Showing posts with label Media Regulation in Australia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Media Regulation in Australia. Show all posts

Monday, November 02, 1998

Improving Media Regulation

CHAPTER EIGHT

Australian broadcasting has long been subject to regulations in three main areas:  control of entry through licensing;  restrictions on foreign and broad ownership;  and control of content.  The print media were not subject to special regulation until the cross-media ownership rules were introduced in 1987.  The regulations affecting the media industries have evolved over the years in response to various forces including the advent of new technologies, changes in consumer demands and the decline of the "social responsibility" approach.  While these changes have been broadly in the direction of greater liberalisation, the media industries remain heavily regulated compared with most other industry groups.

In this study I have described, explained and evaluated Australian media regulations.  The approach is both retrospective and prospective.  The regulations have not always served well what I understand to be "the public interest".  While characteristics of public good, natural monopoly and spectrum scarcity have meant that the market cannot be relied on totally to produce an efficient outcome, regulations have not always led to an improvement or, when they have, not to the maximum possible improvement.  In this concluding chapter I canvass some possibilities for alternative regulatory directions that avoid some of the shortcomings inherent in the existing regulatory structure.  The recommendations are based on four guiding principles:

  1. Regulation should be retained or introduced only when correction of market failure is strictly necessary and justified or to achieve a clearly identified social goal whose benefits to society clearly outweigh all the cost associated with the regulation.
  2. Regulation should be based on a clear, well-defined, transparent and predictable framework.
  3. Regulation should be directed to outcomes and not to the way in which the outcomes are generated or delivered.
  4. Regulation should be neutral in its impact on delivery technologies and on services with substantially similar attributes.

SPECIFIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. Freer Entry into Broadcasting

Regulation of entry into broadcasting has been overly restrictive, limiting the number of particular services in particular markets, and delaying the introduction of emerging services based on new technologies.  Without these restrictions it appears that the present size, structure and performance of broadcasting services would have been substantially different from that observed.  High licence values reflect the rents accruing to their holders and the presence of these rents is prima facie evidence of excessive restriction.  There is also evidence that in the case of all new services based on new technologies (monochrome television, FM radio and pay-television in particular), introduction was unnecessarily delayed with consequent efficiency costs.  Further, the combination of carriage (signal transmission) and content (programme production) in Australian broadcasting has been a source of regulatory difficulties and has restricted policy flexibility.  There are several elements that could help establish a freer and more coherent approach to broadcasting licensing:


Reduce entry barriers

I recommend much freer entry into broadcasting.  The only "public interest" grounds for limiting entry are those of natural monopoly (economies of scale or scope) and technical considerations such as spectrum scarcity.  However, natural monopoly provides only a prima facie case for intervention (it provides only a necessary condition for restriction, not a sufficient one).  New entry that duplicates investment in infrastructure is not necessarily wasteful.  Its benefits such as greater programme diversity and choice to consumers or lower prices for advertising could well exceed the cost of the investment.  Technological changes have greatly reduced spectrum scarcity constraints and new delivery platforms, such as the Internet and international satellite, are largely beyond the reach of national regulations.  Increased adoption of these technological advances will continue to reduce the effectiveness of restrictive entry barriers and would make their retention increasingly questionable.


Continue the auction system

Where entry is to be restricted on public interest grounds, including spectrum scarcity, a market mechanism should continue to be used to allocate the available licences.  However, there may be a case for consideration of alternative auction designs that facilitate a more efficient approach to market allocation and avoid some of the pitfalls experienced in recent years (e.g., allocation of satellite pay television licences).


Separation of carriage and content

There is a case for the means of carriage and the content of free-to-air broadcasting services to be licensed separately as is the case in the United Kingdom.  This would be easy to apply to all new services immediately, but would be difficult for existing services.  One approach for existing services would be a requirement that, after an appropriate period of notice, owners divest themselves of either the carriage or content element of their current licences.


Limit licence periods

Currently, although licences are issued for a nominal period, they are held virtually in perpetuity.  Separation of carriage and content would help establish enforceable fixed licence periods.  Unless completely free entry were justifiable, the content licences should be allocated initially, and re-allocated when they expire, by a market mechanism, such as an auction, to secure any scarcity value for the government.  The government could also retain the right to impose obligatory content clauses and would then be free to amend them each time a licence is re-allocated.  Owners of transmission facilities would not necessarily be excluded from holding a content licence.  The effectiveness of this approach has been demonstrated in the United Kingdom where it is used to allocate programming licences for free-to-air television.


Spectrum management

Efficient use of the scarce radio frequency spectrum would require broadcasters to purchase spectrum rights in competition with users in other industries.  It would provide broadcasters with the flexibility to choose alternative delivery mechanisms (e.g. cable, satellites) should they prove to be more commercially attractive.  The introduction of a tradeable spectrum-access rights system would need to give special consideration to the terms and conditions under which existing broadcasters could continue to retain tenure of the broadcasting frequencies currently assigned to them.


Technological neutrality

The BSA sought to establish a technologically-neutral framework for the development of broadcasting.  However, those intentions of the Act have not always been pursued in practice.  In the short period since the enactment of the legislation the concept of technological neutrality has been overridden by two policy initiatives (pay television and HDTV), which have had major implications for the development of broadcasting services.  Issues surrounding the management of new technologies were treated at length in Chapter 7.  In brief, wherever regulation is justified, considerable care should be exercised to ensure that it is not distortionary in its application to different technologies.  My recommendation is that any such regulation should be applied to outcomes irrespective of the technology by which they are delivered.


2. Fewer Restrictions on Ownership and Control

When evaluated on economic criteria, restrictions on audience reach, foreign ownership and cross-media ownership all have a number of adverse effects.  In particular they have limited the development of industry structures exploiting economies of scale and scope, prevented the formation of multi-media groups, and given incentives to the creation of new financial instruments and other arrangements to avoid the regulations.  At the same time, substantial diversification of the media industry has weakened the non-economic case for ownership restrictions, and, as the delivery of media services by non-traditional means becomes more widespread, the justification for continued restrictions on ownership of traditional media will be further eroded.  In the case of restrictions on population reach, these have effectively been circumvented by television programming affiliation agreements.  In the light of these considerations it is difficult to mount a case for continuing to restrict audience reach, foreign ownership and cross-media ownership.


3. Use More Efficient Means of Promoting Australian Content

Programme standards in television are quite extensive and include requirements for overall Australian content (type and quantity) of television programmes, children's programmes, Australian content in advertising (80 per cent must be produced in Australia) and limits on time devoted to advertising (maximum of 13 minutes an hour in prime time and 15 minutes an hour at other times).

The discussion of programme standards in Papandrea (1997) considered the desirability and appropriateness of Australian content requirements and found evidence that there was a willingness to pay for the additional cost of local content, but that the current means of delivery are inefficient.  They distort broadcasters' programming decisions and provide a substantial, but hidden, level of assistance to drama production and employment.

Assuming that the current assistance is desirable, it would be possible to eliminate some of the current distortions and improve the efficiency of the scheme without significantly affecting its outcome.  It is proposed that a direct and more transparent mechanism should be used to assist film and television programme production.  A mechanism other than quota (e.g. a bounty or other direct assistance to production) which removed the relative price differential between Australian drama and foreign drama or other Australian programmes would allow programmers greater flexibility in choosing programmes on the basis of audience response.


OVERALL CONCLUSION

My broad conclusion is that, while there have been substantial improvements in the regulatory structure and its outcomes (especially with the BSA), there are still problems in the approach and results in the three major areas of regulation:  licensing, ownership controls and content regulation.  The traditional regulatory structure continues to be challenged by new technologies and the convergence of existing ones.  The media industry needs to be managed very carefully to produce results that maximise the "public interest".

This leads us to reflect on how different the broadcasting landscape may have been with a more liberal, market based approach to the licensing of new services.  Additional broadcasting services and new technologies such as FM radio, television and pay television would probably have been introduced much earlier.  For instance, notwithstanding the invention of FM radio in the 1930s, its successful use overseas and in local test stations for decades, the existence of many unsatisfied applications for new radio services and 60 per cent receiver penetration by 1978 (Postal and Telecommunications Department, 1978), FM radio services were not introduced until 1980.  The use of FM was prohibited by legislation in 1956 and the FM spectrum was allocated for use by television in 1961.  Similarly, the introduction of television was delayed until 1956 even though the technology had been developed much earlier, and 20 applications for commercial television licences had been lodged as early as 1944 (Curthoys, 1986).  The same pattern is repeated in the case of subscription television whose introduction "as soon as practicable" had been recommended as early as 1982 in a report by the ABT (1982).  The government ignored the report until 1986 and then decided to impose a four-year moratorium on the introduction of subscription television.  The moratorium was extended in subsequent years and pay television was finally introduced in 1995.  A similar pattern is also evident with the introduction of digital television.  Of course, had the timely introduction of these technologies occurred in response to market demand, the community at large, rather than a select few, would probably have gained substantial social benefits and the present size, structure and performance of broadcasting services would be very different.


APPENDIX:  HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF MEDIA REGULATION

Different media are subject to different levels of regulation.  The principle of press freedom, for example, has ensured the development of a print media largely unconstrained by regulation.  New electronic media, such as online services, are also largely unconstrained by regulation, but for different reasons.  In their case, the technological developments that have made the new media possible have also led to the demise of effective regulation using traditional means.  Regulation, however, has always been a feature of broadcasting and many aspects of the industry are subject to extensive controls.  This appendix outlines the development of broadcasting regulation in Australia highlighting the factors that have a significant impact on the current structure of the broadcasting industry.


EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO

Experimentation with radio broadcasting attracted increasing attention in the years following the First World War.  By 1920 radio stations were already broadcasting regularly overseas.  The first regular radio service was established in Sydney in late 1923 and was quickly followed by the establishment of another service in Melbourne in early 1924.  The Commonwealth Government used the powers of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1905 to license transmission and reception of radio signals and to set operational standards for stations.  The initial regulations introduced in 1923 were concerned with:  technical and financial aspects of broadcasting;  prevention of interference between stations;  ensuring availability of frequencies for services throughout the country;  and establishing mechanisms for financial compensation of service providers.

Initially, to access the service of a radio station listeners were required to pay a subscription fee to the broadcaster, including a receiver licence fee collected on behalf of the government for the right to use a radio receiver permanently tuned to that station's frequency (referred to as a "sealed" set).  This arrangement was difficult to implement and control.  Theoretically, listeners wanting to have access to more than one station were required to pay a separate fee to each station and to operate a separate radio receiver for each station.  In practice, adjustments to a radio receiver to enable reception of more than one station were simple to carry out while enforcement of the sealed set arrangement was difficult.  Also, many listeners quickly discovered that they could avoid payment of subscriptions to stations altogether by the simple expedient of purchasing an "experimental" receiver licence which enabled them to operate an unrestricted receiver that could be tuned to the frequency of any station.

New arrangements to replace the "sealed" set scheme were introduced in 1924.  These authorised two types of stations, Class A, financed from receiver licence fees and limited advertising up to one hour per day;  and Class B, financed solely from unlimited amounts of advertising.  The establishment of a national radio service led to the government's takeover of the Class A stations as their licences expired in 1929 and 1930.  Initially, programming for the national stations was contracted to the Australian Broadcasting Company, and then became the responsibility of the Australian Broadcasting Commission, later Corporation (ABC) when it was established in 1932.  The legislation establishing the ABC incorporated most of the earlier established conditions of the programming contract assigned to the programming company (see table A.1 for details).  Some, including provisions for programme diversity, adequate and comprehensive programmes, quality programmes, local content, and protection of good taste, are still clearly identifiable in the ABC's current charter.

Table A.1 Australian Broadcasting Company --
Conditions of Programming Contract

  1. That the programmes, both in their compilation and rendition, shall be to the satisfaction of the Postmaster-General;
  2. That they shall be of general interest and of sufficient diversity to cater for the reasonable tastes of the community as a whole;
  3. That they shall contain news items and market reports suitable for the relevant localities;
  4. That the Company will exercise its expert knowledge to the full and make the maximum use of all the facilities available for securing the greatest possible variety of items and subjects of merit and interest;
  5. That the Company shall do all in its power to cultivate a public desire for transmission of educational items, musical items of merit and generally, for all items and subjects which tend to elevate the mind;
  6. That the Company shall make all reasonable arrangements for the rendering of items provided by Orchestras, Choral Societies and organisations of high standing, and shall pursue a reasonable policy in inducing the establishment and maintenance of organisations devoting their talent to the rendering of high class compositions;
  7. That the Company shall, so far as practicable, encourage local talent by utilising the services of persons who may possess attributes rendering them suitable for providing broadcasting items;
  8. That the Company shall avoid monotony, tedious repetition of items and unduly prolonged use of an artist in a particular State;
  9. That the Company shall ensure that no matter is broadcast which might be repugnant to good taste.

Source:  Postmaster-General's Department (1931).


Cultural enhancement and protection of good taste were particular concerns of the early programming controls imposed on radio stations.  Programmes on the national stations were scrutinised for suitability by the Postmaster-General's Department prior to transmission and those of commercial stations were kept under observation.  Authorities were also concerned with ensuring equitable treatment of political broadcasts during elections, and the provision of educational, children's and religious programmes.

Although the government was initially anxious to promote the expansion of commercial services, particularly in non-metropolitan areas, demand for licences soon outstripped supply.  By 1942, 99 commercial stations were in operation and 695 applications were unsatisfied.  Increased ownership concentration of licences caused the government to become concerned about "the inherent dangers of allowing the control of commercial broadcasting to become a monopoly or a partial monopoly" and led to the introduction of ownership controls in 1935.  However, the initial regulatory instruments were watered down within several weeks of their introduction following concerted action by the broadcasters (Gibson, 1942).


GIBSON COMMITTEE

In 1942, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Wireless Broadcasting (Gibson Committee) completed a report to Parliament that was to have a major influence on Australian broadcasting for many years.  The report led not only to the framing of the Broadcasting Act 1942, but also to the establishment of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Broadcasting.  Many of the provisions of the Broadcasting Act remained in force for more than half a century and the Standing Committee exerted considerable influence on the development of broadcasting regulations throughout the 1940s.

The Gibson Committee's report raised several concerns about the power and influence of broadcasters.  The Committee was particularly concerned about the potential of broadcasters to influence the political process during election campaigns and recommended prohibition of broadcasts of political speeches in the 48 hours preceding election day.  Although not proceeded with immediately, the recommended prohibition was introduced in 1949.

The Gibson Committee was also influential in the establishment of domestic content quotas for broadcasting stations to promote Australian culture and to assist the development and employment of Australian artists.


THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CONTROL BOARD

The introduction of limits on multiple ownership of radio stations in 1935 stimulated demands for the establishment of a statutory authority to regulate broadcasting at arm's length from the government.  Subsequent events, such as the 1938 revocation of 2KY's licence for being critical of the Minister and the 1941 revocation of licences associated with Jehovah's Witnesses for allegedly obstructing the war effort, kept alive broadcasters' fears of undesirable government interference in their affairs.  The government's reluctance to allow increases in the transmitter power of commercial broadcasters after the war rekindled the campaign for a statutory authority and eventually the Australian Broadcasting Control Board (ABCB) was established in 1948.

The principal functions of the ABCB were:

  • planning of broadcasting services;
  • determination of technical operating standards for broadcasters;  and
  • ensuring the provision of adequate and comprehensive programmes by commercial broadcasters to serve the best interests of the general public.

Although a statutory body, the ABCB was largely confined to making recommendations to the Minister who continued to exercise most of the major powers with respect to broadcasting.  Lacking significant independent powers, the ABCB was careful to remain in accord with both the government and powerful commercial interests.  It largely confined itself to issues such as standards for programming and technical operations of services.  From its early days, the ABCB clearly saw commercial broadcasters as its constituents;  and its actions were largely concerned with protecting their interests.  For example, as early as 1952, the ABCB indicated that its policy for the granting of new licences included considerations of the commercial viability of incumbent broadcasters.  The effect of that policy was that virtually no new stations were established for more than a quarter of a century.

Foreign ownership of broadcasting became a contentious issue in 1951 when British press principals acquired a controlling interest in the Macquarie Network.  The acquisition was the catalyst for a resolution by both Houses of Parliament declaring foreign ownership and control of broadcasting stations to be undesirable.  Controls on foreign ownership of broadcasting, however, were not introduced until 1956.


INTRODUCTION OF TELEVISION

To cater for the introduction of television, the principal legislation was amended and became the Broadcasting and Television Act 1956.  The Act extended the pre-existing radio regulations to television, and gave the ABCB an enhanced role in licensing.  The amended legislation required the ABCB to hold a public inquiry before the responsible Minister could grant, revoke or refuse to renew a licence.

The period immediately after the introduction of television was concerned primarily with the granting of television licences and with related ownership and control issues.  Foreign interests were precluded from owning or controlling television licences and domestic interests were prohibited from controlling more than two licences.  As was the case for radio thirty years earlier, ownership of television stations was dominated by newspaper interests and revived the issue of the desirability of media concentration.

Television licences were very valuable assets in the hands of the lucky few who were allocated one.  Each licence was allocated after a public inquiry by the ABCB to determine the best applicant for the licence (colloquially referred to as a "beauty contest").  Because of their value, licences were keenly sought and the public inquiry process was quickly demonstrated to be ineffective in determining the ultimate ownership of stations.  Unsuccessful applicants wishing to enter the industry simply bought out the beauty contest winners after the licences were allocated.  Provisions to regulate share transactions in stations were first introduced in 1960 and were strengthened in 1965.

Programming controls in the form of local content requirements for television were introduced in the early 1960s.  Initially they required the broadcast of locally produced programmes in much the same way as the Australian music content did for radio.  Eventually, as stations sought to reduce their compliance costs by producing inexpensive programmes, such as game shows, specific requirements for the broadcast of Australian drama were introduced.  Subsequent changes introduced additional specific requirements for children's programming and, more recently, for documentaries.


TURMOIL IN THE 1970s

By the end of the 1960s the broadcasting industry in Australia had settled into a cosy relationship with the regulatory authorities.  Television services had been extended throughout the country.  Licensing of new radio services was strictly controlled and very few new licences, particularly in capital cities, had been issued for more than three decades.

Responding to the increasing pressure for additional radio services, the ABCB finally recommended the introduction of FM radio in Australia.  However, its recommendation was for the introduction of FM radio in the UHF band rather than in the VHF that was reserved internationally for FM radio because a previous shortsighted decision had allocated part of that band to television stations.  The internationally unique effect of the recommendation caused much debate and opposition culminating in the government's establishment of an independent inquiry into the issue.  The inquiry recommended the use of the international FM band for radio services and the relocation of television stations using that band.  The first FM station was licensed in 1974.  Concurrently with the FM inquiry, the ABCB belatedly adopted "new planning guidelines" which led to a major expansion of AM radio services.

The early 1970s also saw concerted campaigns by acting and television production interests for effective domestic content quotas, particularly drama, for television programming.  The domestic content scheme for television programmes was amended several times during the following decade.

Several other public reviews or inquiries concerning commercial and other broadcasting were conducted during the 1970s and had considerable impact on the structure of broadcasting in Australia.  A major report comprehensively reviewing the structure of the broadcasting system was conducted by the Secretary of the Postal and Telecommunications Department in 1976 (Green Report).  The report favoured a less interventionist approach to some aspects of regulation and provided the basis for many legislative changes in 1976 and 1977.

One of the changes was the abolition of the ABCB and the establishment of the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) to implement the new regulatory approach.  The ABT was assigned the licensing, ownership and control powers that had been held by the Minister since the inception of broadcasting as well as the powers and functions of the ABCB (other than the planning and technical functions, which were transferred to the Postal and Telecommunications Department).  In something of a contrast to the less interventionist approach in other areas, one of the amendments to the legislation formally incorporated protection of the commercial viability of incumbent broadcasters as a consideration in the granting of new licences.

Attempts to introduce different forms of self-regulation in broadcasting in the late 1970s and early 1980s were largely unsuccessful.  The ABT's inquiry into self-regulation recommended greater public accountability by broadcasters in return for reduced regulatory intervention in programming.  Although the government announced it had accepted the recommendations, the legislative amendments introduced in Parliament in 1980 bore little resemblance to them.  The proposals would have replaced the existing programme and advertising standards with self-regulation.  Although the proposals were supported by commercial broadcasters and advertisers, they were strongly opposed by other groups and were allowed to lapse in Parliament without becoming law.


THE 1980s AND BEYOND

Ownership and control and pay television issues were prominent throughout the 1980s.  Two major amendments to ownership and control regulations were made during this period.  The first, in 1981, removed the requirement for prior approval of the takeover of a licensee company (one of the amendments commonly known as the "Murdoch amendments").  The second, in 1987, replaced the "two-station rule" with a rule permitting ownership or control of any number of stations provided that their aggregate audience reach did not exceed 60 per cent of the Australian population (extended to 75 per cent in 1992).

Cross-media ownership rules were introduced for the first time in 1987 and prohibited common ownership of television stations and radio stations or newspapers with the same geographic coverage.  The prohibitions were extended in 1988 to include common ownership of radio stations and newspapers with the same coverage area.

The 1980s witnessed the transformation of an early interest in cable and pay television into a saga prohibiting the introduction of such services.  In 1980 the government announced that it had decided that cable television services should be introduced and the ABT was asked to inquire and report on the best way to introduce the services.  The ABT's report of 1982 recommended introduction as soon as practicable but recommended against monopoly control by the telephony network operator.  It also recommended against the operation of subscription television services by the ABC and SBS.  The recommendations were opposed strongly by commercial television operators and other interests and no action was taken by the government of the day.  After its election in 1983, the Hawke Government decided that introduction of cable television was unjustified.  In 1986 it went further and imposed a four-year moratorium on the introduction of pay television services of any kind.  The moratorium was later extended to 1992.

In 1982, licensing arrangements prohibiting the control of more than one licence in any one area were loosened with the introduction of supplementary licences.  The purpose of supplementary licences was to enable radio and television station operators in areas with a single service to provide a second service.  This mechanism was used primarily for the expansion of radio services.  For television, the government decided that regional centres should receive three commercial television services, as was the case for large metropolitan centres.  This became known as the "equalisation" policy.  It was announced in 1985 and legislation to implement it was enacted in 1987.  The equalisation policy was implemented by aggregating the licence areas of three adjacent regional areas, each receiving a single commercial television service, and allowing each of the incumbents to provide a service throughout the aggregated area.

The late 1980s saw the introduction of auctions for the allocation of FM radio licences in metropolitan areas.  This was the first time that auctions were used to allocate broadcasting frequencies and related to the allocation of rights to convert some existing AM stations to FM and introduce new FM services.


BROADCASTING SERVICES ACT 1992

The BSA followed an extensive review of the existing broadcasting legislation and introduced major changes in the regulatory framework for broadcasting.  It also provided for the establishment of the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) to replace the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal.  The new legislation represented a major step towards a more market based, less interventionist approach to regulation.  For example, protection of the commercial viability of incumbents as a major consideration of the licensing of new services was repealed.  The major changes instituted by the new Act included:  the introduction of a price-based licensing system for new commercial radio and television services;  a new broadcasting planning regime administered by the ABA;  provisions for the introduction of new services such as subscription services and narrowcasting;  and greater reliance on industry codes and standards.


CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE

As in the past the principal elements of the current regulatory arrangements relate to ownership and control of licences and programming requirements.

Various provisions of the Act restrict the extent to which an individual may own and control commercial broadcasting in Australia.  These provisions include limits on the number of stations an individual or a corporation may own or control within a licence area and cumulatively in Australia.  They also restrict common ownership of television and radio in the same area or the common ownership of either television or radio and a daily newspaper in the same area, and the extent of foreign ownership and control of television licences.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, a person is deemed to be in a position to exercise control of a licence if that person holds directly or indirectly 15 per cent or more of the shares except in the case where another person holds over 50 per cent of the shares.

In summary, the ownership provisions of the legislation are as follows:

  • A person must not control more than one television station in the same licence area or a combination of stations in different areas whose combined licence area populations exceed 75 per cent of the population of Australia (s 53(1)).
  • A person must not be in a position to control more than two radio licences in the same licence area (s 55(1)).
  • A person must not control a television licence and a radio licence in the same licence area (s 60(a)).
  • A person must not control a television licence and a newspaper associated with the licence area of that licence (s 60(b)).
  • A person must not control a radio licence and a newspaper associated with the licence area of that licence (s 60(c)).
  • A foreign person must not control a television licence or have interests in a licence exceeding 15 per cent of the shares.  Two or more foreign persons must not have combined interests in a licence exceeding 20 per cent of the shares (s 57).  There are no restrictions on foreign ownership of radio.

Parallel provisions restrict the holding of directorships in licensee companies.

Commercial broadcasting licences are issued for a period of five years.  Renewal, at least 20 weeks before the expiry date, is virtually automatic on payment of the prescribed fee.  Commercial licences may be transferred freely without prior approval of the ABA.

As part of its decision on the introduction of digital television, the government has banned the granting of new commercial free-to-air television licences before the end of 2006.

The principal controls on programming take the form of licence conditions, registered codes of practice drafted by the industry and standards defined by the industry regulator.  Both television and radio are subject to detailed codes of practice, administered by the respective industry association, on matters such as fairness and accuracy in news services, protection of children and community morals and decency, programme classifications, advertising codes, and requirements for minimum levels of domestic programming.  The domestic content requirement for radio takes the form of an industry code and relates to the broadcast of minimum levels of music performed by Australians.  The domestic-content requirements for television are administered by the ABA.

Reflecting the objective of the BSA, the ABA's Australian Content Standard states that its objective is "to promote the role of commercial television in developing and reflecting a sense of Australian identity, character and cultural diversity by supporting the community's continued access to television programmes produced under Australian creative control".  The main programming obligations imposed by the current Australian Content and Children's Programmes standards require commercial stations to:

  • Broadcast Australian programmes for at least 55 per cent of all programming broadcast between 6.00am and midnight.
  • Broadcast sufficient first release Australian drama programmes between 5.00pm and midnight to score at least 775 points in each succeeding period of three years and at least 225 points in any year.  The points are the product of a "format factor" and the duration of the programme.  The format factor takes three different values depending on the type of programme.  Serials and series produced at the rate of more than one hour a week are assigned a format factor of 1;  for those produced at the rate of one hour or less a week the format factor is 2;  and, for feature films, telemovies, mini-series and self-contained drama of less than 90 minutes, the factor is 3.2.
  • Broadcast at least 32 hours of first release children's drama in the appropriate time band in 1996.  In addition, stations are required to broadcast at least eight hours of non-first release children's drama each year.
  • Broadcast at least 260 hours of children's programming per year of which 50 per cent must be first release Australian children's programmes.
  • Broadcast at least 130 hours a year of Australian pre-school children's programming.  A pre-school children's programme must not be broadcast on more than three occasions in a period of five years.
  • Broadcast at least 10 hours of first release Australian documentary programmes a year of not less than 30 minutes each.

Different regulatory arrangements apply to subscription television services.  Subscription television operators are not required to comply with any overall transmission requirements for Australian programmes.  However, predominantly drama channels are required to use 10 per cent of their programming expenditure to fund first release Australian programmes.  The BSA also imposes a special regime to prevent subscription television from securing exclusive rights to the broadcast of major events.  Known as the "anti-siphoning" provision, it empowers the Minister to issue a list of events whose broadcast should be available free to the general public.  The list includes most major national sporting events.

The amount of advertising is also controlled.  No advertising is permitted during prescribed pre-school programme times and no more than five minutes per half hour is permitted during other children's programming times.  Advertising time is restricted to an average of 13 minutes an hour between 6.00pm and midnight, and an average 15 minutes an hour at other times.  Between 6.00pm and midnight no more than 15 minutes may be used for advertising in any hour, and no more than 14 minutes an hour in any four hours.  A maximum of 16 minutes is permitted at other times.  Overall, Australian produced advertisements must be used for at least 80 per cent of the total annual advertising time broadcast between 6.00am and midnight.



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Curthoys, A. (1986), "The getting of television:  dilemmas in ownership, control and culture, 1941-56", pages 123-54 in A. Curthoys and J. Merritt (eds), Better Dead Than Red:  Australia's First Cold War, 1945-1959, Vol. 2, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

DTC (1989), Future Directions for Pay Television in Australia, Vols 1 and 2, AGPS, Canberra.

Duffy, M. (MP, the Hon.) (1987), "Second Reading Speech", House of Representatives Debates, 29 April, page 2194.

Gibson (1942), See Joint Parliamentary Committee on Wireless Broadcasting (1942).

Given, J. (1998), The Death of Broadcasting?  Media's Digital Future, UNSW Press, Sydney.

Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in Competition", Economic Journal, 34, pages 41-57.

House of Representatives (1951), Debates, Vol. 215.

House of Representatives Select Committee on the Print Media (1992), News and Fair Facts:  The Australian Print Media Industry, Report, AGPS, Canberra.

House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure (1989), To Pay or Not to Pay:  Pay Television and Other New Broadcasting-Related Services, AGPS, Canberra (J. Saunderson, Chair).

Joint Parliamentary Committee on Wireless Broadcasting (1942), Report, Government Printing Office, Canberra (W.G. Gibson, Chair).

Jones, R. (1998), "Australia's Digital TV Giveaway", Agenda, 5(4), pages 521-28.

Maiden, M. and K. Simpson (1997), "Pay's $3 billion black hole", The Age, 15 November.

Mathieson, C. (1998), "Ten forces rethink of TV licence values", The Australian, 10 March, page 22.

Papandrea, F. (1997), Cultural Regulation of Australian Television Programmes, Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, AGPS, Canberra (Occasional Paper 114).

Parish, R. (1968), The Political Economy of Broadcasting, University of New England (Inaugural Public Lecture delivered in Armidale, New South Wales, 30 September).

Pay TV News (1998), Vol. 5, issue 10, 10 July.

Picard, R. (1989), Media Economics, Sage, Newbury Park.

Postmaster-General's Department (1931), "National Broadcasting Service – General Report of Activities during the first year 1929-30" (unpublished manuscript).

Postal and Telecommunications Department (1976), Australian Broadcasting:  A Report on the Structure of the Australian Broadcasting System with Particular Regard to the Control, Planning, Licensing, Regulation, Funding and Administration of the System (F.J. Green, Secretary), AGPS, Canberra.

— (1978), Research Report:  Penetration of FM Radio Receivers, Canberra.  Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cwlth).

Royal Commission on Television (1954), Report, Government Printing Office, Canberra (G. Paton, Chair).

Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991 (Cwlth).

Television Broadcasting Services (Digital Conversion) Act 1998 (Cwlth).

Trengove, C. (1983), "Whither Communications Policy in Australia?", pages 83-111 in Centre of Policy Studies, State Enterprise and Deregulation, Monash University, Melbourne (Special Study No. 5).

Windschuttle, K. (1985), The Media, Penguin, Melbourne.

Policies for New Media

CHAPTER SEVEN

The government has always exercised extensive and detailed control over the development of broadcasting services.  Such controls can confer benefits such as uniformity in transmission and reception technologies and the setting of community priorities rather than those reflecting short-term commercial interests of suppliers.  On the other hand, the same controls can clearly reduce the responsiveness of the industry to changing demand and supply opportunities and delay structural change.  There is also the risk that they can be used to mandate inappropriate technologies and to protect incumbent operators from the introduction of competitive new products and services.  As has been detailed in the previous two chapters, the history of broadcasting in Australia is littered with examples of misguided use of politically-expedient, technically-specific, policy instruments resulting in substantial reductions in net benefits to society.  This chapter considers the policy challenges presented by technological change.


RECORD ON MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Conscious of the dangers of rigid, technologically-specific rules, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 sought to establish a technologically-neutral framework for the ongoing development of broadcasting.  Section 4(2) of the BSA declares Parliament's intention for flexible regulation of broadcasting services including in a manner that:

(b) will readily accommodate technological change;  and

(c) encourages:

  1. the development of broadcasting technologies and their application;  and
  2. the provision of services made practicable by those technologies to the Australian community.

The Explanatory Memorandum gives a more detailed explanation of the provisions of section 4 as follows:

Paragraphs (b) and (c) aim for accommodation of technological change (particularly in the provision and reception of broadcasting services) without the need for regular amendment of the Act, wherever possible.  This paragraph recognises that in recent years there has been an acceleration in the development of technologies for delivering communications services.  It is intended, as much as the regime set out in the Act will allow, that as those technologies come on-stream for general application, they be accommodated within the regulatory regime provided by the Act without the need for patch-up amendments as has been the case with the 1942 Act.

In practice, the concept of technological neutrality appears to have been ignored on a number of occasions since 1992.  The government's decisions on the introduction of subscription television and digital broadcasting are the two most important recent developments where the concept of technological neutrality appears to have been cast aside.  Both of these decisions have major implications for the structure of the broadcasting industry.  For different reasons, both have imposed technologically-prescriptive solutions favouring particular interest groups rather than orderly market developments.  Both initiatives also involved special amendments of the Act.  The following is a brief summary of the two decisions.


Pay Television

The introduction of pay television "as soon as practicable" was recommended by the ABT in 1982.  After lengthy delays the government eventually decided to impose a four-year moratorium on the introduction of pay television (from September 1986 to September 1990).  According to the government, the moratorium was needed to facilitate further investigation of the issue and to protect the investments required by commercial broadcasters in response to the policy of introducing three competing commercial television services in regional markets.  The issue was subsequently examined by reports prepared by the Department of Transport and Communications (DTC, 1989) and by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure (1989).  The matter was further complicated by the financial difficulties then encumbering the three commercial television networks and AUSSAT (a government-owned domestic communications satellite and a potential pay television carrier) and by the decision to deregulate the telecommunications industry.

As part of the package of telecommunications industry reforms in 1992, the government decided to dispose of the financially troubled AUSSAT.  In order to make the sale more attractive, it decided that pay television would be introduced using the satellite as the carrier.  Appropriate standards for digital broadcasting from the satellite were to be developed and agreed to by 1 March 1994.  The BSA restricted licensing of satellite pay television to the three licences approved for the AUSSAT system.  As a further protection of incumbent free-to-air broadcasters, the Act also prohibited pay television operators from selling advertising until 1997.  A watered-down version of this latter protection continues today with pay television operators being required to raise their revenue predominantly from subscriptions.

No restrictions were initially imposed on the use of other technologies to deliver pay television services.  Indeed, the Act provided a simple procedure for the ABA to issue non-satellite licences "on application in writing" (s 97).  Following the accumulation of Multipoint Distribution System (MDS) spectrum licences by an entrepreneur with the intention of delivering pay television services, the government moved an amendment to the BSA prohibiting such services until after the start of satellite services.  The prohibition, however, did not extend beyond 31 December 1994.  In the event, problems with the development of appropriate technical standards for satellite delivery delayed the start of satellite services until 1995.  Another development undermining the "approved" satellite pay television services was the roll-out of broadband communication cables by the rival telecommunications carriers, Telstra and Optus.  According to a newspaper report, a former government minister stated that the cable rollout had not been anticipated by the government whose focus in 1992 had been solely on the satellite services (Maiden & Simpson, 1997).

The long delays in the introduction of pay television services deprived Australian consumers of a service that consumers in other countries had enjoyed for many years.  The protection of the interests of incumbent broadcasters by delaying potential competition did nothing to prevent other factors from taking their toll of the financial viability of the three major networks at the end of the 1980s.  Major ownership changes and other operational factors unrelated to changes in competitive pressures saw two of the networks go into receivership and a "fire sale" of the third.  All three networks subsequently returned to sound financial management and profitability, thus demonstrating the power of the market to resolve competition problems satisfactorily without government intervention.  Those changes were of a much greater magnitude than those that would have been associated with earlier introduction of pay television services.  They suggest that the industry is likely to have been able to absorb the impact of earlier introduction of pay television without major difficulty.


Digital Broadcasting

The digital broadcasting decision announced in March 1998 followed a period of concerted lobbying by incumbent free-to-air operators (FTAs), pay television interests and other groups seeking to enter the market for datacasting and other services.  As acknowledged by the Minister for Communications in various media comments, the government's decision endeavoured to find a balance among the competing private and public interests as well as ensure a smooth transition from analog to digital services without undesirable disruptions to either broadcasters or consumers.  The decision provided for the introduction of digital television, datacasting services and digital radio.  The main elements pertaining to commercial broadcasters are as follows:

  • FTAs are required to commence digital terrestrial television broadcasting (DTTB) in metropolitan areas by 1 January 2001, and in regional areas within the three years thereafter.
  • FTAs will be loaned 7 MHz of spectrum free of upfront charge to simulcast their service in both analog and digital format for at least eight years.
  • DTTB with minimum levels of high definition television (HDTV) must begin by the designated start date for the FTAs to avoid the risk of losing their loaned spectrum.
  • FTAs are prohibited from using their digital spectrum to provide multichannelling or subscription television services (to be reviewed in 2005), but may use the spectrum to provide programme enhancements, such as separate broadcasts of different camera angles of the same sporting event.
  • Available spectrum not required by the FTAs for digital conversion will be allocated competitively for the transmission of datacasting services starting concurrently with DTTB.
  • Existing FTAs are precluded from bidding for the additional datacasting spectrum, but may use a portion of their loaned spectrum for datacasting and will be charged fees for providing the services.
  • The existing prohibition on new commercial FTA entrants was extended to 31 December 2006.
  • Planning processes have been put in place to allow the start up of digital radio services in 2001.
  • A departmental review will be conducted in 2005 to assess whether the simulcast provisions, and the related multi-channelling prohibitions, should be revised.

In announcing the decision, the Minister for Communications argued that while the government "would normally welcome additional competition, in any industry, as healthy and likely to lead to benefits for the consumer", because of the special circumstances facing them, Australia's free-to-air and pay television industries "deserve a degree of special treatment, and the Government makes no apologies for [the] decision" (Alston, 1998).  The special circumstances cited by the Minister were as follows:

Australia has a world class TV system, with a strong local content component and a highly skilled production sector.  This could be threatened if the existing networks had to battle a new competitor at the same time as paying huge sums to transfer to digital broadcasting, or if the Pay TV networks found themselves faced with significantly stronger free-to-air opponents while still trying to find their feet.

If amended in the Senate, the Television Broadcasting Services (Digital Conversion) Act 1998 requires the Minister to formulate a "Regional Equalisation Plan" to facilitate the provision of digital television and datacasting services by commercial broadcasters in regional areas.  The plan is required to have regard to several objectives, including:

  • maximising diversity of choice of television services;
  • offering a range of television services similar to that available in metropolitan areas;
  • maintaining the financial viability of the commercial broadcasting industry in regional areas;
  • providing services relevant to local needs;  and
  • discouraging concentration of media ownership.

Some of these objectives appear to be in potential conflict with each other.  For example, demand for information and entertainment services in regional areas may not be sufficient to support a range of services similar to that available in metropolitan areas.  Yet such a range of services is to be pursued concurrently with maintenance of the financial viability of the industry in regional areas.  It would seem, therefore, that where demand is insufficient to support a wide range of services a trade-off between these objectives will be necessary.

In addition to the loan of the necessary spectrum, the regional FTAs are seeking an extensive range of assistance to convert their facilities to digital broadcasting.  The assistance measures they are seeking from the government include rebates of licence fees for the implementation period to help fund infrastructure and equipment costs, exemptions from custom duties and sales tax on digital broadcasting equipment, and assistance to defray operational costs during the mandated simulcast period when both analog and digital signals have to be broadcast.

The government's decision was criticised by the media and commentators generally (e.g., Given, 1998;  Jones 1998).  In a strongly worded editorial, the Australian Financial Review (1998a) was of the view that the decision "shackled the new information economy in the familiar old world of heavy government regulation and media-mogul politics".  It argued that the decision was designed to protect the interests of incumbent media operators by granting free use of spectrum to free-to-air operators as well as protecting them and pay television operators from potential competition. (7)

Some weeks later, another editorial in the Australian Financial Review (1998b) claimed that the decision was inconsistent with the alleged advice of government bureaucrats contained in a leaked cabinet submission.  According to the editorial, key departmental advisers had argued the decision was inconsistent with "the non interventionist approach which the Government had endorsed for developing the information economy", would "result in inefficient use of valuable spectrum", would "restrict consumer benefits from a wider range and flexibility of services", conferred benefits to commercial interests that "already enjoy significant private benefits at public and community expense", and "inadequately deals with a complex and important new technology which could have far-reaching implications for the future of Australia's communications sector and its impact on the community".

The requirement to broadcast minimum levels of HDTV appears to be an implicit acceptance of the argument by FTAs that the availability of HDTV programmes would accelerate the take-up of digital television by consumers.  However, apart from a view expressed by the ABA's Digital Terrestrial Television Broadcasting Specialist Group that "consumer demand for high definition programming will grow rapidly once this becomes available" (ABA, 1997), there are no detailed studies to suggest that consumers are ready to embrace HDTV.  Indications from overseas suggests that HDTV sets are costly (currently more than $5000) and the available systems are not yet fully tested in mass markets.

Whether Australian consumers are ready to embrace HDTV remains to be seen.  In terms of benefits, consumers may have been better served by increased programme diversity, likely to result from an expansion of television services that would have been made possible by digital conversion.  HDTV requires a full 7 MHz channel for transmission, as is currently required by analogue transmission.  Alternatively, a 7 MHz channel is capable of supporting several standard definition digital services, of a higher quality than current analogue services, but not of the "cinema-like" quality of HDTV.

The Australian decision to mandate at least a minimum level of HDTV differs from approaches taken in other countries.  Closest to the Australian approach is the model adopted by the US for the introduction of digital television.  There, television operators have been lent a full digital channel for use during the transition from analog broadcasting.  However, while the broadcasters are expected to provide HDTV services, they are not compelled to do so.  The choice of whether the channel is used to provide a single HDTV service or several multiplexed standard definition television services or a combination of television and other services, such as datacasting, is left to the operators.

In the United Kingdom, each of the existing free-to-air broadcasters is being provided with digital capacity to simulcast a standard definition signal.  The additional digital capacity has been made available for additional standard definition services by new entrants.  No provisions have been made for the introduction of HDTV services.

The Australian Government's decision prescribes the range and type of services that can be provided in the new digital environment rather than allow market processes to respond to consumer demand.  A market-based approach would have led to a different outcome.  Given that digital conversion is being mandated by the government, a reasonable case would exist for the allocation of a standard digital service capacity to incumbent broadcasters to enable them to transmit in both analog and digital formats during the transition period.  The allocation of the additional spectrum capacity could then have been decided by the market on the basis of actual demand for particular services.  Auctioning of the available spectrum would have allowed bidders to make their own commercial judgements about the best combination of HDTV and standard usage television services and bid for the capacity accordingly.  Not only would this have been likely to raise substantial revenue for the government but it would also have avoided the inherent danger that a prescriptive solution may not maximise social welfare.


CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Ongoing developments in digital technology and computer software applications are rapidly changing the nature of information services, including those of media industries.  Increasing adoption and use of the same technology by traditionally distinctly different services is rapidly eroding the boundaries between them.  This means that previously dedicated platforms for the delivery of a single service are rapidly acquiring the capacity to deliver different services simultaneously.  New delivery platforms are also emerging.  The most prominent example of convergence in service delivery is the Internet, which can deliver information and entertainment services in a variety of forms, including audio, video and data.

Convergence has far-reaching implications for regulatory policy and for the development of innovative information services for the advancement of the economic and social well-being of society.  Traditional technology-based regulation of what were essentially distinct services is ineffective and inefficient in an environment where essentially the same service can be delivered by a variety of means or simultaneously with other services that do not necessarily have similar attributes.  Different regulatory treatment of essentially the same services on the basis of differences in delivery technologies can distort economic development and opportunities.  Under these circumstances, while licensing is likely to remain a key tool for regulatory control of media industries, its aim should be to facilitate efficient development of services without endangering progress and innovation.

Convergence is also increasingly challenging national approaches to regulation.  The global nature of Internet services, for example, means that national controls are virtually impossible to enforce.  Internet users can source their services from almost anywhere in the world and can easily get around any restrictions or controls that are national rather than global.  Satellite delivery of broadcast programmes is another example where national controls such as domestic content regulations of television programmes cannot be enforced.  The increasingly global nature of media industries can have major implications for economic development.  National regulation that tends to be more restrictive than that applying in other countries may prove to be a significant incentive for media industries to migrate to countries with less restrictive regulation.


IMPACT OF CONVERGENCE ON MEDIA INDUSTRIES

There are several elements of technological convergence that impact on the development and growth of media industries.

First, the development of the microchip has greatly facilitated ownership and use of personal computers.  Combined with the growth of the Internet, this has brought access to a large range of information and entertainment services to large sections of the community.  For example, the Internet is becoming an important platform for the delivery of audio and video broadcasting services (webcast radio and television).  Traditional media services are thus finding their predominant position in the home being eroded and that they have to compete strongly with new services for the consumer's time and attention.

Second, the establishment of fibre optic cable networks with a capacity to deliver hundreds of television channels to the home spells the end of spectrum capacity constraints that have restricted the number of television channels that could be made available in any one locality.  The availability of numerous channels erodes the potential influence of individual television channels and, thus, one of the principal bases for licensing of services and regulation of programming.

Third, another important technological development from the point of view of content regulation is the digitisation of information signals.  The process reduces all forms of information content to electromagnetic pulses, which greatly facilitates the storage, processing, transmission and retrieval of signals.  The process permits rapid processing and exchange of information.  Coupled with advances in computer technology and the ease of access to computer networks, consumers can avail themselves of remote access to diverse services and products.  This means that individuals will increasingly be able to enjoy greater flexibility in sourcing information and entertainment products that best meet their needs and bypass traditional services and associated regulations.  Most of the new services will be delivered by electronic means.

Fourth, the print media industry has also experienced extensive technological changes in the past three decades and these have had a substantial impact on production processes.  Although the primary effect has been on production and printing activities, advances in electronic information services are also having a major impact on the nature and function of newspapers and magazines.  Copy and advertising material can be prepared electronically and can be transferred from one end of the world to the other in seconds.  The simplification of production and printing by eliminating typesetting and other time-consuming functions has shortened the printing timeframe of newspapers considerably and has improved their ability to compete with other media in providing timely in-depth coverage of breaking news stories.

Although improvements in newspaper production technology are expected to continue, the major challenges for newspapers are expected to come from other sources.  With the growth of online information services the character of the newspaper of the future is likely to change.  Some commentators are even forecasting the disappearance of printing.  If printing is essentially the transmission medium for the carriage of newspaper content, more efficient carriage by electronic means may indeed supplant it.  Furthermore, electronic carriage is more conducive to sorting automatically the stories of interest to an individual.  If a hard copy of the stories of interest is required, it could be printed locally.

Newspapers are already accessible electronically on the Internet.  Newspapers use their Internet accessibility as a complement to their printed outputs.  It also provides them greater exposure to their advertisements.


IMPACT ON COMPETITION

Availability of a vast range of interactive information and entertainment products will generate new competitive pressures on traditional media.  Services based on mass audiences are likely to suffer most as there will be an increasing tendency for the new products to appeal to niche markets by providing services that match more closely the needs of consumers in those markets.  Traditional mass media, therefore, are likely to see increasing fragmentation of their audiences.

Erosion of free-to-air television's audience will not only reduce its influence in the community, but will also reduce its earnings capacity.  Advertising will become more competitive with the entry of new services.  Online advertising can be much more targeted than that of mass media.  The demographics of Internet users, for example, are attractive to many advertisers.  The placing of advertisements at popular Internet sites is increasing.  It can also provide a tangible measure of the effectiveness of the advertisement for the advertisers.  For example, Procter & Gamble is reported to have negotiated a deal with Yahoo! to pay only for the number of hits it gets on its home page via the Yahoo! site (Carveth, Owers & Alexander, 1998).  Furthermore, as advertising is sold primarily on the basis of audience size, the erosion of traditional television audiences will lead to a commensurate decline in advertising revenue.  The entry of new services will also result in increased competition and increased costs for the available programming.  The twin pressures of reduced revenues and increased programming costs will weaken the capacity of traditional operators to sustain the continuing cost of programming regulation.

The way consumers use the media is also changing.  The Internet, with its capacity to act as a major source of information, is both a potential competitor to established media as a source of information and entertainment and a potential ally in providing greater access to the established media.  Newspapers, for example, may be accessed through the Internet;  they thus extend their primary readership and provide a new vehicle for the delivery of advertisements to readers.


IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIA REGULATION

Historically, the broadcasting and communications industries supplied distinct services that facilitated the application of different regulations for different services.  With changing technology, the same service can now be provided by a variety of means (such as over-the-air broadcasting, cable, microwave, satellite, etc.).  The activities of firms also tended to be confined within one industry.  This is changing particularly with telecommunication carriers increasingly expanding their interests in supplying content services such as pay television, and video, rather than just confining their activities to carriage of information.  These and other potential changes to the structure and nature of media industries are likely to erode the effectiveness of current regulatory mechanisms.

The BSA was intended to be technologically neutral in its application to the delivery of services.  Yet it still relies on different rules for different media or for differently defined elements of the same medium.  Narrowcasting and broadcasting essentially perform the same functions but have a different degree of technical or audience reach.  Online information services are being integrated with newspapers, and subscription television services share many of their characteristics with point-to-multipoint services.  As the boundaries between services become increasingly blurred, the application of different rules will become increasingly unsustainable and will increasingly distort industry structures and competition.

Technological change is also likely to generate new services that may be beyond the reach of domestic regulation.  Satellite services originating overseas can be accessed in Australia.  Similarly, video images and entertainment services are accessible through the Internet, and may originate anywhere in the world.  Thus, the use of domestic regulation to achieve social objectives will become decreasingly effective over time, since it can be applied only to services originating in areas within the jurisdiction of domestic governments.


CONCLUSION

Traditional media industries are undergoing extensive restructuring as a result of rapid technological changes.  These changes are not only expanding the availability of existing services, but are also generating a massive expansion of new services likely to compete with or supplant traditional services.  The changes are also blurring the boundaries between previously well-defined industries and services.

As recognised by the BSA, a necessary condition for efficient, non-distorting regulation is that its treatment of a service should be independent of the process by which the service is produced or delivered.  Such equal treatment ensures that investment decisions are driven by market incentives and not by regulatory impact.  The need for regulatory policy to avoid unequal impact on different versions of the same service is particularly important in an environment of rapid technological change when both services and delivery platforms are no longer confined to traditional and distinct structures.  In such a situation, regulatory approaches that are not neutral in their effect on both delivery technologies and on substitutable services can greatly distort incentive structures, economic efficiency and development.



ENDNOTES

7.  It should be noted that the Fairfax Group, the owners of the Australian Financial Review, had been lobbying for a decision more favourable to its own private interests.

Restrictions on Ownership

CHAPTER SIX

Ownership of electronic media has been tightly regulated since the early days of radio.  The regulations limit ownership of broadcasting services in a licence area and the overall breadth of media interests that may be held by an individual.  While Australia imposes formal control on ownership of free-to-air and subscription television, there are no formal controls on foreign ownership of radio.  Foreign ownership of newspapers is subject only to Foreign Investment Review Board guidelines and proposals are considered on a case-by-case basis.  However, in recent years, attempts to increase foreign interests in the Fairfax Group above 25 per cent have not been allowed.  Cross-media ownership restrictions are similarly based on the principle of limiting concentration of influence on public opinion.

Legislators have always been concerned about the power of the electronic media to influence public opinion.  The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Wireless Broadcasting (Gibson, 1942), for example, was of the view that "no medium of entertainment, whether it be stage, cinema or literature has such a powerful influence for good or evil as broadcasting".  With respect to foreign owners, Robert Menzies, the then Prime Minister, saw the issue as whether "people who do not belong to this country" should be permitted to control "the most intimate form of propaganda known to modern society" (House of Representatives, 1951:  2926).

Australia is not unique in this respect.  Limits on ownership of electronic media are a common feature of media regulation around the world.  Most countries also restrict foreign ownership and control of electronic media industries.  In many countries foreign ownership of newspapers is also limited.

While ownership controls are intended primarily to promote diversity of influence on opinion, they also have substantial impact on industry structures and operational efficiencies.  In essence, therefore, the regulation is a trade-off between efficiency and the social objective of promoting diversity of influence on opinion.  Similarly, while foreign-ownership limits ensure domestic control of influential media, they also reduce the pool of potential investors and may limit the scope for ownership diversity and competition.  How well these restrictions serve the public interest when these factors are taken in account is considered in this chapter.


REGULATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

The first regulatory controls on ownership were applied to radio in 1935.  Legislators acted to prevent what was then seen as the "development of monopolies" by newspapers as there was "little multiple ownership of broadcasting licences by other interests" (Gibson, 1942).  That initial regulation, which continued to apply for half a century, restricted individuals from owning:

  • more than one metropolitan station in any State;
  • more than four metropolitan stations in the Commonwealth;
  • more than four stations in any one State;  and
  • more than eight stations in the Commonwealth.

The same regulatory arrangements had been proposed for television (Royal Commission on Television, 1954).  However, when television was introduced in 1956, the government imposed a stricter limit, permitting common ownership of a maximum of only two television stations located anywhere in Australia.  Both the radio and television ownership limits were reduced progressively in the 1980s and 1990s.

Restrictions on ownership and control of media by foreign interests (initially defined as non-residents of Australia) were first introduced in 1956 to safeguard national sovereignty by preventing foreigners from gaining a position of influence on domestic opinion.  The concern with foreign ownership of media was precipitated by the acquisition of several radio stations by British press interests and prompted Parliament to express the opinion that foreign control of radio stations was undesirable (House of Representatives, 1951).

Another important element of ownership and control provisions is cross-media limits which prohibit ownership of television and radio interests in the same market or the ownership of a radio or television station jointly with a newspaper associated with their service area.  Although newspaper ownership of broadcasting media had regularly aroused concerns, prohibition of cross-media ownership was introduced only in 1987 with respect to television and newspapers and television and radio, and in 1988 with respect to radio and newspapers.  According to the then Minister for Communications, the cross-media ownership restrictions were needed "in order to curb major expansion in television by existing newspapers or radio interests which already have considerable influence over the formation of public opinion" (Duffy, 1987).


MEDIA OWNERSHIP PROVISIONS

The BSA limits the extent to which a person may control commercial radio and television licences, whether in terms of one medium or jointly, or control a broadcasting licence and an associated newspaper in the same licence area, and the extent of individual and aggregate ownership of broadcasting licences by foreigners.  The specific limits set by the Act are as follows:


Commercial television licences

S.53(1) of the Act provides that a person must not control:

  • more than one licence in the same licence area
  • licences whose combined licence area populations exceed 75 per cent of the declared population of Australia.

Commercial radio licences

S.55(1) of the Act provides that a person must not be in a position to control more than two licences in the same licence area.


Cross-media rules

A person must not control:

  • a television licence and a radio licence that have the same licence area (s 60(a));
  • a television licence and a newspaper associated with the licence area of that licence (s 60(b));
  • a radio licence and a newspaper associated with the licence area of that licence.

Equivalent restrictions apply to the holding of directorships of companies that control radio and television licences and newspapers.

For the purpose of the Act, a person is deemed to be in control of a company by holding, directly or indirectly or through associates, 15 per cent of the company's shares.  The deemed control is held to apply in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  Two or more persons may be deemed to exercise separate control of a company if each controls 15 per cent or more of the company's shares.  However, a person is not deemed to be in control if another person holds more than 50 per cent of the shares in the company.

Shareholdings in licensee companies may be transferred or sold freely to another person.


Foreign Ownership Limits

A foreign person is prohibited by the Act from controlling, either directly or indirectly or through associates, a television licence (s 57(1)) or have share interests exceeding 15 per cent in a company holding a television licence.  In aggregate two or more foreign persons must not have company interests in a television licence exceeding 20 per cent (s 57(3)).  Also, no more than 20 per cent of the directors of a company holding a television licence may be foreign persons.  A foreign person is defined as either a person who is not an Australian citizen, or a company controlled by persons who are not Australian citizens.

In subscription television, a foreign person is prohibited from having share interests in a licensee company exceeding 20 per cent.  The aggregate company interests in a licence held by a foreign person must not exceed 35 per cent (s 109).  There are no restrictions on the interests foreign persons may have in radio licences.


Newspaper Ownership Restrictions

Although the print media can also exert substantial influence on public opinion, it is not subject to controls on ownership concentration other than the provisions of the Trade Practices Act.  This might be partly because the Commonwealth Government does not have the necessary powers.  Cross-media provisions, however, were introduced partly in response to increasing concentration of press ownership reflected in the decline in the number of independent proprietors of metropolitan dailies from 10 in 1950 to two currently.


IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS

Concentration Limits

Ownership limits appear to have considerable influence on the structure of the commercial radio and television industries.  Amendments to ownership limits, particularly for television, have generally been the catalyst for major and rapid changes to industry structures.  The biggest restructuring that has taken place in the media industries, for example, is linked to the 1987 amendments which combined a major liberalisation of ownership of broadcasting assets with the introduction of cross-media rules.

For television, the changes replaced the two-station ownership rule with provisions permitting a single owner to hold any number of television stations provided that the aggregate population reach of the stations did not exceed 60 per cent of the Australian population.  The population reach limit was subsequently increased to 75 per cent.  The changes were followed by major realignments of the ownership of media assets and led to the creation of three current capital-city television networks and other regional television groups.

For radio, the 1987 amendments increased the ownership limits to no more than 16 licences in Australia and no more than half the radio licences in any State.  These limits proved to be quite liberal even for the then largest radio groups and generated little change in the concentration of radio assets.

The introduction of cross-media restrictions not only prevented the formation of large multimedia groups, but also led to the dismantling of existing groupings.  Although the introduction of cross-media limits provided for the "grandfathering" of existing cross-media groups for as long as the owners did not acquire new media interests, virtually all of them disappeared soon after as the major players moved to consolidate their position in the medium of choice for their future business interests.  Some of the effects of the ownership regulation changes at the end of the 1980s are illustrated in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

Table 6.1:  Characteristics of the Commercial Television Industry,
as at 30 June 1986 and 30 June 1991 a

19861990
Number of stations b5043
Number of owners c2916
Television revenue earned by:  d
  4 largest owners
  8 largest owners
(per cent)
61
80
(per cent)
77
90
Television revenue earned by those with interests in:  b
  television only
  television and radio
  all media e
(per cent)
12
31
57
(per cent)
59
40
1

Notes:

a Ownership as at 30 June 1986 and 30 June 1991, financial data for years 1985-86 and 1989-90 respectively.

b Excludes the remote commercial television services.

c Owner is defined as the major shareholder in the licensee company or the major shareholder's controlling company.

d As a proportion of total television revenue (including remote commercial television services).

e Includes those companies with a combination of television-radio-newspaper and television newspaper interests.

Source:  BTCE (1991a).


Table 6.2:  Characteristics of the Commercial Radio Industry,
as at 30 June 1986 and 30 June 1991 a

19861990
Number of stations b139149
Number of owners c6476
Radio revenue earned by:  d
  4 largest owners
  8 largest owners
(per cent)
36
56
(per cent)
45
59
Radio revenue earned by those with interests in:  b
  radio only
  radio and television
  all media e
(per cent)
64
6
30
(per cent)
89
10
1

Notes:

a Ownership as at 30 June 1986 and 30 June 1991, financial data for years 1985-86 and 1989-90 respectively.

b Excludes the remote commercial radio services.

c Owner is defined as the major shareholder in the licensee company or the major shareholder's controlling company.

d As a proportion of total radio revenue (including remote commercial radio services).

e Includes those companies with a combination of radio-television-newspaper and radio-newspaper interests.

Source:  BTCE (1991a).


The BSA in 1992 increased the allowed population reach of commercial television stations under common ownership to 75 per cent.  It also removed most of the controls on the ownership of commercial radio stations.  Since 1992 there have been no limits on the aggregate number of radio stations that may be held by an individual, with the exception that no more than two stations may be held in any one licence area.  Cross-media ownership limits were not changed by the BSA.

These changes allowed the formation of the Seven Network from the stations previously owned by Qintex (which had been placed in receivership in November 1989) and other assets, giving it a population reach of more than 70 per cent.  The new arrangements for radio led to major changes in the structure of the radio industry.  Facilitated by the supplementary station licensing arrangements, common ownership of two stations in the same area has now become the norm in regional areas.  It has also become a feature of radio station ownership in capital cities.  Similarly, the removal of aggregate ownership limits has allowed the formation of relatively large groups of stations under common ownership.  Austereo, with 11 metropolitan stations and three regional stations and Australian Radio Network with eight metropolitan and three regional are currently the largest radio groups (in terms of audience reach) in Australia.  Details of the current ownership structures for the commercial television and radio industries are provided in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.

Table 6.3:  Structure of the Commercial Television Industry,
February 1998

Ownership GroupNumber of StationsAudience Reach
(per cent of population)
Seven Network5 metropolitan
1 regional
71.38
The Ten Group Ltd5 metropolitan64.60
Nine Network3 metropolitan
1 regional
51.22
Prime Network8 regional25.02
TWT Holdings Ltd1 metropolitan
4 regional
22.72
Telecasters Australia Ltd5 regional18.05
Southern Cross Broadcasting
Australia Ltd
4 regional15.36
NBN Ltd1 regional9.43
Sunraysia Television Ltd1 metropolitan7.05
Broadcast Investments Pty Ltd1 metropolitan6.86
Others (3 groups)5 regionalLess than 1.00
per group
Total (14 groups)15 metropolitan
30 regional
n.a.

Source:  Communications Update (1998).


Table 6.4:  Structure of the Commercial Radio Industry,
February 1998

Ownership GroupNumber of StationsAudience Reach
(per cent of population)
Austereo Ltd11 metropolitan
3 regional
62.72
Australian Radio Network8 metropolitan
3 regional
61.34
Lamb Family2 metropolitan27.02
RG Capital Australia1 metropolitan
9 regional
25.47
Southern Cross Broadcasting
Australia Ltd
4 metropolitan
4 regional
24.87
2KY Broadcasters1 metropolitan
2 regional
21.73
Radio Superhighways Pty Ltd2 metropolitan
2 regional
19.05
Fusion Media1 metropolitan18.08
Radio 3UZ Pty Ltd1 metropolitan18.08
DMG Radio Investments Pty Ltd1 metropolitan
53 regional
16.01
Queensland TAB1 metropolitan7.97
Broadcast Operations26 regional5.06
Grant Broadcasters Pty Ltd11 regional4.86
Others6 metropolitan
29 regional
Less than
3.00 per group
Total (14 groups)39 metropolitan
142 regional
n.a.

Source:  Communications Update (1998).


Localism

The promotion of local ownership (localism) and programming has played an important role in broadcasting policy for many years.  In the early days of television, for example, it was at the centre of a major difference of opinion between the Australian Broadcasting Control Board (ABCB) and the government.  When considering the allocation of commercial television stations in Brisbane and Adelaide in 1958, the ABCB favoured a plan for the allocation of the licences to local interests in preference to other major applicants.  The plan was rejected by the government.  The ABCB (1958:26) saw local ownership as an important element of policy.  It explained its position as follows:

The purpose of the legislation is clearly, on the one hand to prevent any trend towards concentration of ownership of stations, and, on the other hand, and as a consequence, to encourage the local ownership of stations.  Indeed, it seems to be universally agreed that, having regard to the nature and function of television stations, in the broadest sense, they should be, to the extent to which it is practicable, owned by the people in the areas which they are designed to serve.

The principle of localism has proved difficult to implement particularly when it has been in conflict with other competing priorities.  In commercial television it appears to have been set aside when the "equalisation" policy of providing three commercial services to regional areas was developed in the 1980s.  The equalisation policy together with the liberalisation of ownership controls provided strong incentives for stations in different parts of the country to combine into networks for the distribution of programming.  The effect is that most of the programming on regional stations, with the possible exception of local news bulletins, now originates in Sydney. (6)

Localism continues to be an important consideration for radio.  Although networking and syndication of programmes are possible, local programming is predominant on most commercial radio stations.  Localism was boosted by the policy of allocating "supplementary" licences permitting owners of existing services in small regional centres to operate a second service in the same area.  Localism is also a major consideration for the licensing of non-profit community radio services.  Typically, community radio licences are for low-power transmitters that allow signal coverage over small geographical areas.


Foreign Ownership Limits

Foreign ownership of radio and television stations has never been widespread.  To a large extent, this may reflect prohibition of foreign ownership and control of the media.  It may also indicate that the permitted levels of foreign ownership do not represent attractive investment propositions to foreigners.  This is likely to be the case for commercial radio generally.  Although foreign ownership restrictions of commercial radio were removed completely in 1992, foreign ownership of stations remains uncommon.  In television, foreign ownership is restricted to the interests of CanWest Global Communications (CanWest) in the TEN Group owners of the TEN Network television licences.

The TEN Group was initially a consortium put together in December 1992 by CanWest (a Canadian company) to acquire television stations in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane from Northern Star which had been placed in receivership.  Subsequently, it also acquired stations in Adelaide and Perth.  To comply with foreign ownership limits, CanWest took a shareholding of 15 per cent in the TEN Group company and provided additional loan finance to the group in the form of "subordinated and convertible debentures" equal in value to the subscribed equity in the company.  Although this amounted to a financial interest of 57.5 per cent, a number of ABA inquiries had found the arrangements not to be in breach of the foreign ownership regulation.

In January 1997, through a separate Australian company, CanWest acquired an additional 37.49 per cent of the TEN Group shares, bringing its total shareholders' interest in the company to 52.49 per cent.  The ABA found the new arrangements to be in breach of the foreign ownership regulation and ordered CanWest to divest itself of the excess shareholding.  CanWest was also found to be in breach of the Act because it was in a position to secure the appointment of more than half of the directors of the Ten Group.


EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS

Media industries have been treated differently from other industries.  Ownership controls impose much more onerous limits on media industry concentration than those allowed by trade practices legislation for industry in general.  These are claimed to be necessary to ensure diversity of opinion and programming.  But do these controls actually meet these goals?  And, if they do, at what cost?


Effect on Firm Size

The ownership regulations prevent the common ownership of more than one television station or more than two radio stations in a licence area.  They also prevent a company from owning assets in more than one medium (television, radio or daily newspapers) in the same area, forcing companies to specialise in one medium.

In broadcasting, economies of size may arise both from standard processes whereby companies apply fixed overhead costs to larger size units and from the special characteristics of broadcasting programmes.  A company with multiple broadcasting licences is likely to achieve economies of scale in management, administration, purchasing and other central office functions as well as in marketing and the sale of advertising.

Broadcasters have a strong incentive to maximise the size of the audience for a given programme.  Networking of commonly-owned or affiliated stations is one way of achieving an increased audience.  The advantages of networking come mainly from the operational savings associated with the programming function of stations rather than savings in programme costs.  Programme costs usually take the form of rights to broadcast and are based on the size of the potential audience in the area in which they are shown.  Consequently, for most programmes, the cost of the programme rights for a given audience reach is unlikely to differ substantially whether the programme is networked or separately distributed to stations.  The benefit of networking arises from the centralisation of the programme purchasing and scheduling functions.  In a network, this function is performed once for all the stations in the network whereas for independent stations each would have to perform those functions separately.

Second, a network also has advantages over independent stations in producing programmes and competing for independently-produced programmes.  Because a network is able to spread production costs over all its stations it is able to undertake more expensive and more appealing productions than independent stations.  Similarly, because it is assured a large combined audience, a network will generally be able to outbid independent stations for the rights to popular programmes produced independently.

Third, networks also have substantial advantages in the sale of advertising.  This is particularly so for television where most of the advertising is sourced through advertising agencies and comes from national advertisers.  Advertisers seeking large national audiences for their products are better off dealing with a network rather than singly for a large group of stations.  Indeed, advertisers tend to pay a premium for large audiences.  The network also benefits from having a single specialised sales force for all its stations and from the ability to promote the stations as a group.

However, as indicated in Chapter 3, many of the financial incentives that underlie the formation of networks arise from the nature of broadcasting rather than common ownership.  Independently-owned stations could secure similar benefits by collaborating to form a network.  For example, because of the limit on population reach for commonly-owned television stations, each of the current national networks comprises several affiliated stations not owned by the network.  However, many of the affiliated stations are part of multi-station independently-owned groups such as the seven stations in the Prime Network and the five stations owned by TWT Holdings Ltd.  This suggests that substantial economies of scale may also be gained from group ownership.

My overall conclusion is that, although the current ownership limits do not necessarily preclude network-type economies from being achieved, they prevent the achievement of economies of size that could flow from the formation of single-owner national networks.


Effect on Formation of Multi-Media Groups

Limits on cross-media ownership and on the ownership of multiple media outlets in the same service area are aimed at promoting competition between media outlets and ensuring diversity of opinion.  While independent ownership is more likely than common ownership to produce a diversity of opinion, this comes at a cost.  Programming diversity is more likely under common ownership of outlets in one medium.  Further, the regulation also prevents the formation of local media monopolies and could be potentially beneficial to advertisers.

Considering first programme diversity, the owner of multiple outlets would be likely to promote complementary rather than competitive programmes and thus satisfy the programming needs of a wider cross-section of the community.  It is not possible, however, to assess whether the additional minority groups served by complementary programming value those programmes more than majority audiences value the choice provided by competitive programmes.

Considering advertising, competition between media outlets (both intra- and cross-media) allows advertisers to choose the best medium for their advertisements and to benefit from the price competition likely to exist between the outlets.

The limits on cross-media ownership prevent owners from maximising administrative efficiencies and from minimising their commercial risk by being involved in competing activities (rises and falls in demand for advertising in different media do not necessarily coincide).  However, they do not necessarily prevent co-operative arrangements being developed between rival media groups or outlets where this is perceived as being in their mutual interest.  Examples of such co-operation include radio and newspaper groups sharing advertising personnel and parts of their premises, and radio and television stations sharing local news gathering personnel, facilities and programmes.

The prohibition of common ownership of multiple broadcasting outlets has both negative and positive effects.  On the negative side, particularly in relation to television, it promotes duplication of programmes appealing to large audiences.  Minority audiences would be more likely to be catered for by owners of multiple outlets in the same service area who would have a financial incentive to broadcast complementary rather than competing programmes on the commonly-owned stations.  On the positive side it enhances diversity of editorial opinion.


Foreign Interests

Foreign ownership restrictions in broadcasting are intended to ensure that broadcasting remains essentially "Australian", and that foreign individuals and companies are not in a position to exert effective control over any licensee company.  The restrictions affect not only foreign citizens and companies wishing to invest in Australian broadcast media, but also any foreign-owned creditors of licensee companies taking equity positions in those companies or directorships on their boards.  They may also prevent locally-owned investment funds (including superannuation funds) managed by the local subsidiaries of foreign-owned financial institutions from acquiring substantial interests in licensee companies.

The effect of these restrictions on economic efficiency depends on the extent to which they alter patterns of ownership in the industry and limit the capacity of media companies to secure benefits of economies of scale and scope.  By limiting the pool of potential investors in Australian media stocks they may also disadvantage existing and potential licensees and their shareholders.  Specifically, they are likely to reduce the opportunities for licensees to maximise the profitability of their operations and the realisable value of their licences, and for foreign companies to diversify into Australian media assets.

The existence of networks at both the national and international level suggests that economies of scale and scope are possible in broadcasting and related activities.  Foreign entities with existing media or entertainment interests are the most likely source of such economies.  Among the benefits which might result from affiliation with foreign broadcast interests are access to lower-cost finance, reductions in some categories of operating costs such as satellite use and station facilities, and some management and administration outlays.  However as long as programme regulations persist, so preventing Australian stations from operating merely as relay stations for foreign networks, these benefits are likely to be limited by the continuing need to operate Australian facilities and retain sales staff.  Even if full integration with a foreign network were permitted, the need to take account of domestic tastes and preferences in programming would limit potential operational benefits, as would the need to sell advertising time to domestic advertisers.  Ownership changes that may result in access to an improved range or lower cost of programmes could offer further potential benefits.

Another possible cost of the foreign ownership restrictions is a distortion of the debt/equity structure of broadcasting companies by favouring debt over foreign equity.  However, it is not possible to measure the extent to which the restrictions distort the debt/equity structure.

Further, ensuring majority Australian ownership of broadcast media does not necessarily guarantee Australian control of its tone and content.  These are more likely to be determined by the programming.  The choice between programmes depends on commercial imperatives such as the programme's price and attractiveness to audiences.  If foreign programmes have a substantial advantage in these respects, the nationality of the owner, or indeed the programme manager, is likely to have little influence on programme choice.  A more effective means of ensuring Australian control over tone and content is through regulations that address this directly;  specifically through content requirements and restrictions on the source of programmes.

While the Parliament's concerns with foreign control of radio in 1951 were understandable in the context of that era, the continued validity of those concerns a half-century later is questionable.  Today it is virtually impossible to prevent foreign media from influencing domestic audiences.  Radio waves simply do not recognise national borders and may be propagated across borders by a variety of means.  Similarly, technological change and the development of new media are increasingly undermining the effectiveness of regulations designed to limit the influence of media owners.  For example, satellite transmission and the Internet provide access to sources of information that are beyond the reach of national regulation.

Furthermore, ownership of domestic broadcasting stations by citizens of a country does not guarantee that they will be less prone to use their influence to promote private, rather than public, agendas.  The best protection against potential abuse of the media's power of influence is likely to be greater diversity of media outlets competing for the attention of audiences.  In such a situation, sanctioning of foreign ownership would enlarge the pool of potential investors in media stocks, thus reducing media concentration and the need for domestic ownership and control regulations.

Apart from the populist sentiment in favour of keeping Australian media in Australian hands, it is difficult to see any continuing value in maintaining strict controls on foreign ownership.  The inherent absurdity of the restrictions is highlighted by Rupert Murdoch's assumption of American citizenship in 1985.  Although he had been living abroad for many years, he was deemed to be a resident of Australia for the purpose of the legislation and was able to retain ownership of television stations.  However, on becoming a US citizen, even though nothing else had changed, he was no longer regarded suitable to own Australian television stations, but continued to remain suitable to own extensive Australian newspaper interests with a potentially greater capacity to influence public opinion.

RUPERT MURDOCH BECOMES AN AMERICAN

Rupert Murdoch, founder of the Australian-based News Corporation international media conglomerate, took up US citizenship in 1985 to facilitate purchases of US broadcasting assets by The News Corporation.  At the time Murdoch had been residing in the US for many years and made only infrequent visits to Australia.

Broadcasting regulations prior to 1981 prohibited control of television stations by non-residents of Australia.  However, in 1979 the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT) approved Murdoch's takeover of TEN-10 (Sydney) by ruling that he was a resident of Australia for the purposes of the Act.  Soon after, Murdoch's purchase of half of Ansett Transport Industries Ltd which held major interests in ATV-10 (Melbourne) was contested on the basis of his residency status, and the ABT eventually refused approval of the purchase.  The News Corporation appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  One of the amendments to the Act in 1981 (colloquially referred to as the "Murdoch Amendments") replaced the residency requirement with citizenship as the determinant of foreign control and enabled the purchase to proceed legally.

Ironically, the citizenship requirement that facilitated the ATV-10 takeover necessitated the sale of The News Corporation's television stations when Murdoch became a US citizen in 1985.


CONCLUSION

Limits on the level of concentration and control of broadcasting have traditionally been considered to be in the public interest because they reduce the power held by any one individual and because the resultant wider spread of control generates a greater diversity of views.  Similarly, the public interest is seen by many to be better served by restrictions on foreign ownership, on the basis that there may be a greater risk that the interests of foreigners might not be consistent with the national interest.  However, the regulations addressing these concerns come at a cost.

A significant effect of the ownership and control limits has been to prevent the formation of single-owner national television networks and multi-media conglomerates and to restrict foreign involvement in Australian broadcasting.  The current provisions appear to act as genuine constraints on acquisition, with some owners declared in breach and required to divest assets in recent years.

Ownership restrictions reduce the range of potential operators and limit the development of industry structures reflecting the existence of economies of scale or scope.  Businesses prevented by regulation from growing to their optimal size or from producing complementary products have higher costs and lower profits than otherwise.  Cross-media rules are likely to be preventing the formation of multi-media groups and the realisation of benefits of economies of scope likely to be associated with them.

Foreign ownership restrictions, in particular, do not appear to serve a useful function.  They are based on outmoded concepts of national sovereignty and in an era of media globalisation they have little effect on the capacity of foreign media to influence Australian consumers.  Also, by reducing the pool of potential investors in Australian media, they are likely to encourage, rather than discourage, higher ownership concentration of media assets contrary to the objective of domestic ownership and control regulation.



ENDNOTES

6.  The recent decision that the sixth wide-coverage television channel available in most parts of Australia will be reserved for community television should increase opportunities for the development of local programming.