Terrorism and Justice

Ethics and Informal War
R.C. Smith,
Vantage Press

THE massive bomb explosion which recently killed an Italian judge (who had been successful in locking up members of the Mafia), along with his family and innocent bystanders;  the 40-kilogram Libyan-supplied IRA Semtex bomb, which killed two people and injured 91 people the day after the British elections;  and the mortar attack in Sarajevo during a ceasefire, which killed 20 people and maimed many more:  these are only three recent examples of terrorism at its worst -- the deliberate and indiscriminate killing of civilians for political ends.  It is therefore no wonder that discussion about terrorism can rarely be rational.  This is why R.C. Smith's Ethics and Informal War is a welcome contribution to the debate about terrorism and guerrilla warfare.  He successfully manages to avoid emotional arguments, and to separate sympathy for a cause from justification for terrorism.

Using examples, Smith analyses and categorises terrorism and guerrilla warfare along an intolerable-acceptable spectrum according to how these two forms of non-conventional warfare meet five just war principles.  These are:

• just cause:  it must be shown that the specified gains to be achieved out-value the probable losses;
• last resort:  after all non-violent means have been explored;
• prospect of success:  war cannot be justified if success is unlikely;
• proportion:  balance between the good ends to be achieved and the losses likely to be sustained;  and
• non-combatant immunity:  civilians are in principle excluded as targets.

So while some terrorist groups' objectives may be viewed by some as just, they may not all five of the above conditions.  For example, many would doubt that the IRA is any closer to achieving its aim of a unified Ireland than it would have been without terrorism;  and few would accept the Iran-backed Hezbollah's tactic of killing innocent Israelis.

Moreover, according to Smith, the underlying philosophy by which an act of terrorism must always be judged is whether the consequence of the act will be to the benefit of humankind rather than being only of limited good.  Put differently, he supports Machiavelli's adage that "the end justifies the means" but only if the end is the welfare of humanity.  According to this principle, the assassination of dictators like Hitler and Stalin would have been justified and would therefore not have been terrorism.

Smith determines that the essential difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that in the latter the intended victims are generally combatants.  The Afghan Mujaheddin and UNITA in Angola would both be classical examples.  And while guerrilla war will inevitably blur the distinction between combatants and civilians, there are cases where some guerrilla groups will deliberately target non-combatants.  For example, Renamo, Mozambique's anti-government organisation, is generally considered a guerrilla group, mainly because of its structure and appearances;  but, applying Smith's categorisation, its terror tactics against innocent civilians squarely makes it a terrorist organisation.  Similarly, few para-military groups only target combatants.  The many urban guerrilla groups which have emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last few months, and which deliberately include civilians as targets, are cases in point.  There is no doubt that this is terrorism.

As with terrorism, Smith sees only one justification for guerrilla warfare;  and that is in the case of self-defence.  However, he appears to negate this when he gives equal right to both sides, stating that "the inhabitants of the de facto political entity are entitled to defend themselves if attacked.  Again, it should be stressed that this should not be taken to prejudice the moral right which the official authorities may have to restore the unity of the original state or defend its present institutions".  Supporting both sides, as Smith does, will not assist in the resolution of the conflict.  The case of Sri Lanka would be such a situation.  As for the case of guerrillas fighting for political freedom or minority rights which are being denied, Smith stresses that all five conditions for a just war must be met to justify guerrilla activities.  His argument is that unless guerrilla war leads to a comprehensive reshuffling of the political order and the racial/ethnic groups -- and this rarely happens -- the result may well be more injustice down the road.

Moreover, he surprisingly appears to agree with the assertion by the guru of terrorism, Walter Laqueur, that the "historical record shows that guerrilla warfare, with one exception (Cuba), has succeeded only against colonial rule or during a general war".  Although it is not clear what he means by "general war", in recent times Pol Pot in Cambodia, President Museveni in Uganda and the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan each successfully toppled the regime in power.  Certainly, it is debatable whether these guerrillas actually improved conditions for the people, but that is not the issue.  Similarly, Smith questions whether the French Revolution was really necessary, and wonders whether political freedom could not have been achieved by more peaceful means.  In any case, he would not condone guerrilla attacks or violent revolutions to correct real or imagined socio-economic injustices, especially if political rights already exist.

THE ANC AND SOUTH AFRICA

Surprisingly, Smith does not attempt to categorise the African National Congress (ANC) as either a terrorist group or a guerrilla organisation.  While I realise Ethics and Informal War does not pretend to be exhaustive in its study of non-conventional combatant groups (it stresses instead theory), the failure to discuss the ANC, even in a section dealing specifically with South Africa, is an unfortunate lacuna.  Nevertheless, his short analysis of South Africa is interesting and convincing.  In his discussion of the South African situation (prior to the present constitutional negotiations), Smith rejects justification for political violence.  This does not mean he is not sympathetic to the plight of the black majority.  But, rather, he argues that not only is South Africa not suitable for guerrilla warfare because of the terrain and the Afrikaners' determination to fight back, but the guerrilla's chances of success are probably minimal.  Smith is right on both counts.

Moreover -- and this is a theme he developed in other cases -- he argues that, if a guerrilla war had eventually ensued (that is if the ANC had been militarily capable of bringing one about), "the historical record would suggest that the habits of lawlessness and cruelty acquired in such a 'war' would persist long after political change was achieved, if it was achieved".  As a result, in his judgment such a course could not be morally supported.  Certainly, he is right to worry about the habit of violence in South Africa.  One only needs to look at the townships, where inter-tribal, gang and political violence have already taken a life of their own.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that this violence will stop once majority rule becomes the norm in South Africa, especially when it will become glaringly obvious that no government -- black or white -- will be able to deliver the economic goods to the black townships f0r.a long time to come.  So, as he states, while political violence may appear to be justified, poor prospects of success and the disproportionate likely cost of the attempt (which contravene two of the five conditions for a just war) would lead one to argue against such a course of action.  Certainly, the present negotiations and the general improvement in the political situation of South Africa confirm that a non-violent and negotiated approach, even in highly divided and polarised societies, remains the best option for resolving political conflict.

I would recommend this book to anyone who seriously believes terrorism and guerrilla warfare are the best options for achieving political goals.  Even in the worst cases (Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, the Arab-Israeli dispute), everyone's human rights must be respected, especially non-combatants'.  Absolutely nothing can justify the killing of innocent civilians.  Or as Smith puts it when dealing with revolution -- but his question is applicable to the issue in general:  is it justified to redistribute injustice when seeking to dispense justice?