants to such institutions) ceased, it should be possible to save $100m of such administrative costs.


Student Assistance

AUSTUDY provides income support to students undertaking approved courses in secondary schools, TAFE colleges and the like.  Assistance is similar to the unemployment benefit and is subject to income and assets tests, parental and personal.

This is another area where a particular interest group has captured the system, with the result that student beneficiary numbers have increased from about 300,000 in 1987 to over 500,000 today.  It is apparent that, by one means or another, considerable numbers of students from middle- and upper-income families (including wealthy overseas families) have been able to obtain assistance.  (A recent academic study reportedly found that 36 per cent of private school students 16 years and over, and no less than 51 per cent of students from Hong Kong and 46 per cent from Malaysia, received AUSTUDY).  The Government's recent decision gradually to lower the age of "dependence" for Austudy from 25 to 22 will only add to the problem.  This decision, which was little more than an attempt to buy the support of the National Union of Students, will cost $40m within 4 years.

This proposal should be reversed and greater emphasis should be placed on assessing "independence" which is already widely and quite openly abused.  The number of students eligible for AUSTUDY should be capped at 400,000 and the eligibility requirements toughened accordingly.  A reduction in beneficiary numbers of 100,000 would yield total savings (combined) of at least $300m (including the $40m).


Post-Secondary

A freeing up of higher education, by transferring it to the States and providing assistance to individual students rather than institutions, would require universities to meet their costs from fees for students (as they currently do in the case of foreign students) and would allow them to vary the costs of courses -- including top-up fees.  Universities could also more actively involve business and benevolent funds.  Similar arrangements should be made for TAFE.  This approach would be consistent with the world-wide trend of concentrating the government's role on the funding rather than the delivery of services.

Such a major change would take time to implement.  The opportunity should be taken progressively to reduce (in effect) the number of students who are assisted by government by limiting such assistance to low-income and disadvantaged groups.  In the short term, it should be possible to keep funding to current levels, saving (against forward estimates) $300m per annum in higher education and $200m per annum in Vocational and other Education (TAFE).

Summary$m
Bureaucracy100
Student Assistance300
Post-Secondary500
Total900

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AMENITIES

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Assistance to Other Governments4430.269270.20
Total (incl. other programmes)7750.451,1970.26

Housing assistance to low-income groups, and to groups judged to be disadvantaged in finding suitable accommodation, is provided through the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement.  A number of different programmes of housing assistance are provided by the Commonwealth under this Agreement.  These include untied grants for the construction and maintenance by State Governments of a public rental-housing stock, presently consisting of about 370,000 dwelling units valued at about $20 billion.  There is also a range of programmes covering rental assistance (including in the private rental market), or assistance with the purchase of housing, to low income groups.  Some programmes of assistance for low-income renters/buyers are included under Social Security and Welfare, not Housing.  (The vast majority of people in public housing are, in any event, also in receipt of welfare assistance.)

There is a major question as to whether the Commonwealth (or indeed any other government) should continue to provide assistance for the construction of public housing.  The Industry Commission's 1993 Report on Public Housing did conclude that the construction and maintenance of public rental housing "can be cost effective" if housing administration is efficient.  This conclusion appeared to be based, at least in part, on the Commission's assessment that the private rental market is imperfect in providing adequate housing for some low-income groups.  At the same time, the Commission acknowledged that that market would be improved by reducing government intervention and that some of those who need housing do not wish to resort to public housing.  It also made criticisms of the administration of housing assistance.

Assessments of the capacity of the private market to adapt should not be based on the present inadequacies and should take account of the "unfair" competition which exists from the presently large public housing sector.  The agreement by NSW with superannuation funds to finance low-cost housing shows that there is considerable potential for the private sector market to develop given that governments accept a much reduced role.

If Commonwealth funds were diverted from public housing construction and property acquisitions, support could instead be provided in the form of rent or mortgage relief.  Such an arrangement would in theory provide support for around 25-30 times as many families per dollar as capital funding.  Alternatively, it would provide scope for significant savings.  The Industry Commission proposed that the Commonwealth confine its role to the provision of rent assistance to households on low incomes and it would seem sensible to adopt that proposal.  In that event the continued provision of public rental housing would be a matter for each individual State to decide. (21)

If the Commonwealth funded only rental or mortgage assistance through social security and the States had sole responsibility for public housing, such a change would also avoid unnecessary duplication between the Commonwealth and the States in the housing area as well as more logically fitting in with the Commonwealth's social welfare responsibilities.  This approach would involve transferring half the Commonwealth's current contribution to the social security area and saving the other half of $500m.  The Department of Housing and Regional Development could be closed down, with any residual responsibilities transferred to other Departments.


Other

With the transfer of housing responsibilities to the States a number of smaller programmes could also be terminated.  The National Urban Development Program, the National Housing Strategy and costs associated with the Better Cities Program and the Local Government Development Program (two projects largely designed to keep Deputy Prime Minister Brian Howe happy) could be abolished, while bureaucratic duplication could also be eliminated.  Savings:  $22m.

Summary$m
CSHA500
Other22
Total522

DEFENCE

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Personnel and Retirement Benefits Costs2,0831.163,6890.81
Defence Equipment and Stores1,4930.863,6760.81
Defence Facilities1140.075490.12
Total (incl. other programmes)4,5002.599,6372.12

There has been much debate about the defence needs of nations in the post-Cold War world.  Australia has never had a very large or expensive defence force and the Government has continually reduced the proportion of GDP allocated to defence.  While improved technology has provided considerable scope for increased productivity, there is concern that, at around 2 per cent of GDP, the bare minimum rock bottom has now been reached if Australia is to have a credible force.  However, this does not mean that savings may not be achievable through changes in administrative arrangements and greater resort to commercialisation of some activities.


Commercialisation

The Wrigley Report of 1991 identified savings of up to $350m per annum from greater commercialisation of the forces.  While the Government accepted many of the Report's recommendations, the speed of their implementation has been very slow.  The extent of commercialisation could also be expanded to all non-high security areas.  If this process was hastened and broadened it could contribute savings of $250m per annum.


Diarchy

The biggest burden to the Defence Budget is the cost of running two administrations -- the "diarchy".  This results from the development of an armed forces central headquarters and a Departmental one.  This sees virtually all functions being duplicated, a great many committees to resolve differences and a lot of double-guessing (this doesn't even include the triplicate nature of the three arms of the forces themselves which each have their own administration and support).  This structure does not improve a Defence force which needs to have, as its foremost traits, flexibility and speed.  There are 15,000 combat personnel, compared to 50,000 service personnel in support roles and half that again in civilians.  It is time to address this burdensome bureaucracy and dismantle the diarchy.  Such a move could save $350m, although redundancies would have to be absorbed in earlier years.  Properly implemented, this would leave Australia with a more efficient and effective armed forces capability.

Summary$m
Commercialisation250
Diarchy350
Total600

CULTURE AND RECREATION

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Broadcasting3540.207630.17
Arts & Cultural Heritage1480.093490.08
Sport and Recreation24-1140.03
National Estate and Parks15-1250.03
Total5420.311,3510.30

The rationale for government assistance to the arts is that there are benefits from having a greater proportion of resources devoted to cultural pursuits than would be the case if these pursuits were left to "the market".  It is argued, in particular, that "the market" would not by itself produce artistic excellence and that such excellence contributes importantly to "the quality of life" and is a matter of national (or State) prestige.

However, while there is some validity to such arguments, they have to be balanced against the increasing difficulty of justifying continued high levels of funding in circumstances where "the arts" is now a well-established and growing industry in Australia and where its services are increasingly being used by Australian businesses and well-to-do individuals, not to mention foreign tourists for whom visits to galleries, museums, and the like, have become an essential (but heavily taxpayer-subsidised) occasion.  Indeed, while they have been assisted by government subsidies, all branches of the arts industry have demonstrated that they are now well able to compete in the international market place, including some with little or no subsidy.  Many Australians now make good livings from the industry and, while there are also many who strive to become artists but do not succeed, that should not be a matter for the taxpayer any more than it should be in the case of would-be champion athletes.

As living standards rise, the arts should look increasingly to the market and private patronage, and taxpayers could reasonably be expected to be relieved of most of the burden of support.  Particularly as the "users" of the arts come to a large extent from middle- and upper-income groups, and as many such users get spin-offs of more than one sort from their involvement in and enjoyment of the industry's services, it seems reasonable to look to such users to fund a much higher proportion of "artistic excellence".

There is a further reason for reducing government assistance to the arts, viz., the increasing tendency of governments to (mis-)use patronage of the arts as a vehicle for conveying the impression of national (or State) leadership and, thereby, canvassing political support for the party in power.  In short, in yet another example of vote-buying from particular interest groups, the arts have become politicised.  The present Prime Minister's use of this tactic is particularly blatant and the taxpayer should not have to pay for it.

Accordingly, there should now be a large reduction in Commonwealth "cultural" assistance and the achievement of artistic excellence should be left largely to the private sector.


Broadcasting

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) receives over $600m of taxpayers' funds ($530m directly from the Budget plus $70m in free transmission services from the Department of Communications).  To put this into perspective, the annual taxpayer funding to the ABC is equivalent to the total annual Commonwealth commitment to Technical and Further Education, or more than double the annual Commonwealth funding for Vocational Training.

With a nationwide audience of only about 13 per cent, and even a country audience (where the commercial programmes are often less readily available) of less than 30 per cent, it is difficult to justify such a high level of funding for public broadcasting, particularly as the "users" of these services tend to be in middle- and upper-income groups.  Commercial broadcasting and television have been and are expanding at a rapid rate, both in Australia and internationally, and are delivering a wider range of programmes.  There will be a further expansion in the already wide range of TV programmes when Pay-TV arrives and the CD ROM is already contributing both in terms of quality and quantity.

There is a question as to whether, if the ABC was privatised, the commercial sector could not now take over the ABC's role -- apart, that is, from providing an outlet for the ABC's New Class denizens to spout their prejudices free from accountability.  If it appeared that particular programmes or areas of "high culture" would be neglected without the ABC, subsidies could be offered for the provision of such programmes and commercial (including ex-ABC) interests invited to tender for them on a competitive basis.

Accordingly, options for the sale of the ABC and its operating units should be developed with a view to privatisation in 1996-97.  Provision should be made for continued subsidies to cover broadcasting to remote areas and for programmes of "high culture".  This approach would save around $500m per annum and would also provide much needed assets sale revenue to reduce accumulated budget debt.  In the meantime, the ABC should be forced to get itself into better financial shape by cut-backs on senior management (which has almost doubled in three years), and on world travel, and by reducing services which are clearly duplicated by commercial interests.  The major television and radio networks went through major restructuring with cuts often up to 30 per cent, while the ABC has hardly been touched.

The SBS has proven a successful and efficient television and radio network, especially when compared to the ABC.  Nonetheless, somewhat similar tendencies to those which have, over the past 25 years or so, resulted in the "capture" of the ABC, are now beginning to appear in the SBS.  In any case the same rationale as discussed above dictates that the Government should have no ongoing role in owning this form of asset.  The private radio sector already caters for ethnic groups and would doubtless expand further if the SBS were sold.  As a lean, still relatively highly-regarded broadcasting company, its sale would no doubt attract considerable private sector interest.

The special charter of the SBS to supply services to non-English speaking background Australians could continue as a condition of sale of its broadcasting licence, or be the subject of separate arrangements with commercial interests who were prepared to tender for the supply of such services.  While making the supply of such services a condition of licence could result in a slightly lower price for the network's sale, it would not deter willing and keen buyers.  The sale would result in direct savings of SBS's annual appropriation of $77.5m, plus the $5.5m of free transmission services which it receives.  Total saving $83m.


National Collections

These include the Commonwealth national galleries, museums, libraries and the Australian War Memorial.  The collections of these national bodies are well-established and well-regarded, and the need for capital funding to supplement them is now limited.  Attendances at these institutions have increased strongly in recent years.  Even so, the total cost to the taxpayer of all these bodies is still running at $128m per annum.  This will be added to by the Prime Minister's promise of a new Gallery of Aboriginal Australia, the cost of which has not yet been revealed.

Such bodies should now be expected to adopt the corporate objective of covering their costs -- not necessarily immediately, but on the basis of clearly defined corporate plans designed to achieve that objective over not more than (say), five years.  With some exceptions, they should be able to raise capital costs from public bequests, donations or corporate sponsorships.  Operating costs should largely be met by user charges (with appropriate exemptions or reduced charges for students and low-income groups) with the rest coming from donations and sponsorship of exhibitions.  These changes could be phased in over 5 years.


Film Industry

The Australian film industry is another branch of the arts that has become well established and is thriving.  Australian film makers are now more than capable of producing saleable films, both for domestic and international viewing.  At a time when industry generally is having its assistance reduced even in the face of fierce international competition, there is no case for the recent increase in government paternalism towards the film industry.  Yet the Prime Minister's Cultural statement committed the taxpayer to an additional $155m (over four years) for film, television, radio and multi-media.  The abolition of taxpayer-funded film finance would save $79m in 1995-96.


Arts and Heritage

The dominant item of funding within this area is the Australia Council.  Despite the Government's own reservations about the appropriateness and effectiveness of this body, it was given additional responsibilities and resources in the Cultural statement.  Even one or two brave members of the artistic community have criticised the Council for its (in their view) unjustified patronage and personal prejudices.  This indicates that, as with film, the personal predilections of those who appreciate and are interested users of the services of the creative world are best met primarily by private support.

In accordance with the general approach outlined above, the activities of the Australia Council should be phased out over 5 years.  This would save $65m, with an estimated saving of $26m by 1996-97.  Similarly, the financial support of the Opera, Ballet and Orchestras should be made a matter for their patrons within 5 years.  This would save an extra $20m, with a saving of $8m by 1996-97.


Sport and Recreation

This item includes the Australian Sports Commission (which through the Australian Institute of Sport trains allegedly "elite" athletes), an Athlete Preparation Strategy for the Sydney 2000 Olympics, and support for the Sydney Olympics.  Even though the Los Angeles Olympics was privately funded, assistance for the Olympics may be justified as providing one-off "external" benefits.

The Institute of Sport and Sports Drug Agency should, however, be made independent and financially self-sufficient by way of private contributions from athletes, sponsors and donors.  The department's sports advisory function should also be terminated.  There is no need for Australia to have one Federal Sports Minister and six State Ministers;  their main activity is vote-buying, as was well demonstrated by the whiteboard activity of the former Federal Sports Minister.  The Commonwealth should vacate this arena.  Combined savings from rationalisation (excluding Olympics programmes):  $40m.


Environment

Commonwealth spending on environmental matters has grown under the "Culture and Recreation" heading from $110m in 1991-92 to a budgeted $180m this year.  However, an additional $112m is provided in 1994-95 for "Environment Protection" under the Housing function, up from $41m in 1991-92.  Thus, total Commonwealth spending on environmental matters has increased from $151m in 1991-92 to no less than $293m (est.) in 1994-95.  (However, $30m of 1994-95 expenditure on environment protection reflects expenditure on the rehabilitation of the Maralinga former atomic test site, and the forward estimates project a reduction in such expenditure to $55m in 1996-97).

The Commonwealth's heavy involvement in environmental matters is, to a large extent, another case of responding to narrow, sectional interest groups who create the impression of being able to deliver votes.  The result has been to reduce investment and employment below what they would otherwise have been with little or no benefit to the environment properly defined.

The creation of a National Environment Protection Authority was a case of duplication with the States (which already have similar bodies), at its worst.  It is completely unnecessary and should be abolished before it gets too "established".

The Commonwealth will spend $61m on "environment strategies" this year.  These programmes also all involve duplication and interference in State affairs, and conservation management issues.  The Commonwealth should significantly reduce this overlap.  Savings are estimated as at least $30m.

Summary$m
Broadcasting583 (a)
National Collections128    
Film79    
Arts34    
Sport40    
Environment50    
Total894    

(a) Excluding proceeds from assets sales.


TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Air Transport5210.301020.02
Land Transport1,0080.581,0800.24
Sea Transport1350.081400.03
Total (incl. other programmes)1,8151.051,3490.30

Specific purpose payments to the States for the construction and maintenance of roads constitute the main programme.  From 1 January, 1994 the Commonwealth untied $350m a year for funding of State arterial roads and for 1994-95 that amount has, in effect, been transferred from this function to "Assistance to Other Governments, NEC", where it is included as general revenue assistance.


Australian National Railways

Included under "Land Transport" is a provision in 1994-95 of $222m for rail transport, including $71.7m for the Australian National Railways Commission, of which $53m is to cover continuing losses on passenger operations as well as redundancies.  The ANR's interstate freight operations have been transferred to the newly-established National Rail Corporation but it retains a rump responsibility for intrastate rail freight in South Australia and Tasmania.

It is clearly anomalous for the Commonwealth still to have a separate railway (freight) operation in two States and to operate only an interstate passenger service.  The continued operation of the latter with such high losses is particularly difficult to justify given the ready availability of interstate bus and plane travel.  Accordingly, the operations in the two States should be offered back to their Governments and the interstate passenger service should be closed unless a private operator is prepared to take it on franchise.  Assuming that the sale of the two States' operations would produce no return (but would cease to incur a loss), the total saving by 1996-97 would be $23m (the amount provided in the forward estimates for that year).


Tasmanian Subsidies

Under the Tasmanian Freight Equalisation Scheme an ongoing subsidy is provided to shippers of certain goods between Tasmania and the mainland, estimated to cost $39.5m in 1994-95.  A separate freight subsidy on the transport of wheat to Tasmania is also provided, estimated at $2.7m in 1994-95, as well as a $300,000 subsidy on the Bass Strait Passenger Service.

Tasmanians argue that Bass Strait should be treated as if it were a road and they claim, on that basis, that the Commonwealth should contribute to the cost of the Bass Strait "road", just as it contributes to the cost of other "national" highways.  However, Tasmania already receives a relatively generous per capita share of Commonwealth road grants ($55 per head compared to the six-State average of $46 per head) and there can be no more justification for the residents of other States subsidising the Bass Strait crossing than there would be for them to subsidise the cost of transport between the Eastern States and Western Australia.  In reality, these subsidies have been provided and maintained by successive Commonwealth Governments entirely for political reasons.

Accordingly, these various subsidies should be abolished, saving an estimated $43.5m in 1995-96.


Australian National Line

According to the 1994-95 Budget papers, the "Government's decision to sell a substantial part of ANL was first announced in the 1991-92 Budget".  The fact that no final decision has yet been made about the sale of this shipping business is symbolic of the Government's incapacity to resist trade union pressure designed to block microeconomic reform.  The sale should proceed forthwith, regardless of the outcome of the Wran "inquiry".  It must now be doubtful if the sale would yield any significant sum but it would at least save the loss of around $23m last financial year.

Summary$m
Australian National Railways23    
Tasmanian Transport Subsidies44    
ANL(23) (a)
Total67 (a)

(a) This loss does not show up in the Commonwealth budget, but is in effect funded off-budget by increasing borrowings.


LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Vocational and Industry Training1080.063630.08
Labour Market Assistance to Jobseekers and Industry2880.171,7640.39
industrial Relations82-2640.06
Employment Services1710.108580.19
Total (incl. other programmes)7050.413,5210.78

Outlays on Labour and Employment are mainly for training and employment assistance, facilitation of migration and temporary entry into Australia, and the operation of associated Commonwealth agencies.  These outlays include:  subsidies to employers for apprentices, trainees and disadvantaged jobseekers;  payments to suppliers of formal training;  income support for people undertaking full-time training;  and assistance for people affected by industry restructuring.  Outlays also include the operational costs of the Federal industrial relations system and the relevant parts of the Departments of Industrial Relations (DIR), Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA) and DEET, including the CES.

Of the major functions, this is the one where expenditure has increased most -- by about 5 times -- since 1982-83, with the biggest increase being in labour market assistance to jobseekers.  It is important to keep in mind that these outlays are additional to the $7.6 billion being provided to the unemployed and sick under Social Welfare:  that is, in 1994-95 the taxpayer is spending over $11 billion in "relieving" unemployment in one form or another, or about $13,000 per person unemployed.

The Newstart Allowance (which accounts for $3.8 billion of such spending in 1994-95) is provided under a so-called "structured activity arrangement".  In essence, the NSA arrangements for long-term unemployed are similar to the new labour market assistance arrangements and, as such, the latter are something of an admission of the failure of the NSA.  It is certainly pertinent to ask the question -- given that the NSA has apparently had a minimal effect in reducing long term unemployment, why would the latest arrangements (the so-called Working Nation arrangements) do any better? (22)

Certainly, there is no sign to date that the large expenditure on labour market programmes over recent years has had any effect in reducing the "natural" unemployment rate.  Indeed, it is now widely accepted that, despite all the emphasis (and money) devoted to labour market programmes during the past decade, the NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) has risen since the early 1980s and is now around 7-7.5 per cent.  As pointed out by the Director of the National Institute of Labour Studies Professor Judith Sloan in an article in the Australian Financial Review (17 November, 1994), it is indeed quite possible that such programmes increase the NAIRU -- by making it "easier" for unions to press for larger wage increases and/or because the cost of job losses to individual workers is reduced.  The unemployment experience of countries (such as Sweden) with large labour market programmes is certainly not encouraging in this regard.

Commonwealth Labour Market Assistance and Unemployment

The Government's basic argument is that, by giving the unemployed (particularly the long-term unemployed) training and other assistance now, they will be absorbed into the workforce as the economy recovers and the NAIRU will consequently be lowered.  A further line of argument is that it is a matter of "equity and justice" that the unemployed be given the opportunity to become employed (or re-employed).

A major difficulty with this approach is that it almost certainly does not deal with the major underlying cause of Australia's high unemployment, viz., the high cost to employers, relative to the likely returns in terms of taking on extra employees, particularly those who are amongst the lesser-skilled.  This relatively high cost arises to an important extent because of the institutional and regulatory structure within which employers and employees have to operate, including the quasi-monopoly status accorded to trade unions which raises the price of labour and, as a result, inhibits the employment of those who are less skilled.  "Equity and justice" would be better met by addressing this problem.

Nor does the labour market programme approach do anything to reduce the disposition of the unemployed to remain on social welfare.  This problem has been mentioned above under Social Welfare.  However, it is worth adding that the expansion in labour market programmes may either be attracting people into the labour force or keeping them there longer than would otherwise be the case.  The continued high participation rate (that is, the continued high proportion of the working-age population actively seeking work) during the 1990s may partly reflect this influence.  To the extent that such influence does exist, the net result may be to keep the unemployment rate higher than it otherwise would be.  It is relevant that the vast raft of schemes, programmes, and initiatives is scheduled to fund a total of no less than 585,000 places in 1994-95, equal to around 70 per cent of those on unemployment benefits.

Thus, the Government has got itself into a bind:  in responding to pressure from union and other activist groups to "do something" about the very high levels of unemployment which were maintained until about a year ago, it entered into expensive labour market programmes only to find that, even before these really got under way, the unemployment rate started to drop as a result of cyclical influences and is now 1.7 percentage points lower than last November.

Thus the forward estimates provide for a further massive increase in such programmes of 33.7 per cent in 1995-96, following the 25.8 per cent increase this year.  The Minister will doubtless argue that the benefits of such expenditure will come when unemployment approaches the 7-7.5 per cent rate at which NAIRU is said to be.

However, the Government should not allow the programmes to continue on the basis of flimsy hopes and in the face of analytical evidence which suggests their futility.  While it would clearly involve too much loss of political face to now abandon these labour market assistance programmes altogether, the way out may be to combine them with the Newstart Allowance programme and, in the process, to use the fall in unemployment as an "excuse" for scaling down heavily the provision for the combined programmes.  The obvious need for rationalisation of the 14 different types of labour market assistance programmes could provide a further justification for effecting such a scaling down.  (At the very least, "Jobstart", "Jobtrain", "Jobskills" and "Jobclubs" should be combinable -- perhaps into one "Jobclub"!).  The reports suggesting that employers are showing only marginal interest in those programmes carrying incentives to take on employees -- doubtless for the reasons mentioned above -- could be used as another reason for a new start.

One particular programme of limited value is the Jobstart programme which basically provides a subsidy to an employer because the cost of the employee's labour is too high.  This situation has arisen because of the lack of flexibility in labour relations.  It is an absurdity for other workers who are being paid what they are worth to have to pay taxes so a privileged group of fellow workers can be paid the same wages even though by definition the employer (and the Government) considers them to be worth less.  The fact that this is one of the better-performing programmes indicates that, when wage costs to employers can be reduced, they are prepared to take on extra staff.  Thus, having eventually accepted the need for enterprise-based employment relations, the Government should now take the next step and address this obvious inflexibility in the award system.  That would make wage subsidies unnecessary for the almost 200,000 programme participants.  Total savings:  $467m after full phase-out.

Rationalisation of the remaining labour market programmes, in the context of increased labour market flexibility, should save an additional $500m.


Industrial Relations

With the shift to an enterprise-based industrial relations system, there should no longer be any need for a large corporatist industrial relations department and related activities.  Yet industrial relations is still expected to consume $260m annually for the next few years.  With the exception of the cost of the Industrial Relations Commission and Special Industry Services -- which are fully funded by levies -- the rest of the expenditure could be abolished.  Employers and (particularly) unions could reasonably be expected to use private sector advisory and conciliatory services.

This would also result in an end to "workplace reform" payments, which are another form of subsidy to trade unions (over the last 11 years of Labor Government, grants of various sorts to trade unions have exceeded $80m);  the closure or sale of the Trade Union Training Authority (annual cost $10m);  a major reduction in advisory services;  and abolition of the Affirmative Action Agency and the Construction Industry Development Agency.  Total savings:  $100m.

The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission should have its responsibilities handed back to the States' respective bodies, saving an extra $20m.


Employment Services

The Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) is one of the larger and more expensive government agencies.  It is estimated to cost $858m this year, a 15 per cent real increase over the previous year.  Its size increased dramatically following the recession, the new responsibility for Newstart (the long-term unemployment benefit) and, more recently, the case-management "system" adopted under Working Nation.

The CES is not viewed very positively either by employers or by clients and the decision to move Newstart to the CES from DSS a couple of years ago was a mistake.  DSS is relatively efficient at processing and dealing with welfare issues;  by comparison the CES is not.  The CES and DSS should be merged into one larger body which can administer welfare payments and related activities.  The CES's job-placement function should be contracted out to private-sector employment agencies by putting them out to tender with a success fee.  Such a proposal has been given consideration before and also been supported by DSS, who have claimed that major savings can be made.  It has naturally been resisted by DEET (the department responsible for the CES).  Savings arising would be at least $300m.

Summary$m
Labour Market Programmes967
Industrial Relations120
Employment Services300
Total1387

PRIME MINISTER *

Under Mr Keating the Department has further developed the cornucopia of special interests bodies and Prime Ministerial pet projects (past and present).  This is reflected in the inclusion of the allocation for ATSIC under the Prime Minister's responsibilities, resulting in his Department's being responsible for outlays of $1,131m in 1994-95, up 10.0 per cent on last year.

ATSIC aside, there is a need for a good cleanout, which could begin with the abolition of a number of quangos.  The Office of the Status of Women ($6m), the Office of Multicultural Affairs ($5m), Council for Reconciliation ($10m), the Office of Economic Planning Advisory Commission ($2m), and the Australian Science and Technology Council ($2m) should all be axed and, to the extent that some of their functions are still needed, they should be returned to the Departments where the relevant responsibility lies, for example, EPAC functions should be performed by Treasury.  Combined saving:  $25m.

Summary$m
Total25

* Expenditure by the Prime Minister's Department is not a "function" but is scattered across a range of functions.  It is included here as one indicator of the extent to which taxpayers' funds are being used for predominantly political purposes.


ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER AFFAIRS

Aboriginal Programmes

1994-95
$m
Aboriginal Advancement Programmes
  ATSIC and TSRA (1)
  CDEP (2)
  National Aboriginal Health Strategy
Total (incl. other programmes)

563
281
113
1,032
ABSTUDY etc158
Aboriginal Rental Housing104
Aboriginal Employment Assistance45
Total1,339

(1) "Global" allocations to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and Torres Strait Regional Authority.

(2) Community Development Employment Projects.  Some unemployment benefits are channelled into these "vork for the dole" type projects.


This is not a separate function.  Expenditure on aboriginal programmes is spread across a number of functions -- Social Security and Welfare (Aboriginal Advancement Programs), Education (ABSTUDY and Other Assistance to Aboriginals), Housing and Community Amenities (Aboriginal Rental Housing) and Labour and Employment (Aboriginal Employment Assistance).  An attempt is made here to bring the various budget allocations together to show their total extent.  Assuming an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population of about 290,000, the total amount identified below is equal to about $4,600 per head.  This excludes some, though not all, unemployment benefits and also excludes expenditure under other programmes available to both Aborigines and non-Aborigines alike.

The Government's strategy for assisting Aborigines implies a rejection of any "assimilationist" approach and an acceptance of a collectivist approach that encourages separatist development in which "people are encouraged to see themselves as members of groups with a collective entitlement to resources obtainable in political competition with members of other groups". (23)  This strategy is fundamentally flawed and against the interests of Aborigines themselves, who are not one single homogeneous group and who should, in general, be assisted under the same programmes and on the same basis as other Australians who are in need of special help.


ATSIC

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) is the main Aboriginal programmes funding body.  It replaced the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and subsumed most of its functions.  Its budget has increased from $600m in 1990-91 to over $1 billion in 1994-95.  Much of its expenditure has been broadly criticised as wasteful, misdirected or simply ineffective.  An administration which takes over 10 per cent of the resources does not assist.

There is now enough experience with ATSIC to confirm not only that it lacks support from the Aboriginal community itself (this is reflected in the fact that only about one in three turn out at ATSIC elections), but that it is an inappropriate and divisive vehicle to administer assistance for Aborigines.  Its activities should therefore be wound back into the relevant departments.  Failing that, ATSIC funding should be held at the 1993-94 year level, which alone would mean a saving of $100m this year against the forward estimates.  Stricter accountability and performance auditing should be implemented to try to reduce the over-funding involved in the three-tiered administration and the excessive personal well-being of commissioners and employees.


Land Fund

ATSIC's role looks set to be increased as the Government transfers responsibility for the Land Fund to it following the Senate's insistence on significant amendments to the Land Fund legislation and the Government's refusal to accept such amendments.  The Fund was to get an initial allocation of $200m this year, to be built up to $1 billion.

There has been much debate about the appropriateness of the Land Fund as a suitable means for addressing Aboriginal advancement.  It does not address the main problems faced by Aborigines, and is responding to the symbolic importance which Aborigines attach to land rather than to the substance.  Indeed, by encouraging people to go to places where there are no or only limited employment prospects, the end result may be to worsen the position and prospects of sections of the Aboriginal community.  The main beneficiaries are likely to be the professional Aboriginal activists who will no doubt gain control of, or significant influence over, it.  It should be scrapped as a misdirected idea.  Although the saving over time would amount to the $1 billion planned contribution, the saving this year would only be worth $25m, which (due to accounting arrangements) is the only estimated outgoing (purchase) from the fund and hence the public sector.


Abstudy

Abstudy is the Aboriginal version of Austudy.  As such, it is discriminatory in that it denies non-Aborigines access to its benefits.  It is also a more generous scheme so far as eligibility goes, that is, it is easier to qualify -- there is no assets test (or objective test of Aboriginality), for instance, and it is financially more generous, by providing additional assistance for school fees.  Aboriginal Australian students should be eligible for the same assistance as other Australian students.  Abstudy should be merged into Austudy, with Austudy guidelines being applicable.  Such a move would save in the order of $30m.

Summary$m
ATSIC100
Abstudy30
Land Fund25
Total155

LAW, ORDER AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Main Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Courts and Legal Services1250.074070.09
Security and Intelligence Services46-1170.02
Criminal Investigation1000.062500.06
Other Law, Order and Public Safety850.041070.02
Total3550.208810.20

The Commonwealth has developed a number of legal or quasi-legal "institutions" which seek to intrude an overriding national role into various aspects of human rights and crime.  As in a number of other areas, this Commonwealth intrusion is largely a response to interest groups with either narrow perspectives or a belief that additional policing and/or regulation will solve problems or improve human relations.  Experience with these authorities, however, suggests that they contribute little of value and are not infrequently counterproductive.

In particular, the HREOC and the Law Reform Commission do not add anything to the Australian legal system -- if anything they tend to undermine the precedents which are important to maintaining a stable society.  The National Crime Authority was set up to catch bigwig criminals who fell through the net.  It duplicates functions of the Australian Federal Police, Australian Securities Commission and State bodies.  It proved to be very unsuccessful in the 1980s and its demise would not be noticed, let alone regretted.  The Institute of Criminology performs work done by police forces, the Australian Bureau of Statistics and universities.  Any residual function it has could be adequately handled by those bodies.  The ATRAC has already undergone a name change but what was really needed was extermination.  This body is a very costly and burdensome imposition on banks, customs authorities and individuals undertaking normal ordinary business.  It has, like some of these other bodies, failed to live up to its supposed role -- identifying crooks.

Accordingly, the Law Reform Commission, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Australian Institute of Criminology, National Crime Authority, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (ATRAC, formerly the Cash Transactions Reports Agency) should all be abolished and the matters dealt with by them left to the States or other Federal authorities.

The combined savings from these abolitions is $78m.


Legal Aid

With the increasing deregulation of the legal profession it should now be possible for that profession to take on an increasing number of cases on the basis of "no win, no fee".  This should allow a progressive reduction in the provision for legal aid, which is estimated to be $145m in 1994-95 or 5.0 per cent higher than last year.  A saving of $10m should be achievable in 1995-96.

Summary$m
Abolish HREOC, AIC, NCA, ATRAC78
Reduce Legal Aid10
Total88

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OVERSEAS AID

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Overseas Aid
  Bilateral
  Multilateral
  Administration
Sub Total

642
155
15
812

0.37
0.09
-
0.46

1,041
356
55
1,453

0.23
0.08
-
0.31
Foreign Affairs Non-Aid2400.147590.17
Total1,0520.612,2120.49

The combining of the foreign affairs and overseas trade functions might have been thought likely to force the Department and its Minister to pay a little less attention to accommodating the desires of overseas countries in the interests of having "friendly relations" and somewhat more attention to Australia's national economic interests.  In fact, the Department still gives far too much support to policies because they are seen as "politically correct" in international forums, because they are in accord with pressures from narrow interest groups in Australia or because they provide Australia (and the Minister personally) with the opportunity to give the appearance of international leadership.  As part of this syndrome, it is still far too ready to take the internationalist approach without paying adequate regard to where Australia's interests lie.  Australia would benefit from the Department and its Minister adopting a somewhat lower profile and recognising that the best contribution Australia can make in assisting the world's developing nations is by allowing them freedom to trade with us and by encouraging them to pursue domestic economic policies which minimise the role of government.

With the development of international capital markets that have an enhanced capacity to assess risk, there should also now be a lesser role for foreign aid to play, whether provided bilaterally or through multilateral institutions.  Indeed, it would likely improve the policy stances and outcomes of most developing countries if they reduced their reliance on foreign aid and exposed themselves more to the "discipline" of international capital markets.  This is particularly relevant to Papua New Guinea, the country which is the largest recipient of Australia's bilateral aid and which has evidently allowed the continued receipt of such aid (in general-purpose form) to delay much-needed reform to an oversized public sector.

Accordingly, there should be a significant reduction in the $390m earmarked in 1995-96 for multilateral organisations (including the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development).  A reduction of $59m or 15 per cent should be achievable.

An even larger reduction should be made in bilateral aid, which does not even enjoy the benefit of being administered by multilateral agencies but is largely the product of various "deals" entered into by our posts overseas with the governments of the countries concerned.  Papua New Guinea receives the largest single donation at $213m and, although this is less than the $270m they received a few years ago, its policies would clearly be improved by a faster reduction in such aid.  In addition, the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) should be dispensed with.  This is, in reality, not aid but an inequitable form of industry assistance which is paid to a few very large Australian companies that do not (and should not) need taxpayer handouts to export their products and expertise.  This would produce a saving of over $130m.  Areas of emergency aid, refugee relief and NGOs (non-government organisations) should, however, be left untouched.

General Administration is a significant cost at $597m.  A 10 per cent saving ($60m) in this area, implemented over two years, should be readily achievable by reorganising our overseas posts in order of priorities now (as opposed to 30 years ago) and by having Australia adopt a lower profile on the international scene.  There is no justification for maintaining 8 posts in the USA, 3 in Paris, 4 in Switzerland and 3 in Germany and the largest single post in London, when our opportunities are developing in Asia, South America and Eastern Europe.

Summary$m
Multilateral aid59
Administration60
DIFF130
Other bilateral130
Total379

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Major Programmes

1982-831994-95 (est.)
$m% GDP$m% GDP
Financial, Budgetary, Statistical and Administrative9020.502,1020.47
Net Superannuation Payments4700.161,5710.35
Taxes Paid by Budget Agencies---301-
Total (incl. other programmes)1,4190.703,4420.76

The main item of expenditure, estimated at $2.1 billion in 1994-95, is on the running costs and other outlays of departments (or agencies) concerned with non-service delivery function -- Treasury, Tax, ABS, Finance, Customs, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Environment, Sport and Recreation, Administration Services and the Insurance and Superannuation Commission.  The "big spenders" in this context are Tax, Customs, the ABS and Administrative Services.

Substantial benefit has resulted from the commercialisation of considerable chunks of the Department of Administrative Services, a significant proportion of whose services are now provided by business units subject to competition from the private sector.  Unfortunately, due again to union pressures, the opportunity was missed to adopt a similar approach with Customs.  Although the re-organisation of that agency following the Conroy Report is projected to produce some savings once redundancy costs are met, a more commercial approach would likely produce more savings.  Accordingly, the reorganisation should be reviewed and a more commercial approach adopted.  It should be possible to obtain additional savings of $10m.

More generally, greater emphasis needs to be given in the public service to the use of market-type mechanisms and associated techniques, including separating the roles of purchaser and provider;  simulation of competitive market conditions;  annual market-testing of a proportion of expenditure;  contracting out (including compulsory competitive tendering);  vouchers;  user charges;  devolution of operations to quasi-independent agencies and/or to lower tiers of government;  the setting of performance objectives;  the establishment of contractual arrangements between Ministers and Chief Executives;  and the publication of Citizens' Charters defining citizens' rights to a defined standard of service. (24)  An investigation of the scope for greater resort to such techniques could form part of the functions of the proposed Audit Commission.

Such an investigation should not, however, preclude action in the meantime to improve productivity gains in the public service.  While Departments have been required since 1987-88 to yield an Efficiency Dividend of 1.25 per cent per annum of running costs (salaries and administrative expenses), the cumulative yield to 1993-94 was only $375m, a tiny fraction of cumulative budget outlays of $594,087m.  Given that running costs have risen by no less than 5 per cent per annum in real terms over the last 4 years, there should be scope for a special additional 2.5 per cent Efficiency Dividend in 1995-96.  This would save about $300m.


Commonwealth Superannuation

Public servants' superannuation entitlements (other than at the senior levels of the service) are very generous at a 16 per cent (unfunded) employer contribution, against a 5 per cent employee one;  with indexed pensions for most, they outdo those for most private sector employees.  The cost of retired public servants' benefits is estimated to rise from $1,571m in 1994-95 ($492m for military schemes) to $1,843m by 1997-98.  While nothing can be done to reduce these now committed costs, the Commonwealth needs to take action to reduce the future liability on working Australians arising from new entrants into the workforce.

The new superannuation scheme introduced in 1990 -- with a lump sum payment -- is estimated to eventually save $800m.  But moves should be made now to reduce the superannuation entitlements of future public servants to the legislated minimum SGC requirement, as the New South Wales Government attempted.  This could save hundreds of millions of dollars in future years.  Savings at this stage would be minimal, if any, but within a few years would be worth at least $100m.

Summary$m
Customs -- Commercialisation Measures10
Efficiency Dividend300
Commonwealth Superannuation100
Total410

ASSISTANCE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS (n.e.c.)

This "function" includes the general purpose revenue and capital payments which the Commonwealth provides the States to assist them in funding their budgetary outlays on health, education, law and order, and so on.  Assistance for general purposes is also provided to local government and, although a specific purpose payment, natural disaster relief is also included here.  (Other specific purpose payments are included under the relevant function.)

The decline since 1982-83 in general revenue assistance as a proportion of GDP -- equivalent to a reduction of about 2 per cent of GDP or $9 billion in 1994-95 dollars -- vividly highlights the fact that the Commonwealth has, in effect, financed the 2 per cent of GDP increase in its own-purpose outlays (excluding asset sales) since 1982-83 from the reduction in general purpose assistance to the States.  The States have responded by a mixture consisting mainly (relative to GDP) of reductions in their own expenditures and increases in State taxes.  The reduction in expenditure (relative to GDP) has been very largely in capital rather than current spending.

Notwithstanding the discrimination and inequity involved in terms of Commonwealth-State relations, the reduction in Commonwealth assistance to the States was justified in terms of both macro- and micro-economic policy requirements.  The resultant pressure put on States' budgets has been an important contributing factor to action that has been taken by States to improve the efficiency of both their budget and trading enterprise sectors.  This pressure needs to be maintained.

However, at the March 1994 Premiers Conference, the Commonwealth agreed to provide a faster rate of growth in the FAGs by maintaining them in real per capita terms for the next three years.  (For the previous three years they had been maintained in real terms only).  It also agreed to "one-off" special revenue assistance of $103m to all States, and $40m to Queensland and Western Australia, but the general purpose capital grant ($330m in 1993-94) was eliminated. (25)  Excluding the effect of accelerating sinking fund payments by the States, the overall effect is to increase general purpose assistance to the States by 2.5 per cent in 1994-95.

The reforms to State budgetary sectors currently being undertaken in States such as Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania demonstrate that there is considerable scope for improving productivity in those sectors.  While some of the productivity gains are of a one-off kind reflecting reductions in the extent of union "capture" of these sectors, it seems likely that further improvements in productivity will be attainable for some time into the future, particularly as changed structures expose the delivery of services to competitive forces to a greater extent.  Given this situation, it would be reasonable to expect the Commonwealth, as a major supplier of assistance, both to seek such productivity gains and to share in them.

Accordingly, while the present arrangements were agreed to last for three years, the demands of national economic policy make it appropriate for the Commonwealth again to cut back the growth in general revenue assistance to maintaining the same real level.  The case for such a cutback in 1995-96 is enhanced by the fact that generous drought relief is being provided by the Commonwealth.  Natural disaster relief payments in 1994-95 are now estimated at $255m compared with the original Budget estimate of $35m.  Saving:  about $150m.


Assistance for Local Government

There is no case for the Commonwealth to provide funding to local governments, which are a creation of the States and whose functions are distributed, as between State and local levels, differently amongst the States.  This assistance is essentially provided for the political purpose of enabling Commonwealth politicians to tell their electorates that they are helping to fund local government.

Abolition of the grants would need to be offset by compensating adjustments to States' general revenue grants.  There would be administrative savings for both the States and the Commonwealth.  Saving to the Commonwealth Budget, say, $2m.

Summary$m
General Revenue Assistance150
Abolition of Local Government Grants (net)2
Total152

PUBLIC DEBT INTEREST AND ASSET SALES

The main item under the public debt interest function is the payment of interest on borrowings raised by the Commonwealth on its own behalf.  Under existing policies at the time of the 1994-95 Budget these outlays were projected to jump to $9.5 billion by 1997-98, an increase of almost 30 per cent on the current year's estimate and 64 per cent up on the interest payments in 1991-92.  Given the increase in interest rates since May 1994, it is very likely that this estimate is now too low.

This enormous increase in interest payments reflects, of course, the large increase in Commonwealth borrowings in recent years (and the prospective further increase under existing policies).  Between June 1990 and June 1995, Commonwealth debt issued on its own account is expected to increase from around $30 billion to about $95 billion.  Thus, in the short space of just 5 years Commonwealth debt will have more than trebled.

It is relevant also that the interest cost of borrowings has been significantly understated by the issue of Treasury bonds at a premium, with that premium then being treated as an offset to public debt interest outlays.  Possibly around $1 billion per annum in interest costs has, in effect, been pushed into the future by this strategy, which comes perilously close to being open to the charge of "cooking the books".

The prospective increase in interest costs emphasises the need to speed up asset sales and use the proceeds to reduce debt as well as the deficit.  Australia is lagging behind overseas countries in the privatisation process, a process which the World Bank has concluded is one that "can and has worked.  This is true for a variety of enterprises in a variety of settings, including in poor countries".  The Commonwealth's attempts at privatisation are continually resisted by the union movement, whose last surviving bastion is the public trading enterprise sector.  The latest "problem" is with ANL Ltd, but union resistance is clearly holding back the privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank despite the obvious lack of justification for government ownership of banks in a deregulated market.  The sale of the Government's 51 per cent holding should produce a price of at least $7 per share, which would yield about $3.5 billion.

A similar situation exists with Telstra.  The Government should take a leaf out of the book of the NZ Government.  There the privatisation of NZ Telecom has been a considerable success both in terms of improving the efficiency of resource use and in terms of direct benefit to consumers.  The sale of Telstra, which recently announced a record profit of $1.7 billion, should yield at least $20 billion.

Given an average interest rate on Commonwealth debt of around 10 per cent per annum, (26) the use of the proceeds of the sale of Telecom, the remainder of the Commonwealth Bank, the ABC/SBS and Medibank Private should yield interest savings of around $2.4 billion by 1996-97 on asset sale proceeds of $24 billion.  Also, as the elimination of the deficit in 1995-96 would eliminate the projected need for borrowings of $14.6 billion to fund the projected deficit in 1995-96 and 1996-97, that would save another $1.3 billion in interest.  After allowing for loss of dividends from enterprises being privatised, the net savings would be about $2,600m.

Summary$m
Additional Privatisations (after dividend loss of $1,100m net)1,300
Elimination of Deficit1,300
Total2,600

TOTAL SUMMARY

$m
Social Security5,130
Health2,324
Education900
Housing and Community Amenities522
Defence600
Culture and Recreation894
Transport and Communications67
Labour and Employment1,387
Prime Minister25
Aboriginal Affairs155
Law, Order and Public Safety88
Foreign Affairs and Overseas Aid379
Administrative Services410
Payments to Other Governments152
Public Debt Interest2,600
Total15,636

CONCLUSION

The savings outlined in this document provide a tangible example of the (large) expenditure reductions which are available to the Government if it is prepared (and determined) to reduce the ongoing Commonwealth Budget deficit.

Nearly all of them could be achieved within a year or two.  Some longer-term ones, like sole parent pension and Commonwealth superannuation reforms would take a little longer to produce the full savings, but nevertheless should be introduced now.

Savings of the magnitude here, $15-16 billion, would provide a boost to national savings and assist Australia's economic recovery, without imposing the burden on any one sector of the economy, or any one group of people.

It would also, as noted, focus on reducing Commonwealth own-purpose outlays rather than on assistance to the States.  The following table summarises the effect in this regard of adopting my proposals and compares own-purpose outlays in 1981-82 and 1982-83, the last year of the Fraser Government.

Commonwealth Budget Outlays

YearOwn Purpose (a)Own Purpose (a)
Excl. Asset Sales
Payments to StatesTotalTotal
Excl. Asset Sales
$m% GDP$m% GDP$m% GDP$m% GDP$m% GDP
1981-8226,008    16.1926,008    16.1915,309    9.6541,517    25.8441,51725.84
1982-8331,250    18.0031,250    18.0018,140    10.4549,391    28.4649,39128.45
1994-95
(Budget est.)
88,981    19.5491,431    20.0831,652    6.95120,633    26.49123,08327.03
1994-95
(After cuts) (b)
51,243 (c)115577.693 (b)17.0629,757 (d)6.5481,000 (c)17.79107,45023.50

(a) Excludes payments to other governments only;  in other words, payments to Commonwealth trading enterprises are not excluded.

(b) Assuming all cuts occurred in 1994-95 rather than over 2 years (as proposed).

(c) Includes $24,00Om of additional asset sales proceeds.

(d) Reductions proposed in Payments to the States are Rent Assistance ($40m), Hospital Grants ($690m). Post-Secondary Education ($5OOm), CSHA ($SOOm), Tasmania Freight Subsidies ($5m), Legal Aid ($1Om), and General Revenue Assistance ($150m).



ENDNOTES

1.  It might be noted that our EPAC submission for the 1994-95 Budget proposed a reduction of $10 billion, or about 2.2 per cent of GDP, in net public sector expenditure and borrowings in 1994-95.  Our press release of 10 May 1994 on the 1994-95 Budget, entitled "Risky Strategy Threatens Tighter Money", argued that the Government's failure to reduce its deficit by more than proposed meant that it "will likely have either to take relatively early action to move to a Budget surplus or to tighten monetary policy".

2.  For a further elaboration of this point, see "Debt:  What Should Be Done" by Richard J. Wood, October 1989.

3.  An income unit is analogous to a family except that nondependent children and other adults living in the same household are treated as one unit.

4.  That assumption could be affected if there was a major change in income distribution which reduced living standards in lower income groups.  There is, however, no evidence to suggest such a reduction

5.  The paying of taxes and receiving them back, in part or in whole, via government assistance.

6.  Even allowing for drought detracting about 0.4 per cent from GDP, it now appears that the economy will grow somewhat faster than the 4.5 per cent forecast in the 1994-95 Budget.

7.  $250m for "Creative Nation", $220m for additional drought relief, and $20m of income tax relief for maritime employees engaged in international shipping.

8.  This assumes that the equivalent of the Loan Council borrowing programme for State works and housing in 1971-72 of $533m (about 1.4 per cent of GDP) would have been advanced in 1994-95.

9.  In 1982-83, Commonwealth taxation was 23.8 per cent of GDP and State taxation was 6.1 per cent of GDP.  In 1994-95, Commonwealth taxation is estimated at 22.1 per cent of GDP and State taxation at 7.4 per cent of GDP.

10.  See, in particular, "Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance", OECD, 1987.

11.  "Workforce 2005:  The Future of Jobs in the United Sates and Europe" by Alan Reynolds in OECD Societies in Transition.  The future of work and leisure, OECD 1994.

12.  See "The Bad Old Days?", Backgrounder by Richard J. Wood, 16 October 1994.  Central government expenditure is well below 30 per cent of GDP in all the more prosperous Asian countries except Malaysia, where it is just over.

13.  Diewart, W.E., "The Marginal Costs of Taxation in New Zealand", Swan Consultants, Canberra, March 1994.

14.  Findlay, C. and Jones R., "The Marginal Cost of Australian Income Taxation", Economic Record, 58, 1982, pages 253-266.

15.  While the forward estimates in the 1993-94 Budget showed resultant "savings" of $1480m for 1995-96 and $3550m for 1996-97, formally the remaining tax cuts have only been "deferred".  The 1993-94 Budget papers stated that "The second round of tax cuts will be determined by the Government at a time when fiscal conditions permit".

16.  July 94 DSS recipients JSA/NSA -- 865,000

17.  In 1982-83, 86 per cent of the average unemployed were in receipt of benefits;  in 1993-94, over 100 per cent received benefits.  It is possible that the increase in the participation rate from around 60 per cent in the early 1980s, to around 62.5 per cent now partly reflects such easing.

18.  Special Benefit is paid to people who are unable to earn a sufficient livelihood for themselves and their dependants, who are ineligible for any other pension or allowance and who can prove hardship.  It is payable at Job Search Allowance rates.

19.  This estimate allows for a considerable number of sole parent pensioners moving on to other benefits.

20.  Purchasers of pharmaceuticals are already liable to make a contribution.  Prescriptions to the general public, for example, are subsidised at a maximum of $16 per prescription item until total expenditure reaches a safety net of $450 per individual or family per year;  thereafter at $2.60 a prescription until such additional expenditures (that is, over the $450) reach $135.20 a year;  then at no cost thereafter in that year.

21.  Notwithstanding the Industry Commission Report, there is a strong case for the States to sell off the public housing stock.  The proceeds could be used to pay off debt, and the resultant interest savings would probably more than finance the provision of rental assistance to low-income and disadvantaged groups.

22.  It might be noted, however, that, once long-term unemployed complete a labour market assistance program, they are then treated as "normal" unemployed, not long-term, if they do not obtain a job;  in other words, there is a shuffling of the unemployed pack which artificially reduces the long-term unemployed.

23.  Richard J. Wood in Black Suffering, White Guilt?, February 1993.

24.  For further details, see Richard J. Wood, "Improving The Efficiency of the Public Service:  Alternatives to the Efficiency Dividend Arrangements", Backgrounder, 13 February 1994.

25.  However, the general purpose capital grant for Better Cities is continued (at $260m in 1994-95 compared to $213m in 1993-94).

26.  Although the average interest rate on outstanding Commonwealth debt is around 8 per cent, the relevant rate for purposes of calculating savings is the current average rate.