Tuesday, December 08, 2009

10 years of Labor is a record of records;  especially in spending

Ten years ago most members of the state Labor caucus would have had mixed reactions to their come-from-behind election win under Steve Bracks.

The champagne corks were no doubt popping in celebration after years in the political wilderness.  At the same time many in the new government would have breathed a huge sigh of relief knowing they pulled off victory despite their much-pilloried financial mismanagement record.

Since stumbling back into office in 1999, Labor has had 10 years to clean the stain of the Cain-Kirner years and present themselves as reliable stewards of Victoria's public finances.  With another state election scheduled about this time next year, it is appropriate to ask how Labor has performed over the past decade.

One of the most important benchmarks of financial prudence is the state of the net operating surplus for the general government sector, covering the transactions of core agencies and departments.

The Government's own budget papers show that state treasurers Steve Bracks, John Brumby and John Lenders have presided over an eroding accrual budget surplus in trend terms since 2000-01, the first full fiscal year of the state Labor Government.

In 2000-01, the budget surplus stood at $1.2 billion, a rich fiscal inheritance left behind by the Kennett government.  By 2008-09, the surplus stood at a relative pittance of $243 million.  The revised expected outcome for this financial year is not much better.

Labor's implicit acknowledgement that the budget has melted away on its watch is reflected in recent changes in fiscal policy.

In the 2008-09 budget, the Government announced it would set an operating surplus target of at least 1 per cent of revenue.  In the following budget, it announced a diluted surplus target of at least $100 million.

A glaring feature of the expected budget surplus for 2009-10 is that it has been bankrolled by grants from the Rudd Government, most likely in the form of borrowed money.  It is expected that grant funding will grow by 17 per cent this financial year.  If it had grown by 10 per cent instead, as was the case in 2008-09, the budget would be in deficit by about $1 billion.

A characteristic feature of this Government's record is the extent to which it has received a huge influx of receipts across a broad range of revenue instruments.

It snared $4.3 billion more from individuals and businesses in 2008-09 than in 2000-01.  This represents a 50 per cent increase in revenue from this source alone.

A big source of tax growth has been property taxes, as rising residential and commercial property prices have given the State Government a lucrative revenue stream.  In particular, land tax jumped by a staggering 140 per cent over the period, from $516 million to $1.2 billion.

As many small and medium businesses will attest, the often pernicious increases in land tax bills have affected incentives to grow, invest and employ people.

The Victorian Government over the past decade has also gouged holders of general and life insurance policies, as insurance tax revenues grew by 91 per cent, while Victoria maintains the invidious status as the highest stamp duty state in the Commonwealth.

The Government has also benefited from money funnelled from a GST and specific purpose grants pipeline stretching from Canberra to Spring Street.  The amount of grants received by the state has grown from about $10.4 billion in 2000-01 to about $18.8 billion in 2008-09, a whopping increase of 81 per cent.

Last financial year, Federal Government grants accounted for 48 per cent of Victorian general government sector revenue.  With Kevin Rudd and Wayne Swan doling out even more money to prop up state budgets, it is expected that grants will account for just over 51 per cent of the state's available revenue.  For Victoria, the new-found dependence on the feds to effectively give the Brumby Government a veneer of a budget surplus is a sign of financial and economic weakness.

To understand how a gradual budget surplus meltdown squares with record revenues, it is necessary to examine the spending record of Labor.

General government operating expenses rose from $22.5 billion in 2000-01 to $38.9 billion;  an increase of $16.4 billion, or 73 per cent.

While the overall increase in spending has been significant, it is not sufficient to explain changes in the direction of the budget bottom line.  Therefore, a comparison of growth of expenditure and revenue on an annualised basis is required.

On the basis of the Government's own estimates, annual spending growth exceeded the growth in revenues in five out of eight years, including in 2008-09 when expenditure grew by 9 per cent compared with a strong 6 per cent increase in revenue.

The state budget papers reveal that spending on employee wages and salaries has grown at a faster rate than overall general government expenditure since 2000-01.  My recent study has also shown that Victoria has recorded the fastest increase in total numbers of public servants of any state since 2000;  the core Victorian Public Service bureaucracy alone has grown by 60,000 people.

And, in what must be of major concern to Victorians who lived through the Cain-Kirner years, the Brumby Government is projecting a big spike in public sector indebtedness over the next four years.

For the general government sector, net debt will rise from $5 billion in 2009 to a projected $16 billion by 2013, an increase of 202 per cent.  By contrast, state general government net debt was just $2 billion in 2001.

For the non-financial public sector, including government trading enterprises, net debt is expected to balloon to a huge $31.3 billion by the end of the forward estimates.


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COP15 Opening Ceremony

It is hard not to be cynical about the UN Climate Change Conference that opened in Copenhagen, Denmark today.

The opening ceremony to the 15th session of the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP15, opened at the Bella Conference Centre with a video presentation visually demonstrating the looming fate of the world if tough action wasn't taken to cut emissions from floods and droughts to hurricanes;  and concluded with young children asking negotiators and political leaders to "please help save the world".

And saving the world was clearly on the agenda of the first two speakers -- Danish Prime Minister, Lars Rasmussen, and the Mayor of the City of Copenhagen, Ritt Bjerregaard.

Rasmussen didn't hold back making it clear he was committed to rhetorical flutter by seeking "a strong and ambitious climate change agreement" and "an agreement for effective global solutions".  But he avoided boring the meeting with details.  After all he'll have a busy work schedule over the next two weeks hosting the one hundred and ten world leaders who'll come to Copenhagen to either share the credit of an agreement or pass the blame for its failure.

Bjerrgaard is following in Rasmussen's footsteps by hosting seventy leaders of major local governments.  She's also taken onto Copenhagen's shoulders the responsibility to save the world by renaming the City as ‘Hopenhagen' for the next fortnight.

Their speeches might have been pointless, but at least they were welcoming.

By comparison the Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Rajendra Pachuari, used his speech to attack climate sceptics who were fuelling doubt on the science of climate change.

And he directly responded to the exposure of data and emails from the British Hadley Centre by attacking those who "would go the extent of engaging illegal acts, perhaps to discredit the IPCC".

Pachuari was clearly annoyed that his immediately preceding seven metre sea level rise claim unless a new agreement to cut emissions may be open to scrutiny.  But Pachuari was trumped by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Yvo de Boer, who read out a story of climate-induced rain, strong winds and floods and that that a Copenhagen agreement would "prevent" them occurring.

De Boer also outlined his "Christmas cake" structured Copenhagen deal including:

  • The foundation layer of an "agreement to prompt implementation of action on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and capacity building.
  • The second layer including "ambitious reduction commitments and actions ... (which) also includes commitments to start up finance in the order of $10 billion per year, as well as long term finance".
  • Iced with "a shared vision on long-term cooperative action on climate change and a long term goal".

But rather than calling it a Christmas cake, he should probably call it a Christmas wish list because it is the job of countries, not the UNFCCC Secretariat to decide what should be in any deal.

The ceremony was book ended with rapturous applause, but like most of the debate leading up to this conference the applause was false.

Despite the main plenary hall that housed the opening ceremony being the largest in the conference centre, organisers had to reasonably ration attendance with more than fifteen thousand registered delegates.

But rather than admission on a first come, first served basis tickets were issued to "constituent groups" which included large NGO delegations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund, or social justice movements like indigenous people's forums.

The consequence was that anyone sceptical of the UN system or the science of climate change never made it into the opening ceremony under the gaze of the world's media.  Instead their voices were sent to the other end of the conference centre out of sight, and out of mind.

Wednesday, December 02, 2009

Stop picking on the pokies

It has been a bad few weeks for the rights of poker machine users.

First, there was the draft Productivity Commission (PC) report which, despite finding there had been a decline in the rates of problem gambling since its last report in 1999, still proposed a whole suite of new restrictions on pokies players.

Yet, even the measures proposed by the Commission were not enough for some of the nation's least tolerant politicians.  Both Family First's Stephen Fielding and the Greens Rachel Siewert demanded immediate action against poker machines.  Siewert wants ATMs ripped out of gaming venues almost straightaway, while Fielding wants the even more drastic action of removing gaming machines entirely from pubs and clubs and corralling them in large gambling halls.

Not only do the intolerant extremes in the Australian Parliament show no respect for the rights of those Australians who enjoy playing the pokies, they also seem to have no interest in procedural niceties, like the period of consultation built into the PC timetable or for the final report due in early 2010.

The next step in the pokie-bashing came a couple of weeks later, when the 7.30 Report ran a story highlighting calls from anti-pokies activists for bans on clubs and pubs providing family entertainment.  The argument is that while children are enjoying a meal with their parents or playing in the facility's play area they are being exposed to the sights and sounds of the pokies.

According to the zealots this is either "inherently dangerous" or plain "immoral", personally, "far-fetched" seems a better description.  One minute your kids are watching Big Ted and Jemima in a Play School concert at the local RSL, and the next they are gambling addicts.

Of course, if pubs and clubs took away all the family friendly food, entertainment and facilities, the same zealots would be attacking them for solely focusing on gaming.

Then, as if to prove that bad news comes in threes, there was the decision of the Victorian Civil & Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) to deny the proprietor of the Romsey Hotel the right to install pokies in his pub.  Romsey is a small town on the northern fringes of Melbourne, which bears some of the tree-changing demographics of a place like Bundanoon in the New South Wales Southern Highlands, which achieved notoriety earlier this year for its ban on bottled water.  The Romsey pub is in desperate need of a renovation to install modern features such as a new family-friendly bistro, and providing a full range of gambling options (it already has a TAB) would be part of this.

VCAT's Justice Bell actually found that the economic impact of allowing pokies in Romsey would be "slightly positive", but the social impact would be "strongly negative", and therefore he rejected the application.

What is remarkable about Justice Bell's decision is that he concluded that if granted the licenses, gaming expenditure in Romsey would still be below the state, country Victorian and regional levels.  However, Bell opined that "not everything you can count counts and you cannot count everything that counts" and proceeded to talk about "wellbeing".  Obviously, Justice Bell's view of wellbeing was not shared by the drinkers in the Romsey pub.  They came out to voice their strong opposition to the supporters of the ban, celebrating in the town's main street on the day of the decision.

There is some dispute about what the majority view was in Romsey about poker machines, but even if those wanting pokies were a minority one has to ask what on earth makes the majority think that they should be able to dictate to the minority about how they spend their leisure dollars?

Whether it is gambling, or the suite of measures relating to food and alcohol proposed in the National Preventive Health Taskforce report, there is a growing trend for so-called experts to propose "evidence-based" solutions to the problems of society.

Of course, there is an issue with problem gambling, albeit a declining one, and there may be merit in some of the PC's proposals in relation to it.  However, in a healthy society, as many decisions as possible about risk should be made by individuals, and decisions on what risks children should be exposed to should be made by parents.

Instead, we seem to be rushing down a path where these sorts of decisions are made through the political and legal processes.  This potentially leaves national policy at the whim of Family First and Green Senators and local policy driven by the sort of articulate, litigious tree-changers who seem to have succeeded in imposing their world view on the potential pokies players of Romsey.


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The moral value of free markets

Speech from the launch of Richard Morgan's
Lessons From The Global Financial Crisis:
The Relevance of Adam Smith on Morality and Free Markets

at "Morgans at 401", 401 Collins Street Melbourne


We are here today to launch Richard Morgan's book, a book that applies 18th century wisdom to current circumstances.

One of the great virtues of knowledge of past ideas, is that it forces present thinkers to work harder.  Not always an agreeable prospect.  Hence the push to define the past as a realm of Stygian moral and intellectual darkness that our present knowing moral splendour has utterly superseded.  Thus is current fashionable opinion both elevated and protected.

Yet much that has been paraded in recent decades as allegedly cutting edge thought is little more than ideas from as long ago as the 5th century BC re-packaged.  Indeterminacy of meaning, for example -- which the post-modernists make so much of -- was a hot topic for Socrates and the boys.  While the politics of Plato's Republic -- with its Platonic Guardians, and their necessary supporting Platonic myths -- seems to get endlessly recycled.  Judges and international bureaucrats -- some of them scientific -- are notable current offerings as Platonic Guardians:  with supporting Platonic myths from which dissent is, apparently, not to be permitted in polite society.

Against this recycling of the 5th century BC, it would be quite an advance if we could get rather more academics and other intellectuals to advance to the standard of some good 18th century thinking.

Consider the famous passage by Voltaire in his Letters on the English, first published in 1734.

Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind.  There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts.  There thee Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker's word.  At the breaking up of this pacific and free assembly, some withdraw to the synagogue, and others to take a glass.  This man goes and is baptized in a great tub, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:  that man has his son's foreskin cut off, whilst a set of Hebrew words (quite unintelligible to him) are mumbled over his child.  Others retire to their churches, and there wait for the inspiration of heaven with their hats on, and all are satisfied.

Let us consider for a moment how much turgid academic ranting on the allegedly intimate connection between capitalism and bigotry is rendered otiose by this simple observation of what commerce actually means.  Commerce does not care for the colour of your skin, your religion, your sex, your sexuality, your ethnicity:  what it cares about is the colour of your money.  And the worth of your word.

It is politics, with its conjunction of coercion and category -- often coercion-by-category -- that makes the colour of your skin, your religion, your sex, your sexuality, your ethnicity important, even fatally important.  Commerce wants your money and so must, perforce, attend to what you want.  Commerce-as-commerce is not interested in any of the vile wars waged by believers -- both secular and religious -- against human nature as it is in the name of human nature as it is supposed to be.  Commerce just wants your money.  Preferably again and again.  "It is better for me if you are happy with what I do" is practical commerce.

For requiring their consent is a great encourager of good behaviour towards others.  As Adam Smith observed:

The real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman is that of his customers.  It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence.

Down the ages, there has been much railing against commerce as undermining the moral order, how amoral the "vulgar merchants" are.  Yet -- when one bothers to look at the historical record -- it is the commercial societies that have, again and again, pioneered social advances.  The Serene Republic of Venice with equality before the law and sophisticated capital markets;  the Dutch Republic being the first society to abolish the spectre of famine;  England pioneering state action to assist the poor.  No nations have been so morally tender about just about everything as are modern liberal capitalist societies.

The marginal in society are frequently rather better treated by commerce than by politics.  A Fortune 500 company is much more likely to acknowledge same-sex relationships than a US State is.  The former cares about getting and keeping good staff, and reaching customers.  While political and religious entrepreneurs often seek to sell effortless virtue:  to sell a sense of unearned self-satisfaction from simply being different to some other group -- whites feeling terribly virtuous for not being black, gentiles feeling terribly virtuous for not being Jewish, straights for not being gay, those born and raised Protestant for not being Catholic, or vice versa.  And so on.

If one is selling effortless virtue based on denigration of others, then one is selling bigotry.  Something politics, and religion, are sadly rife with.  Commerce, not so much.  One attends in a different way to those you want to do business with, as Voltaire famously observed.

Long before people talked of the "pink dollar", there was the Jewish ducat.  While women could scale the heights of commerce when they were still formally barred from even the foothills of politics.  The first African-American woman to become a millionaire was not Oprah Winfrey, but Madame C.J. Walker, who became a millionaire by 1910:  and if you were a millionaire in 1910, you were really a millionaire.  She achieved this by selling hair-care products, employing many African-American women in the process, quite deliberately so:  no doubt a grave offence against the Equal Opportunity Act -- don't tell Rob Hulls.

When one looks at the denunciations of vulgar merchants and "immoral" commerce, again and again one sees the real complaint is that they attend to what people want, not what the critic thinks people ought to want.  That they attend to what people are like, not what people allegedly ought to be like.

To any supporter of a static social order, the restless energy of commerce is a threat.  And what social order is more static than one that seeks equality of outcome?  The societies that have most raged against commerce have also created some of the most appalling horrors in history, struggling mightily and brutally against what people want.

Indeed, if one wants to establish any bigoted social order, one of the first things one has to do is to restrain commerce.  As Thomas Sowell points out, part of the impetus for the Jim Crow laws in the American South was to ensure that a white person buying a first class train ticket did not find themselves sitting next to a black person.  For, left to themselves, the railroad companies only cared if you could pay.

The apartheid regime in South Africa restricted commerce in all sorts of ways, as it had to in order to make race matter so much.  Hence, when Helen Suzman was the only Opposition member of the South African Parliament, she represented the Cape Town equivalent of Kooyong.  The commanding heights of South African commerce was where white opposition to apartheid was electorally strongest.

One of the great disasters of indigenous policy in our country was the law restricting consensual commercial relations between Aboriginal stockmen and pastoralists, by imposing full-time employment as the only acceptable form of contract.  This, as was predicted at the time, devastated outback Aboriginal employment.  Arrangements that had evolved to suit the people involved in them were abolished by coercive action by central authority because people, not involved in those interactions, had a theory.  A theory that did not have pay any attention to what people on the ground actually wanted, and so what would actually work.  A theory that classed itself as profoundly moral while it proceeded to stop people attending to what each other wanted.

Adam Smith had something to say about such "Men of System", who attended to their own theories of government and not to people and circumstances.  Such a person

... does not consider that in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it.

In Richard Trudgen's Why Warriors Lie Down and Die -- a necessary book to understand the serial disasters of indigenous policy in this country -- there is a particularly appalling passage about "benevolent" government bureaucrats being frustrated when the locals continued to use their canoes to fish rather than the shiny new trawler the taxpayers had bought for them.  But the locals knew about canoes and operated them within family and clan groups.  The trawler involved new skills and its operation would upset agreed alliances and arrangements among those families and clans.  But the bureaucrats knew nought of such matters, so they deliberately burnt the canoes to force the locals to use the trawler.

Needless to say, this wanton vandalism had no such effect.  Indigenous Australians have suffered mightily from the coercive benevolence of the state.

For attending to what other people want is not a simple matter of selfishness versus benevolence.  As C.S. Lewis noted:

"... those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their consciences."

As will those who torment others in the name of the general good.  The truly terrible thing about a Nazi gauleiter or Soviet commissar was not that they lacked a conscience, but precisely that they had them:  consciences that burned to "purify" society.  Attending to others is a great restraint on oppression of all kinds:  both those motivated by moral claims, and those not.

For great harms are often created when capitalist acts between consenting adults are banned.  The high minimum wages, and grave difficulties in sacking people, of French law do much to explain the social disasters of the banlieu, the French housing estates.  The harder it is to sever a working relationship, the riskier it becomes to begin it.  The more productive someone has to be to make starting a working relationship worthwhile, the less such relationships will be engaged in.  Instead, people retreat to ways of reducing the risk:  they insist on more certification;  they use networks so people they know can, in effect, vouch for any new person;  they minimise risks in communication by hiring people most like themself, and so on.  Consequently, if you are a young Muslim male from those French housing estates, your chances of getting a job are greatly reduced.  Living lives of idle resentment, burning a few cars provides cathartic excitement.

Thus does state-imposed "morality" divide society by stopping commerce from bringing people together.  Social disaster created by a whole set of "moral" theories that stop people attending, one-on-one, to what other people want.

Yet Voltaire, over two and a half centuries ago, could see what encourages people to live together amiably and productively and what divides them.  We really could do with a great deal more such eighteenth century wisdom:  a sentiment that can turn up in all sorts of places.  When he was General Secretary of the Communist Party of the People's Republic, Hu Yaobang was reported to have observed that it was the ideas of Montesquieu, rather than "outdated" ones of Marx, that China needed.

There is much to be said for the brute realism of commerce.  The ivory towers of academe generate more than their fair share of nonsense.  Adam Smith famously described certain universities as having:

... chosen to remain, for a long time, the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection after they had been hunted out of every other corner of the world.

But academics can peddle ideas whose consequences they do not have to deal with.  Consider the fairly appalling state of modern pedagogical theory.  Academics come up with pedagogical theories to be imbued in educators of teachers, who then teach student teachers, who then go and teach students, the ones who actually bear the consequences of those ideas.  Few milieus in our society are more isolated from the consequences of their ideas than the peddlers of pedagogical theory and few groups produce so much arrant nonsense -- and often grandly big-noting nonsense at that.

Not, I suggest, a coincidence.  There are all sorts of good features to commerce's attention to what other people want:  to having to deal, often on a daily basis, with the consequences of what you do.

It is a grave mistake to think that politics has any inherent tendency to better behaviour than commercial life.  In his recent book on the Irish housing boom and bust, Irish journalist Fintan O'Toole refers to:

... certain landowners [who] had accumulated large landbanks at the outskirts of urban areas which they then released in dribs and drabs in order to manipulate the market and artificially to maintain high land prices.

In Australia we have a name for such people.  We call them "State Governments".  If Australians were as free to buy and sell land as Texans -- a State that has a bigger population than Australia, faster population growth, higher average income and a bigger proportion of its population in its five largest cities -- our houses would cost half to a third (or even less) their current prices.  Instead, a country with one of the world's lowest population densities has the most expensive metropolitan housing in the Anglosphere.  A true regulatory achievement.

As Adam Smith observed:

The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would no-where be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

In the light of recent tragic events, we might consider the way regulations controlling removal of trees and bushes retarded people's ability to manage the fire risk of their properties.  We might further consider the failures in management of public lands -- notably the failure to reduce fire loads along roads, and in government lands generally.

We might consider the failure to invest in dams to match the increase in Victoria's population.  The last being a particularly egregious failure to live up to Adam Smith's third duty of government:

... the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain, because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.

But "global warming" provides useful cover for the failure to match new water infrastructure to the increase in Victoria's population.  A 30% increase in Victoria's population without a significant new dam is so obviously the fault of the climate -- one of those useful Platonic myths I referred to earlier.

The failures of regulation, and of government management, are so numerous, that to presume that they have some strong demand on our support -- rather than requiring very careful justification -- is a triumph of faith over experience.

By contrast, the economic benefits of free commerce are well attested, something Richard Morgan provides an excellent short survey of in his book.  But it is a great mistake to think that those economic benefits are somehow separate, or even opposed, to the moral benefits of free commerce.

Not a mistake that Adam Smith himself was at all inclined to make.  As Richard Morgan reminds us, Smith was a moral philosopher who produced The Theory of the Moral Sentiments years before he published The Wealth of Nations.  To start with a short discussion of elements of The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, as Richard Morgan does, is entirely appropriate.  The right way to frame the practical and moral advantages of free commerce, illuminated by the observations and wisdom of Adam Smith.  Wisdom that, as Richard Morgan sets out, is entirely relevant to our own time.

The case for freedom of commerce is very much a moral case.  I commend Richard Morgan's short, and highly readable, book to you as an excellent primer to the continuing relevance of Adam Smith's 18th century wisdom.  Perhaps more of our academics -- and even a few of our politicians -- might catch up to the 18th century, so we can better cope with the challenges of the 21st century.  Especially as Richard Morgan has kindly made it so easy for them to do so.

Thank you

Tuesday, December 01, 2009

Here's what isn't happening

There's a lot going on in the Liberal Party at the moment, and, indeed, on the Australian right.  But here's what isn't happening.  There isn't a burgeoning ideological split between conservatives and liberals.  Climate change is not a stalking horse for social conservatism.  And this isn't the old guard rebelling against the new guard.  In both camps there are conservatives and liberals, seasoned parliamentarians, time-servers and first-termers.

Neither is this any sort of "Howard's revenge".  It's a long bow to blame a schism within a party on the one leader who kept it together for a decade.

For the Liberal Party, the emissions trading scheme is a special case.

After the 2007 election, there was much discussion about the future of liberalism and the Liberal Party.  And the debate largely framed in British terms.  Should the post-Howard party saunter down David Cameron's path of moderate economics and moderate greenism, or talk about high tax rates and inflation?

Anyway, it turns out that there are a few problems implementing an Antipodean interpretation of Cameronism.  There appears to have been an assumption that choosing to follow the UK model was a simple as flicking a switch -- just a quick rejig of the Liberal Party's press release template and bang, the Liberals are now greener than the ALP.  Hence Turnbull's recent use of "progressive" -- a word that resonates among Cameron's strategists, but is alien to the Liberal parliamentary party and its supporters.

Campbell's piece shows that Cameron's strategy was more than just adding a tree to the Conservatives logo.  For one thing, he took his party with him, over a period of many years.  And whatever success Cameron is enjoying cannot be isolated from a few pertinent facts:  the Tories have been out of power for a decade, Labour has driven the UK basically into the ground, and the ideological ghost of John Howard is not as strong as the ghost of Margaret Thatcher.

But most importantly:  It's easy for a nominally small government party to be clean and green if all you're talking is about bicycles.  By contrast, the ETS is no small thing.  The ETS Green Paper bragged that the government's scheme would "change the things we produce, the way we produce them, and the things we buy".  The scheme is arguably the largest economic change in Australian history -- an emissions trading scheme is like plopping a entire second economy on top of the first one.

Malcolm Turnbull's camp wants to follow the Cameron model.  Nick Minchin's camp is more diverse.  Not all of the Minchin sceptics are sceptics of the science.  Weirdly, Kevin Rudd got this one right.  Sceptics include those who believe the science but think the scheme is irrevocably flawed (does anyone disagree with that?).  And then there are those in the Minchin camp who even believe the world should take action on climate change, but feel that Rudd's diplomatic strategy of legislating before Copenhagen is a little bit silly.  You might not agree with it, but this is an entirely defensible position.  The entire economy isn't just a bargaining chip to be handed to our diplomats to go off and play with.

Most in the Minchin camp have little interest in climate science, but believe a Liberal Party cannot claim to be liberal if it supports one of the biggest government interventions ever considered by the parliament.  And with its extraordinary concessions, the ETS doesn't even have the redeeming quality of being able to achieve its purported goal:  substantially reducing emissions.  It doesn't even work as an insurance policy.  It has negligible coverage and a massive premium.  The ETS is, simply, a massive tax/corporate-welfare churn.  Its economic cost will inevitably be substantial -- doubly so in the absence of a global deal -- and the Minchinites are betting that cost will be a significant political issue in future elections.

So before a global deal, for many in the parliamentary Liberal Party, opposing the ETS seems like a no-brainer.


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The human cost of bans

Prohibitions
by John Meadowcroft
(Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008, 269 pages)

Looking back on the notorious gangster Al Capone, it is often hard to believe that he had to go to all that trouble just to sell some booze.  Nowadays, obtaining an responsible service of alcohol qualification is much less of a hassle than setting up an underground crime syndicate.  But in the era of alcohol prohibition, this was just what happened.

These days, nobody denies that alcohol is a potentially dangerous drug.  The science consistently demonstrates this.  Yet there are few people today advocating prohibition of alcohol.  But this argument does not seem to extend to recreational drugs.  Supporters of drug prohibition tend to use arguments that are equally valid (or invalid) with respect to alcohol, but paradoxically do not support its prohibition.

The Institute of Economic Affairs' Prohibitions covers more than just alcohol and illicit drugs.  It systematically tackles boxing, firearms, advertising, pornography, medical drugs and devices, prostitution, gambling, organ trade and alcohol, all of which have been subject to certain restrictions or prohibitions over time.

The philosophical perspective of Prohibitions is grounded in personal choice and the belief that everybody holds a property right over their own body.  As such, it is immoral for government to interfere with that right of private property.  In particular, the issue of drug use and organ trade highlight this ethical argument.

Furthermore, Prohibitions explains that even if something could be considered morally wrong by some, this does not give the do-gooders a right do impose that moral choice on others.  Take the example of boxing:  an activity where people are paid, and the sole objective of the activity is to harm another person, desirably to the point of loss of consciousness, seems morally repugnant.  And to think that the state permits this activity is, at first glance, confronting.  That is, until we examine the facts.

Fights happen, spontaneous or organised.  The commercialisation of boxing has led to dramatic increases in safety -- the increased provision of medical resources and the use of boxing gloves are two prime examples of this improvement.  And we may still consider this as not affecting the inherent morality -- the aims of boxing remain the same.  But again, this does not give legislators authority to infringe on the rights of two consenting adults engaging in an activity that they deem to be worthwhile.

Prohibitions goes a step further, highlighting several key practical arguments against prohibitions in general.

Firstly, there is the issue of the formation of black markets.  In an underground market, the rule of law does not apply.  There is no accountability, no safety and no provisions against coercive behaviour.  This is exemplified by drug markets, where extortion, murder, kidnapping and true exploitation occur.  Or the prostitution industry, where prostitutes are regularly beaten and occasionally murdered.  In these instances, individuals involved are not subject to the rule of law and have no protection.

Violence reigns supreme in the criminal underground.  A viewing of the Australian TV series Underbelly is enough to show this (provided the sale and viewing of the show is not prohibited itself!)  But contrary to most beliefs, it is not the nature of the drugs that cause the violence that we see, but the nature of prohibition.  Violence and extortion were a huge problem in the time of Al Capone and the Chicago Outfit that smuggled and sold alcohol, but since the lifting of the ban on alcohol, the trade is peaceful, beneficial and persons involved are accountable for their actions.

Another effect of the black market is that information is not able to flow freely.  While in legitimate markets, there is incentive to release information about a product (in the form of competitive advertising and awareness campaigns), a black market gives incentive to remain hidden and to conceal as much information as possible.  This means that the only people who can effectively inform the public about illegal goods are government and special interest groups.  For example, a lot of what we hear about prostitution comes from religious organisations that have a biased view on the issue and cannot be said to promote true public awareness.

The next practical implication of prohibition is that risks are increased.  The drug trade again exemplifies this issue.  The quality and makeup of drugs that are bought and sold is highly variable.  Heroin use is a highly risky activity even when makeup, adulterants and production standards are disclosed, but the underground nature of its trade means that these are not disclosed.  As such, the risks of heroin use are greatly increased by prohibition.

Another cost of prohibition is the cost in public money.  When consenting, responsible individuals are criminals under the eyes of the law, vast sums of money are expended.  This money could be diverted to other more worthwhile causes or better, returned to the taxpayer.

All of these considerations above seem trivial, however, when compared with the stark reality of prohibition -- it just doesn't work.

The chapter on gun prohibition shows this most strongly, with violent crime trends in Scotland, Australia, Canada, USA, Ireland and Jamaica remaining unaffected by restrictions and prohibitions.

Unfortunately, the book does not delve deeply into practical considerations in implementing these policies.  There are several institutions that stand in the way of legalising and liberalising many of these markets, and these are the grossly proportioned welfare system and similarly the public health system.  Prohibitions does not take these considerations into account, and as such presents more of an idealistic vision.  In an otherwise minimal state, the case against prohibition is extremely strong.

Despite this omission, the publication does mount a very strong and convincing case that has many real-world applications that could be implemented now.  Overall, Prohibitions offers a serious and considered challenge to the Nanny State that dominates so many facets of our modern life.

A raid by prohibition officers in Washington DC, 1923

Lehman in retrospect

A Colossal Failure of Common Sense:  The Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers
by Lawrence G. McDonald
(Crown Business, 2009, 368 pages)

With the Lehman Brothers remembrance show having just passed, there has been a flood of books on the global financial crisis, largely falling into two camps.  In the first camp are books written mainly by academic economists that provide a rigorous and systematic look into the causes and consequences of the crisis.  In the second are the more journalistic accounts that provide a narrative with a strong emphasis on the personalities, meetings, and decisions made during the crisis.

Like William Cohan's House of Cards and David Wessel's In Fed We Trust, Lawrence G. McDonald's Colossal Failure of Common Sense falls into the second camp, turning the complex sub-prime shenanigans of Wall Street investment banks into high drama.  McDonald was a vice president of high-yield debt and convertible securities trading at Lehman from 2004 until March 2008 when he was summarily executed by Lehman's corporate firing squad.

McDonald begins his book with a prologue outlining the government interventions he believes to have been primarily responsible for the financial chaos of 2008.

The first being the various policies initiated by the Clinton administration and continued under George Bush to increase home ownership amongst low-income folks by "threatening, sometimes berating, sometimes bullying" lenders to provide mortgages to people with traditionally poor credit histories.  McDonald specifically mentions the Community Reinvestment Act as a culprit and remarks that "Easy mortgages were the invention of Bill Clinton's Democrats".

The second is repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the depression-era legislation that separated commercial banking from investment banking.  McDonald argues that Glass-Steagall was crucial in preventing "some diabolical investment house from plunging in big on a corporation like Enron and going down with a zillion dollars of small depositors' cash".  And that its repeal was "directly responsible for bringing the entire world to the brink of financial ruin".

Whilst I am sympathetic of the first point, I am less so of the second which seems to be a common view held by economic commentators.  The major financial institutions that failed during the crisis were pure investment banks, such as Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers;  or they were pure commercial banks, like IndyMac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia.  The only exception is Citigroup, which was formed from a merger between Citicorp and Travelers Insurance (a large company that owned the investment bank Smith Barney) that happened before the repeal of Glass-Steagall due to a special exemption.

Not to mention the fact that JP Morgan and Bank of America would not have been able to save Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch respectively had it not been for the repeal of Glass-Steagall.  Further, the economic research on Glass-Steagall doesn't support McDonald's view either.

Nonetheless, the book does not pretend to be an academic text on the crisis.  Its subtitle promises "the incredible inside story of the collapse of Lehman Brothers."  But it should really be called "An Autobiography of Larry McDonald", as the first three chapters are devoted to his life story, including his pre-Lehman days.  We learn, for example, that he was once a pork chop salesman, that his mother was a fashion model and that his father liked to play golf.

When McDonald finally gets around to Lehman, we are introduced to the likes of Mike Gelband, Alex Kirk and Larry McCarthy who were Lehman's global heads of fixed income, high-yield trading, and distressed-debt trading respectively.  (McDonald worked for, and admired these men greatly, painting them as geniuses and heroes who foresaw the impending subprime crash.)  McDonald writes:

Each and every one of them laid it out, from way back in 2005, that the real estate market was living on borrowed time and that Lehman Brothers was headed directly for the biggest subprime iceberg ever seen, and with the wrong men on the bridge

The "wrong men" of course refer to Richard Fuld, Lehman's CEO and Chairman, and Fuld's right-hand-man, Lehman's President, Joseph Gregory.

McDonald portrays Fuld and Gregory as out-of-touch, the two of them closeted up in their own little world on the 31st floor.  McDonald admits that he has never actually met the reclusive Fuld, which is not so uncommon for a vice president, but he then reveals that his boss, a managing director, has not once met Fuld either.  Inevitably what readers are fed are mainly second-hand anecdotes from uncited sources, presumably colleagues.  And the picture that McDonald paints is not a pretty one:  Fuld comes across as reckless, aggressive, arrogant, and wilfully ignorant.  Although he was not so ignorant of McDonald's book.  Speaking with a Reuters reporter, Richard Fuld called the book "absolutely slanderous".  In Fuld's defence, McDonald's writing can often be melodramatic and over-the-top.  At one point, McDonald wondered "if we three [McDonald, McCarthy and Kirk] alone stood square against the forces of evil."

In a telling scene, reminiscent of Bud Fox's "How much is enough speech" in Oliver Stone's Wall Street, Kirk engages in a heated exchange in Gregory's office.  Gregory was eager to take on more risks while the subprime crisis was well underway in 2007.  "Where's the number?" Kirk roared, "We tried twenty times leverage that didn't work.  So we tried thirty times leverage and that didn't work either.  Now we've tried forty times and that won't work.  Well what's the number?  What will make you happy?  One hundred times?  One thousand times?  Where does it end?"  Shortly after, Kirk resigned.

According to McDonald, Fuld once told Madelyn Antoncic, Lehman's chief risk officer who was internationally voted the 2005 Risk Manager of the Year to "shut up" at a meeting.  And it was custom at executive committee meetings for the risk chief to be asked to leave the room when there was a major deal being discussed.

McDonald's book, like so many other journalistic accounts, focuses on the people and the personalities, the heroes and the villains.  Sure one could say that Lehman's collapse was caused by reckless risk-taking and a failure of common sense.  But that doesn't get us very far.

What's more telling is that on being asked by Representative Peter Welsh at a congressional hearing:  "Why were you allowed to fail?"  Fuld replied:  "Until the day they put me in the ground, I will wonder.  I do not know why we were the only one".

Fuld was expecting that "in the end, come what may Hank would save both him and Lehman Brothers" -- as if his firm were too big to fail.


The press assemble in front of Lehman Brothers on 16
September 2008, the day the bankruptcy filing was announced.

Beyond the bunyip aristocracy

William Charles Wentworth:  Australia's greatest native son
by Andrew Tink
(Allen & Unwin, 2009, 332 pages)

When John Brogden was forced to quit as Leader of the NSW Liberal Party in 2005, John Howard apparently wanted Andrew Tink to run for the position.  Tink chose not to and, the following year, announced that he would not recontest his seat at the 2007 state election, ending a nineteen year parliamentary career.

On quitting politics, Tink commented that "I've got a fascination for historical biography and (I) really want to devote a bit of time into getting stuck into that as something totally different, but something that is nevertheless intellectually challenging".

While there is often public scepticism about politicians and their promises, Tink kept his.  The passion he brought to his new craft is manifested, not only through the quality of his recently published biography of W.C. Wentworth, but also through his commitment to its completion that meant he ignored symptoms of health problems and delayed visiting the doctor.  He has now been diagnosed with inoperable prostate cancer.

Tink says that he "didn't want to try to write a book and go through chemo at the same time because I didn't think I could put everything into the book ... so I ignored the symptoms, although I suspected I knew what they were."  At least Tink has the consolation that it was important work which delayed his visit to the doctor.

It is actually remarkable, given the sheer range and colour of Wentworth's life, that no one has undertaken the task of a full-length biography before now.  Not that Wentworth has been left out of the historical narrative.  He, of course, featured prominently in the early volumes of Manning Clark's six-volume History of Australia.  Indeed, it was Clark who described Wentworth as "Australia's greatest native son", a subtitle appended to this work perhaps more for marketing aims, rather than historical accuracy.  More recently, Wentworth was described and analysed in significant detail in Peter Cochrane's award-winning book, Colonial Ambition, so many readers of Tink's work may have slightly more knowledge of Wentworth than the clichéd memories that he was one of the first three men to cross the Blue Mountains and that he wanted to create a "bunyip aristocracy".

Any study of Wentworth has to grapple with his ambiguous beginnings, as the progeny of a father who was a member of a prominent English family, but who had narrowly avoided conviction for armed robbery, and a mother sentenced to transportation for stealing sheets and clothes from her employer.  D'Arcy Wentworth and Catherine Crowley met on board one of the vessels of the Second Fleet, and their very survival was fortuitous, given that their ship, the Neptune, lost 31 per cent of its passengers to illness, the worst record of any convict transport ever to sail to Sydney.  Having made it to the starving colony at Sydney Cove, D'Arcy and Catherine were then sent onto Norfolk Island.

Wentworth, "the native son" was actually born at sea, in August 1790, while his parents were in transit from Sydney to Norfolk Island.  Given that the earliest date that the couple could have met was 12 December, 1789 there is some doubt that D'Arcy was the father, but Tink leans to the view that he was, "since the only known image of D'Arcy indicates a strong physical resemblance to William and they shared a number of buccaneering character traits".

Wentworth (known by the surname Crowley until his mother's death in 1800) only spent half a dozen years in Sydney as a child, sandwiched between his infancy on Norfolk Island and a teenage education in the mother country.  His next spell in Sydney was highlighted by his crossing of the Blue Mountains with Blaxland and Lawson.  But it also saw him embroiled in controversy related to the killing of natives on a South Sea Island and contractual problems in relation to obtaining sandalwood from it, and being the suspected author of a scurrilous poem about a military commander seen as a threat to Governor Macquarie and his policy of championing ex-convicts.

Wentworth was out of the country from 1816 to 1824, but New South Wales was clearly still on his mind as he not only proposed to marry John Macarthur's daughter, but also made his political agenda clear in a book ("the first by an Australian-born author ever to be published") he wrote while in London.  The book argued in favour of Macquarie's attempts to integrate ex-convicts into the NSW community and railed against "exclusives" who wanted "to convert the ignominy of the great body of the people into a hereditary deformity".

Returning to NSW he put his rhetoric into action, pursuing twin careers as a barrister and newspaper publisher, both of which saw Wentworth at the forefront of public life in the colony.  He pushed for freedom of the press, trial by jury and at least semi-democratic institutions.

The newspaper he and his colleague Robert Wardell produced was The Australian and to celebrate one year of publication it boasted that "the first authors of The Australian will be referred to as the founders of liberal politics in the colony".  Considering the word "liberal" had only been coined in Cadiz in 1812, its arrival in Sydney by 1825 was quite an achievement.

While Wentworth and Wardell were colleagues in the newspaper, they were often opposed to each other in cases in the law courts of the colony.  One of these was to have a major impact on Wentworth's personal life when he took on a breach of promise case for Francis Cox, whose daughter, Sarah, had been misled by one John Payne.  By the time Francis Cox was awarded £100 damages, his daughter and his barrister were lovers.

The relationship between Wentworth and Cox produced ten children, the first three out of wedlock, and for years she was precluded from entering polite Sydney society.  Eventually, feelings softened, leaving her son-in-law one of the last of the prigs who refused to have dealings with her.

By the late 1830s Wentworth's career was seen to be at an end with a comment in the newspaper that "his day is gone by ... his opinion is worth nothing".  It was not as if Wentworth was completely inactive;  in this period he attempted to buy the South Island of New Zealand.  However, when an elected Legislative Council was inaugurated in 1843 Wentworth was there, becoming effectively the Leader of the Opposition.

Despite representing Sydney he argued against greater representation for the city, not liking its propensity for radical democratic ideas and behaviour.  He strongly supported the squattocracy, of which he himself was a member.  He was also a protectionist, none of which made him a great successor to the liberals of the 1820s.  The one area where he was consistent was in wanting rule by his class of the NSW born -- currency lads made good should be able prosper economically and run the place politically.

Tink recognises both the strengths and weaknesses of his subject.  He recognises both Wentworth's historical importance and his personal flaws:

Like so many other historical figures, the driven personality that impelled Wentworth to great things was matched by utterly obnoxious behaviour.  So often his intelligence, energy and courage were offset by his intolerant, loud and self-serving ways.

Tink's severest criticism of Wentworth is of his attitudes to Aborigines, but balances that with praise for his tolerance of others who were often the victims of discrimination such as the Jewish community.

When Wentworth died in 1873 he received the first state funeral in Australia.  The day was declared a public holiday and 70,000 lined the route from the city to Vaucluse to see the funeral possession pass.  There was some irony both in the fact that the service was held in a church when Wentworth despised organised religion and that so may Sydneysiders turned out when Wentworth had often supported the interests of squatters against the urban population.

Politicians often make good political biographers, even when writing about different eras, they tend to appreciate that politicians can be strange mixtures of principle and pragmatism, and that often those who make an impact have significant personal failings.

While Tink's Wentworth may not quite be in the class of William Hague's biography of Pitt the Younger, it adds significantly to our understanding of an important Australian.


State Library of Victoria

Liberty and the seven seas

The Invisible Hook:  The Hidden Economics of Pirates
by Peter Leeson
(Princeton University Press, 2009, 296 pages)

Would you believe that some of the earliest examples of the separation of powers preceded the foundation of American government, but originated on the high seas?  Or that emancipation of African slaves was led by Long John Silver, not Abraham Lincoln?

Peter Leeson's The Invisible Hook argues that many of the founding principles of capitalist, liberal democracies are not rooted in the Glorious Revolution or the writing of the Declaration of Independence;  but the incentive structures necessary to keep a group of rowdy ocean-bound outlaws working as a team of ruthless sea bandits.

In popular media pirates are presented as an ill-disciplined ramshackle of entirely self-interested robbers who plunder merchant ships and seek out buried treasure.  But according to Leeson "a pirate ship more closely resembled a Fortune 500 company".  Leeson argues that in pursuit of profit they learned to apply economic and self-regulatory principles through structures of private governance to avoid their ships becoming "rock 'em-sock 'em, anything goes-type atmospheres".

Leeson's assessment is that Adam Smith's invisible hand that delivers society-wide benefits from individuals pursuing their own interests operated in pirate societies as well.  But there are differences between Smith's invisible hand and its metallic equivalent.

The hook "considers criminal self-interest's effect on cooperation in pirate society ... (and) pirates weren't primarily in the business of selling anything ... therefore didn't have customers they needed to satisfy".

Pirates became pirates for two very simple reasons -- profit and better working conditions.  Sea goers on a merchant ship earned the equivalent of a modern minimum wage and suffered under the harsh hand of captains who mistreated them.  Whereas "a single successful pirating expedition could make a sailor wealthy enough to retire" and rules were established to ensure pirates were treated well and even enjoyed workers compensation.

Before pirates joined a ship they were required to sign up to a constitution that set compulsory rules.  Their constitutions were designed to achieve three objectives, first to stop conflict amongst themselves, second to stop negative externalities and third to maintain incentives to avoid free riding.

These rules were surprisingly detailed from outlawing gambling because it would lead to fighting, forced bedtimes to ensure members were well-rested, and requiring weapons be kept clean to ensure they can engage in battle immediately.

But once the constitution was established, resolutions were made by a simple majority, including election of a captain.  One of the principles of a pirate constitution was to elect captains and limit their powers.  And pirates exercised their right to democracy regularly -- "one crew went through thirteen captains in the space of a single voyage".

Outside of battle where captains had absolute authority, pirate constitutions also established the separation of powers to keep checks and balances on their elected representative.

Other officers were also elected and afforded responsibilities to diffuse power.  The second position onboard was that of an elected quartermaster who held almost equivalent authority and position to the captain, and whose position was often used as a stepping stone for the top job.

Pirates clearly understood the risks they faced and the incentives necessary to overcome them.  For example, to address the risk of free riding, because a selfish pirate could always hold back from battle and still enjoy the spoils, a private system of workers compensation was established and additional booty was allocated to those injured.  And to avoid disputes about sharing booty, pirates all took an equal share.

Even the "Jolly Roger" skulls and crossbones flag would have made a modern marketing executive proud.  It was designed to frighten potential opponents into surrendering without a fight, reducing the potential liabilities of plundering.

But whether by the figurative dead hand of government regulation, or the literal dead hand of the hook, what The Invisible Hook demonstrates is that at heart all people seek to pursue their self-interest.  And even in the absence of formal government people recognise the need to develop private governance and in the process of achieving their own interest, do so for their fellow buccaneers as well.


Warner Brothers Pictures | Capitain Blood (1935)

The origins of liberty

Realizing Freedom:  Libertarian Theory, History, and Practice
by Tom Palmer
(Cato Institute, 2009, 496 pages)

It is very easy to take for granted the freedom we enjoy and to overlook the encroachment of government into the private sphere.

Tom Palmer is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and written extensively on libertarian theory, history and practice.  His Realizing Freedom draws together a number of decades advocating limited government and individual liberty.

Palmer convincingly argues that the greatest advances civilisations have achieved have not been orchestrated by government.  The advancement of culture, philosophy and technology has been achieved through individuals pursuing ideas.  Governments today would like us to think our world is the product of government fiat, but it is as important as ever to remember that we need our liberty to adapt, create and improve;  these are essential for a constantly improving society.

Palmer begins Realizing Freedom with an essay entitled "Freedom Properly Understood".  Here Palmer examines the liberty over the millennia of its evolution.  To understand liberty -- and, indeed, advocate liberty -- it is essential to understand its history.  Palmer examines the role of associations of merchants, artisans and citizens in increasing individual liberty, as well as how they improved living conditions and resisted oppression.  Palmer stresses the supremacy of the rule of law, that is the "mutual enjoyment of equal freedom."

Much liberal thought focuses on free markets.  As a consequence, opponents of liberalism spread myths about it.  Palmer rebuts some twenty of these common myths, ranging from the immorality of markets, to the "problem" of externalities, to markets and inequality.  However, Palmer does argue that the American (and by extension, the Australian) model of governance is not suitable for developing nations.  Developing nations can ill-afford the luxuries that these developed nations enjoy.

America's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission are but two of the luxuries developing nations do not deserve thrust upon them.  Palmer argues that America has such a well-developed economy that it can afford the extravagance of the SEC to regulate its financial markets inefficiently.  Developing nations need to be efficient so they develop and improve at a faster rate -- thus decreasing poverty, disease and increasing the need to develop regulatory agencies.

As Palmer makes clear, libertarianism is the culmination of millennia of philosophical argument and thought.  Civil society is invariably linked to liberalism.  Freedom of thought can only occur in a society that encourages dissenting opinion and public debate.  Palmer links the origins of civil society with the emergence of the city-state in Europe in the eleventh century onward.  The notion of a "burgher" -- the urban middle class -- endowed the inhabitants of such cities with rights and privileges not extended to those living in the countryside.

This is one of the earliest occurrences of a social contract where the governing authorities undertook to maintain social order formed under free agreement of individuals.

Progressing from the development of the liberal ideal, Palmer dissects the inherent problems in the authoritarian or illiberal doctrines espoused in Marxism, and the notion of the conflict of classes.  However, most interesting is Palmer's take on the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe.  Palmer posits the Soviet Union was unable to maintain its Empire;  therefore, socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe.  Palmer goes on:

Perhaps the silent heroes in the revolutions of 1989 were Sony and Mitsubishi and others who keep making more powerful and fantastic devices that convey more information in smaller packages at lower cost.

The most disconcerting thought in Realizing Freedom is not that we do not have governments that hold liberal democratic values but that there is a misunderstanding of these values by those charged with their advocacy.

After reading Realizing Freedom it is clear that much more work needs to be done to ensure liberty of the individual and to limit state intervention.

Valuable, but not complete

The March Of Patriots:  The Struggle For Modern Australia
by Paul Kelly
(Melbourne University Press, 2009, 720 pages)

Paul Kelly transformed himself from journalist into historian with the publication of his The End of Certainty in 1992.  In it he converted a century of Australian history into five dot points:  White Australia, industry protection, wage arbitration, state paternalism, and imperial benevolence.  For Kelly this was the "Australian Settlement" that determined the course of public policy for a hundred years.

Kelly's thesis is powerful because it's true.  Although discussion of it takes up only a few pages in the nearly 800 pages of The End of Certainty, the thesis defines the book and turns it into something to almost rival those masterworks of Australian politics like Keith Hancock's Australia and Frederic Eggleston's State Socialism in Victoria.

The End of Certainty covered an epoch-making period.  The 1980s was the end of one era and the beginning of another.  Although Australia in the 1950s and 1960s wasn't quite as closed, closeted, and conservative as critics like to make out it is nevertheless true that by the end of the 1980s the country was very different from what it had been a few decades before.  During the 1980s both of Australia's political parties, embraced (to a greater or lesser extent) the ideas that have come to be termed "neo-liberalism" and which recognise that free markets works better than the alternative.

It was inevitable therefore that The End of Certainty was going to be a hard act to follow.  And so it has proved to be.  The March of Patriots:  The Struggle for Modern Australia is important, necessary, and significant.  But it's no The End of Certainty.  For one thing The March of Patriots doesn't come with a handy five dot point summary.  The End of Certainty had a beginning, middle, and an end.  It began with the Australian Settlement as unchallenged political orthodoxy.  The middle was the late 1970s and early 1980s as the wets and dries fought it out in the Liberal Party.  And the end was the election of the Hawke/Keating government and the triumph of economic common-sense.

The March of Patriots covers Australian politics from 1991 to 2001.  Although much happened during this decade, there is a sense that it is still a work in progress.  In The End of Certainty it was clear who the good guys and the bad guys were.  The good guys were those who wanted an open economy and an open society.  The bad guys were those who didn't.  Kelly's sympathies are those on the right side of the debate (in every sense of the word).  The sides in The March of Patriots are more ambiguous.  In The End of Certainty it was easy to agree with Kelly in his barracking for the removal of tariff protection for example.  In The March of Patriots some of the causes that Kelly lobbies for are less easy to support.  And sometimes Kelly himself is unsure which side he is on.

Take the republic.  It soon becomes obvious what side of the debate Kelly is on.  He writes that the rejection in May 1993 by the then Liberal leader John Hewson of Keating's offer that the Opposition appoint a representative to the Republican Advisory Committee was "the death knell for hopes that the Liberals would keep an open mind."  The implication being that the Liberals should have kept an open mind about the republic.

But for many Liberals, to ask them to keep an open mind about the republic would like asking the executive of the ACTU to keep an open mind on whether trade unions serve a useful purpose in the community.  Kelly, like so many republicans, struggles with the fact that while popular opinion might be in favor of a republic, popular opinion is also in favour of a directly-elected president.  Kelly endorses Keating's view on the problems of a directly elected president.

Keating was convinced that Australia's political and constitutional system could not risk a popularly elected president without the safeguard of full codification of the Reserve Powers, including the dismissal power.  This view was soundly based and widely shared.

But to attempt to codify the Reserve Powers would have been "the political kiss of death to the republic".

On native title and reconciliation, Kelly is broadly supportive of the High Court's Mabo and Wik decisions and the consequences of those decisions.  At the same time though he recognises the usurpation of the democratic process that those decision represented.  He says of Mabo -- "The High Court was responding to the failure of the politicians ... The High Court, in effect, drove the executive by creating a crisis of uncertainty over land management."  Kelly is certainly right that in Mabo the High Court did indeed respond to what the judges saw as "the failure of the politicians".  What Kelly doesn't examine are the consequences of the High Court's actions.

Paul Keating drove the republic as an issue and he drove the legislative response to Mabo.  And at times parts of the book read as though Kelly is telling the story of the 1990s as it has been told to him by Keating.

This is not to say that the story isn't interesting -- it's just to acknowledge that from time to time Kelly's story is far from dispassionate.  Kelly tries to resurrect Keating's prime ministership -- but with limited success.  As prime minister Keating had the chance to reform the one area that remained largely untouched during his time as treasurer -- the labour market.  And he didn't -- because he couldn't.  Kelly quotes Keating saying to ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty before the 1993 federal election "If we win I want to give unions more bargaining power.  We'll legislate to entrench enterprise bargaining."  And that's what happened.

Although Kelly lauds Keating and Bill Kelty's invention of enterprise bargaining, he doesn't acknowledge that Keating and Kelty's creation was designed to ensure that a dwindling labour movement maintained its central role in the country's industrial relations system.

When Kelly quotes Mike Keating, the former head of the department of prime minister and cabinet, confirming that "Enterprise bargaining was the most significant reform affecting workplace relations in at least the last fifty years" it has to be recalled that Paul Keating was once Mike Keating's boss.

Reading Kelly's analysis of Keating's demolition of Fightback! one is left with two overwhelming impressions.  The first is that Keating was a political maestro.  The second is that his actions during the 1993 federal election were completely cynical.  It is difficult not to think that part of the reason that Keating fought so hard against Hewson's GST was that Keating could not bear to risk the sight of Hewson implementing a reform which Keating himself could not get past Bob Hawke.

When he writes about Keating, Kelly usually quotes Keating's supporters.  When he writes about John Howard, Kelly usually quotes Howard's critics.  One of the book's best chapters is that which deals with the story of the independence of East Timor.  It is a fascinating story, and Kelly tells it well.  But it is a chapter heavily influenced by the opinion of people like the former defence department official Hugh White who tends to regard Howard's involvement in East Timor as a series of blunders and errors relieved by occasional instances of good luck.  Similarly when Kelly comes to the "children overboard" affair one of his main sources is Mike Scrafton, the military adviser to the defence minister, who later became a vocal Howard opponent.

Kelly is spot on about some things though.  He points that on 8 September 1999 the editorial of the Sydney Morning Herald called upon Australia to invade Indonesia.  In the wake of the pro-independence vote in East Timor violence was sweeping the province, and the Indonesian government was resisting an international peace-keeping force.  According to the Sydney Morning Herald:

Australia, however reluctantly and without waiting for others must lead the way -- in force ... Australia should end this dangerous period of uncertainty.  It should declare its intention to move troops into East Timor if Indonesia doesn't restore order immediately ...

As Kelly says, "The idea was divorced from any military or political reality."  And as Howard said, being quoted by Kelly:

I was basically being attacked by everybody for not invading the place.  I said you can't do that, you've got to get a United Nations mandate.  It was elementary.  It seems bizarre in the light of all the later comments that have been made about me and the United Nations.

Kelly is an astute and shrewd commentator.  Even though The March of Patriots lacks the compelling narrative of The End of Certainty, it is these sorts of insights that nonetheless makes Kelly's latest worthwhile.


DefenceImagery.mil | Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen

Why Europe?

Europe Between The Oceans:  9000 BC to AD 1000
by Barry Cunliffe
(Yale University Press, 2008, 480 pages)

&

The Shortest History of Europe
by John Hirst
(Black Inc., 2009, 152 pages)

Two recent histories of Europe, one by an English archaeologist, the other by an Australian historian, both start from a premise of the unique importance of Europe:

"Europe came to dominate the world during the course of the second millennium AD."
"European civilisation is unique because it is the only civilisation which has imposed itself on the rest of the world."

Both Barry Cunliffe and John Hirst ask their readers to consider what it was about Europe that made its citizens have the desire, and the capacity, to dominate the other continents.  Both look for big answers to this big question.

Any similarities end there.  It would be hard to find two books of such radically different size and presentation, and with such differing interpretations of what is important in history.

Cunliffe, a veteran Oxford archaeologist regarded as a pre-eminent expert on the Iron Age, has produced a lavishly colour-illustrated hardcover book which runs to 480 pages, including a twenty page section of suggested further reading for those who take their history seriously.

Hirst, a veteran La Trobe University historian most of whose work has been on aspects of Australian history, has produced a paperback of 152 pages, with a handful of black and white images, and without the support of even an index.  His book is based on lectures that he gave to introduce undergraduates to a few basics of European history.  It begins with two very general lectures and then has six slightly more specific ones.  Where Cunliffe enunciates historical reasons for his timeframe, Hirst stops at 1800, for the prosaic reason that, when he was teaching his course, there was another subject which covered the subsequent period.

Given that just about the only things these books have in common is that they think Europe is important (hardly a groundbreaking idea), one might ask why look at them together.  The answer is that by pursuing such different themes they force the reader to consider what really is important in history.

Cunliffe believes that what distinguishes the people of Europe was that over millennia they had become "hardwired to be mobile".  This desire to be on the move was largely a factor of geography, in particular, the fact that so much of Europe is close to water -- hence the title:  Europe Between the Oceans.  However, other geographic features also have an impact:

The successive waves of eastern peoples sweeping westwards and ending up in the restricted territory between the Carpathian arc and the eastern Alps are a recurring theme throughout the first millennium BC and first millennium AD.  It is a product of the constant build-up of population on the distant steppe.  Presented with such a remarkable phenomenon, it is difficult not to accept that geography is sometimes a major determinant in history.


Hirst, on the other hand, identifies three early factors that meant Europe was the favourite to conquer the world -- classical learning, Christianity and German warrior culture.  The key moments of the first millennium AD in Europe in his thesis are when the Roman Empire becomes Christian and when the Christian Church becomes Roman.  Then, when the Germans invade the empire, they continue to support the Roman Church, which in turn preserves classical learning, thus completing the circle.

While for Hirst, Christianity holds the whole show together until the modern world begins about 1400, for Cunliffe it does not appear to be that important.  One of the key moments in Hirst is the 313 conversion of Emperor Constantine to Christianity, the first link between the three elements in his chain.  Constantine merits three mentions in Cunliffe, twice in regard to how he and his predecessor, Diocletian, attempted to deal with the problem of inflation across the Roman Empire.  The third describes his military campaigns and mentions in passing how at the battle of Milvian Bridge "he embraced Christianity".  This event happens early in a chapter in which Cunliffe takes his readers from 300 to 800, a period in which he says "Europe underwent a total reformation" and that "the seismic shifts taking place can all too easily be obscured by the superficialities of narrative history".

However, in going from Constantine to Charlemagne, the spread of Christianity does not really seem to rate as a "seismic shift";  indeed, Europe being Christianised does not rate a mention in the introduction to this chapter, but the fact that "the world of Islam was to share the European stage" does.

Cunliffe is a follower of the Annales school of history, in particular of Fernand Braudel.  Braudel pioneered the concept of the longue duree, which Cunliffe defines as "the deep rhythm of underlying forces influencing all human society".  Historians should not be distracted by exciting, but often trivial events such as battles, coups or day-to-day politics, but look for the big changes in how people live, considering factors such as the effects of climate, development of technology and movement of people.  As Cunliffe puts it, "despite what military leaders and politicians may have thought they were more acted upon than actors".

Interestingly, the Annales school rated a significant mention in The Australian's review of Hirst's book, reviewer Remy Davison arguing that:

Hirst implicitly takes issue with Marxist structuralism, which dominated French historiography in the 20th century, and remains de rigeur in history departments throughout the Anglo-Saxon world.  Marx -- and his French disciples -- Fernand Braudel, Marc Bloch and Jacques Le Goff -- broadly ascribe the emergence of European civilisation, capitalism and liberal democracy to the longue duree (long-cycle) of economic development, epitomised by class struggle.


Sculpture depicting Charlemagne, Paris, France


While there are some similarities in Marxist and Annales approaches to history, this depiction is quite misleading.  Indeed, many on the Left have seen Braudel as a conservative historian, and seen him endeavouring to create "a form of socio-economic history that did not rely on Marxist concepts and stressed continuity rather than change".  Others have argued that, in recent decades, the dominant force in history departments has been post-modernism, a philosophy that is neither Marxist, nor close to the Annales school.  What makes Davison's comments even stranger is that the highest profile Australian historian to have expressed admiration for the work of Braudel is Geoffrey Blainey.

In part, the approaches of historians and archaeologists are driven by the sources.  Historians like to wait until Herodotus and Thucydides appear.  These two Greek historians do not become available as sources until two-thirds of the way through Cunliffe, but when they do, he actually uses them quite a lot as he believes "both writers were close to the events they described and, while no means free from bias, they strived for accuracy".  However, he reads history in a way which would have greatly surprised the early historians.

In a chapter titled "States in Collision" which takes us from the Greek victory at Salamis in 480BC to the destruction of Carthage in 146BC, Cunliffe states that "the historical sources would have us believe that everything was driven by the egos of men and the honour of the state, but this was only petulance on the surface of deeper movements".  These deeper movements included growing division of labour, the increasing expectations of urban societies, and resultant competition for scarce resources between states and peoples.

Hirst describes what the mathematicians and scientists were doing in Ancient Greece;  Cunliffe explores how society was meeting the demand "to provide the food and services to support gaggles of philosophers and droves of vase painters".  Hirst is a huge fan of Classical Greece.  He acknowledges that the Romans were better than the Greeks at fighting, law and engineering, but the Greeks were better at everything else.  What he sees as "the greatest legacy that European civilisation still owes to the Greeks" is that the answers to important questions would be "simple, mathematical and logical".  Why were the Greeks so clever?  Hirst argues that "historians have no convincing explanation".  Cunliffe at least provides a partial explanation saying that "the world in which they lived was energized by mobility facilitated by the sea".  Cunliffe does not spend much time on the sort of achievements Hirst so admires, although he does acknowledge a "stunning cast, encompassing the greatest minds who created the basis of western civilization".  For the historian, Hirst, the significant history of Europe begins with the Ancient Greeks, for the archaeologist, Cunliffe, it commences in 9000BC as Europe's climate approaches what we today regard as normal, as the three thousand year warming after the Last Ice Age reached something approaching stability.

Incidentally, both books provide some useful ideas for contemporary debates, Cunliffe implicitly and Hirst explicitly.  Cunliffe's book is a useful reminder that contemporary talk about unprecedented global warming, somewhat overlooks the fact that in 20,000 BC "land temperatures were about 20° lower than they are today".  Cunliffe shows how the rising of the seas radically altered life in Europe, although, of course, it was in Australia that this phenomenon had the greatest impact on a human population.  Hirst must have got his students thinking when he contrasted how in contemporary discourse there appears to be a manifest double-standard in the treatment of Christian creation myths compared with Aboriginal creation myths -- "For our children you want them to have only science;  yet you seem envious of those people without science whose traditional beliefs have not been disrupted".

One theme which comes through powerfully in Cunliffe is the importance of free movement of people and goods.

All the big changes in history are in some way the product of some form of trading whether of goods, ideas or practices.  He has a keen eye for economic development and pinpoints the 9th century BC Tyre as the place and time where "we have now moved firmly into a commercial world -- a world of supply and demand, price fluctuations and private speculation".  Economics explains a lot, such as the end of the Roman Republic:

The century of political turmoil and military conflict ... is usually explained in terms of the ambitions of "big men" who inspired the factions and led the armies -- people like the Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Mark Antony and Augustus -- but really they were only helpless human beings caught up on the deep swell of change set in motion by the rise of acquisitive elites vying for space in a peninsula too small to contain them.


Jean Lemaine (1601-1659) "Roman Senators and Administrators"


Centuries later, he finds a range of interesting explanations for the decline of the Roman Empire, emphasising the spread of disease and speculating about the possibility of lead poisoning reducing fertility rates.  Recognising that not everything is materialist, he comments that "finally, one should not overlook the debilitating effects of living in a time of crisis".

Cunliffe stops in 1000AD because "the counterbalancing of Europe in the tenth century AD is a convenient place to end" because for different reasons the Scandinavian and Mediterranean spheres were losing comparative strength and "the Atlantic facade came into its own again".  Hirst provides a clever sketch of the big events from 1400 onwards -- renaissance, reformation, scientific revolution, parliamentary government in England, Enlightenment, revolution in France and romanticism.

There is no doubt that for years Hirst must have performed a useful service to his students "who had too much Australian history and knew too little of the civilisation of which they are a part".  In its new book form, it will hopefully provide the same service to a wider readership.  However, with its brevity, as well as being digestible for the less knowledgeable, Hirst's book forces both writer and reader to focus on that which is really significant.

Writing specifically about Europe is in one important way easier than writing world history.  Writers of world history must studiously restrict the amount of coverage they devote to Europe, unless they wish to suffer the wrath of vigilante reviewers ready to lambast them for any hint of Eurocentricism.  So one can see why any historian who believes that Europe was the key agent of change in the world, may perhaps choose to write a book specifically about Europe, rather than the world.  In some ways that is a shame, because in order to know why it was Europe that colonised the world rather than vice versa, one must consider the broader world.  It was not inevitable that Europe would be the coloniser;  Blainey emphasises this point in his history of the world:

In 1400 an observer with the gift of acute foresight might have thought that China was rushing, ahead of England, towards the world's first industrial revolution.

In 1600 and 1700 the rise of Europe to dominate much of the world was not preordained.


Pieter Aertsen (1508-1575) "Market woman with Vegetable Stall"


Given that it was still in doubt in 1700, one might think that a book which stops in AD 1000 was of limited use in providing an explanation.  However, the fact that it was the Atlantic facing countries of Europe that ended up being the great exporters of European civilisation would tend to indicate that it was the geography that, in the end, changed the world.