Saturday, March 02, 1991

The Rise of the Femocrats

Sisters in Suits
by Marian Sawer,
Allen and Unwin:  Sydney, 1990.

&

Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats
by Anna Yeatman,
Allen and Unwin:  Sydney, 1990.

Playing the State
Sophie Watson,
Allen and Unwin:  Sydney 1990.

To outsider, the bureaucratic and legislative achievements of feminism in Australia seem very great;  so great, indeed, that feminism appears to be part of the New Establishment.  From a miniscule advisory unit in the Prime Minister's Department during the Whitlam years, feminism's presence in the bureaucracy has spread to every Commonwealth Department, as well as into the States.  It has created a raft of positions occupiable only by women with feminist credentials, and it has successfully guided the enactment of laws compelling other institutions of society (businesses, universities) to establish similiar women-oriented positions.  It has also diverted public monies to support its own favourite projects in the community.

The view from within the feminist movement is rather different;  just how different can be grasped from three recent books dealing with the "femocracy":  Marian Sawer's Sisters in Suits, Anna Yeatman's Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats, and Sophie Watson's collection, Playing the State.  These books recognise the gains feminism has made, but see them as being over-shadowed by the expectations that have been dashed, the battles lost, the positions captured by non-feminist women, by the threat from an anti-feminist backlash growing just at the time when feminism is suffering from exhaustion.  As Sawer comments, "the older generation of political activists worries about how to "hand on the torch".  Feminists inside the bureaucracy bemoan the lack of organised pressure from outside".  The effusion of soul-searching, stock-taking and strategic reassessment spawned by this crisis of morale should be of interest to us all, for it offers us fascinating insights not only into feminism but also the ALP's style of government, the politics of the media and the general nature of contemporary Australian politics.

Hester Eisenstein, one of the contributors to Sophie Watson's volume, writes that "the strategy of creating a femocracy has gone hand in hand with a strategy of alliance with the Labor Party".  As the 1980s rolled on, however, the ALP became increasingly obsessed with loyalty to itself, and those femocrats who were not members of the Party found themselves somewhat frozen out.

The case of Mary Draper is instructive.  According to Marian Sawer, when Draper took over Victoria's Office of Women's Affairs (as it was then known) in 1983, she found the ALP's women's policy "very thin" and therefore set about developing an agenda of her own.  Because party committees in that State played an important role in the operation of the government, however, the Status of Women Policy Committee had to have Draper's initiatives "retrospectively legitimised through the party conference".  This made her unpopular with party women.  As Sawer comments, "women without strong links with the party found it difficult to succeed in senior positions in Victoria".

At the Federal level, the obsession with loyalty saw the Office of the Status of Women select staff of non-women's movement backgrounds (and even non-feminist backgrounds!).  The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet -- a department notable for its sensitivity to political imperatives -- became a major source of recruits.  One recounted to Sawer that she had been "surprised to find there were very few in NSW who regarded themselves as feminists".

When the veteran feminist Anne Summers left the office in 1986, she was replaced by Sue Brooks, who had previously worked for the State Bank of Victoria and the Victorian Treasurer.  Brooks lacked "shared experience in the women's movement", which created some problems over consultative mechanisms.  While she found the post a "radicalising experience", the office showed an increasing concern with "second-guessing" PM & C's economic rationalists, and a tendency to submit to the government only those policy options which it was thought likely to accept.  The emphasis on being "on side" with PM &  C even led to men being appointed to the office!


MODERATES AND EXTREMISTS

The influx of ALP women into the femocracy exacerbated a pre-existing division between relatively moderate and extreme femocrats.  A similar division has existed in the general feminist movement virtually since the beginning, although the bureaucratic factional alignments have not always corresponded to those in the movement as a whole.

Women's Liberation groups began to spring up in 1969, first in Sydney and Canberra, then spreading rapidly to the other capitals.  Focusing initially on "consciousness raising" and "personal transformation" with a view to making revolutionary changes, these groups were amorphous and anarchic.  Many of these groups developed an enthusiasm for socialist ideologies, separatist lifestyles and paranoid, rancorous protests against the insidious "patriarchy".  They also seem to have furnished many of the staff (at least in the initial stages) for women's refuges, rape crisis centres and women's health centres.

The more pragmatic organisation was the Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL), which coalesced in 1972.  WEL adopted the same six-point agenda as Women's Liberation -- free, "safe" abortion on demand;  24-hour childcare;  Equal Employment Opportunities;  equal access to education;  free contraceptives;  and equal pay.  But WEL was more interested in getting "runs on the board", as it were, than in making symbolic gestures or spouting revolutionary rhetoric.  Using the expertise of professional women -- female journalists, sociologists, economists, political scientists -- WEL mounted a sophisticated campaign and became, as Lyndal Ryan puts it (in Watson), "the political bombshell of 1972".

Within the bureaucracy, the moderatelextreme division has revolved around the competition between the Office of the Status of Women (earlier known as the Women's Branch and then the Office of Women's Affairs) and the older Women's Bureau of the Department of Employment and Industrial Relations.  In the late Whitlam and early Fraser periods, the Women's Bureau was "not headed by an SES officer and its actions were partly dictated by an extremely conservative branch head".  It was also somewhat jealous of the Women's Affairs Branch.  By contrast, the Women's Affairs Branch was headed first by Elizabeth Reid and then by Sara Dowse, both of whom were in WEL as well as Women's Liberation.

By 1988, the relative inclination of the two units had been reversed.  Now the Women's Bureau viewed itself as more in touch than the Office of the Status of Women (OSW) with the interests of working-class women.  Between 1983 and 1986 (i.e. Anne Summers' period at OSW), bureau staff referred disparagingly to the "Office of Women of Status".  One reason for this (which became more pronounced after 1986) was that the Bureau used the euphemistic employment criterion of "knowledge of women's issues" to recruit movement-feminists while OSW was recruiting non-activists and non-feminists.  The tensions persisted despite, according to Sawer, "deliberate efforts to recruit heads of the Women's Bureau who would be able to work more co-operatively with the office".

Relations between femocrats and feminists in the community have often been severely strained.  For example, when the first ever Prime Ministerial advisory position on women's affairs was created by the Whitlam Government, and filled by Elizabeth Reid, there was uproar in the "women's" movement.  The editorial collective of one Sydney journal circulated a protest letter declaring that "no woman chosen by men to advise upon us will be acceptable to us".  An accompanying leaflet attacked the applicants, "pointed out that all the women on the short list were white, hlghly educated, socially adept and heterosexual, and asked how they would resolve conflicts of loyalty between the PM and women".

The case of Anne Summers is also interesting.  In 1969 she was a founder of Women's Liberation in Australia.  At a Women's Liberation conference in Melbourne in 1970, she was abused for daring to wear make-up.  Then in 1973, she was one of the unsuccessful applicants for Elizabeth Reid's position.  She also helped establish a radical journal called Refractory Girl.  1974 saw her participate in the "squat" which established "Elsie", believed to be the country's first women's refuge.  In 1975 she published the controversial book, Damned Whores and God's Police, and was at the forefront of a hostile Balmain Town Hall crowd that confronted Elizabeth Reid's spokeswoman over International Women's Year funding.  Then, after completing a PhD and working as a journalist, she emerged as head of OSW in 1983.  Summers had thus passed from an early radicalism to an interest in the femocracy, then from radical criticism of the femocracy to being the nation's leading femocrat!

One twist of Summers' career draws our attention to the media's political role.  The distinct lack of interest in "feminism" shown by young women nowadays is often blamed, by feminists, upon the prejudicial outpourings of the "masculinist" media.  But how anti-feminist really is the media?  True, Sawer notes the "unremitting press hostility", the trivialisation and personal innuendo practised on Elizabeth Reid (and some others).  On the other hand, we see that of 164 press articles about WEL during 1972, only three were unfavourable.  And when refuge funding seemed threatened in the early Fraser years, "Lyndal Ryan, who had left the Office [of Women's Affairs] contacted Paul Lyneham and arranged for a Four Corners program on the refuges".  On top of this, we learn from Sawer that at one stage the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery was so anti-feminist that it elected Anne Summers as its President!


HOSTILITY TO NON-FEMINISTS

The books reveal the existence within both feminism and the femocracy of a widespread antipathy towards non-feminist women.  Anna Yeatman, using a species of post-Marxist class analysis, decides that "a dilemma appears for femocrats when it is appreciated that their feminism, when set to work in practical policies, usually turns out to be an effective ideology and class consciousness for them but not for the majority of women".

One of the most explicit cases of hostility to traditional women is revealed by Watson's contributor, Ludo McFerren:  in 1976-77, it transpires, the women's refuge liaison officer in NSW's Department of Youth and Community Services persuaded her Minister to oppose the funding of church-run refuges on the grounds that only "women's groups should set up women's refuges".  The pragmatic Premier, Neville Wran, over-rode this policy because of the political power of Catholics in the ALP, but the feminist opposition did limit the number of funded religious refuges in the State.

Now, if the objective is to help women in need, then surely the ideological pedigree of the helpers is irrelevant.  If, however, the object is to gain power over other women, to close off their opportunities for living in ways which feminists dislike, then the drive to privilege feminist refuges makes perfect sense.  She who offers the shelter calls the tune!

Some of the writers' off-hand remarks also reveal anti-traditional feelings.  Anna Yeatman speaks of the ideology of "familism" and implies that the position of women in the home is inherently one of "exploitation".  Ominously, she goes on to argue that "struggles against the exploitation of women by men are necessarily struggles over the extent to which women's work should be left to private choices ..." and that "femocrats seek to deprivatise this relationship ..." that is, to make people's private relationships the objects of "public" or political scrutiny.  Judith Allen speaks of a "foetocentric backlash" that has forced women to pay 40 per cent of the cost of their own abortions.  The comment most demeaning to home-making women, however, must surely be Marian Sawer's quip that National Party MP Tom McVeigh was "a Catholic father of five who also bred Clydesdales".

The wealth of information in the three books is so great that here I have merely presented some of the highlights.  Researchers can find within these pages plenty of ideas for future work:  they might consider the role played by Liberal Party women, as well as by pro-feminist male MPs and bureaucrats, in the femocracy's advancement;  or they might ponder the relationship between bureaucratic and academic feminists (particularly since Anna Yeatman argues that the latter are fully-fledged "femocrats");  or they might study how the feminist movement has used the competing jurisdictions of Australian federalism to advance its own objectives.

This is not to say that the books have no faults.  Yeatman's handful of prescient observations must be extracted from the convoluted prose so beloved of the modern social science academic.  She accepts uncritically the caricatures of conservatism put about by radical intellectuals:  neo-conservatives are "undemocratic", deregulators are "proto-fascists", etc.  Watson's Playing the State suffers, as so many collections do, from the uneven quality of the contributions.  Sawer's Sisters in Suits has suffered from its long gestation, and also from a fear of "economic rationalism" -- a fear which seems rather excessive when it is recalled that "efficiency" was one of the earliest stimuli for equal opportunities in the public service.

These books give us a glimpse of feminism's state of mind, which is not very healthy.  However, the femocrats' bureaucratic achievements -- machinery, regulations, legislation -- have faired much better than their morale.  Although some budgets have been cut back, some positions downgraded, a few planned programs put on hold, the essential structures remain in place.  The femocracy is unlikely ever to shrink to its proportions of the Fraser era, let alone to the miniscule size of its Whitlam foundations.  Feminism's biggest handicap must be its poor public reputation, and this, I would suggest, will only change when those women who are seen as feminism's leaders begin to show genuine interest in the aspirations of ordinary women.  That, I would submit, means taking the desire for home, children and domesticity as seriously as the quest for a career.

Friday, March 01, 1991

Coal:  the communist challenge to law and order

THE PROBLEM

THIS PAMPHLET WILL TELL YOU ABOUT --

  • The facts behind the Coal Industry Tribunal Award of December, 1950.
  • The strangling effects of the one-day stoppages between January and March, 1951.
  • The growth of lawlessness in the mines.
  • The pit-top meetings as part of the Communist technique of sabotaging output, and sabotaging awards.
  • The sort of frivolous stoppages that rob us of coal.
  • The way the darg defeats the use of machines for increasing output.
  • The Coal Industry Tribunal, and the Joint Coal Board.
  • The story of Government control at Coalcliff, and Government ownership at Lithgow.
  • The Communist rejection of Arbitration.
  • The vacillation of the authorities on the observance of conditions for paid annual holidays.

THE SOLUTION

THESE THINGS WILL RELIEVE THE COAL SHORTAGE

  • Develop the Open Cut Mines.
  • Use Snowy River earth-moving machines, if necessary, on open cuts.
  • Make duplication of Railway from Muswellbrook a first priority and transfer men from East Sydney railway.
  • Speed up road and rail connection with Burragorang and speed up development of the mines there.
  • Secure a revision of the existing dargs in mechanised pits.
  • Introduce the incentives in the Gallagher award of December, 1950.  This will, in itself, restrict frivolous stoppages, curtail pit-top meetings.
  • Make mining lodges responsible for authorising stoppages.
  • Galvanise the State Labor Ministry into giving the Commonwealth positive help.
  • Prevent Communist control of coal mines, which is strangling our whole economy, e.g., use Secret Ballot.  Is there a new field for public relations?


When your wife cannot cook your meal because there is no gas, and cannot wash the children or do the ironing because of an electricity black-out, when your train is cancelled, or your tram service curtailed to save coal, when your factory is closed because there is no power, and when you are unemployed and cannot buy the things you need for the home, when these and other uncomfortable things happen daily, life becomes pretty grim.  How long are you going to put up with these disruptions?  What are you going to do about them?  What have you been doing about them for the past five years?

It is easy to "pass the buck" and make the excuse that you do not know who really is to blame.  But even though all these industrial disputes are complicated, there is a fairly safe test you can apply when trying to find out who is to blame.  Here it is, and it is quite simple.


ARBITRATION OR JUNGLE RULE?

We have set up Arbitration Courts and other Industrial Tribunals whose main job is to hear union arguments and to settle disputes.  These Courts are on the job all the time and don't make things difficult for those who want to settle disputes legally.  Very well.  If one of the parties to a dispute refuses to go to the Arbitration Court, or if it decides to take direct action, and stage a strike to force its demands, then it is clear that the party so acting is to blame for the industrial hold-up.

The party that refuses to abide by the law of the land is a rebel, and, as such, cannot expect our sympathy or our support.  We must stand for Law and Order, or we shall have to put up with the rule of the Jungle, where might is right.  All rebels may have just grievances, but rebellions must be put down if society is to survive.  If rebels are not prepared to let the Courts set up by Parliament judge the merits of their claim, then they are relying upon jungle rule, and jungle rule means chaos.

In this case, where the Miners' Federation are endeavouring to beat us to our knees because they can stop our factories, and throw us out of work, disrupt our transport, our gas works, and our power plants, we have no alternative but to support the authority of the law, and the forces that stand for order.  If we give in, then the miners, like Hitler, or like the Communists, will regard our surrender as appeasement, and will be continually increasing the kind and extent of their demands.


WHO STANDS FOR LAW AND ORDER?

You rightly expect that you will be supported in your stand by all who believe in the supremacy of the law of the land.  So when Mr. Chifley found himself in mortal conflict with the Communists in 1949, the Liberals and the Country Party stood behind him and helped Mr. Chifley all they could.  To-day, when the Liberals and the Country Party are fighting the same sort of battle that Mr. Chifley waged, the leaders of the Labor Party are playing politics and are not giving Mr. Menzies the unqualified support he gave Mr. Chifley.

If you ask where the Labor Party really stands in this war for survival the best answer is found in the Communist Miners' Federation declaration of the terms upon which they would go back to work.  Mr. Williams declared that they had "neutralised the Labor Movement" and by the agreement made with the A.C.T.U. "were assured of its 100 per cent. support for our claims".


DOUBLE-CROSSING

As you read this pamphlet, we are sure that you will think it outrageous after all that has been done for the mining industry and for the miners during the past ten years that our position should be measurably worse than it was before the War.  Is this constant interruption with industry to be permanent?  If it is, where is our vaunted full-employment policy?  What is the use of labor leaders boasting about having attained full-employment when various key groups of unions can throw tens of thousands out of work, when these groups wreck our factories, strangle our businesses, disrupt our transport, and reduce housewives to despair as they go about their work in unlighted homes!


ONE-DAY STOPPAGES

The effects of the one-day stoppages decreed by the Communist majority in the Miners' Federation, added to other stoppages, are felt everywhere.  On the first occasion in January, 1951, about 200,000 men and women were thrown out of work, and apart from a serious loss in wages, there was a loss of about £2,000,000 production.  Lost production is best measured in terms of lost homes, less furniture, less clothes, fewer refrigerators, fewer motor cars, and so on.  These things cannot be made up;  they have gone for ever.

What do you think of the reasons given by the Miners' leaders for the stoppages?  You know the facts.  The Miners' Federation called a strike each week as a protest against an award made on December 20, 1950, by the Coal Industry Tribunal, Mr. F.H. Gallagher, which required the miners to work ten consecutive clays to qualify for a pound a week increase (in addition to the basic wage rise of one pound, of course).  Men who don't work the ten consecutive days don't get the extra pound a week.  The Federation sought to prevent any of the miners from getting it by calling the weekly stoppages.  The Communist majority in the Federation chose the award as the ground for striking, condemned it as a "swindle", demanded its cancellation, and the unconditional granting of the log of claims, including the £2 per week increase.

We shall try to show you later in this pamphlet that the Miners' leaders have repeated this tactic again and again since 1947.

They attack an award which might be twisted into an industrial dispute and then apply the Communist technique for disrupting industry, at the same time using the occasion for making new demands in the hope of wringing fresh concessions from the Government or from the Industrial Tribunals, who are always anxious to save the people the distress of industrial upheavals.  Here, for example, is the usual method adopted:

An award is made giving something the miners have been agitating for subject to their fulfilling certain conditions.  Because the men's leaders want unconditional benefits they strike against the award;  later, under the terms of the settlement, or for other reasons, the award is varied by removing the conditions.  Then fresh demands are formulated, and the business starts all over again.

Every concession squeezed from the Court, or from the Government, is represented to the rank and file of the miners' unions as another example of the manner in which the Communist leaders are able to "put things over".  And this partly explains their success at elections of Federation officials!

On the occasion of the recent strike there is no really serious dissatisfaction with the award on the part of the rank and file, who stand to gain from it;  the stoppage had to take place to carry out the commands of the Moscow authorities to sabotage all efforts by the democracies to build up their defences as a means of protecting us against Communist aggression,


WHAT COAL SHORTAGES MEAN

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of coal in our Australian economy.  It is the foundation of all our industrial progress, and is therefore vital to all our defence preparations.  Without it, our migration policy must be curtailed, for it is estimated that every 100,000 migrants require an additional 250,000 tons of coal.  Unless the vast post-war expansion of industry and transport is to "fold-up" we must get additional supplies of coal to keep our power houses at Bunnerong, White Bay, Pyrmont, and elsewhere up to our demands for electricity.  These power houses have been starved and rendered inefficient by inadequate maintenance and by short supplies of coal suitable for their types of boilers.  Coal and power shortages have prevented the Broken Hill Steel-works from working at more than 70 per cent. capacity, and that has meant the loss of our export markets, and has had its repercussions throughout the whole Commonwealth by disastrously retarding our development.

Because steel cannot be produced in sufficient quantities, our industries have been prevented from supplying our urgent needs for homes.  The shortage of coal, power and steel has played havoc with our railway transport, caused it to show a loss of some millions, and thrown such a burden upon road transport as to make many of our roads unuseable;  Millions of pounds are now involved in road reconstruction and repairs.

Or take the effect upon our ship-building programme of the shortages of coal and steel.  We would not need many of the new ships we have ordered were it not that the Water-side workers and the Seamen are following a course similar to that being pursued by the Miners under directions from Moscow, by slowing down the handling of cargoes and the turn round of ships.

Coal shortages result in slowing down the making of bricks, tiles, and fibro-cement needed for our building programme.  Increased demands by the Miners for houses have recently developed as a result of welfare schemes worked out by the Joint Coal Board, but every strike or petty stoppage delays the fulfilment of their expectations.

Every new factory that is built, every new railway engine or truck that takes the rails, and every new home that is occupied and furnished reminds us that coal out-put and power supplies must be increased to keep pace with increased demands.  To have to resort to substitute fuels, or to the installation of factory power plants is to add disastrously to costs of production, and therefore to our cost of living.

Think what might have been.  Between January 15, 1951 when the Miners returned to work after three weeks' holiday, and March 8, the one-day stoppages had lost us 311,250 tons of coal.  In addition, other disputes and stoppages that were unavoidable lost us another 309,585 tons or a total of about 620,000 tons.  It is estimated that one and a half tons of coal is needed for a ton of steel and that a ton of coal is used in the building of the average house.  In addition the loss of time in factories ranging from eight to fourteen hours a week because of power shortages, and the never-ending irritation of the housewife would have been prevented.


TARGETS AND OUTPUT

In recent years, the coal authorities have been setting out the minimum needs of our expanding economy as "targets" hoping thereby to stimulate productive effort.  They have also been proceeding with "mechanisation" in the hope of increasing out-put per man-shift.  But all to no avail.  The following figures eloquently tell the story of the deliberate starvation of coal-hungry industries:

In 1938 machines were used to cut 28 per cent. of coal mined, and the output was 3.51 tons per man-shift.  This output has steadily decreased to 2.91 tons in 1949 notwithstanding that much more was cut in that year by machines;  in addition, in 1949 over 30 per cent. was mechanically loaded on to skips as against 6.5 per cent in 1938, and even then less coal was loaded.  The setting of "targets" has emphasised the Miners' policy of restricted output.

In the last three years of the war, the coal output, and the losses that might have been avoided were:

YearOutput:
Tons
Avoidable
Losses:
Tons
194311,528,0001,284,000
194411,102,0001,547,000
194510,237,0001,282,000

The figures for the past three years are:

YearOutput:
Tons
Avoidable
Losses:
Tons
1947-4811,917,0001,607,000
1948-4911,647,0002,096,000
1949-5011,191,9003,015,000

Had it not been for the open cuts, the coal position would have been wholly desperate.  At the beginning of 1943 there was only one open cut with an output of 55,000 tons a year.  In 1950, there were 19 cuts producing 1,600,000 tons.


THE DARG AND MECHANISATION

A closer look at the production from mines, as distinct from that from open cuts, shows clearly the policy of deliberate restriction.  At Hebburn, No. 2, when all coal was loaded into skips by hand, the output was 5.95 tons per man-shift.  In 1950 with machine loading, the output is 3.81 tons.  At the same mine, before power borers were installed, the output was 8.81 tons as against 8.64 in 1950.

At Elrington, 1268 tons a day were loaded before machines were installed.  Now that the mine is 60 per cent. mechanised, the output has fallen to 735 tons a day.  At the same mine, when the machines were first installed, each machine loaded an average of 192 tons a day.  To-day it is 135 tons.

At Hebburn, No. 2 in 1939 when all coal was handmined, the lodge fixed 16 skips as the number to be filled (the darg).  In 1950, with 70 per cent. of the mine mechanised, the darg remains at 16.  At Burwood, there was a darg of 26 skips before the mine was mechanised.  When mechanised, the darg was reduced to 22 skips with the result that the output per man-shift at the coal face fell from 15.73 tons to 12.34 tons.

In one group of mines, about a million pounds was expended in mechanisation and improving facilities, and yet the output from these mines is less than it was before that expenditure was incurred.  One consequence of the reduced output in relation to the increased capital expenditure has been the heavy additional cost per ton of coal mined.

In the face of this refusal so to work the machines as to increase output, the 1951 policy of the Joint Coal Board to push ahead with mechanisation, and to import additional machinery from overseas is, in itself, not likely to get us increased tonnage of coal.


RESTRICTED OUTPUT

The Joint Coal Board reports that N.S.W. Miners are producing about 51,000 tons of coal daily, which is, at least, 10,000 tons below their capacity given the existing dargs, while if full use of machines were made "capacity" could be increased by some thousands of tons without involving any undue effort.

Output is reduced not merely by adopting smaller dargs, or by deliberately slowing down;  it is reduced by taking longer "cribs" i.e., time off for meals, etc., industrial disputes, political action, community considerations (funerals), inter-union quarrels, late starts, early knocking off, absenteeism, break-down of mine equipment, weather conditions, and so on.

The Joint Coal Board showed in its first report (1947-48) that about 550,000 tons were lost through disputes between the craft unions and the Miners' Federation.  Another half-million tons were lost from stoppages that were socio-political, rather than industrial.  Still another million was lost for reasons so vague as to be impossible to classify.


FANTASTIC LOSSES

In the Board's view, these losses were "fantastically high" when the needs of the community for coal were so desperate.  And all the Board has done to improve living conditions in the coal-mining districts has so far failed to bring any change in employer-employee relationships, or any good will for the Board itself.

In 1950, the Joint Coal Board decided to make a fresh appeal to those members of the mining unions who were not deliberately committed to the destruction of the Australian economy.  It published "Coal Facts", which showed that the loss of 2,500,000 tons of coal for the year 1949 was equivalent to a loss of:  400 houses, 1,000 motor cars, 2,000 refrigerators, and 2,000 electric stoves.

There was a loss of 860,000 man-shifts, which was equivalent to a loss of 48 shifts or an absence from work of 9 weeks for each miner.  That meant that virtually 3,600 miners did not work for a whole twelve months.  The loss in wages to the miner was £1,800,000 or an average of about £4 each pay for each miner!  The picture sketched by the Joint Coal Board also illustrates the fact that absenteeism has increased over the past ten years from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. i.e., for every 100 men employed, 15 are away from work every day!


ARBITRATION

Whatever grievances the miners have had in the past, they can have none now in respect of the readiness of any government to listen to those grievances, and, in general, to take steps to remove them.  Indeed, some of the concessions have been outright appeasement and have consequently tended to make the Federation leaders more truculent in their attitudes.

There have been Royal Commissions and other investigations into coal mining and its problems, and there has been a spate of legislation, some of which Mr. Justice Davidson (in his report of March 13, 1946) criticised as adding "confusion to the tangled mass of legislation surrounding coal mining under which it is a mystery that any industry could survive".


SPECIAL COAL TRIBUNALS

During the war, the coal industry was regulated by the Commonwealth under its defence powers.  When those powers were about to lapse, the Commonwealth and New South Wales Governments agreed to legislate jointly to secure what neither could effectively do separately.  By legislation passed by each Government in 1946, the Joint Coal Board was established in February, 1947 with power "to ensure that coal is produced in the state in such quantities and with such regularity as will meet requirements throughout Australia and in trade with other countries".  In addition, the Board is to conserve develop, and work the coal resources to the best advantage;  to distribute such coal in such manner, quantities, classes, grades and prices as will be in the public interest, and finally "to promote the welfare of workers engaged in the coal industry in the State".  These powers are extremely wide and allow the Board to take over and manage any privately owned mine if the occasion seems to warrant it.

In addition, the Coal Industry Acts of 1946 establish the Coal Industry Tribunal (Mr. F.H. Gallagher) as an arbitration authority to deal with the industry as it affects the Miners' Federation, while other Unions engaged in the industry come under system of central and local Reference Boards.  Mr. Gallagher is also Chairman of the Central Reference Board.

There is thus a separate Board of Management and a separate Industrial Tribunal devoting all their time to the problems of production as well as to the disputes that arise.  Governments have, at least, gone more than half-way to meet Miners' claims.


STUDIED CONTEMPT

The practice of the Tribunal has been to anticipate disputes, and to eliminate, as far as possible, any undue delay in hearing those that develop.  Nevertheless, the policy of the Miners' Federation has been for direct action, and when ever the Tribunal makes an award with which it disagrees, the Federation's deliberate policy (See Common Cause -- the Miners' paper) has been to fan agitations and promote strikes in the confident expectation that if enough vigour is displayed in aggressive opposition, the Coal tribunal will either reverse or modify its decision.  This readiness to review on the part of the Coal Tribunal becomes a new jumping-off ground for discrediting it.  And not being a "Court", the Tribunal has no remedy lying to it for contempt.  There is ample evidence of the determination of the Miners' Federation to refuse to accept arbitration, although it has no compunction in taking what it can get from the system.  The Tribunal has pointed out, however, that if the Federation objects to an award, there is always the right to apply for a new hearing, and even of appealing to the High Court for a writ of Prohibition if it is thought that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers.  The tribunal went to extreme lengths to meet the Federation's objections to this award of December, 1950, but the Miners' Federation unhesitatingly preferred direct action as being the most effective manner of black-mailing the Community and the Tribunal.

If there is no justification for the Miners' contemptuous attack upon the Arbitration system, little can be found for the childishly irresponsible stoppages that have accounted, in recent years, for annual losses of millions of tons of coal.


FRIVOLOUS STOPPAGES

The Joint Coal Board includes an item "Not readily classifiable" in its catalogue of reasons for stoppages, and it comments that not only is this the case, but often reasons for the stoppages are never known.

A boy's boots are hidden, a cap is missing, a path is muddy, a manager so far forgets himself as to help a man push a skip, a horse has a nasty smell, a S.P. Bookmaker delays settlement, or the High Court declares invalid "such progressive legislation as the Bank Bill" -- these are some of the reasons for holding a pit-top meeting that always results in the whole of the employees of that mine going home.

The Joint Coal Board also lists many stoppages hypocritically called as a protest against the progress of its welfare programme, against delays in installing power borers, in equipping pit-top shelters, and so on, and it comments that such strikes are futile for they can do nothing to hasten the objects of the strike, and often indirectly delay their realisation.

The following list of frivolous stoppages indicates the deep-seated failure on the part of lodge leaders to exercise leadership in the several mines -- although some of them have at times pilloried the younger employees for their indiscipline.  They also show the unquestioning loyalty of the employees to each other, and their unrelenting refusal to examine the bona-fides of any employee making a complaint at a pit-top meeting.


PIT-TOP MEETINGS

Pit-top meetings have long been a means of irritating the employers, and they have always played into the hands of the agitators and malcontents.  There have been efforts over the years to prohibit the meetings during working hours unless the management consented, or unless there is a genuine industrial dispute.  At times, Tribunals have imposed penalties for unauthorised stoppages but have seldom exacted them.  Indeed, in seeking to avert industrial upheavals, the Tribunals have been so ready to appease and conciliate that they have forfeited some public respect, and have undermined their authority with the Miners.

If the pit-top meeting is a genuine opportunity to air grievances or to discuss industrial methods, then there is much to be said for the contention that it should be held after knock-off time, when discussions could continue without watching the clock.  But that does not suit the irresponsibles, or the agitators, while the practice of a large number of employees leaving the pits as soon as they have filled their "Darg" -- an hour or more before normal knock-off time -- would not make for full attendance after work.

There is widespread agreement that the pit-top meeting should be curtailed, but in any case, there is urgent need for formalising the procedure, and for making the lodge officials responsible for them.  As it is, anyone seems able to call a meeting, and the procedure is hopelessly haphazard.


IDLE MINES

Every day, the District Officers of the Joint Coal Board collect telephonic information about every mine in N.S.W. and thus the Board knows every morning what mines are idle, for what reason, how many men are affected, and the loss of coal resulting.

Mr. Justice Davidson catalogues a long list of stoppages which he says (p.170) "are a few only of the more unreasonable excuses for cessation of work".  Here are some of them:

In May and June, 1944, many of the collieries of the Northern District were idle as a protest against butter rationing.  At Bellbird, on 24th January, '44, the mine was idle as a protest against income tax assessments received the previous week.  About 29th November, 1944, many pits were idle as a protest against a vice-president of the Northern Branch of the Federation remaining at work after reaching retiring age.  At Pelaw Main, on 10th July, '44, a wheeler complained that his horse had a sore shoulder, and while it was being replaced, all the miners went down except the wheelers' pair of miners;  when it was discovered that they were missing, all the men came out, and went home without making any further inquiries.  At Corrimal, a pair of boots had been missing from the bathroom for several days prior to the 16th June, 1944.  A miner accused the clippers of being responsible.  The latter became incensed, and refused to resume work until he apologised publicly.  The man apologised publicly to avoid a stoppage.  The clippers then demanded that he apologise privately as well.  He agreed, but the stoppage still took place.  There was a similar occurrence at the Hermitage, in the Western field, on 10th May, 1944, with the inevitable stoppage even after the boots had been restored.


LAWLESSNESS

The records of the Joint Coal Board are replete with instances similar to those quoted by Mr. Justice Davidson.  At Burwood, on 6th and 7th October, 1949, 741 men were idle with a daily loss of 2,736 tons, because of a dispute about the quality of household coal.  At Abedare Central, and at Stanford Main No. 2, 296 and 361 employees respectively were idle for a loss of 670 and 867 tons of coal as a protest against the non-issue of domestic coal.  At the State Mine, at Lithgow, there was a pit-top meeting on 16th August, 1949, which requested an immediate issue of household coal.  The manager said this was impossible as there had been falls leaving accumulations of debris and mud.  To allow household coal to be pulled up would interfere with the general working of the mine.  He promised that some household coal would be made available next day, but this was unacceptable, and the men went home.  1,355 tons of coal were lost.


ARROGANT ATTITUDE

This stand and deliver attitude is characteristic where there is the slightest suggestion that the management is indifferent to a grievance, and their stopping work highlights their utter indifference to the needs of other workers in the community who cannot get a ton of coal or coke in a year (let alone one ton a month) because of miners' stoppages, and in addition have to put up with the misery and discomfort of unlit and unwarmed homes.  The urgency of the miners' demands for their issue of household coal was not unconnected with their desire to fulfil promises to sell some on the black-market.


IRRESPONSIBLE METHODS

In October, 1949, Austral Main was idle for three days because of a complaint about the bath house.  32 men were affected and 134 tons daily were lost.  On 18th August, 1950, Excelsior mine, employing 225 men, was idle with a loss of 460 tons because of dissatisfaction with the condition of the bathroom.  On 2nd August, 1950, South Bulli, with 496 men, lost 810 tons of coal because it was alleged that there was an offensive odour in the changeroom.  At Stockrington, during October, November, and December, 1949, there were several occasions upon which pit-top meetings threw the mine idle, but the management was never given any reasons for the men not working.  On the other hand, on 24th October, 1949, Stockrington No. 1 was idle for a loss of 405 tons because of dissatisfaction with the bathroom.  The trouble was satisfactorily adjusted, but the men continued with their meeting, and then went away without having any further communication with the management.

Stockrington No. 2 was idle on 14th and on 19th October, 1949, with a daily loss of 749 tons because of resentment at men being disciplined for smoking in the pits -- a practice which is prohibited by law because of the possible fire hazards.


DISCIPLINE RESENTED

Disciplinary action by the management invariably brings about a cessation of work.  Mr. Justice Davidson comments that discipline is almost non-existent, and he strongly recommends the restoration of the rights of management to dismiss recalcitrant employees, subject to appeals to the Arbitration Court.  There is little doubt that the right to hire and fire would immeasurably raise the morale of the men in many mines where discipline is non-existent.


ROLLING STRIKES

During September, 1950, there were rolling strikes throughout the Northern and Southern fields involving losses of thousands of tons of coal to protest against not granting long service leave to miner "service" men.  On 29th September, 1950, Abermain No. 1 was idle with the loss of 290 tons because there was some delay in harnessing the horses in the absence of the Ostler.  On 11th October, there was a dispute at Excelsior mine over an alleged delay in getting a new collar for a horse.  The management was not approached in the first instance, but the dispute involved a daily loss of 460 tons.  On 2nd October, 1950, John Darling was idle for a loss of 2,020 tons because it was alleged that an employee had been prematurely discharged from the Newcastle hospital.  Stockrington lost 890 tons on 25th October, '50, because the miners were protesting against an increase in bus fares.  South Bulli was idle on 9th October, as a protest against the evidence of the Colliery Manager, before the Coal Industry Tribunal.  Aberdare Central lost 650 tons on 27th September, 1950, because the wheelers objected to their horses being used by other employees.  Hartley Main was idle on 8th December, 1950, and lost 40 tons of coal because the miners were disputing payment of an S.P. debt by a bookmaker.  And on the day after the first of the general one-day stoppages, 6th February, 1951, Hebburn was idle because the wheelers demanded another horse.  The management was willing to provide another if an inspector so recommended after investigation.  But the men would not wait for any inspection, and went home.


CONTEMPTUOUS DISREGARD FOR THE PUBLIC

To counter this contemptuous disregard for the rights of the community, the several tribunals that, from time to time, have had to deal with the mining industry, have sought to impose sanctions in the form of penalties -- loss of annual leave -- loss of pay -- and so on.  Mr. Justice Davidson believed that any injustices would be corrected by allowing the right of appeal.  But even if these frivolous stoppages were altogether eliminated, the "daily targets" set by the Coal Board would not be reached.  Nor would they be reached if the futile strikes were also abandoned.  But there would be at least upwards of a couple of million more tons of coal available, and industry and housewives would not be so despairingly scraping the bottom of coal bins in search of fuel.

The contemptuous rejection of awards by the Coal Industry Tribunal, of the authority of the Joint Coal Board, and of directions by mine managers are further exemplified in the unbending opposition of the Miners' Federation to the extraction of pillars by machines.  It is true that in this opposition, the Miners have been aided and abetted in the past by the then N.S.W. Minister for Mines (J.M. Baddeley), who refused to allow the work to proceed.


PILLAR EXTRACTION

There are over 240,000,000 tons of coal in the pillars in our mines, and it is estimated that about 170,000,000 tons of this can safely be extracted by machines before it deteriorates.  This coal is easily accessible, and could add considerably to the daily output of miners working it.  The owners have had permission to instal machinery in two mines but the miners refuse to work the machines on grounds of safety.  On April 14th, 1950, Mr. Gallagher, by exercising his Federal powers, over-ruled the State Minister, and decided, after having a report by three British experts, that the mechanical extraction of pillar coal would be in the best interests of the community, colliery employers and employees, because it had been proved that use of machines:

  1. Had reduced accident rates in U.S.A.
  2. Kept miners further away from falls of coal.
  3. Made possible better dust control, and
  4. Was less fatiguing than hand-mining.

The Coal Industry Tribunal (Mr. Gallagher), at the same time, recommended that the pillars should be extracted as soon as possible, and especially in the Maitland district, to prevent both deterioration and spontaneous combustion.

The day after the Tribunal's decision, the Miners' Federation declared that under no circumstance would they work machines for pillar extraction.  They did not present their case at the hearing, but withdrew altogether saying that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

Here, again, is a refusal by the Federation to accept an award it dislikes and yet the Federation takes no steps to have the award set aside as being beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  In other words, the Federation, by repudiating the law of the land, proclaims that it is a law unto itself.

The community cannot afford to ignore such a challenge.  Nothing but anarchy can result if a powerful section is allowed to make its own rules in defiance of those made by a duly constituted authority.

Mr. Justice Davidson, in his report (1946), strongly supports the mechanical extraction of pillar coal, but here, again, the State Government will do nothing that might offend the Communists.


NATIONALISATION

Coalcliff represents a story of studied rejection by the miners of all overtures by the management and by the Government through its Controller, together with a steady decline in production, as well as in morale.

The management of Coalcliff mine had engaged three pairs of miners to extract the pillar coal.  The work had been proceeding satisfactorily for some time, when, in January, 1944, the Miners' Federation demanded the abolition of the three lifts, and Mr. A.C. Willis, in his capacity as Commonwealth Conciliation Commissioner, directed that one pair of miners was to be employed on each pillar.  For reasons of safety, the management thereupon ceased pillar extraction and concentrated upon solid coal winning.  This led to a strike, on 8th February, and threatened to develop into a district stoppage, whereupon the Coal Commissioner decided to allow two pairs of miners.  Still the miners refused to return to work and the management said that because of the marked decline in output (from 800 tons daily to about 370), the mine would be closed down.  The Coal Commissioner therefore decided in terms of the wartime powers of control vested in him to take over the mine, and work was resumed on 14th March, 1944.  The mine was decontrolled on 31st March, 1947, and reverted to private management.

The assumption by the Government of control evoked no response from the Federation which puts nationalisation amongst its objectives.  Production per man shift fell, absenteeism increased, compensation claims increased, and industrial interruptions occurred just as freely under Government control as before.  In other words Government ownership produced no change in attitudes or methods on the part of the miners.  Production fell from 800 tons a day when the mine was taken over to 570 in February, '47, partly because the number of miners offering for work under the Government agency fell from 176 to 113.  Both Mr. Justice Davidson (pp. 259, et seq), and the Joint Coal Board report one beneficial result from the assumption of public control of Coalcliff, viz.:  A means of minimising dust.  Experiments costing about £2,800 proved the value of certain techniques which are now being applied in other mines liable to dust.  (See first Report of Joint Coal Board, 1948, p. 14.)


LITHGOW STATE MINE

The State Mine at Lithgow was acquired to prevent the Railway Department from alleged exploitation by private coal owners, but its costs have been such as to necessitate its paying more for mining its own coal than it would if it bought from private enterprise.  The methods of management, its accounting system, and its value as an experiment in public ownership are not now our problem.  What we are concerned with is whether relationships between miners and management are better than under private ownership, and whether this results in greater output, and whether the management has shown more progressiveness than have the privately-owned mines.

Mr. Justice Davidson reported in March, 1946, that recent changes in management were likely to result in an increased output, but until then, the output was not such as to enable the Railways to produce cheaper than private owners were able to in the same locality.  It appears that the accident rate is higher than in the case of privately owned mines in the Northern District of equal or larger size;  that progress in mechanisation has been less than in privately-owned mines;  and that there are not substantially fewer of the usual industrial troubles such as strikes, absenteeism, and pit-top meetings in comparison with privately owned mines in the same district.

These instances suggest that neither Government control nor Government ownership offers any hope of better industrial relationships or of obtaining increased output.


PAID HOLIDAYS WITH CONDITIONS

Annual leave with pay was first granted by Mr. Justice Drake-Brockman, in his interim award of 29th June, 1939, which gave the miners ten days on pay;  the leave was to accrue at the rate of one day's leave for every 25 shifts worked.  The final award of 28th October, 1939, which was to run for three years, imposed penalties for unauthorised stoppages (loss of one day), holding pit-top meetings in working hours (half a day), or for refusing to work on Saturdays (half a day).  Later (8th October, 1940), refusal to work overtime when so required meant the loss of half a day, while absenteeism for two consecutive days without reasonable explanation also cost half a day's leave.

An application for the removal of the penalties was refused on 10th June, 1941, because, said the Judge, to do so "would render the clause almost meaningless and certainly quite valueless".


ENTER POLITICS:  EXIT CONDITIONS

On 25th November, 1941, just after the Curtin Government took office, the Minister for Labour, E.J. Ward, directed Mr. Morrison, Conciliation Commissioner, to hear and determine industrial disputes between the unions and employers with respect to annual leave.  Mr. Morrison decided on 5th December, 1941, to delete the penalty clauses from the annual leave clause, and made that deletion retrospective to the commencement of annual leave for 1940.

When the employers protested, a National Security regulation was immediately issued to remove the existing right of appeal from the Conciliation Commissioner's decision.  During 1942-43-44, there were no penalty provisions in the award, but the Government prosecuted hundreds of employees for absenteeism, while the possibility of a "call-up" operated as a sanction as compelling as penalties might have been.


ADDITIONAL HOLIDAYS WITH PAY

On 10th October, 1946, the Central Industrial Authority heard an application by the Federation for fifteen days' annual leave for each employee after twelve months' employment in the industry.  The application was refused, and instead, five days' "recreation" leave was added to the existing ten days' annual leave, subject to employees working 225 shifts in the year.  The original award of ten days provided that leave should accrue at the rate of one day for every 25 shifts worked.  Mr. A.C. Willis (the Central Industrial Authority) refused to make the award without conditions, and said:  "It is the responsibility of each and every employee to render, in return for any privileges enjoyed, satisfactory service to his employer, which obviously must, of necessity, include regular attendance at work."

On 2nd June, 1947, the Coal Industry Tribunal heard a further application by the Federation to combine the annual and recreational leave and for an award of fifteen days without any other condition than that an employee had been in the industry for twelve months.  The Coal Industry Tribunal reversed the decision of Mr. Willis (Central Industrial Authority) and awarded fifteen days' annual leave, subject to the condition that 225 shifts were worked, or that for the balance of the year (from June to December, 1947), the employee's service was continuous.  It was also a condition that the extra leave was not to be taken at a time when the Joint Coal Board thought that stocks of coal were insufficient.

Stoppages having occurred immediately after the making of the award, the Tribunal extended the date from which continuous service was to operate, in case the men had not appreciated the effect of the conditions imposed.  The award was made "interim" only, and leave was reserved to the parties to apply for variation after 1st January, 1948.


THE COAL BOARD INTERVENES

Because few employees would have qualified for the extra five days on the conditions laid down by the Tribunal, the Joint Coal Board made an agreement with the Federation, without consulting either the Tribunal or the employers.  Mr. Idris Williams, the Miners' President, had declared that the June Award was noxious and would result in at least 70 per cent. of the miners losing the extra five days.  Consequently stoppages were likely to occur.  The terms of the Agreement as set out in a letter of 3rd September, recited the Coal Board's belief in the good faith of the Miners, and the willingness of the Miners' Federation to persuade the members to work "back Saturdays" for the rest of 1947, to intensify efforts to reduce stoppages, to raise output by at least 10 per cent., and to try to better the targets set.  In return, the Joint Coal Board undertook to support the Federation's application for the cancellation of the conditions requiring a minimum number of shifts, or continuity from June to December, 1947.


AN AGREEMENT FOR UNCONDITIONAL HOLIDAYS

Although the employers opposed the variation, the Coal Industry Tribunal declared that the action of the Coal Board which was "the managerial authority created by the Governments for the purpose of directing or controlling the coal mining industry", had left him with no option but to make an award consistent with the Agreement of 3rd September.  While, therefore, on 10th September, 1947, he cancelled the conditions attaching to his June award, the Tribunal made it clear that the award was to operate for the year 1947 alone, and that it was not intended to create a precedent for the granting of paid leave without conditions relating to service.  On 8th December, 1947, a further interim report was made covering the amount of leave to be granted, viz.:  fifteen days, and designed only for the special conditions of 1947, and the Tribunal again took the opportunity to declare the need for attaching conditions to leave privileges.

The agreement between the Coal Board and the Federation torpedoed the Industrial Tribunal because the Coal Board was prepared to believe that the Federation could so discipline its members as to make conditions attached to the award unnecessary.  What did the Federation do to justify its claim?  In 1947, the Federation could point to a number of victories for the men.  It had gained fifteen days' annual leave unconditionally, the doubling of previous amount of sick-leave, payment for statutory holidays, as well as increases in pay -- all this within a few short months.  It was therefore in a highly favourable position to demand attention to its wishes.

Nevertheless, on the Wednesday after the first "Back-Saturday" (September, 1947), twenty-seven mines on the Northern field were laid idle by the Wheelers for what Common Cause described as petty and unjustified.  The paper attacked the wheelers for endangering the gains of the Federation, and called for support for its policy.


STOPPAGES CONTINUE

Whatever efforts the Federation officials may have made, stoppages showed no diminution during the rest of 1947, and the beginning of 1948.  The miners got their leave, and the community went short of coal.

In April, 1948, the Coal Board made a fresh application to the Tribunal to have conditions attached to the right to annual leave.  The Federation's response to this was to declare that outside intervention with the internal union discipline was undesirable, and to inform the Coal Board that the Mining Council had passed a resolution on 11th February, 1948, outlawing "unauthorised" local strikes.


ANOTHER AGREEMENT

In the discussions that followed, the Coal Board agreed not to proceed with its application that annual leave should be conditional upon continuity of work, on the Federation's undertaking to do everything possible to get the rank and file to observe the resolutions passed by the 1945 convention concerning internal union discipline and the elimination of petty stoppages.

This agreement was reported to the Tribunal which, on 19th April, 1948, adjourned the Coal Board's application.  In applying for the adjournment, the Coal Board expressed its belief that internal discipline would be improved if the Federation took steps to have the 1945 resolutions adopted.  These resolutions (as set out in the proceedings of the Tribunal) included the reference to District Officers if a dispute could not be settled by the lodge officers and the management, the limiting of pit-top meetings to safety matters, the endorsement by the District Management Committee of stoppages, provided the Governments left discipline to the Federation.  A scale of Union fines for breaches of discipline was fixed, including suspension or even expulsion for indulging in disruptive activity.


PROMISES

The Federation promised the Coal Board that these resolutions would be submitted to the District Boards of Management, to a conference of such Board and Lodge Officers, to area conferences of District Boards and Lodge Committees, and finally to all the members of the Federation at all collieries at pit-top meetings approved by the Board.  (See Common Cause, 8/5/'48.)


BROKEN

Although the minutes of the Northern District Board of Management show that approval was given to the procedure outlined above for the adoption of the 1945 resolutions, it is significant that the resolutions were not submitted to the members.


THE COAL BOARD AGAIN

In July, 1948, the Coal Board again brought to the Tribunal the "urgent necessity of varying the award" because of losses through petty stoppages, "notwithstanding the undertakings given by the Miners' Federation".

After the case had proceeded for six days, the Coal Board asked for an adjournment because it had reached another agreement with the Federation providing that Aggregate meetings set down for Thursday, 16th July, were abandoned, and that the Federation undertook within three weeks to give effect to the resolution to maintain internal discipline.


ANOTHER AGREEMENT

Other items in the agreement included a conference on "back-Saturdays", on raising permissible output in pits where power borers had been installed, and an understanding that the Coal Board was to inform the Tribunal that its report upon long-service leave would soon be ready.


THE FEDERATION'S ATTITUDE

At the hearing of this case, the Federation witnesses gave no evidence of steps taken to impress upon the rank and file the need for internal discipline while, in reporting the proceedings, Common Cause took an aggressive tone regarding "the Coal Board's action in seeking the scrapping of our holiday awards".  It spoke of the "Federation's determination to fight", of the "backing of the rank and file in the spontaneous stoppages of protest", and in consequence "threats vanished, coal owners sulked, and a calm hearing of the case proceeded".

As in April, 1948, so in August, 1948, the Federation failed to honour its promise to submit disciplinary code to the members.

Between 1948 and 1950 lie the turbulent days of 1949, with its savage strikes, the special labour legislation under which fines and imprisonment were imposed on some of the Federation leaders, the undertakings, freely given, and as freely disregarded when the undertaking had served its purpose.

1950 was a year of stocktaking by the miners, but in April, 1950, the question of leave sanctions came up again when the representatives of the Northern District Branch applied for an adjournment for the purpose of submitting the 1948 code to the rank and file.


ARBITRATION REJECTED

According to Common Cause, of 6/5/'50, the Southern District Delegate Board rejected "the so-called codes of discipline" which would take "away the rights of local lodges to deal with their disputes from time to time".  This was a repudiation of the promises of the Federation, but when it came before the Central Council, Common Cause reported (20/5/'50) the Council's attitude to discipline.  We will not "agree on the plea of elimination of trivial stoppages to the introduction into the industry of restrictive arbitrationist practices that are calculated to prevent legitimate freedom of action" ... "particularly do we reaffirm the right to strike, the right to hold pit-top meetings, and unfettered negotiations with management to endeavour to iron out disputes".


COMMUNISM RAMPANT

These attitudes are in line with the repeated assertions of the President (Mr. Williams) that the Federation does not favour anything, e.g., Conciliation Committees at each mine, "which could develop into machinery of an arbitrationist character".

This pamphlet was written in January, 1951, and its publication delayed to record the result of the dispute that developed over the December, 1950, award.  In March, 1951, at the time of resumption of work, the Tribunal's decision on annual leave and paid holidays is still couched in terms of an "interim" award to meet the special conditions of September, 1947.  And the Joint Coal Board is still waiting, apparently hopefully, for the Federation to honour its plighted word.

Despite the unequivocal declarations by the Miners' President during January and February, 1951, that "there can be no settlement of the dispute except on terms providing for the cancellation of the award" of December, 1950, the several Governmental authorities (other than the State Government), made every possible move to get the miners back to work, short of surrender to the Miners' demands.  And to what end?

All the world knows what credence to attach to any Communist undertaking.  In particular, there is the Moscow declaration upon Trade Unions and collective bargaining that "the belief in the sanctity of collective bargaining ... must be met with a resolute and decided resistance on the part of the revolutionary trade union movement." (From the First International Congress of Revolutionary and Industrial Unions, Moscow, 1921.)