CHAPTER FOUR
THE security situation in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s promises to be less certain than it was in the Cold War period. (1) The naval forces of the former Soviet Union are leaving the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The United States is reducing its military presence in the region. Questions are being asked by the smaller regional countries whether these trends will offer greater opportunities for influence by such large regional powers as China, Japan and India.
There is a growing concern about the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and of ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific region. Advanced conventional weapons are also becoming more easily affordable, as the leading arms manufacturers in North America and Western Europe compete for a contracting arms market. In the Asia-Pacific region, military power will remain a fact of life and a fundamental determinant of relations between states.
From an Australian security perspective, these trends raise important issues about our relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the alliance with the United States. They suggest a more fluid strategic outlook. Change and instability are not generally welcome to security planners. Not all change will, however, be adverse: the rapid economic growth of the region as a whole, and particularly of North-East Asia and South-East Asia, is underpinning political stability and the development of more participatory forms of government.
This chapter examines these issues and their relevance for Australia's security policy in the 1990s.
ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Monitoring strategic change is an important function of the intelligence agencies in any modern system of government. Australia has highly developed capabilities in this area. For over 20 years now intelligence agencies have evolved a concept of strategic warning time, which has largely determined the size and preparedness of the Australian defence force structure. (2) Briefly, this concept -- which has been endorsed by successive governments and more than 25 Service Chiefs and Secretaries of Defence -- judges that Australia would have several years' warning time of the development of a regional capability to mount a large-scale military attack. In the absence of the build-up of large military capabilities in the region capable of such an assault, let alone the emergence of hostile intentions, Australia's defence planning is unlikely to move dramatically away from the force structure priorities set out in the 1987 White Paper, The Defence of Australia.
Australia did not structure its defence force to meet the Soviet military threat, so there is no requirement for a "peace dividend" in the form of reduced defence spending. Rather, it is important that Australia continues to build up its self-reliant military capabilities so as to meet the uncertainties of the future, without being dependent on external combat assistance.
These elements of continuity in Australia's defence circumstances are important to stress at the outset. Australia is one of the more secure countries in the world. It does not have any land borders with adjacent countries, nor does it have any heavily armed neighbours. The countries in Australia's area of direct military interest (Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the islands of the South-West Pacific and New Zealand) are basically friendly and they have no issues of territorial or military contention with Australia. These circumstances are unlikely to change quickly. But lower levels of contingency, and the requirement for us to have closer defence relations with our neighbours, will be demanding of our limited defence resources.
What, then, are the main elements of uncertainty in Australia's security outlook in the 1990s? In addition to the strategic developments in the Asia-Pacific region I have already mentioned, they concern, primarily, the economic strength of the nation and whether sufficient funds will be allocated to the defence portfolio to ensure that the capabilities needed for the defence of Australia are acquired by the end of this decade. They also involve making judgments about Australia's capacity to sustain a margin of technological advantage in its defence force structure in the 1990s. The introduction of more capable conventional weapons systems into the Asia-Pacific region seems likely to reduce Australia's advantage in this area. Imported high-technology weapons systems will be incorporated effectively into regional orders of battle more quickly than has been the case in the past. Australia will still retain a technological edge over the next decade, but with less and less reason for complacency.
It will be important, therefore, for Australia's defence industry to concentrate on those high-technology systems -- such as intelligence and surveillance sensors; command, control and communication; combat data systems; and integrated logistic support -- which will be key force multipliers for the Australian defence force in the next decade.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION
The United States Administration states that it intends to remain a military power in the Asia-Pacific region, where it still has important strategic and economic interests to protect. By the end of 1992 the US had withdrawn its military presence from the Philippines, but it will retain a substantial military presence in Korea and Japan (including the Marine force on Okinawa), in Hawaii and at sea with the Seventh Fleet. In addition, the US is negotiating access to naval and air facilities in South-East Asia.
The US thus remains a substantial military power in the region. But there are some doubts about the ability of America to sustain such a large military presence in the Asia-Pacific region in the longer term, particularly given the disappearance of the Soviet military threat and the domestic economic problems that the US faces. Many influential leaders and officials in the region believe that the mood of the Congress and the US people is moving against distant military commitments. (3)
A pessimistic scenario would see the American military presence substantially reduced by the late 1990s in South Korea and Japan -- and the centre of gravity of US military forces having moved eastward, to be based in Hawaii, Alaska and the West Coast. America's interests would focus primarily on its strategic concerns in North-East Asia. South-East Asia, Australia and the South-West Pacific would be seen by Washington as areas of low strategic interest. Under this scenario, the United States would not move to check Chinese military ambitions in the South China Sea, and Japan would be encouraged by the US to expand its military capabilities significantly. The South-East Asian countries would be expected to do more for their own defence; and Australia, as the strongest military power in this region, would be encouraged to expand its military activities. Even in this scenario, however, the United States would retain formidable power projection capabilities; and its capacity to regenerate forces, with minimum access to military bases in the Asia-Pacific region, would act as a deterrent.
A more optimistic scenario would see the United States retain essentially its current level of military forces in the region once the withdrawal from the Philippines is completed. United States concerns about North Korea -- and an acute awareness that the alliance with Japan is the keystone of strategic stability in the region -- would see Washington reduce its military presence only by some 10 to 12 per cent. The Seventh Fleet in particular would be largely protected from large cuts because of the essentially maritime nature of the Asia-Pacific theatre of operation.
It is too early to discern how these policy outcomes will be resolved. From an Asia-Pacific security perspective it will be crucial for America's close allies in the region -- especially Japan, Australia and South Korea -- to impress on Washington the importance of remaining engaged militarily in this part of the world. Several reasons suggest themselves:
- United States trade interests in the Asia-Pacific region are now larger than with Europe;
- the US alliance with Japan is a constraint on Japanese military expansion;
- the withdrawal of American military power would leave China with the region's largest military forces;
- an American drawdown will encourage the build-up of regional military capabilities with the attendant risks of arms races and perhaps even the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS
With the exception of Russia, the regional great powers -- China, Japan and India -- seem likely to increase their influence in the region in the 1990s. This will be particularly the case if the United States reduces its military presence rather more quickly than currently expected. Large powers tend to be ambitious and, where opportunities present themselves, they will seek to extend their influence. With the removal of superpower alignments, the large regional powers will be freer to exert predominance not only over their immediate region, but -- if domestic circumstances and economic strength allow it -- further afield.
Thus, China sees itself as possessing a natural claim to regional hegemony. Its manifest sense of historical destiny and its culture, population, size and military potential all lend weight to this ambition. China will not in the foreseeable future develop a global military reach, but it has much more international status and potential power than either Japan or India.
China will be concerned to prevent the emergence of Japanese military capabilities, and to avoid a disintegrating former Soviet Union from infecting its own political stability and minority groups. It will increasingly attempt to gain influence in South-East Asia -- which it sees as a natural area for expansion of Chinese influence. The key strategic question surrounding the future of China is whether communism will be overthrown. An unstable China erupting in turmoil would not be conducive to a peaceful Asia-Pacific region, and it might encourage China in the direction of external adventures.
China is modernising its military capabilities and is developing naval and air forces that will extend its strategic reach. In the South China Sea, for example, China is already capable of operating decisively against local South-East Asian military forces.
Japan shows little sign of moderating its military build-up, even though the former Soviet military threat no longer exists. Japan has long-established suspicions about the Russians, and is likely to retain substantial defensive military forces against the regeneration of Russian military power in the future. The very proximity of the Russian Far East -- and the fact that Russia will continue to be the second largest nuclear power in the world -- will cause the Japanese to be cautious about hasty cuts to their defence expenditure.
Japan already has very sizeable military forces. Its navy and air force are larger than those of the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand combined. Japan's defence spending (US$36 billion this year) and its acquisitions of major weapons systems -- such as Aegis class cruisers -- cause suspicion amongst the South-East Asian countries. Japan's future defence build-up, and the deployment patterns of its navy, will be closely watched by other regional powers. China, in particular, will not allow Japan to gain a military edge.
India's economic and social problems seem likely to curtail its military ambitions. India has a natural desire to be taken more seriously as the largest democratic nation in the region. It fears China, and it wants to be recognised as the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean. India is steadily developing a more capable navy and maritime reconnaissance capabilities; and it continues to expand its ballistic missile potential. India is unlikely to use military force except in its own neighbourhood. But if China expands its influence in the South China Sea and in South-East Asia, India will be concerned.
India may seek to develop military relations with the United States as a counterbalance to China. And America may be tempted -- now that India is no longer an ally of the former Soviet Union -- to develop India's military capabilities. This will not necessarily be to the advantage of smaller countries in the region.
Russia will not be a major force in Asia-Pacific affairs. It will be largely preoccupied with its domestic problems. Russia's main interests in the Asia-Pacific region will be in gaining access to the dynamic economies of North-East Asia, which will be important to the development of the backward economic infrastructure of Siberia. Russia's military forces in the region will be substantially reduced. By the late 1990s, Russia's Pacific Fleet will be less than half its current size and its naval deployments will be concentrated especially around its own territorial waters. Russia has no natural partners in the region and it will continue to be the odd-man-out, a country that is seen as basically having little to offer (especially economically) to the Asia-Pacific region.
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
In this uncertain strategic climate, nations are likely to acquire more capable means of defence. Nuclear weapons proliferation is already occurring in North-East Asia (China and North Korea) and in South Asia (India and Pakistan). There is a risk that nuclear weapons might be used in any future Indo-Pakistan war. North Korea's nuclear weapons program -- if it is allowed to develop unchecked -- could encourage the development of similar capabilities in South Korea. A nuclear-armed Korean peninsula would encourage deep concerns in Japan about its own nuclear vulnerabilities. Japan could very quickly develop a nuclear weapons capability, and the means of delivery, if it decided to do so. This is highly unlikely, but the prevention of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula is important to Japan's sense of strategic confidence.
Together with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a spreading of ballistic missile technology to India, Pakistan and North Korea. Several nations also have chemical and biological weapons. The proliferation of such weapons must not extend to South-East Asia, which so far has remained free from weapons of mass destruction. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in South-East Asia contiguous to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone would be a useful arms control initiative.
In addition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, most countries in the region are gaining access to much more capable conventional weapons. Modern combat fighters, such as F-16s, and warships equipped with modern missile systems, such as Harpoon and Exocet, are becoming commonplace. As the arms market in North America and Europe shrinks, so the major arms manufacturers are competing for the remaining lucrative markets in the Middle East and Asia. The risks here are the well-known action/reaction model of regional arms races, and the fact that in even low-level conflict the destructive force of weapons being used will be much greater than hitherto. The agreement on a United Nations regional arms transfer register for major items of military equipment is a useful initiative in the area of military transparency and confidence-building.
SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING MEDIUM-SIZED POWERS
The medium-sized countries in the region (the ASEAN countries and Australia in particular) will face difficult defence planning problems over the next decade. The cost of acquiring modern weapons platforms is doubling with every new generation of weapons. Typically, also, the cost of operating advanced modern weapons, such as F/A-18 fighters and Blackhawk helicopters, is doubling at a similar rate. Affording even minimum numbers of such aircraft is becoming very difficult for small countries.
Modern submarines and surface ships are also characterised by the high costs of their weapons systems: particularly in the area of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air defence, embarked helicopters, electronic counter-measures and electronic counter-counter-measures. Ways will have to be found of designing weapons platforms that are not optimised for high-intensity conflict in the northern hemisphere. Much more attention will have to be paid by medium-sized countries to common designs and to indigenous technology. The optimisation of equipment for low-intensity conflict in tropical environments will be a central issue for defence planners in our region. Much of the defence equipment made by North American and West European suppliers has significant deficiencies in this area.
Among the ASEAN countries and Australia, there will also be an increased emphasis on defending themselves against possible external aggression, without reliance on direct combat support from other powers. The maritime environment will become more and more significant, as far as credible threats are concerned.
Unlike the large military powers in North-East Asia and South Asia, the medium-sized countries face no direct military threat. But they need to establish demonstrable sovereignty over their territories and off-shore resources, and to create a military presence and patterns of patrol and surveillance. These will lend weight to territorial claims and support vital defence interests.
Regional contingency planning will focus around low-intensity operations in the maritime environment, including such non-military areas as unlicensed fishing operations, refugee movements, illicit drug traffic, piracy and marine pollution; as well as the protection of off-shore islands and reefs, resource zones and oil and gas platforms, and territorial waters. This suggests a need for more co-operative defence efforts.
The areas to which defence planners in these countries should give highest priority in the 1990s are: intelligence and surveillance; command, control and communication systems able to combine data in quick time for military commanders; combat data systems capable of delivering ordnance (including expensive tactical missiles) accurately onto the target; and local logistic, industry and defence scientific support. These capabilities are crucial to the defence of countries which can only afford relatively small numbers of aircraft, warships and submarines. Much more work needs to be done in these key areas through the sharing of common defence planning problems.
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY
It is commonplace to argue that the growing economic interdependence which is occurring in the Asia-Pacific region is a force for political stability. It is true that the impressive economic growth of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has underpinned the stability of those nations and the development of their political systems. In the communist countries -- China, North Korea and Vietnam -- the centrally planned economic system is faltering (in North Korea it is demonstrably a failure), and dynamic processes of economic and political change are occurring. It seems immutable that any country desiring economic success must, in the long haul, move to a basically free-enterprise system. Moreover, future great powers will be those that take advantage of the information technology revolution. For communist countries, this is almost a contradiction in terms. The free dissemination of knowledge that the information revolution brings is a fundamental threat to central authoritarian control.
As for economic interdependence, much more analytical work needs to be undertaken to determine whether the fruits of interdependence necessarily are a stabilising force. Economic differences will become sharper as economic competition is less moderated by the need to co-operate in the face of East-West strategic competition. Generally, trade between nations is asymmetrical and the benefits are not perceived as evenly distributed between trading partners. The trade imbalance between the United States and Japan, for example, has resulted in political confrontation.
In the past, wars have occurred when an economic newcomer displaces an established power. But the political tensions that inevitably accompany growing economic interdependence cannot be settled in the modern world by war. Yet the necessary political mechanisms for settling such disputes are not in place in the world of the 1990s either. The situation will be exacerbated if closed trading blocs emerge out of the much more intense focus that economic issues will now receive because of the end of the Cold War.
In our own region, the growing economic mass of Japan (as well as of South Korea and Taiwan), relative to China, has important security connotations. The relative economic contraction of Australia is also of concern in this regard.
What is being argued here is that not all aspects of economic growth and international economic interdependence will work in favour of regional stability. In extremis, the economic disparity between nations and the emergence of powerful new economic competitors could lead to confrontation. We need much better analysis in this area of security studies.
OUTLOOK
The outlook for security in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s is for a period of greater uncertainty. Change will take time. But the region is unsure about the future military presence of the Americans, and some regional leaders believe that they can no longer rely on the United States to provide military security. The region is also concerned about the ambitions and future influence of China, Japan and India. The most unstable parts of the region are South Asia, where there are attendant risks of war between India and Pakistan, and North-East Asia, where China's authoritarian communist régime and North Korea's nuclear weapons program are the key strategic concerns. Japan's future leadership role -- and the region's reluctance to let Japan's economic power translate into military power -- is another key area of strategic uncertainty.
In Australia's neighbourhood the situation is much more favourable. ASEAN will continue to exhibit strong economic growth, basic political stability and limited military capabilities. In South-East Asia, the South China Sea is the most serious potential flashpoint, which could involve the military forces of China against those of Vietnam or even some of the ASEAN claimants. In the South-West Pacific -- and particularly Papua New Guinea -- the concern will be more with domestic instabilities. External powers are most unlikely to interfere militarily in the South-West Pacific. In adjusting to a changed world, however, island countries are looking for reassurance and protection, as well as aid. And because the interest of powers external to the region is declining, island expectations of Australia are growing.
There are several important strategic planning issues facing Australian policy-makers in the 1990s. The first issue focuses on the question: what kind of ally will the United States be? Part of this question centres on judgments about the likely size and nature of America's military presence in and commitments to the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s. Prudent defence planners must contemplate a rather more rapid United States military withdrawal than the Bush Administration planned. As well, some rather cold-eyed judgments will have to be made about the situations where United States combat forces are likely to be committed. For example, the Indian subcontinent and the South China Sea are not priority areas for the United States in this regard, whereas North-East Asia -- and particularly the Korean peninsula -- will retain its strategic importance for US defence planning. The United States' allies will have to ask themselves a series of questions that, for the first time in several decades, probe key defence policy questions -- such as:
- What does "alliance" mean when the discipline of a common threat has disappeared?
- What are the United States' vital interests in its traditional allied partners, Japan, Australia and South Korea, in the new strategic order of the 1990s?
- What does the United States expect of its allies in terms of regional military commitments?
For Australia there is the particular point that, as a medium-sized power, we gained considerable international stature from being seen as one of the close inner group of United States allies (along with Britain and Canada). Will our status as an ally of America now diminish as the United States concentrates more on domestic issues and, in our part of the world, more on its important economic interests in North-East Asia?
Australia seems likely to have to plan on a more independent defence policy. We should also develop closer military relations with our friends of South-East Asia, who will have many defence planning problems in common with us in the 1990s. The alliance with the United States will, of course, continue to be an important element in Australia's security. While seeking to keep the United States strategically engaged in the region, Australia should also build in the next decade on its existing defence interests with South-East Asian countries. This is not to suggest some form of regional military alliance. Australian defence policy will need to concentrate on the network of bilateral and trilateral defence relationships we already have with the ASEAN countries. That network might be expended to include closer defence relationships in selected areas (such as intelligence, maritime information, defence planning) and perhaps in some common defence production ventures.
In the new world order, Australia is likely to encounter more requests for contributions to United Nations peace-keeping. We can make appropriate (but essentially limited) contributions -- with priority given to our region of primary strategic interest. Australia's force structure must not be determined, however, by peace-keeping requirements.
As a prudent measure of insurance against the uncertainties of the future, Australia should press ahead with putting in place the military capabilities to defend itself. Now is not the time to retreat from the essential force structure priorities identified in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Defence planning is about the long term. This requires the allocation of enough defence funds to meet the $25 billion that is required for new capital equipment in this decade and before the onset of block obsolescence in key weapons systems next decade.
The above has identified sufficient uncertainties in our own region -- and concerning the policies of our major ally, the United States -- for a self-reliant defence policy to be the central element in our security planning for the 1990s. To an even greater degree than before, Australia will need to look after its own security needs in a regional security environment that will be increasingly fluid.
ENDNOTES
1. The Asia-Pacific region is defined here as including India and Pakistan in the west and Japan and the Russian Far East in the east. Australia, New Zealand and the islands of the South-West Pacific form its southern limits.
2. See Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 88, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992.
3. For example, "... the perceived prospect for American force reduction in the region is a matter of common concern to many Asians ... The lowering of American political attention to the Asia-Pacific affairs has already been felt acutely in the region," Yukio Satoh, a senior Gaimusho official, in an address entitled Asian-Pacific Security after the Cold War and the Japanese Role, unpublished, 1992.
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