Debts and Deficits

CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION

The extent of State debt and of the budget deficit have, after decades of deliberate attempts to obscure their significance, become a focal point of public concern and public policy.  The public is now aware that the 1980s has left a legacy in the form of a large State debt;  and they know it will haunt them and their children for years.  They also recognise that the debt problem must be dealt with fairly, effectively and in an accountable manner;  and they want to know that it will never be allowed to happen again.

State governments can no longer think of themselves as fiscal islands.  Their fiscal performance does count -- locally and nationally -- as the sorry saga of Victoria in the 1980s and the early 1990s has shown.  More people than ever before are watching their State government carefully, and they are increasingly well-informed.  Even the media, after a long period of lack of interest and inadequate expertise, are now more competent and engaged in State fiscal matters on an on-going basis.  Competition among the States, which has always been a significant, though often disregarded, feature of the Australian federal system, is clearly increasing.  Workers and jobs, investors and capital, will increasingly vote with their feet;  the fiscal performance of State governments will have a major bearing on that voting pattern.

Commonwealth policies will continue to have a major impact on the States' fiscal position.  There is a chance that the nature and extent of Commonwealth control over State finances will lessen in the 1990s, but any such move is likely to be predicated not only on the States' getting their finances in good order but also on their showing a commitment to keeping them in good order.  Reforms to State-Commonwealth relations may involve the States' assuming more responsibility for the nation's, as well as their own, fiscal position.

Of course, policies on debt and deficits cannot be determined in isolation from those on taxation and spending.  Borrowing is, ultimately, deferred taxation;  and in the final analysis the key concern must be the extent to which government expenditure is justifiable.  For clarity and brevity, taxation policy is separately considered in Chapter 4, and spending in Chapter 5.

The first step in developing a debt management strategy must be to ascertain and explain the condition of the State's finances -- to know where we want to go, we need to how where we are, and how and why we got here.

The second step is to formulate a coherent debt management strategy which sets out the principles and a set of targets for the State debt and deficit and other liabilities, to be achieved over the term of the government, using as a benchmark the debt management strategy released by the WA government in mid-1992.

The third step is to put into place reforms to the existing political, administrative and constitutional systems which will lock in the strategy.

COMMUNICATE THE FULL PICTURE

The first step in designing a debt management strategy, and other aspects of fiscal policy, is to assess the state of the State's finances;  a task which is as difficult as it is important.  The past is important, as it tells us how we got to where we are now:  in particular, what policies were actually put in place, what their consequences were, and how much of a legacy or handicap we must now bear because of those policies.  It is also obviously important for the government, the Parliament and the voters to have some idea of the direction in which the State's finances is likely to be heading under current policy settings,

Gaps in Information

This first step must be a tentative one, as the information publicly available on the State's finances is deficient in a number of important areas.  Although the quality and quantity of published information on, and analysis of, the State's finances have improved in recent years (and will necessarily keep improving), key bits of information are still missing -- including forward estimates of spending, revenue and debt;  and data on the changes in assets and liabilities and depreciation over time.  Existing policy settings, moreover, are not clear;  there is a paucity of objective analysis of the State's performance;  and the data on the State's finances are highly fragmented.  In fact, the information available on Western Australia's finances lags behind that available on all other State and Territory governments.

Commission of Audit

The new government should, as a matter of priority, commission an independent audit of the State's finances.  This should be undertaken not in the expectation of finding wrong-doing or in the expectation of uncovering additional liabilities, but rather to obtain a thorough, objective assessment of the State's fiscal position and future policy options.  The audit will be of use to the Executive, but its main target audience should be the Parliament and the public.  These are the groups which are currently most in the dark.  An ancillary benefit of the Commission will be to lay the foundations for more thorough reporting and analysis of the State's financial position on an annual basis in the State's budget documents.  The Commission of Audit should be considered as one of a number of actions designed to improve the accountability of government.

Enough, however, is now known of State's fiscal performance and position to provide the foundations of a debt strategy.

LEGACY OF FHE 1980s:  HANDICAP OF THE 1990s

Rapid Growth in State Debt

During the 1980s, Western Australian governments, like many private organisations and some other (but not all) State governments, dramatically increased the State's level of indebtedness. ⁽¹¹⁾

As of 30 June 1992, the gross indebtedness of the Western Australian public sector was $11.3 billion or $6850 per head of population (see Table 3.1).  In contrast, public sector debt stood at $3.2 billion in 1982.  The State's public sector also held, at the end of 1992, financial assets valued at $3.2 billion, which, when deducted from gross debt, results in a level of net indebtedness of $8.1 billion.  Since these financial assets are fully utilised in the operation of the government and could only be freed-up by the closure of government, gross debt is the most appropriate measure of State debt. ⁽¹²⁾

Table 3.1:
WA Public Sector Debt ($ billion, as of 30 June)

	1991 (a)	1992 (a)	1993 (b)
Gross Debt	10.1	11.3	11.6
Net Debt	7.6	8.1	8.4

Sources:

^(a) WA Treasury (1992) Analytical Information in Support of the Treasurer's Annual Statement:  1991-92

^(b) Estimated by the author using data supplie in 1992-93 WA Budget

Between 1982 and 1992, ⁽¹³⁾ the indebtedness of the State's public sector expanded rapidly by all measures (Table 3.2):  in dollars of the day it grew by 257 per cent;  in real per capita terms it grew by 56 per cent;  it grew as a share of the State economy -- from 22.7 per cent of Gross State Product (GSP) to 29.2 per cent of GSP;  and, given that debt had actually shrunk in real per capita terms during the preceding decade (1971-1981), it grew in relation to recent experience. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Table 3.2:
Growth in WA Public Sector Debt 1982 to 1992

Terms:
Nominal	257%
Real per Capita	52%
As Share of GSP	6.5% points (from 22.7 to 29.2)

Sources:

WA Treasury, Analytical Information in Support of the Treasurer's Annual Statements 1988-89, 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92;  Debt defined as net loan liabilities measured on current value basis for total public sector.

Population:  ABS Cat. No. 3101.0.

GSP:  1982-91 from ABS Cat. No. 5220.0, 1992 estimated by the author and assumes 4.0 per cent real growth in GSP.

Deflator:  Non-farm GDP deflator:  1982-1991 from ABS Cat. No. 5204.0;  1992 from 1992-93 Commonwealth Budget Paper No. 1.

State Debt Still Growing

Public sector debt did decline during the late 1980s, if measured as a share of GSP.  This decline was, however, temporary, and reflected the rapid and unsustainable growth in GSP, not a reduction in borrowings.  In fact, between 1986 and 1992, State debt per head grew by 51 per cent -- hardly a sign of borrowing restraint.  Moreover, as the State's economic growth declined in 1990, debt began again to grow as a proportion of GSP;  and in 1992 it reached its highest level since the early 1970s.

Although there are no official projections of State debt for 1993, the available data on public sector estimates of financial transactions indicate that it will again grow in 1993, albeit at a lesser pace.  As shown in Table 3.1, gross State debt is likely to expand by 3 per cent, or to around $11.6 billion, by the end of 1993;  and net State debt is likely to expand by around 4 per cent -- rates much lower than recorded in recent years. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Public Trading Enterprises Account For Most Debt

State debt is predominantly in the Public Trading Enterprises (or PTE) subsector, and particularly in the larger utilities.  In 1992, the PTE subsector accounted for $6.7 billion, or 60 per cent of State debt.  The State Energy Commission of Western Australia (SECWA) accounted for the largest proportion (34 per cent), with most of this acmu1ated since 1981.  The Water Authority (3 per cent), Homeswest (6 per cent) and Westrail (3.5 per cent) are the next largest contributors to total State debt. ⁽¹⁶⁾

Figure 3.1:
WA State Debt ^(a) by Subsector, 1980 to 1992 (real per capita ^(b))

^(a) Net loan liabilities include liabilities arising from WA Government Holdings.

^(b) Deflated by non-farm GDP deflator with 1991 base year.

Sources:

"Report on State Debt", Report No. 25, Public Accounts and Expenditure Review Committee, Legislative Assembly of Western Australia, December 1992.

WA Treasury, "Analytical Information in Support of the Treasurer's Annual Statements", November 1992.

Although the PTE subsector still accounts for the largest share of debt, its share has been declining (see Figure 3.1).  Measured in real per capita terms, PTE subsector debt reached a historic peak in 1986 ⁽¹⁷⁾ with the completion of the Dampier-Perth gas pipeline and its associated infrastructure, and has decreased steadily ever since.  In 1992, PE subsector debt declined both in absolute terms and as a share of total State debt;  and this trend will continue in 1993.

PTEs Are Still Tools Of The Government

The fact that the bulk of the State's debt is held by PTEs does not necessarily mean that the debt has been used to fund investments in commercially viable, self-funding capital projects.  PTEs are, to varying degrees, instruments of the general government subsector.  With only a few exceptions, they are required to pursue a range of non-commercial, and essentially redistributive objectives, ⁽¹⁸⁾ including promoting regional development, providing financial assistance to the disadvantaged, giving preference to local suppliers, subsidising "special" industries and projects, "stimulating economic growth", and protecting or creating employment. ⁽¹⁹⁾  The pursuit of these non-commercial objectives significantly affects the operating results of the PTEs and therefore their level of borrowing.  CSOs are in large part the reason for the PTE subsector's unbroken history of losses.  And, although since 1985 the Western Australian PTE subsector has shown a marked improvement in its operating performance, with its net operating losses declining each year in nominal terms, it is continuing to experience losses and is expected to do so again in 1993. ⁽²⁰⁾

Although the data are very limited, anecdotal evidence indicates that a considerable number of investments by the PTE subsector have not been commercially viable, and in some cases were never designed to be.  Examples abound, including the $250 million spent by Westrail on the suburban rail network, the $427 million borrowed by Homeswest over the last decade for low-cost housing, $36 million spent by Transperth on the Perth city bus station, and the $37 million spent by the Fremantle Port Authority on the dredging of its inner harbour and the development of a boat harbour. ⁽²¹⁾

The level of PTE debt is thus affected by its non-commercial functions and obligations.  For example, SECWA is required to provide subsidies to rural electricity consumers:  this reduces SECWA's net earnings, and so increases its dependence on debt-funding of capital works.  In turn, that subsidy will, by inducing higher demand for electricity in higher-cost areas, increase SECWA's need for capital outlays and borrowing.

The PTE subsector receives some compensation from the budget for its non-commercial functions.  In 1992, around $332 million was paid to PTEs in the form of subsidies, grants and advances from the general government subsector.  However, these payments do not represent total cost to the PTE subsector arising from the non-commercial functions.

PTEs also possess, in varying degrees and forms, the power to tax, and thus, like general government, in part they directly exploit taxpayers.  For example, SECWA operates as an integrated energy monopolist with extensive powers over the pricing, transmission and use of gas and electricity.  Our governments have exploited and continue to exploit SECWA's monopoly powers to levy, albeit selectively, higher-than-commercial charges, which enable it to fund an extensive range of non-commercial investments and other activities.  Thus SECWA's charges are in part a tax, and are commonly perceived by politicians and consumers as such.  The Water Authority not only imposes de facto taxes by way of higher-than-commercial water charges, but, by levying its sewerage charges on the basis of land values, also directly imposes a tax -- a land tax -- similar to that levied by the general government subsector.  Homeswest not only is exempt from a range of taxes -- an implicit subsidy not recognised in the data referred to above -- but has the power to acquire land, buildings and other property at a highly subsidised rate.  There are numerous other examples of the use of taxing powers, both explicit and implicit, by PTEs to fund non-commercial activity.  Further, the use of tax or monopoly powers by the PTEs has been directly exploited to fund general government subsector activity via the payment of higher-than-normal dividends.  Indeed, in some states (but not in WA), PTEs have become the source of very large tax revenues.

The PTE subsector has, however, become more commercially orientated over the last decade.  If the corporatisation policies currently in place ⁽²²⁾ are widely implemented, the extent of commercialisation will increase.  There are, moreover, large differences as between the various PTEs, in terms of their access to and use of tax-like instruments, and their commercial orientation.  Nonetheless, the liabilities from past non-commercial decisions remain, and some PTEs, such as Homeswest, will continue to be inherently redistributive and non-commercial.  Thus the distinction between PTE and general government debt is, in part, illusory.

General Government Debt Growing Rapidly

Although the general government subsector currently accounts for a minor share of State debt, its level of indebtedness has nevertheless grown rapidly both in absolute terms and as a share of State debt (see Figure 3.1).  As of June 30 1992, general government agencies accounted for $4.6 billion or 40 per cent of total State debt.  This represents a 150 per cent increase in real per capita terms over the 1982-92 period and a doubling of the share of debt.  General government debt is estimated to increase further again in 1993, with almost all anticipated public sector borrowing in 1993 being designated for the genera1 government subsector.

Financial Institutions Losses A Large Cause Of Debt

Debt owed by the general government subsector is not thoroughly broken down on an agency-by-agency basis.  Nonetheless, between 1982 and 1992, a substantial proportion of this debt was actually incurred to bail out State financial institutions.  Between 1988 and 1992 at least $675 million was borrowed by the general government subsector to provide capital to State financial institutions forced to write off assets lost through WA Inc and other failed business loans.  This included $420 million to the R&I Bank, $80 million to SGIO, and $175 million to Western Australian Government Holdings Ltd (WAGH).  These debts represent about 15 per cent of all general government debt.  The R&I Bank and the SGIO are reportedly required to service the moneys borrowed on their behalf by the general government subsector by way of higher dividends.  Even if they do so successfully, however, this will only be achieved at the cost of dividends or asset values that would otherwise have been available to taxpayers.  The borrowing thus represents an unproductive use of State borrowings, that is, capital being expended for no return.

It can also be argued that the $161 million paid from the budget to meet the losses of the Teachers Credit Society and the Swan Building Society was, in effect, indirectly financed through additional government borrowing, for at the time these expenditures were incurred, the general government subsector was running a large budget deficit.

Large Losses Remain In Financial Enterprises

The official estimates of State debt referred to above do not include all the losses of State financial institutions. ⁽²³⁾  Specifically, they do not included the losses incurred by the Government Employees Superannuation Board (GESB), and the State Government Insurance Corporation (SGIC).  These State-owned financial institutions experienced significant losses during the last 5 years as a result of WA Inc and other investment decisions.  Although the full extent of these losses is not yet known, they will certainly be large, and represent a significant reduction in the financial assets previously available to taxpayers.  Between 1988 and 1992, the SGIC wrote down assets or realised losses to the extent of approximately $520 million as a result of politically-motivated investment decisions.  During the same period and for the same reasons, the GESB wrote down assets of $234 million.  These losses represent a decline in the State's asset base, and indirectly contribute to the State's indebtedness through the elimination of revenue from asset sales and dividends.

Importantly, the losses of the SGIC and the GESB are being funded, in part, by taxpayers through special relationships and dealings with the State government.  The SGIC, which had a negative net worth of $354 million as of 30 June 1992, has only been able to avoid an explicit injection of funds from the State government by exploiting its exclusive right to provide third party insurance and to provide insurance to various State government agencies -- in other words, by utilising its power to impose taxes on select insurance transactions.  The SGIC also has preferential rental arrangements with the State government for some of its central business district properties.  The GESB not only has similar preferential rent arrangements, but all of its investments are underwritten in full by the State government and all cash deficiencies are met directly by the State Treasury.

Debt Has Been Used For Consumption Purposes

Successive State governments have consistently argued that, at least for the general government subsector, borrowings have been used solely for capital purposes.  Indeed, this principle underpins the structure and classification of its accounts, with all borrowings, and loan repayments and most, but not all, receipts of a capital nature and all expenditure of a capital nature by the public sector (except for a number of PTEs), being required, by the Financial Administration and Audit Act, to be credited to the General Loan and Capital Works Fund (GL&CWF). ⁽²⁴⁾

This is at odds, however, with the available data -- limited as they are -- which indicate that a large proportion of the debt accumulated by Western Australia's public sector (both FTE and the general government subsectors), over the last fifteen years has been used for funding capital consumption rather than new capital investment.  As shown in Table 3.3, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimates that the the State's public sector increased its net stock of fixed assets -- gross fixed capital less depreciation or capital consumption in 1985 dollars -- by $4.1 billion over the 1977-91 period.  During this period, the public sector is estimated to have increased its net debt by a much larger amount -- around $6.2 billion in 1985 dollars -- which indicates that about $2.1 billion or 34 per cent of total net debt accumulated over the period was used to fund spending for capital consumption purposes.  These data also show that the use of borrowings for consumption purposes has not been restricted to Labor governments.  During the six years prior to 1982, the coalition governments of the day also borrowed, albeit at a lower rate, for current purposes -- about 30 per cent of total borrowings.

The level of borrowing used for consumption purposes has been extremely high in the general government subsector.  During the 1978-1991 period, general government accumulated, in 1985 dollars, new net debt of $2.7 billion, of which $1.6 billion or 59 per cent was used to fund current spending.

Table 3.3:
Use of borrowing 1978-1991 ($ Billion, 1984/85 Dollars)

	General Government	Total Public Sector
Borrowing (a)	2.7	6.2
Net Investment (b)	1.1	4.1
Net Mining Royalties (c)	1.4	1.4
Borrowing less net investment	1.6	2.1
% of Total Borrowing	59%	34%
Borrowing minus net investment plus royalties	0.2	0.7
% of total borrowing	7%	11%

Sources:

^(a) ABS Cat. No. 5501.0;  borrowing estimated as deficit less advances paid over the 1978-91.

^(b) ABS Cat. No. 5220.0;  net investment calculated as gross fixed capital investment less consumption of capital (depreciation) over the 1978-91 period.

^(c) WA Budget Papers;  net mining royalties calculated as mining and petroleum royalties less expenditure for administration (outlays of Department of Mines and Energy) deflated by the 10-year Treasury Bond rate to reflect the growth in the in situ value of the resources.

The use of debt for consumption purposes is continuing, and makes up a significant portion of the deficit.  Data provided by State Treasury with the assistance of the ABS ⁽²⁵⁾ show that, at least for the general government subsector, a large proportion of the net debt incurred in 1992 was used for consumption purposes.  During 1992, about 68 per cent of debt incurred was used for consumption purposes, if depreciation is measured on a current cost basis;  and about 30 per cent of the increase in net debt was used for consumption purposes, if depreciation is measured on a historical cost basis.  The use of debt by the PTE subsector is more problematic;  depending entirely on how depreciation is measured.  An examination of the 1993 GL&CWF shows that a significant proportion of expenditures is clearly not in the nature of additions to the capital stock, but rather replacement of capital which in the past was funded through the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

The discrepancy between the constant official rhetoric and the actual results shown in Table 3.3 arises from four main causes.

First, the government defines the repair and maintenance of existing assets as a capital outlay.  As a result, it has borrowed to fund the depreciation or consumption of capital which, being a recurring item of expenditure, is more appropriately defined -- as indeed it is by the ABS in the State Accounts, (Cat.  No.  5220.0) -- as current expenditure.  Second, it has used long-term borrowings to fund short-lived assets such as computers.  Third, it has borrowed to bail out FTEs and to offer financial assistance to private firms.  Fourth, it includes as capital some items of expenditure which are unambiguously recurrent in nature -- such as office rental, superannuation and redundancy payments, and consultants' fees.

Capital Revenue Used For Current Outlays

Western Australian governments have consistently used revenue from the sale of physical assets such as land ($62 million in 1992) and motor vehicles (about $20 million in 1992), and from the sale or use of financial assets such as cash balances (around $160 million in 1989) to fund current expenditure.  Under the National Accounts framework, these revenue sources are treated correctly;  the sales of physical assets are treated as an offset to capital expenditure -- effectively as negative outlays -- and consumption of financial assets is treated as a funding transaction and part of the deficit.  The use of capital revenue for recurrent purposes is another reason why the State has been able to give the appearance of using debt only for "capital" purposes (see Table 3.3).

Governments have also used income from mineral royalties, which should be treated as capital revenue, to fund recurrent outlays.  The Western Australian government obtains a large share -- larger than any other State -- of its own-sourced revenue from mineral royalties:  $2 billion in real terms over the 1982-93 period and $398 million in 1992.  In fact, in 1992, mineral royalties were the largest State source of revenue after payroll tax.  Royalties are not a tax, but a payment for the use of a capital asset.  Since these assets -- mineral and petroleum deposits -- are non-renewable, royalties represent payments for the right to consume a public asset.  In this sense, royalties are tantamount to asset sales, and similar to the sale of land, buildings and business ventures.  As such, they should be treated as capital revenue and as constituting a reduction in the stock of public assets.  It must be said, however, that under both the National Accounting framework and the State public accounts format, royalties are treated as current revenue, and the reduction in public assets denoted by royalties are not reflected in estimates of capital expenditure or changes in capital stock.  Nevertheless, if royalty receipts are considered as consumption of public capital and deducted from capital stock, then the net capital stock of the public sector would in real terms have increased by only $700 million over the 1978-91 period (see Table 3.3), and around 89 per cent of borrowings would be deemed to have been used for consumption purposes.  The impact on the general government subsector is much more dramatic, largely because all royalty income is used by this subsector.  Income from mineral royalties exceeded net investment in the general government subsector:  the implication being that over 93 per cent of the debt incurred over the 1978-91 period was in the final analysis used for consumption purposes.  A portion of Western Australia's above-average royalty receipts is siphoned away from this State to the other States via the Commonwealth grants process. ⁽²⁶⁾  Nonetheless the core of the argument remains, that royalties are large and are a capital revenue and have in effect been used for consumption rather than to increase the State's capital stock

Other Financial Liabilities

Debt or loan liabilities are not the only type of financial liabilities borne by the public sector.  Others include employee-related entitlements (such as leave entitlement, unfunded superannuation, workers' compensation), and accounts payable, foreign exchange contracts and other accrued interest payments relating to debt-raising (see Table 3,4). ⁽²⁷⁾

The financial liabilities of the public sector (excluding guarantees, indemnities and sureties) are listed in Table 3.4.  In 1992, the State public sector had total financial liabilities of $17.8 billion, representing 46 per cent of GSP.  State debt constituted the bulk (61 per cent) of total liabilities.  Employee entitlements, however, were also large, at $5 billion or 28 per cent, of which unfunded superannuation liabilities represented $4.4 billion.  There are no published data on employment and other non-loan liabilities prior to 1991;  it is, thus, not possible to estimate the growth in such liabilities over the last decade.

Table 3.4:
WA Public Sector Financial Liabilities and Assets ($ million)

	Public Trading Enterprises		General Government		State Public Sector
Year	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992
Borrowings	6879	6779	3031	4153	9856	10905
Employee related entitlements (a)	1233	1182	3545	3808	4778	4990
Other (b)	757	872	1194	1614	1469	1896
Total Liabilities	8869	8833	7770	9575	16103	17791
Financial Assets (c)	1862	1848	2486	3496	3812	4727
Net Financial Liabilities	7007	6985	5284	6079	12291	13064

^(a) These include:  leave entitlements;  superannuation;  workers' compensation.

^(b) This includes:  overdrawn bank and operating accounts;  accounts payable;  finance leases;  other liabilities and accruals;  moneys held in trust.

^(c) These include:  cash, bank and operating balances;  accounts receivable;  other debts, accruals and prepayments;  investments;  loans and advances.

Source:  WA Treasury (1992), Analytical Information in
Support of the Treasurer's Annual Statements, 1991-92.

It is significant that, unlike the composition of State debt, the general government subsector has the largest share of the State's total financial liabilities;  and total liabilities have exhibited very strong growth in recent years.  In 1992, the general government subsector had financial liabilities of $9.6 billion (which represented 54 per cent of the State's total), a massive 23 per cent increase on the previous year.  The PTE subsector, on the other hand, actually reduced its financial liabilities in 1992.  The reason for the higher concentration of total liabilities in the general government subsector is that most (76 per cent) of employee entitlements are in the general government subsector.

The Western Australian public sector does, of course, have financial assets, which in 1992 stood at $4.7 billion.  The lion's share (74 per cent) of these assets are in the general government subsector.  Since these financial assets are fully employed in the day-to-day operations of government and their liquidation would require the cessation of all government functions, it makes little sense to offset these against financial liabilities.  Notwithstanding that, net financial liabilities (total financial liabilities less financial assets) of the public sector stood at $13.0 billion in 1992, with a large portion (47 per cent) in the general government subsector.  It is also relevant that the level of net financial liabilities in the general government subsector grew by 18 per cent in 1992.

The public sector also has substantial contingent liabilities, arising from guarantees, indemnities and sureties, and standing at $705 million in 1992.  These liabilities have shown a high level of volatility over the last decade because of WA Inc deals.  Even excluding those deals, however, contingent liabilities have grown sharply in recent years:  by 26 per cent in 1990-92.  Moreover, these estimates do not included the large liabilities that could arise from the legal action, commenced by Bond Corporation Holdings Limited and others against the State for an aggregate of approximately $550 million, for alleged breaches of contract in relation to the failed petrochemical plant in Kwinana. ⁽²⁸⁾  Nor do they include the underwriting of bondholders by the State Housing Commission for the Keystart Housing Scheme.

These liabilities are of policy significance:  they can be used, as they have during the 1980s, as substitutes for debt.  Since these liabilities are subject to little analysis or scrutiny, and are often shielded from Parliamentary and public scrutiny through the specious excuse of "commercial confidentiality", their use significantly undermines the accountability of State finances and specifically the State debt.  Perhaps more crucially, recent policy initiatives will lead to further expansion of these contingent liabilities:  specifically, the policy to encourage private "equity" funding of public infrastructure. ⁽²⁹⁾  One of the potential effects of this policy is to shift the source of funds for public infrastructure from debt to equity.

Debt-Servicing Cost

The rapid growth in State indebtedness, coupled with the higher cost of funds, resulted in a massive increase in the State's interest bill over the 1980s (Figure 3.2).  In 1992, the State's net interest bill -- interest paid less interest received -- was $937 million, which in real terms represented a 148 per cent ⁽³⁰⁾ increase over 1982.  The State's net interest bill increased from 8.8 per cent of total revenue in 1982 to 14.6 per cent in 1992, or 5.8 percentage points, which in 1992 dollars was equivalent to $380 million or the amount spent on welfare services.

The growth in gross interest payments by general government over the 1980s was nothing short of alarming.  After 1986, interest payments more than doubled in real terms largely as a result of Canberra's tight monetary policy;  it outpaced the growth in all other types of expenditure and was the major force behind the steady growth in total outlays over the 1986-91 period.  The decade of the 1980s was very costly in terms of borrowing.  The average rate of interest paid by the public sector was only 6 per cent in 1980;  by 1982 it had jumped to 9.9 per cent, and increased thereafter until peaking in 1989 at 12.5 per cent.  The cost of funds to the States has decreased since 1989;  hence the decline in Western Australia's public sector interest bill in recent years (Figure 3.2).  While rates similar to those prevailing in 1989 and 1990 are unlikely to return in the foreseeable future, interest rates now seem to have bottomed.  It is unlikely, therefore, that the debt burden on the taxpayer will be eased as a result of lower interest rates per se.

Figure 3.2:
WA Public Sector Net Interest ^(a) and Debt Service Ratio ^(b)

^(a) Net interest equals interest payments minus interest received;  revenue excludes interest received

^(b) Net interest as a share of total revenue

Source:  ABS Cat. No. 5501.0

Superannuation Costs Are High And Growing

Data on superannuation payments are limited, but what are available indicate rapid growth.  In 1992, gross superannuation payments from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) totalled $285 million, representing a 160 per cent real increase over 1988 and a 27 per cent increase over 1991.  The increase in superannuation payments in 1992 is in part due to the special redundancy programme of that year, and thus the growth in payments should, without a change in policy, slow over the term of the new government.

Public Sector Remains In Deficit

The State public sector is in deficit and, on present policies, seems likely to remain so (see Figure 3.3).  The public sector was in deficit throughout the 1982-92 period, with deficit spending growing, albeit irregularly.  The public sector deficit for 1992 reached $405 million.  The outlook for 1993 is for a public sector deficit of $453 million -- an 11 per cent increase on the previous year.

Though the deficit can be funded, as it must be, from a number of sources, including cash balances, and proceeds from the liquidation of financial assets, in the main the funding will come from new borrowings, including advances from the Commonwealth.

Figure 3.3:
Total Public Sector Deficit 1977-78 to 1992-93 ($ million)

Source:  ABS State Accounts, Cat. No. 5501.0

Budget Deficit Is Structural

Contrary to the rhetoric of successive State governments, the Western Australian general government subsector -- the National Accounts analogue of the budget sector -- was not in balance in any year during the last 10 years and incurred a deficit of $464 million in 1992.  Moreover, in 1993 the general government subsector is again expected to have a deficit of $346 million.

The absence of forward estimates of expenditure and revenue prevents an assessment of the State's financial outlook beyond 1993.  Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that, under the policy settings in place at the time of writing, the Western Australian general government subsector will remain in deficit through the term of the new government.  This conclusion is supported by both major credit rating agencies.  As stated in its 1992 Credit Report, "Moody's expects Western Australia to continue to incur heavy borrowing requirements well into the 1990s". ⁽³¹⁾

The State's deficit is structural rather than cyclical in nature.  That is, the general government subsector is expected to remain in deficit even after deducting abnormal items, such as capital for financial institutions (the R&I Bank and the SGIO) and the counter-cyclical capital spending undertaken in 1993, and despite the cuts to the public sector workforce and other spending restraints instituted by the government in 1991 and 1992.  Although Western Australia may continue to experience faster than average economic growth among the States, forecasts of much stronger growth than in recent years ⁽³²⁾ are unlikely to be realised given the constraints on Australia's economic growth imposed by external debt and other factors.

Deficit Driven By Politics Not Economics

A widely accepted rationale for borrowing by the public sector is that it allows governments to act as a stabilising force in the economy.  There are numerous variations on this argument, but essentially they all boil down to the notion that the public sector should run deficits during periods of recession in the economy and reduce its deficit (or, in fact, run surpluses) during periods of high growth (such as that experienced between 1986 and 1989).

Even if this approach were accepted as appropriate for a State government, ⁽³³⁾ there is a question as to whether the fiscal policy of this State's public sector has in fact been implemented in a way that was counter-cyclical.  Certainly, our governments have regularly justified large deficits by the need to stimulate the economy.  Indeed, the increased deficit planned for 1993 is justified primarily on just this "need".  But the pattern of deficit spending by the total public sector and general government subsector does not in practice show any discernible relationship with various indicators of aggregate demand, such as growth of GSP, household income, or unemployment

If anything, the cumulative fiscal policies of successive State governments over the last decade appear to have acted more as a destabilising force.  The public sector did run large deficits during periods of low growth, such as 1982-83 and 1990-93;  but it ran even higher deficits during the boom times.  During those times, as in the late 1980s, when the State and national economies were very clearly overheated, the Western Australian public sector not only ran large deficits, but stepped up the rate of growth of public expenditure by offsetting reductions in Commonwealth grants with large increases in tax receipts, the use of cash balances and asset sales.  The Western Australian public sector thus pursued a highly "stimulatory" fiscal policy during a period when national economic policy was seeking restraint.  And then, during the recession which followed the boom, the State public sector pursued a relatively contractionary fiscal policy, with large tax increases in 1990, and restraint on expenditure growth through to 1993, entailing cuts to the public sector workforce.  The government did maintain large deficits during this recession, but these were driven in large part by the losses in FTEs already mentioned, and an expenditure overhang from the boom times.

On any dispassionate reading, the evidence indicates that Western Australian governments did pursue a "stabilisation" policy:  it was, however, directed less at the business cycle than at the political cycle.  As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the deficits of the total public sector and the general government subsector display a discernible pattern, of large increases in pre-election years -- 1983, 1986, 1989, and 1993 -- and even though the size of the deficit was reduced in non-election years, these reductions did not offset the large increases committed in election and immediate post-election years.  As a result, there is a distinct "ratchet" growth pattern in deficit spending over the 1980s.

Capital Spending As A Whole Is Not Lumpy

Contrary to the frequent claims of governments, there is little evidence that borrowing is required to finance general government capital spending because of its "lumpy" or uneven nature.  Although within particular agencies capital spending can be very uneven, across the general government sector as a whole the peaks and troughs tend to offset each other, so that the path of total capital spending is quite even on an annual basis.  In fact, as we might expect, the level of capital spending appears to be more sensitive to other policy factors, such as the stage of the political cycle, expenditure restraint, and economic growth, than to the size of individual projects.

Figure 3.4:
General Government Deficit, WA, 1977-78 to 1992-93 ($ million)

Source:  ABS State Accounts, Cat. No. 5501.0

COMPARISONS BETWEEN STATES

To put the matter into perspective, the Western Australian public sector, largely because of the inherent strength of the State's private sector, is in a sound financial position.  It is not confronting a crisis of Victorian proportions;  and it is in a far better fiscal position than the other, "southern" states.  Nevertheless the State's finances have deteriorated significantly in recent years.

In other words:

• There has been excessive borrowing, primarily to avoid the politically-hard decision of raising taxes to finance election promises.
• This has imposed an excessive burden on the State which, at the margin, has probably had adverse effects on economic activity.
• Notwithstanding this, the investment opportunities available to the private sector in WA have been sufficient to allow the State to grow faster than average and avoid Victoria's problems.  In a sense, there have been two States in WA -- one in the private sector;  the other in the public sector.

How Does Western Australia Stand Relative To Other States?

In terms of accumulated liabilities, the Western Australian public sector is in the middle rank of the Australian States (see Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7).  In terms of key credit indicators, its public sector ranks below New South Wales and Queensland, and (in 1991) on a par with South Australia and above Victoria and Tasmania.  Public sector net debt in Western Australia was estimated by S&P Australian Ratings ⁽³⁴⁾ to have been $5315 per capita in 1991, which was 77 per cent higher than Queensland and 47 per cent higher than New South Wales.  Its public sector interest bill, measured as a share of current revenue, was also much higher than either Queensland or New South Wales;  in fact double Queensland's.  Although its net debt and debt-servicing costs were substantially larger than those of New South Wales and Queensland, they were much smaller than Victoria's and Tasmania's.  For example, in 1991, public sector net debt in Western Australia was 28 per cent less per person than in Victoria and a massive 43 per cent less than in Tasmania.  Indeed, the Tasmanian public sector had amassed a net debt equivalent to 40 per cent of that State's GSP by 1991 -- almost double the level of Western Australia.  While in 1991 Western Australia's financial position was on a par with that of South Australia, in subsequent years the level of debt and debt-servicing of the latter's public sector has soared due to the losses of its State Bank.

Table 3.5:
Key Credit Indicators, Australian States, June 1991

	NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	Six states
Net Debt --   Per capita $   % of GSP   % of Budgetary Revenue	3,624 15.9 71.7	7,792 28.9 141.4	2,990 15.4 50.4	5,315 22.6 93.1	5,381 27.3 99.2	7,582 40.2 138.5	4,772 21.6 90.9
Net Interest Payments --   % of Operating Revenue	8.9	18.2	5.7	11.8	9.6	13.4	11.0
Contingent Liabilities as % of GSP --   State Financial Enterprises   Unfunded govt liabilities	14.0 11.4	5.5 18.6	7.7 0.0	24.2 10.6	104.0 11.5	13.7 12.0	18.7 11.6

Source:  S&P Australian Ratings, Monthly Ratings Bulletin, April 1992

Table 3.6:
Operating Budget Indicators, General Government Sector, 1990-91

		NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	Six states
Operating balance *   per capita   % of op. expenditure *	$m $ %	218 37 1.1	-806 -183 -5.9	957 326 11.7	74 45 1.3	-76 -52 -1.5	17 37 0.9	384 23 0.7
Own-purpose op. expenditure *	% ch	10.6	5.7	8.9	6.8	7.7	5.0	8.2
Own-source op. revenue *	% ch	6.5	-0.1	6.6	2.1	10.1	9.4	4.7
Net interest coverage	X	1.2	0.4	3.7	1.2	0.7	1.1	1.1

Source:  S&P Australian Ratings, Monthly Ratings Bulletin, April 1992

* Note:  excludes extraordinary transactions

Table 3.7:
Financial Indicators, PTE Sector, 1990-91

		NSW	Vic	Qld	WA	SA	Tas	Six states
Cost recovery ratio	%	218	-806	957	74	-76	17	384
Net interest coverage	X	37	-183	326	45	-52	37	23
Internal financing ratio	%	1.1	-5.9	11.7	1.3	-1.5	0.9	0.7
Debt payback period	yrs	10.6	5.7	8.9	6.8	7.7	5.0	8.2
Dividends/operating revenue	% ch	6.5	-0.1	6.6	2.1	10.1	9.4	4.7

Source:  S&P Australian Ratings, Monthly Ratings Bulletin, April 1992

In terns of the liabilities of State financial enterprises -- which are not treated as part of public sector debt -- Western Australia rates very poorly.  Indeed, its FTEs had liabilities equivalent to 24 per cent of its GSP;  a level only exceeded by South Australia whose FTEs had amassed liabilities equivalent to 104 per cent of that State's GSP.  Victoria would also have had a horrendous level of liabilities in its FTEs if its State Bank had not been sold.  Queensland, again, had, by a large margin, the lowest level of liabilities in its FTEs.

The issue is not just where the State is now, but also where it is going.  As of 1991, WA was heading in the wrong direction, and quickly.  Moody's clearly identified this in early 1992:  "...except for South Australia, and its jump in debt resulting from that State's obligations to its State Bank, absolute growth of both Western Australia's gross and net debt over the last five years to 1991-92 has been the highest of all six States." ⁽³⁵⁾

Fiscal Stance Has Tightened Since 1991

The State government, to its credit, has tightened fiscal policy over the last few years.  Over the three years 1991 to 1993, Western Australia is estimated to achieve the lowest growth in final consumption spending (7.9 per cent) of any State except Tasmania (2.2 per cent), and a rate substantially below the all-State average (11.3 per cent).  The losses of State financial enterprises also appear to have ceased, though these agencies remain, as a group, overloaded with liabilities.  These changes have arrested the degeneration of the State's financial position vis-à-vis the other States, but have not changed its ranking.  Nor have they been enough to stop the growth in liabilities, let alone start eating into the debt accumulated in the 1980s.  Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania all achieved lower public sector deficits, on a per capita basis, than Western Australia during 1992, and are expected to do so in 1993.

Reduction In Credit Rating

In early 1992, Moody's Investor Services downgraded the ratings of Western Australian government long-term domestic debt from Aaa to Aa1 (see Table 3.8). ⁽³⁶⁾  The other major rating agency, S&P Australian Ratings, made a similar decision in October 1991.  As a result this State's credit rating fell below that of Queensland and New South Wales, which both retained a Triple A rating -- the highest rating available.  South Australia and Tasmania are currently one notch below WA at Aa2.  Victoria is the distant laggard, with a credit rating of A1.

Table 3.8:
Credit Ratings, October 1992

New South Wales	Aaa
Queensland	Aaa
Western Australia	Aa1
South Australia	Aa2
Tasmania	Aa2
Victoria	A1
Commonwealth	Aa2

Source:  Moody's Investor Service.

The reduction of Western Australia's credit rating resulted from the deterioration in the State's financial position.  More specifically, the decisions by the rating agencies to reduce the credit rating were based on the following points:

• "the State's rising debt burden over the last few years and our projections of future borrowing requirements";
• "the deterioration in the State's budgetary position, largely resulting from the slow-down in economic activity";  and
• "the additional financial burden imposed on the State's finances as a result of capital obligations to the State's financial institutions". ⁽³⁷⁾

The main significance of the credit ratings is that they are used by financial markets and investors as an objective means of assessing risk and therefore of determining the cost of borrowing.  At a rough estimate, the recent downgrading of the government's credit rating added about 0.3 percentage points to the annual cost of new domestic borrowings. ⁽³⁸⁾  Thus the high level of public sector borrowing during the 1980s has resulted in an increase in the State's already high cost of borrowing.

The State's large debt burden and the consequent credit downgrading, in concert with the WA Inc deals, undoubtedly undermined business and consumer confidence.  As well as providing financial markets with an independent source of information, credit ratings exert an influence on business and consumer confidence.  Indeed a strong credit rating not only reflects a State's capacity to repay debt, but also an acceptance by the government of the need for sound fiscal management.  During the recent economic downturn those Australian States with superior credit ratings fared better in terms of business and consumer confidence than the States with lower credit ratings. ⁽³⁹⁾

Western Australia Is Not A "Rustbelt" State

While the excesses of the 1980s did erode the State's financial position, nevertheless both the State economy, and, because of the economy, the State's public sector, emerged in a relatively strong financial position.  Western Australia, along with Queensland, is expected to lead the nation in the growth stakes over the term of the government.  The State public sector remains highly rated;  its credit rating of Aal is just one notch below the highest possible (Aaa).  That high rating does not, of course, stem from the quality of its fiscal performance over the 1980s, but rather from its rapidly-developing, resource-rich economic base.

It is important for policy purposes to recognise that the State's economy and therefore its public sector are in far better fiscal shape than those of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania.  Australia's southern States have long-term structural problems that threaten to produce low economic and employment growth right through to the mid-1990s (see Table 3.9), and suffer as well the burden of very high levels of debt -- and, in the case of Victoria, an alarmingly large deficit. ⁽⁴⁰⁾  Although the Western Australian public sector does have a high level of debt and a sizeable structural deficit, these are lower than those of the southern States.  More importantly, the Western Australian economy is fundamentally strong, has excellent growth prospects, and stands to benefit enormously, more than any other State except perhaps Queensland, from microeconomic reforms -- not least, reforms to tariff protection, the labour market and all modes of transport. ⁽⁴¹⁾

Table 3.9:
Economic Growth Forecasts 1992/93 to 1996/97 (mean of sample survey)

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	AUST
GDP   Standard Dev.	3.2 [0.1]	2.5 [0.2]	3.9 [0.1]	3.7 [0.3]	2.2 [0.2]	2.2 [0.1]	3.1 [0.1]
Employment   Standard Dev.	2.1 [0.1]	1.6 [0.1]	2.8 [0.1]	2.1 [0.3]	1.3 [0.2]	1.3 [0.1]	2.1 [0.1]

Note:  Standard deviation is a measure of the variation of forecasts.  WA has the highest standard deviation indicating that the respondents' forecasts vary more than other States.

Source:  "Survey of Business and Economic Performance and Prospects for Australian States", Business Econometrics and Forecasting Group, UNSW, July 1992.

The fiscal performances of the southern or "rustbelt" States of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, are of relevance to Western Australia:  not as a benchmark, but as a warning and an opportunity.  The warning is that high debt and large deficits, particularly in combination with interventionist industrial policy, can do serious damage to an economy.  The opportunity is that people and business will be less interested in remaining or investing in the southern States, thereby providing Western Australia with the opportunity to attract and retain economic activity,

Western Australia's Economic Growth Is Not Assured

Although the State has, by Australian standards, excellent growth prospects, its future is by no means assured.  A recent survey of leading forecasters indicates that most expect Western Australia to experience the second fastest rate of economic and employment growth over the term of the government -- second only to Queensland (Table 3.9).  There was, however, a large level of divergence (as indicated by a higher standard deviation) among the forecasters about Western Australia's growth prospects -- more than for any other State.  Indeed, Western Australia received both the highest (6.1 per cent) and the lowest (1.0 per cent) forecasts of economic growth among the States.  The reason for the divergence of opinion arises, in part, from the narrow structure of the WA economy, but also from the State's fiscal performance, in particular the WA Inc losses discussed earlier.  But whatever the reason, it does indicate that the State's future prospects are far from assured.  It will be particularly important that the State government provide an economic environment conducive to increased private investment.

Queensland Is The Benchmark

The most salient feature of the Australian State sector is the excellent performance and prospects of the Queensland economy.  Over the thee years to 1991-92 -- a period of deep recession -- Queensland out-performed all States according to most indicators, ⁽⁴²⁾ and it is expected to continue to do so over the term of the government (Table 3.9).  As shown by the small standard deviation in the forecast -- less than for any other State -- there is also less doubt among forecasters about Queensland's growth prospects.

Coincident with its record of high economic growth was the unique -- by the standards of Australian states -- fiscal stance of successive Queensland governments.  Over the 1980s, when most other State governments (including Western Australia) pursued a very expansive fiscal policy, with large deficits and higher taxes and charges, Queensland's governments did the opposite.  Successive Queensland governments implemented fiscal measures ⁽⁴³⁾ which included:

• restricting borrowing to commercial purposes;
• no borrowing for general government purposes (in other words achieving a "balanced budget");
• fully funding all future liabilities, including superannuation, workers' compensation, and motor vehicle third party insurance liabilities;
• minimising State taxes and charges;
• ensuring that the PTE sector earn an operating profit, and funding most capital investment from retained earnings;  and
• ensuring that FTEs implement a conservative, low-risk investment strategy.

The effect of these policies, which the current Queensland government is committed to continuing for most of the term of the Western Australian government, is shown in Tables 3.5-3.8.  The Queensland public sector has, by a substantial margin, the lowest level of debt and debt-servicing cost of all the States.  Queensland is the only State whose PTE subsector actually continues to earn an operating profit;  and it has funded over 90 per cent of its capital outlays in that subsector through retained earnings rather than borrowings.  Queensland also has the lowest taxes of any State, and lower charges than most other States.  For example, in aggregate, Queensland imposes taxes at 31 per cent below the all-State average. ⁽⁴⁴⁾  Moreover, it is the only State, apart from New South Wales, which increased public investment in new fixed assets in real terms over the 1988-1993 period. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

The prudent fiscal stance of successive Queensland governments bore fruit during the recent economic downturn.  During the 1990-92 period, Western Australia and all States other than Queensland were, in response to the recession, forced to cut capital works, lay off public servants, and pay out more in interest.  During the same period, the Queensland government was able to increase capital spending by 38 per cent, to employ over 4000 more public servants, cut interest payments by $100 million, and at the same time achieve a balanced budget, retire debt and fully fund all liabilities, without increasing taxes.  The contrast could not be more clear or instructive.

More than that, Queensland's fiscal performance is of particular relevance to Western Australia:  Queensland is the State with which Western Australia most obviously competes for investment, people, and jobs.  It is the State with the most similar economic growth potential and the most similar economic structure.  It confronts a similar pattern of and level of demand for public services and has a similar tax- and revenue-raising capacity to Western Australia's.  As such, Queensland's public sector sets the most appropriate benchmark against which Western Australia's fiscal policy can and should be set and assessed.

Table 3.10:
Fiscal Indicators:  Comparative Performance
Western Australia Relative to Queensland * (Per Capita)

General Government   Tax (1990/91) (a)   Interest Paid (1991/92) (b)   Interest Received (1990/91) (b)   Deficit (1992) (b)   Debt (1992) (b)	27% 82% -29% $489 $1726
Public trading Enterprises   Electricity Charges (1991) (c)   Sewage (1991) (d)   Water (1991) (d)   Interest Paid (1992) (b)   Profit (Loss) (1992) (b)   Debt (1992) (b)	58% 113% -29% 107% ($312) 90%

* Note:  Calculated as per capita level in WA relative to the per capita level in Queensland, and presented in percentage terms if possible, otherwise in dollars.

Sources:

^(a) Commonwealth Grants Commission (1992).

^(b) ABS Cat. No. 5501.0.

^(c) ESAA (1992) Electricity Supply Industry Performance Indicators 1987/88 to 1990/91.

^(d) NT government (1992), Comparative Analysis of Selected Taxes and Charges in the Northern Territory and the States, August.

The government, as shown by Table 3.10, will inherit a fiscal position which is notably inferior to that of Queensland.  In terms of the budget or general government sector, Western Australia imposes taxes which, adjusted for differences in ability to pay or size of tax base, are in per capita terms 27 per cent higher than in Queensland, and it pays out 27 per cent more per person in interest costs.  Because cash balances were run down during the 1980s, the Western Australian public sector also earns significantly less in interest receipts than Queensland's.  The Queensland budget or general government subsector is in surplus and has no net debt -- in fact, it has an excess of financial assets over financial liabilities.  As a result, its new borrowings are roughly $489 per person less than, and its per capita net debt is $1726 per person below, that of Western Australia.  The PTE subsector in Western Australia is also in a worse financial position.  Electricity charges in this State are on average 58 per cent higher than in Queensland.  Charges on sewerage are on average 113 per cent above the level in Queensland;  and while Western Australia does impose on average significantly lower charges for water, for an arid State that can hardly be categorised as an appropriate policy.  Queensland's PTE subsector achieved a higher operating profit ($312 per capita), pays 107 per cent less interest and has 90 per cent less net debt on a per capita basis than does its Western Australian counterpart.

EXISTING DEBT MANAGEMENT PLAN IS INADEQUATE

Although there is no general agreement among economists on what the size of public sector debt or government deficit should be -- not an unusual state of affairs -- there is little disagreement that the level of debt accumulated by the WA public sector during the 1980s was excessive, and that the structural deficit to be inherited by the government is too high, particularly given the large portions used to fund consumption.  The question, then, is how much should the deficit and State debt be reduced?

In mid-1992, the Western Australian government announced a debt management plan ⁽⁴⁶⁾ designed to reduce the public sector deficit and debt.  The central objective of the plan is to reduce State debt to a level consistent with achieving, or rather retrieving, a "Triple-A" credit rating.  This is to be achieved by restricting the growth of the public sector deficit to one percentage point less than the growth in GSP until the public sector debt falls to below 18 per cent of GSP -- the level generally believed to be consistent with a Triple A credit rating.  The plan also stated that the repayment of general government debt would be accelerated, so that such debt would be paid off over 25 years.  The plan also included a commitment to reduce expenditures and taxation as a proportion of GSP, and a commitment to monitor and report annually on these targets, as part of the budget process.

Although this debt management plan is an improvement on the past, and unambiguously a move in the right direction, it falls short of being an adequate strategy for the next government.  Specifically, it fails to distinguish between borrowing for commercial and non-commercial activities;  it fails to distinguish between borrowing for capital and current purposes;  it fails to consider adequately the need to make up for the profligacy of the past;  it fails to confront squarely the competition from Queensland and other States;  it fails to consider all the relevant aspects -- ability, desirability, appropriateness -- of counter-cyclical spending;  and it fails to address the systemic tendency toward excessive borrowing by governments.

Need To Separate Commercial From Non-Commercial Functions

Those functions of government that are clearly nominated as operating on a commercial basis should, in respect of debt policy, be treated differently from those functions that operate through non-commercial means.  The existing debt management plan fails to make this distinction.

The funding decisions of the commercial activities of government have, at least potentially, an inbuilt discipline -- the market place.  They are, therefore, less prone to excessive borrowing or spending.  Furthermore, because they are funded through user charges, there is a direct link between the beneficiary and the funder of these goods and services.  They also tend to provide physical infrastructure which yields a direct and quantifiable financial return to users.

The general government subsector is fundamentally different.  An important objective of the general government subsector is redistribution:  that is, to provide services to people who "need" them, financed by people who can "afford" to pay.  There is thus no discipline other than that imposed by the political process.  General government services generally do not yield a financial return to the community in order to meet their establishment and maintenance costs.  And there is no visible link between those who pay for and those who benefit from the services.

It could be argued that there should be no borrowing limits imposed on the commercial operations of government, but rather that the funding decisions should be left up to the market place.  The problem is that PTEs are not entirely structured or operated on commercial grounds.  Their borrowing and spending policies are very significantly influenced by various non-commercial objectives.  As long as the distinction between the PTE and the general government subsectors remains blurred, the funding policies of the PTE subsector should be subjected to limits imposed by the government.  The imposition of a borrowing limit could have adverse effects on commercial activities:  capital works might be inappropriately postponed, or user charges forced up in order to fund "lumpy" capital works.  The solution, however, lies not with refraining from or eliminating global borrowing limits but with changing the structure, functions and objectives of government agencies.  The real task is to isolate the commercial functions from the non-commercial through, initially, an accelerated and more rigorous process of corporatisation, and, ultimately, through privatisation, and to have all non-commercial activities undertaken by PTEs to be funded by the general government sector.

The general government subsector should be the primary focus of the government's debt strategy and the subsectors --- the PTE and general government -- should be subjected to separate, explicit targets for debt and deficits.  The current debt management plan does neither.

Need To Stop Borrowing For Consumption

For reasons of efficiency and equity as well as straightforward financial management, public sector agencies, in both the PTE and general government subsectors, should be allowed to borrow only to fund additions to net capital stock and not to fund consumption.

The use of borrowing by the public sector to fund consumption will inevitably result in excessive costs, with too much of the State's scarce resources being taken away from productive uses in the private sector for unproductive purposes.  Borrowing for unproductive purposes also undermines the ability of government to manage its finances.  Since interest payments are a non-discretionary item of expenditure, their growth necessarily diminishes the policy options available to governments and exposes government to a higher level of risk from economic factors, such as higher interest rates, and from political factors, such as the domination by the Commonwealth.

The most serious and binding criticism of the use of borrowing for consumption purposes is that it is grossly inequitable.  As the current debt management plan correctly indicates, the main justification in theory for the use of debt to finance public expenditure is that it allows the cost of long-lived assets to be spread over time;  that is, it achieves equity over generations.  Public works do often have long lives and can involve large and lumpy expenditure.  If such assets were financed totally from current revenue, then current consumers would be forced to bear the full cost.  That could, as a result of budget constraints, lead to the under-supply of valuable assets;  whilst future consumers would benefit from the use of the assets but would not be required to pay their fair share.  That intergenerational equity argument, however, has a binding corollary, seldom made clear by governments.  It is this:  that it is not equitable to borrow, unless the borrowings are used to create a new long-lived capital asset and one that earns its keep.  That means that it is not equitable to borrow for recurrent or consumption purposes (including the consumption of capital in the form of repair and maintenance expenditure).  Future generations receive little benefit from the consumption of their predecessors.  They will, moreover, be required to meet the cost of their own consumption as well as that of preceding generations.  This is quite clearly inequitable.

As discussed above, the available evidence indicates that the general government subsector and perhaps the PTE subsector are currently borrowing heavily for non-productive or consumption purposes.  Depending on the accounting treatment, the data show that at least 30 per cent and perhaps as much as 87 per cent of the new net borrowing by general government is currently being used for consumption purposes.  The data on the PTE subsector are less definitive, but do indicate the continued use of new borrowings for non-productive purposes,

The obvious conclusion is that the deficit of the general government subsector should be reduced at the very least by a third -- $120 million -- in 1993.  The deficit of the PTE subsector also needs to be reduced.  By way of contrast, the existing debt management plan envisages steady real growth in borrowing over the term of the government, which, on the basis of all accepted criteria, is excessive.

Need To Compensate For The Legacy Of The 1980s

One reason for adopting a balanced budget target is the need to make up for the excesses of the 1980s.  As discussed above, over the last 15 years and particularly during the last six years, the State's public sector has accumulated a large stock of unproductive debt:  around 34 per cent in total public sector debt and around 60 per cent in the general government subsector.  When unfunded superannuation, unrealised losses in State-owned financial enterprises, and the depletion of the State's mineral and energy assets are considered, there has been a significant erosion of the State's net asset base.  Thus the current generation will be passing on to the next generation a greatly depleted legacy.  This directly conflicts with principles of intergenerational equity, at least as applied to general government assets.

Since there is no direct connexion between individual users and individual funders of general government assets, these assets and any associated debt must be assessed on a whole-of-society or collective basis.  Intergenerational equity will be achieved for such assets if, in a given period, the beneficiaries -- the whole of society -- pay an amount which covers the full cost of the services they receive including maintenance and replacement of assets.  In that way, one period's taxpayers will bequeath to subsequent taxpayers no less an inheritance of net assets (capital and financial assets less liabilities) than the one they received.  The central point is that the whole burden of general government debt must be tied to the benefits which the whole of society will gain in the future from improvements to the current capital stock;  the asset, the debt and the benefits are all indivisible.

Given the indivisible nature of general government assets, the level and uses of past borrowings are relevant to determining the appropriateness of new borrowings.  Specifically, there is no equity in making future taxpayers fund the construction of schools or day-care centres if they -- the future taxpayers -- are also saddled with debt for which they receive no benefits.  If the level of debt is already excessive relative to the asset bases -- as it is now -- it is inappropriate to make future generations pay for new schools even though they may benefit from them.

To make up for the profligacy of the past, the general government subsector will need to maintain a balanced budget.  If capital spending is maintained at current levels, a balanced budget would be required for between 15 to 30 years to compensate for the legacy of the 1980s.  In other words, equity requires a balanced budget in the general government subsector for the foreseeable future.

The excesses of the past are less relevant to the commercial activities of government.  If investment is financed on correct commercial grounds, then each debt-funded addition to the capital stock will automatically be justified by the revenue expected from customers.  As such, the stock of debt held by these agencies, whether productive or unproductive, does not theoretically alter the justification for using debt funding at the margin.

The stock of debt is, however, important for the PTE sector.  Some PTEs, such as SECWA, Fremantle Port Authority, and Westrail, have accumulated a large stock of unproductive or under-performing debt which has to be serviced and which is undermining their efficiency and flexibility.  A large proportion of this debt has been generated for redistributive purposes and funded via tax-like instruments.  This should be viewed as part of the general government sector and thus as adding further support to the need for a balanced budget.

Public Sector Must Cut Its Use of Domestic Savings

Australia's economic conditions demand that the public sector reduce its consumption of private savings by achieving a budget surplus.  Australia has a large current account deficit arising from an excess of domestic expenditure over domestic income.  This deficit is being financed by borrowing the savings of foreigners, who must be repaid with interest.  As a result the foreign debt has grown past $160 billion, and debt-servicing costs have grown to 42 per cent of net exports.  Part of the solution to the debt and current account problem lies in achieving a sustainable increase in domestic savings.  The most effective and only direct means open to governments to achieve an increased level of savings is for it to stop borrowing;  that is, for the public sector to stop consuming private savings.

Since all major parties at the Federal level have, in recognition of the nation's fiscal plight, made explicit commitments to return the budget sector to a surplus, the Commonwealth government will, throughout the term of the new State government, put continuous pressure on the States to cut expenditure and restrain borrowings.  Indeed, as the experience of the latter half of the 1980s shows, unless the States take a lead in the process of fiscal reform, the Commonwealth will not only force restraint on the States via the various instruments at its disposal, but it will also force them to bear the bulk of the restraint and the debt.  Moreover, unless the States prove themselves willing and able to respond to the need to reduce public sector borrowings, the Commonwealth is unlikely to support any changes in State-Federal fiscal arrangements which might give the States more autonomy.

Need To Meet The Competition:  Queensland

The processes of structural change and microeconomic reform will present Western Australia with huge challenges and opportunities in the 1990s.  Western Australia's main competitor is and will continue to be Queensland.  Although the level of taxes and charges is only one of the many means by which the State can compete, they are important and they are within the control of the government.  One way in which the new government can meet the challenges and opportunities provided by reform processes is to achieve the level of fiscal performance and the cost structure of its main competitor – Queensland -- and the most obvious way to do this is to adopt Queensland's unique and successful fiscal stance -- the core of which is a balanced budget.  In other words, the government should follow the lead of the private sector in its drive to become internationally competitive and set as its benchmark the best example of current "best practice" in fiscal performance -- Queensland.

Balanced Budget Is Consistent With Stabilisation

If one assumes that State governments can and will manage their finances so as to stabilise the State's economy, then the budget deficit, and even borrowing for consumption purposes, can be rationalised.  Most of those who would argue the orthodox case for the stabilisation function would go on to argue that a rigid balanced-budget rule would make governments either increase taxes or cut spending in periods of low growth, and cut taxes or increase spending during periods of high growth.  This would lead to large fluctuations in tax rates over time.  That in turn would prove very difficult, if not impossible, to manage politically.  It would accentuate the business cycle;  would increase the level of sovereign risk;  and would, over time, distort the relative allocation of work and leisure.  Taxes should remain stable over time, therefore, even if this results periodically in deficits and surpluses.

The key point is that the stabilisation objective is consistent with the pursuit of a balanced budget target.  The Western Australian general government subsector has a structural deficit:  its deficit is not caused by cyclical or temporary factors.  Balancing the budget by either increasing taxes or by cutting expenditure will result in permanent changes and as such it is consistent with the stabilisation objective.  The conflict between a balanced budget target and the stabilisation objective arises more in terms of the timing of the adjustment process and how rigidly the balanced budget target is enforced once it is reached.

The ability of, and need for, State governments to stabilise their local economies is, as argued earlier, very limited and greatly exaggerated.  The evidence indicates that the State governments, including successive Western Australian governments, have in recent years, with one conspicuous exception, pursued a pro-cyclical fiscal stance and in so doing acted as destabilising forces in the economy.  The one exception has been Queensland.  Queensland governments, unlike their counterparts in other States, kept tax rates constant over the 1980s, saved the windfall receipts that flowed from the asset boom of the 1980s, and used the earnings from the accumulated financial assets to make up the shortfall in tax revenue during the recent recession.  Thus Queensland was the only State to pursue a stabilisation policy, and a key reason for its being able to do so was its pursuit of a structural balanced budget.

Need To Check The Bias Of Politics

The inescapable conclusion we gather from the fiscal behaviour of the Western Australian public sector over the last decade or more is that the traditional conception of government as acting benevolently in the "public interest" to achieve equity, to stabilise the economy, and to promote efficiency, is not applicable to State governments.  On the contrary the evidence suggests a strong systemic tendency for excessive growth of State debt, when assessed against any of these objectives.

There are many possible explanations or theories ⁽⁴⁷⁾ of this behaviour -- behaviour that is by no means unique to Western Australia -- but two appear to be most relevant to the issue of State debt:  fiscal illusion and the political cycle.

There is strong evidence that individual voters seldom make the connexion that borrowing today leads to higher taxes tomorrow.  First, the indirect nature of the Stake tax and revenue systems leads voters to believe that they do not pay State taxes -- someone else does, most notably business.  If voters do not think that they pay taxes today, they are going to be less concerned about taxes tomorrow.  Second, voters are very poorly informed about the level, use and cost of State debt -- the format and inadequacies of the State's accounts, and the complicated nature of the issues involved see to that.  Third, government deficits allow some voters and interest groups to free-load on future generations.

The failure of people to make the connexion between debt and taxes allows vote-maximising governments to gain popularity by giving current consumers and some voters what appears to them to be a free lunch:  spending without any immediate or obvious increase in taxes or charges.

The excessive accumulation of debt is also caused by the short time-horizons of political parties.  Political parties are primarily interested in getting elected and, once in government, in staying in power.  They characteristically have a very short and tightly-focused time horizon -- the next election.  Their primary focus within that horizon is on maximising votes in marginal seats.  They also have a strong incentive to push the responsibility for funding current expenditure as much as possible into the future:  many future taxpayers are not current voters, and the future government is likely to be made up either of a different party or at least of different members.  Voters tend to accommodate the short-sightedness of politicians within their own myopic behaviour.  Electoral outcomes are heavily influenced by the apparent economic performance of and benefits provided by governments on election day.  Both the past and the future are discounted heavily. ⁽⁴⁸⁾  The myopia of the political process combined with the vote-maximising imperatives of government give rise to the electoral cycle in which governments manipulate expenditure for maximum impact at election time and in marginal seats, with large increases in deficit funding.  The electoral cycle has been a very obvious and major reason for the ratchet-like growth of debt in Western Australia over the last decade or more.

The existence of these forces -- fiscal illusion and the political cycle -- does not mean that State debt will grow inexorably;  there are limits.  The Commonwealth, through the Loan Council and the provision of grants, will eventually impose its will when things get out of hand.  (The extent to which the Commonwealth government ignored the Victorian fiscal débâcle is not however, an encouraging experience.)  Credit rating agencies are increasingly active and will eventually react to State fiscal policy by changing a State's credit rating and therefore the cost of its capital.  Taxpayers may flee, as they are currently doing in Victoria, or revolt, as they did in California in the 1980s.  And political ideology and personalities do matter.  Although these limits are many and varied, they are inadequate, often too imprecise and not very durable.  They tend to come into effect when things have got too far out of hand -- after the horse has already bolted -- involving resort to extreme, costly and often one-off solutions.

A substantial part of the longer-term solution lies in improving the accountability of State spending (see Chapter 5) and in improving the transparency of and the State's responsibility for State revenue collections (see Chapter 4).  These reforms are by themselves not enough, and will prove ineffective unless supplemented with limits on borrowing.

The solution lies with imposing limits on borrowing -- a balanced budget target.  This directly addresses the structural excesses of the political system, as well as being easily understood, credible, and having the potential to command wide public support.

DEBT STRATEGY FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The new State government should implement a debt management plan, whose primary targets are to:

• achieve by the end of the term -- 1997 -- a "Triple A" rating, which involves reducing the net debt of the State public sector from 21.1 per cent of GSP in 1992 to around 17.0 per cent of GSP in 1997.  This is much more stringent than the existing debt management plan which, assuming it is enforced each year and the economy grows at a rate of 4.0 per cent per year in real terms, will take around 13 years to reach the same target;
• achieve by the end of the term -- 1997 -- a structurally balanced budget, or zero deficit, in the general government subsector.  This means eliminating a structural deficit of between $250 and $300 million over a four-year period;
• phase out, by 1995, all borrowing in the general government subsector for consumption purposes:  that is, new borrowing must be equal to or less than the increase in capital investment minus the cost of depreciation;
• restrict, from 1994, all new borrowings by the PTE subsector to the funding of long-lived assets that yield a commercial rate of return and are fully serviced by user charges;
• set aside, from 1994, sufficient funds to meet all accruing liabilities above the 1992 level ($4.4 billion);
• take on no additional contingent liabilities in the form of sureties, guarantees and indemnities;
• use the proceeds from asset sales and privatisation to decrease the stock of debt and not to fund consumption;
• channel all capital revenue, including mineral royalties, into capital outlays;  and
• make explicit grants to PTEs for community service obligations.

IMPLEMENTATION:  NEED FOR INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

The debt management strategy can only be achieved in a limited number of ways:  by raising more revenue, by cutting expenditure, or by a combination of the two.  These are considered separately in later chapters.  The priority must, however, be to reduce spending.  It is also appropriate to raise additional revenue, in the form of asset sales and privatisation, and to impose for a fixed term a tax or surcharge earmarked for redeeming WA Inc losses (see Chapter 4).

It is not possible or appropriate at this time to provide the detail, or indeed much more than the overall direction, of the necessary process of adjustment.  There is insufficient information and there are numerous options that will need be considered.  The options should be explored by the Commission of Audit.  Notwithstanding the findings of the Commission, some flexibility will be required over the term of government.  The task at this point is to set the debt targets and to commit the government to achieving them over its term.

Necessary Supports To Balancing the Budget

The main impediment to the debt management strategy will be the political system itself.  Under the existing system, the politicians making up the government will have the usual strong incentives to avoid anti-deficit actions.  Deficit reduction will be strongly resisted by an army of vested interests.  And the politicians of the opposition parties will accentuate the pain -- real or imagined -- without mentioning the gain.  Even those voters who strongly oppose deficit spending will prefer that someone else's programmes get cut, or that someone else's taxes get raised.  Many, though not all, sections of the bureaucracy will see it as an attack on the empire.  In addition to the obvious considerations, many members of the government will see it as bad politics to hand over a nest egg to future governments.  Thus even when political leaders have the best of intentions and have a mandate to reduce the deficit, achieving and maintaining it may be difficult.

The first and most important ingredient toward implementing the debt strategy is political will and leadership.  Unless these are provided over the term of government, the debt strategy could turn into a farce.  Thus it must have the full and binding endorsement of the government.  And there must be some mechanisms, such as a Cabinet decision and a very clear, mandated public manifesto, which fully enunciate the strategy and ensure that someone in authority, preferably the Treasurer, has the power to make it work.

In addition to having a meaningful set of goals and the authority to back these up, there must also be the technical and institutional systems in place to produce the results.  The budget must be properly defined with all loop-holes closed off.  There must be a detailed set of forward estimates backed up by detailed financial controls to ensure that targets are actually adhered to at the manager level.  Those responsible for the strategy must be answerable to Parliament for the success or otherwise of meeting the targets.  This would be greatly facilitated by an annual progress report by the Auditor-General.  Financial incentives should also be provided to public service managers not just in relation to the performance of their own department but to the achievement of the strategy as a whole.

Ultimately the solution lies in putting into place constraints on the decision-making powers of government.  Such reforms are necessarily external because any internal reform will itself be inherently unstable and therefore less effective.

Two options appear to be most suitable:  a requirement to balance the budget or a requirement that all borrowing by the general government sector be approved for specific purposes and by a referendum.  The two options can be combined with a balanced budget being required unless authorised for specific purposes via a referendum.  There are other variations that can be considered, and the restraint can be imposed via statutory or constitutional means, though the latter would be preferable.  Although external restraint on the powers of government may appear to be radical to Australians, it is the norm at the State level in the USA.  Forty-nine of the fifty State governments in USA have balanced budget requirements;  in most (42 states) the requirement is imposed constitutionally.  And unlike the poor track record of similar requirements at the national level in the USA, the balanced budget requirements at the State level have proved to be quite successful in restraining growth in debt and to be popular. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

There is a wide range of issues that need exploration, such as whether the requirement applies over a single year or a period of years;  how the budget is defined;  and how the role and impact of the Commonwealth on State revenue and spending can be treated.  The various options and issues need a thorough assessment, and should be carried out as a high priority by the next government.

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ENDNOTES

11.  There are numerous ways of measuring State debt.  It can be measured before (gross) or after (net) deducting financial assets;  it can be valued at face or present value;  and the different measures can result in significantly different estimates.  There is little consistency between the various published measurements of State debt across Australia, though the States have agreed to publish estimates of debt on a standard basis (present value) beginning in 1994.  Since the WA government has only published data on gross debt at face value prior to 1989, this measurement will be used throughout this study.  Estimates on present value basis of gross and net debt are published, but only after 1989.

12.  This is shown by the need for the WA government to borrow $529 million in 1992 to enhance the liquidity of its cash balances in order to meet the liquidity ratio guidelines set by the credit rating agencies.  WA Treasury (1992a), Analytical Information In Support of the Treasurer's Annual Statement:  1991-92, November, page 46.

13.  In this and subsequent chapters, reference to a year implies reference to a fiscal year;  for example, "1982" refers to fiscal year 1981-82.

14.  State debt was higher during the 1960s and earlier decades than in the 1980s.  However, the WA economy and the State's finances have changed to such an extent that the debt levels in the years prior to the 1970s are now no longer relevant.  For example, prior to the 1970s, borrowings were undertaken by the Commonwealth on behalf of the States with significant Commonwealth control over the level of borrowings.  Moreover the cost of debt was much lower during, and in fact at times even negative in real terms prior to, the 1970s.  In the 1960s WA went through a phase of rapid expansion, with the development of the iron ore industry and wheat belt requiring a much higher level of physical infrastructure;  during the 1960s over 47 per cent of total State expenditure was used for capital purposes compared with just 17 per cent during the 1980s.

15.  The State public sector is, under the National Accounting framework (the accounting framework that will be used throughout Reform and Recovery) divided into public trading enterprises, or PTEs, and general government enterprises.  (For a discussion of the National Account format, see WA Treasury (1992b), 1992-93 WA Budget:  Economic and Financial Overview, Appendix 2, pages 43-47;  and for a discussion of its application to State debt, see WA Treasury (1992a), op. cit., Appendix, pages 59-67.) State owned financial trading enterprises (FTEs), such as the R&I Bank and the SGIC, are not included as part of the public sector, though they do transact with the public sector via the payment of dividends and the receipt and repayment of advances.  PTEs are by definition those agencies of government which mainly sell goods into a market with the intention of recovering all or a significant proportion of their operating costs.  (See ABS, Cat. No. 21217.0, Classifications Manual for Government Finance Statistics:  Australia 1984, page 5.) This means that they face a degree of commercial pressure in terms of their financing decisions and have the capacity to service debt via user charges.  In contrast, the general government subsector consists of those agencies of government which in the main operate outside the normal market mechanism, provide goods free of charge, and whose debt is financed by tax revenue.  There is, therefore, a prima-facie case for assessing the financing decision of these subsectors differently.  However, the differences between the subsectors -- in the past and today -- are to some extent more apparent than real.

16.  WA Treasury (1992c), The Treasurer's Annual Statements 1991-92, November, pages 122-123.  WA Treasury (1992d), Submission to The Public Accounts and Expenditure Review Committee State Debt Inquiry, June.

17.  "Report on State Debt", Report No. 25, Public Accounts and Expenditure Review Committee, Legislative Assembly of Western Australia, December 1992.

18.  The Industry Commission defines community service obligations (CSOs) as arising when a government requires a public enterprise to carry out activities relating to outputs or inputs which it would not elect to do on a strictly commercial basis, or which it would only do commercially at higher prices.

19.  See WA Treasury (1992b), op. cit., Table 5, page 60 for a list of major CSOs currently identified by various PTEs.

20.  See ABS Cat. No. 5501.0.

21.  WA Treasury (1992e), 1992-93 WA General Loan and Capital Works Fund, Estimates of Expenditure.

22.  See WA Treasury (1992b), op. cit., pages 49-66, for discussion of reform initiatives currently under way in WA.

23.  These institutions are not treated as part of the budget sector for statistical purposes and thus their losses only affect State debt when met by State borrowing.

24.  WA Treasury (1992e), op. cit., page 2.

25.  Ibid., pages 29-32.

26.  A portion of WA's above-average level of royalties will be offset by a reduction in Commonwealth Grants.

27.  WA Treasury (1992a), op. cit., pages 7-26.

28.  WA Treasury (1992c), op. cit., pages 123-145.

29.  WA Government (1992a), Investing In Infrastructure:  Guidelines for Private Sector Participation in Public Infrastructure, May,

30.  In 1990, the WA government refinanced a large portion of its long-term debt in order to achieve a reduction in its cost of funds.  The decision incurred transaction costs of $190 million which were brought to book in full in 1991.  The transaction led to the very high interest payments in 1991 and the lower level of interest payments recorded in subsequent years.  Thus, to this extent, the decline in interest payments indicated in Figure 3.2 after 1991 is illusory.

31.  Moody's, Moody's Sovereign Credit Report -- Australian States, New York, February 1992.

32.  WA Treasury forecast economic growth of 4 per cent in real terms during 1992-93;  see WA Treasury (1992b), op. cit., page 23.

33.  Stabilisation is primarily a Commonwealth government responsibility and, given the "leakages" from additional State spending to other States and overseas, State governments have only a limited capacity to influence economic activity in their State through such Keynesian policies.

34.  The States do not publish estimates of State debt on a common basis.  The data referred to in Table 3.5 are estimates provided by S&P Australian Ratings, Monthly Ratings Bulletins, April 1992, and differ from the estimates published by individual States,

35.  Moody's, op. cit., pages 27-28.

36.  Note that the two major agencies use different codes, so that Moody's Aaa is the same as S&P Australian Ratings' AAA.  To avoid confusion we will refer to the top rating as "Triple A".

37.  Ibid., page 26.

38.  NSW Government, 1992-93 NSW Budget, Budget Paper No. 2, pages 9-50.

39.  Loc. cit.

40.  Access Economics, Economic Monitor, Canberra, May 1992

41.  Cf. Ken Willett, Clipping The Wings of Eagles, WA, Perth, Policy Paper No. 22.

42.  Queensland Treasury (1992a), Queensland Economic Review, June Quarter, page 34.

43.  Queensland Government (1992a), Queensland Budget, 1992-93, Budget Paper No. 4, pages 3-5.

44.  CGC, Report on General Revenue Grant Relativities for the States, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory:  1992 Update, Commonwealth Grants Commission, Canberra, AGE, 1992

45.  ABS Cat. No. 5501.0.

46.  WA Government (1992b), Managing Public Sector Debt, August.

47.  See E.S. Savas, Privatising The Public Sector:  How To Shrink Government, Chatham House, New Jersey, 1982, pages 10-26.

48.  A.D. Hibbs, The American Political Economy:  Macroeconomic and Electoral Politics, Harvard University Press, Boston, 1987, page 714.

49.  See Fiscal Discipline in the Federal System:  National Reform and the Experience of the States, Report A-107, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, July 1987.