Experiment in Democracy -- The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba

Alan Paton

"Indaba" means important conference or gathering.  In 1986 discussions which may have very important consequences for South Africa's future were held between 37 South African organisations.  They met to draw up a multiracial system of government for the KwaZulu-Natal region.  If the recommendations are accepted they could become the model for a democratic alternative to both a unitary democratic South African State and the present system of white domination and racial separation.

What were the events which led up to the Indaba?  The most important was the setting up of the Buthelezi Commission, which was established by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by its resolution of 29 May 1980.  Its Chairman was Professor G.D.L. Schreiner of the University of Natal, who was assisted by more than forty commissioners, widely representative of the whole communities of Natal and KwaZulu.  The Commission was rightly claimed to be the first real black initiative in constitution making, and offered itself as a non-partisan middle way between white and black aspirations.  In fact it set out to find an answer to that most difficult of South African questions, "What are white hopes and what are black hopes, and can they be hoped together?"

One can paraphrase very briefly the political recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission.  They were that some single legislative body be set up to administer the area of KwaZulu-Natal, that it would not be constructed on the Westminster model in which the ruling party is inordinately powerful, and that the area would remain a part of the Republic of South Africa.  The reality of white fears of black domination was honestly faced and there was discussion of the future constitution of the Republic itself, with a clear preference for some kind of federal dispensation.  Two possible solutions were totally rejected.  The first was the continuance of the present system of white domination and racial separation, even when it is decked out in the fine tricameral clothes designed by the indefatigable Minister Chris Heunis.  The second rejected solution was that of universal suffrage in a unitary state.

The report of the Commission was presented to Chief Buthelezi on 2 March 1982.  It was rejected, however, by both the National Party and the New Republic Party (NRP).  The NRP was the successor to the once powerful United Party, which was formed by the fusion of Hertzog's Nationalists and Smuts' South African Party in 1934, and in 1939 was led by Smuts alone after he took South Africa into the Second World War at the side of Britain, a decision which meant the resignation of Hertzog.  In 1948 Smuts was defeated by Malan in the fateful election of 26 May.  In that same year Hofmeyr died, and this was followed in 1950 by the death of Smuts.  This was the beginning of the decline of the great United Party, a decline hastened by the rapid growth of Afrikaner nationalism, which resulted in the gradual disappearance of the old "conciliation" policies of Botha and Smuts.  The stronghold of the United Party was now in the Province of Natal, and it ruled Natal, first as the United Party and then in 1977 as the New Republic Party.  It was therefore a great set-back to the supporters of the Buthelezi Commission when the most influential white politicians of Natal rejected the proposals.  It seemed as though a great deal of thought and labour had come to nothing, and as though white Natal had no conception of the gravity of the racial situation and of the need to give all South Africans some message of hope for the future.

Fortunately for the people of the region, and ultimately for all the people of South Africa, the KwaZulu-Natal negotiations were not brought to an end by the rejection of the Buthelezi Commission Report by the NRP.  The highly respected Mr. Frank Martin of the Party, and a prominent member of the Natal Provincial Executive (a body now appointed by the State President after the abolition of the Natal Provincial Council in 1985), was convinced that the administration of the region could not be carried out efficiently by two separate bodies.  The self-ruling homeland of KwaZulu consisted of some fifty separate pieces of land, at least half of which were mere pockets.  It was the intention of the Government to "consolidate" KwaZulu, which, presumably, meant to reduce the number of pieces to about twenty.

KwaZulu-Natal was lucky to have two men of the calibre of Buthelezi and Martin, two sensible idealists, both of whom preferred co-operation to conflict.  They were prepared to work together, in the first place for a joint administrative authority, and in the second place for a joint legislative authority.  So was launched what came to be known as the Indaba.  "Indaba" is a Zulu word, and in this context can be taken to mean a gathering at which important matters are to be discussed.  Chief Buthelezi nominated Dr. Oscar Dhlomo as the leader of the delegates from KwaZulu, and he acquitted himself with distinction, so also did Dr. Frank Mdlalose who represented Inkatha.

The organisers invited a wide range of organisations and persons to attend the Indaba.  These included Chief Buthelezi's powerful movement, Inkatha, which claims to have more than a million members;  the ruling National Party;  the white Parliamentary opposition, both from left and right;  the members of the Coloured House of Representatives and the Indian House of Delegates;  representatives of business and the sugar industry, and a number of local and national experts.  Labour was represented by the Trade Union Council of South Africa and the Black Allied Workers' Union.

The African National Congress was also invited but its representatives could not have attended if they had wanted to, the Congress having been banned in South Africa since 1960.  The United Democratic Front (UDF) refused to accept the invitation.  This was hardly surprising, since it is hostile to Chief Buthelezi and is ideologically committed to a unitary state with universal suffrage.  Mrs. Winnie Mandela, who is strongly sympathetic to the UDF, had stated in public that the time for gatherings such as national conventions was past, and that the next inevitable step was for the National Party Government to abdicate and to hand over power to the black majority, a forthright but quite useless suggestion.  For the same reasons the Natal Indian Congress did not attend.  Nor did any of the trade union movements except those mentioned above.  The National Party also attended as observers but not delegates, as indeed was expected, for the Party does not attend gatherings not called by itself.  It was also not surprising that none of the Afrikaner conservative groups attended, because they are ideologically wedded to the Verwoerdian theories of racial separation, whereas the Buthelezi Commission, and consequently the Indaba, had already rejected the "Homeland policy" of the National Party as totally unacceptable on both moral and pragmatic grounds.  However, non-party Afrikaners were represented as observers in three national organisations, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, and the Rapportryers, and one local organisation, the Durbanse Sakekamer.

What and whom did the Indaba represent?  It represented the moderate, peace-loving, conflict-hating, middle-of-the-road people of KwaZulu and Natal.  These people are often called the "silent majority" and are often supposed to be starry-eyed and useless.  But for the eight months of 1986 that the Indaba lasted, from 3 April to 28 November, they proved themselves to be neither silent nor useless.  Professor Desmond Clarence, retired Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal, was invited by the organisers to become the chairman, and John Kane-Berman, Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, to become the vice-chairman, and they earned the respect and the trust of the delegates.  One should record that for eight months the deliberations were earnest and orderly;  there were no what are called "racial incidents".  I shall later record one incident of what might be called a sharp difference on racial grounds.  The delegates from the Afrikaner organisations, while they could not be described as enthusiastic supporters of the Indaba and while they were to dissociate themselves from some of its findings, nevertheless acknowledged the urgent need in South Africa for such discussions.  That is indeed what brought all these prominent people together.  They realised that their country was in a mess and, for a variety of reasons, they wanted to find some way out of the morass.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

It is now time to consider the findings of the Indaba, and I shall confine myself to its constitutional proposals, on the grounds that if they are accepted, all things will fall into place.  If they are rejected, then the Government will proceed along its present course of trying to make the tricameral constitution work.  The Indaba is in itself a recognition by a number of influential citizens of KwaZulu and Natal that the new constitution is unworkable and unacceptable -- and is in fact already obsolescent.  This is a fact that will not escape the notice of the Government.  The constitutional proposals contain a Bill of Rights, but this requires a separate treatment.

The first provision of the constitution is for the appointment of a Governor of the Province by the State President:  one of his duties will be to ensure that the legislature does not exceed its powers and attempt to legislate on matters outside its area of competence, i.e. matters which fall under the central government.  These matters include Foreign Affairs, Defence, National Intelligence, Police, Posts and Telecommunications, Mineral and Energy Affairs, SATS (i.e. Railways and Harbours), Aviation and Inland Revenue.  In other words, the province will not be an independent state (as in theory the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei are), but a self-governing unit forming part of the Republic of South Africa.

There will be two Houses in the legislature.  There will be a first chamber of a hundred members elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, with a prime minister and a ten-member cabinet.  There will also be a system of proportional representation, which will mean that the minority groups -- and here we are speaking of racial groups, and particularly the English-speaking and Indian people of KwaZulu-Natal -- will be represented in the first chamber.  The first must be regarded as one of the most important decisions of the Indaba, because it is the first acceptance of a large gathering of South Africans of the principle of universal adult suffrage.  How was this possible?  It was certainly not due to any noble recognition of the justice of such a franchise.  It was due to the fact that the minority groups of KwaZulu and Natal are not afraid of Chief Buthelezi, Dr. Dhlomo and the other distinguished Zulu delegates.  One other thing is worth noting.  The Indaba was not characterised by any denial of racial differences, or any denial of racial fears, or by any lofty declarations that the concept of race was unimportant, and that all the delegates were brothers and sisters together.  Ever since Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape on 6 April 1652, the concept of race has been dominant, and it became even more dominant in the following three centuries.  The Indaba did not attempt to deny the importance of the concept.  What it did do was to confront it openly and sensibly and to suggest ways and means of preventing it from endangering any further the lives of millions of human beings.

This was very evident from the proposals adopted for the constitution of the second chamber.  This would consist of fifty members, comprised as follows:

• the African background group, ten members;
• the Afrikaans background group, ten members;
• the Asian background group, ten members;
• the English background group, ten members;
• the South African group, ten members.

Voters may decide, whatever their own racial origins, to declare themselves to be members of the South African group.  I wrote earlier that I would record one instance of a sharp difference on racial grounds.  This occurred when one of the Coloured delegations objected to the fact that there was no group for Coloured people, who constitute about two per cent of the population of KwaZulu-Natal.  When one considers the disproportionate representation given to Afrikaners, English and Indians, this claim does not seem absurd, but although the criticism was sharp, it was exaggerated by one newspaper, and it was said to have created a crisis that threatened the whole Indaba.  This was not so, and the delegation's ruffled feelings were finally assuaged.  This was, however, further evidence of the dominance of the concept of race.

Naturally the proposals for the constitution of the second chamber have been heavily criticised by non-racial idealists and by radicals.  Although I do not claim to be a radical, and regard myself as a non-racial idealist, I would be prepared to accept the proposals.  After the past thirty years of strife and frustration, it gave grounds for hope that an imperfect solution should be accepted by so large and influential a gathering.

The rights of minorities are still further safeguarded by Clause 5(a)(i) of Section III, Procedures.  It reads:

In the case of legislation which affects the religious, language, cultural or other rights of the members of a Background Group or the South African Group, such legislation will require in addition to majorities in both chambers, a majority of the representatives of that group in the second chamber.

One can hardly think of greater safeguards than these.

The important question now is, what will be the attitude of the central government (which means the National Party) to the Indaba proposals.  There are several obstacles in the way of government approval of a self-governing KwaZulu-Natal.  One is that the proposals do not come from the National Party.  The second is that the very holding of the Indaba is not only an implicit rejection of the tricameral constitution, but is also a repudiation of the policies of racial separation, which still prevail in the political world in South Africa.  A third obstacle is the Bill of Rights.  How can a self-governing unit of the Republic affirm civil rights which are totally incompatible with laws of the Republic?  One could give many examples of incompatibility but I shall give only one.  The Bill of Rights declares that "everyone has the right to lawfully own land and occupy property anywhere in the province."  How can the province guarantee such a right while the Group Areas Act expressly denies it?  Will the central government legislate that the act will not apply to the new province?

In my view the greatest obstacle of all in the way of government acceptance is the fact that the Indaba proposals are in a large sense revolutionary, and the National Party has in the seven or eight years of the "Reform Era" shown no enthusiasm for revolutionary proposals, especially when they come from a non-Party source.  The three Afrikaner delegations presented a minority report.  In spite of the way in which the proposed new constitution protects minority rights, they found them unacceptable.  They suffer also from the Afrikaner Nationalist fear of a future in which the conquered people become the equal of their conquerors.

A total or near-total rejection of the Indaba proposals by the ruling party would be a calamity.  The total or near-total acceptance would give hope to many who despair of the future.

If a new province of Natal should become (in spite of the constitution of the second chamber) an example of a successful non-racial government, it might inspire the people of other parts of South Africa to set up Indabas of their own, and so open the way to the creation of a federal Republic of South Africa, which many believe to be not only the sensible constitutional solution of our most complex problems, but an alternative to the unitary state that they so fear.

The burden of responsibility that lies on the shoulders of the National Party is immense.  It is the hope of many that the party would consider most earnestly its duty to those who worked so hard and faithfully for the Indaba, and for the country of which Natal-KwaZulu is only a part.

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Appendix 1:  Selected Documents

SPORTING SANCTIONS:  THE GLENEAGLES DECLARATION

The Gleneagles Declaration of 1977 is supported by all nations of the Commonwealth and is designed to prevent sporting contacts with South Africa on the grounds that any such contacts may be seen as an endorsement of the practice of apartheid.

"The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing people of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere.  At their London meeting, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries.  But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration.  Regretting past misunderstanding and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments.  But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities.  As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and governments of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries and their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid.  On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally".

REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP

The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa composed at Nassau in 1985 emphasised the urgent need to institute "a process of dialogue" to hasten the dismantling of apartheid and establishment of democratic structures in South Africa.  To this end, the Accord included the decision to "establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue".  The Commonwealth Persons Group, co-chaired by Mr. Malcolm Fraser and General Olusegun Obasanjo, delivered its report in June 1986.

The Report begins by emphasising the human misery created by apartheid.  It acknowledges that some changes have taken place in recent years, but is highly sceptical of the Botha Government's rhetoric of reform.  On past record, even the abolition of the infamous pass laws, it argues, is no guarantee that similar regulations will not emerge in another form.

The Report notes that while much is said by the Pretoria Government about political rights, this is caged in terms of group and community rights, not individual rights.  "In its unambiguous insistence on a political structure based on communities", the Report argues, "the Government is in reality seeking to preserve and entrench a society based on racial groups ... it is the clear intention of the Government that, in whatever constitutional structures that ultimately emerge, each 'group' will hold some form of veto over government decisions affecting it.  This would enable whites to prevent the economic and social restructuring of South Africa that is essential if the legacy of four decades of apartheid -- and 300 years of discrimination -- is to be remedied".

The Eminent Persons Group spoke with a range of political parties, black activist organisations, business groups and churches.  It had several interviews with the imprisoned black leader, Nelson Mandela, and concluded that any political settlement in South Africa would need to involve him.  "Mr. Mandela, according to all the evidence is a unifying, commanding and popular leader", the Report states.  "Recent opinion polls, as well as our personal observations, revealed that blacks, Indians and coloureds look overwhelmingly to Nelson Mandela as the leader of a non-racial South Africa".

The Group spoke to the ANC and concluded, against those who view it as dominated by Marxist influences, that the ANC is "a movement of pragmatists, not ideologues".

The Group also concluded that the churches are a force for change.  It viewed South African business as "seeking peaceful reform along the middle-ground" although saw it as out of touch with black opinion.  Business, the Report states, should do more to pressure the Pretoria Administration.

Overall, the Group concluded that "a striking identity of views on solutions" exists among the organisations to which it spoke.

The Eminent Persons Group submitted a "Possible Negotiating Concept" to the Botha Government based on steps set down in the Nassau Accord.  The ensuing discussions encountered several points of disagreement -- a key one being the Pretoria Government's demand that the ANC publicly renounce violence prior to negotiations, rather than merely suspend violence as the Eminent Persons Group was suggesting.  After May 19, the day of the South African Government's military strike on ANC bases in three neighbouring countries, discussions broke down completely.

The Nassau Accord specified five steps which it urged the South African Government to take.  These, and the Eminent Persons Group's conclusions with regard to them, are as follows:

• "Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.

  We have examined the Government's 'programme of reform' and have been forced to conclude that at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid.

• Terminate the existing state of emergency.

  Although the state of emergency was technically lifted, the substantive powers remain broadly in force under the ordinary laws of the land which, even now, are being further strengthened in this direction.

• Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.

  Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison.

• Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.

  Political freedom is far from being established;  if anything, it is being more rigorously curtailed.  The ANC and other political parties remain banned.

• Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across the lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

  The cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled and there is no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government".

C.H.O.G.M. COMMUNIQUE

The following statement on South Africa was issued at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting in London 3-5 August 1986.  It lists the economic sanctions against South Africa agreed to by the Commonwealth leaders, including Prime Minister Hawke, who attended the meeting.

As agreed at Nassau last October, our meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa.  At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau.  We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".

At our request the co-chairman of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, introduced the report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them.  Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.

The report of the EPG, Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions.  That unanimous report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa.

We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative government in South Africa.  We particularly commend the EPG's "negotiating concept" and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.

At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa.  It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

As we envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation.  We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency".  Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison.  A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed;  the ANC and other political parties are still banned.  Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government".  We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides.  Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

We receive the Group's finding with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work terminated its efforts for peaceful change.  We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end.  It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.

It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there.  Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and that the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change.  We acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures.  But we looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere.  In deciding on the adoption of further measures we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.

The British Government's position is set out below.  The rest of us have agreed as follows:

1. The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.

2. We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation:

   1. All the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
      1. A ban on air links with South Africa,
      2. A ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,
      3. A ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,
      4. The termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,
      5. The termination of all Government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,
      6. A ban on all Government procurement in South Africa,
      7. A ban on Government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and
      8. A ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
   2. The following additional measures:
      1. A ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,
      2. A ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and
      3. The withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.

3. While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned below.

4. We feel, however, that we must do more.  We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community.  We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:

1. Put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa
2. Put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
3. Accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa.  If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate;  and to contribute in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered.  We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve.  Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.

Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government meeting, is desirable.  We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously.  We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years.  We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES

Named after their founder, an American pastor and civil rights worker, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, the Sullivan Principles constitute a voluntary code of conduct for foreign -- chiefly American -- companies operating in South Africa.  Today there are nearly 200 signatories including all the major US employers in South Africa.  The aim of the code is to promote racial equality in employment practices and, more generally, to help improve the living conditions of non-white South Africans.

The original Sullivan Principles are:

• an end to segregation of the races in all work areas;
• equal and fair employment practices for all employees;
• equal pay for equal work;
• introduction of training programmes that will prepare non-whites for supervisory positions;
• improvements in employees' conditions outside the work environment, in areas such as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

Since the establishment of these Principles in 1977, a procedure by which signatories must report annually on progress in the implementation of the Principles has also been established.  Data in the annual report must be audited by certified public accountants.  In November 1984, the signatories committed themselves to a call for an end to all apartheid laws.

The Sullivan Principles have been accepted by most American companies operating in South Africa as a welcome alternative to disinvestment.

Critics have argued that efforts to improve the economic and social status of non-whites are hollow while blacks are denied political rights.  But the defenders of the Sullivan Principles believe that the greater the economic power and educational level of blacks -- and the Sullivan signatories, they argue, are contributing to both -- the more successful blacks will be in making their political voice heard.

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Source:  William Broderick, "The Sullivan Principles", Optima, Vol. 34 No. 4, December 1986.

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Appendix 2:  International Sanctions against South Africa

¹ Applies only to government bodies

² Imports allowed under licence

³ With exception of exports to the Keoberg nuclear power plant

⁴ Voluntary

Source:  US State Department

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Appendix 3:  Selected Data on South Africa

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Appendix 4:  Map of South Africa

South Africa: The Solution

Frances Kendall and Leon Louw

Since it was first published in 1986, the book South Africa:  The Solution of which this article is a summary, has attracted considerable interest and support both within and outside South Africa.  It has been welcomed not only by prominent liberal whites and moderate blacks, including Helen Suzman and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but even people of less moderate views, such as Winnie Mandela, and the right-wing Oranje Werkers leader, H.F. Verwoerd.  The reforms which Louw and Kendall propose are based on the Swiss system of government and involve a massive decentralisation of power.

South Africa's problem can be defined very simply as one of conflict between black aspirations and white fears.

Black South Africans have very few personal or political rights, and they have been prevented by many unjust laws from developing economically.  Now they are no longer prepared to accept the inequalities of the past and they are demanding representation in government and equality before the law.

White people have controlled political power ever since they first arrived in Southern Africa in the 17th century.  Most whites today realise that this situation cannot continue, but they are afraid that if they surrender political control, a hostile black government might use the powerful machinery of this highly centralised system to suppress white freedoms and seize white property.

The situation can be likened to that of a lion who has grown too big for his cage.  When he was put in the cage the lion was a little cub.  His keeper could stroke him and play with him through the bars.  But now the lion is fully grown, he is pacing up and down, rattling the bars and growling.  The people outside the cage all agree that lions should not be kept in cages, but they are afraid that if they let this one out he will eat them!

The purpose of South Africa:  The Solution is to show that it is possible to meet the aspirations of South African blacks without in any way prejudicing the rights and freedoms of white people.

A WORLD IN ONE COUNTRY

We have described South Africa's problem in a simple way, and this serves a useful purpose.  However, most people agree that the problem is, in fact, very complex.  To begin with, South Africans come from many different backgrounds.  There are eight major black tribes and many minor ones.  There are also two main white groups plus Indians, coloureds, and numerous other ethnic minorities such as Chinese, Italians, Portuguese, Greeks, Dutch and Germans.  All of these people speak different languages and have different cultures and they all want to be free to live according to what they believe is right or wrong, and to have a say in the rules and regulations which affect their lives.

A TOP-HEAVY GOVERNMENT

At present South Africa has one of the most centralised systems of government in the world.  In other words, nearly all of our laws are made by central government.  In most countries, and especially in democratic Western countries, this is not so.  Many government functions are passed down to local levels at which ordinary people can be involved in the decisions which affect them.

This top-heavy government is one of the major causes of the intensity of the power struggle that is taking place today.  Each group is afraid that some other group will take control of the government, and use that power to promote its own interests at the expense of the needs of others.

THE SOLUTION

Democracy

South Africans differ from one another on many matters, but almost all agree that any future system must be democratic.  Unfortunately, "democracy" means different things to different people.

The word "democracy" is derived from the Greek words for "people" (demos) and "power" (kratos).  In an ideal democracy those who govern should not have unlimited power.  Instead, the constitution and other safeguards should ensure that citizens have the power to stop their elected leaders from introducing bad laws.  Nowadays the word "democracy" is often used to describe something very different from the ideal.  For example, many one-party states call themselves "democratic" because they have one man one vote.  However, votes in such countries are worth little or nothing because only "approved" people may stand for election, and once in office they can do whatever they like -- including passing laws which harm the voters, and laws which ensure that no other group will ever emerge to challenge their hold on power.

The Swiss canton system

Switzerland is considered by many to be the most democratic country in the world.  It is small -- about the size of the Transkei -- and it is divided into 26 areas called cantons.  A central or federal government links the cantons into one unified country, but this central government controls only those affairs which are of interest to all the cantons.  These matters of common interest include foreign policy, national defence, federal railways and the mint.  All other issues -- education, labour, economic and welfare policies and so on -- are determined by the governments of the cantons, each of which is elected by all adult citizens resident in the canton.

Each canton elects representatives to the central government, and a different president is elected by members of the central government every year.

Because so many decisions are made at the local level the Swiss people are closely involved with the decisions which affect their lives and because each canton is different they are also able to see for themselves which policies work best.  For example, one canton might have high taxes and expensive welfare programmes, while another might opt for low taxes and private charity.  Each Swiss citizen can then decide which policy suits him best and "vote with his feet" by moving to the canton which he finds the most attractive.

One important reason for this decentralisation of power in Switzerland is that, unlike most European countries, Switzerland is made up of several different major ethnic groups -- Germans, French, Italians and Rhaeto-Romansch.  Over the years the Swiss have developed a system which permits people of different languages, cultures, religions and traditions to live together in peace and harmony.  This makes the Swiss system particularly well suited to South Africa.

South Africa:  The Solution proposes a canton system for South Africa very similar to the Swiss system described above.

South African cantons

We suggest that South Africa be divided into cantons using the present magisterial districts as a starting point.  Not counting the homelands there are approximately 300 magisterial districts, and their purpose is purely administrative.  In other words, their boundaries were established for ease of administration only, without reference to apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act, and thus most of them are multi-racial.  Each has a magistrate's court, licensing office, tax office, school board, labour bureau, welfare office and so on.

We believe that a referendum should be held amongst all the people living in each magisterial district to determine whether the majority wants to keep the magisterial boundary as their canton boundary, or whether they wish to join up with neighbouring districts.  Or part of a magisterial district may vote to break away and form a new canton of its own.

The formation of cantons would be an ongoing process, as it is in Switzerland, where new cantons are being formed to this day.  It is impossible to predict how many cantons South Africa would end up with.  That would be decided by all South Africans.  But we believe that, initially at least, there would be many -- at least 100 -- because existing differences and tensions would be reflected in a division into numerous cantons.  In time, as tensions lessen and attitudes improve, it is possible that more and more cantons would amalgamate.

Citizens of each canton would hold elections to choose a cantonal government.  This would be the most important level of government, responsible for all aspects of economic, political and social policy except those few assigned to central government.  We believe canton governments should pass some powers even further down to local communities.  These could handle such matters as schools, transport, parks and recreation in their own areas.

Government policy would probably differ considerably from one canton and community to another, as each area would reflect the wishes and needs of the people living there.

HOW TO PREVENT THE ABUSE OF POWER

The Bill of Rights

We propose that a Bill of Rights be written into the central constitution.  This would guarantee every South African certain basic freedoms no matter who governs.  The Bill of Rights would be binding on every level of government (central, cantonal and community) and would include the following:

1. all people, regardless of colour, race, creed or gender, shall be equal before the law, and any discriminatory law will be forbidden;
2. all people will be citizens, including those living in all the homelands;
3. every adult citizen will be entitled to vote;
4. all citizens may move freely throughout South Africa;
5. all citizens will have the right to own property, and property rights may not be taken away by any government;
6. any person may associate or transact with any other person or refuse to associate or transact with any other person for any reason;
7. there shall be freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

Referendums

As another means of preventing abuse of power we suggest a system of referendums whereby any proposed change to the central constitution must be put to the popular vote.  Furthermore, we suggest that citizens should have the right to request a referendum on any law, practice or policy they disagree with.  In order to do this they would have to obtain a specified number of signatures from others who agree with them.

The referendum (direct democracy) is very important because of the tendency of elected politicians to pass laws their own voters don't want.  A referendum is the most reliable way of determining what citizens want government to do regarding specific issues.

ADVANTAGES OF THE CANTON SYSTEM

Diversity

Perhaps the greatest advantage of a truly democratic system like this is that it allows many different policies and practices to exist at the same time in one country.  In this way most people will be able to find at least one canton in which they feel at home and can live according to their own values.

The demonstration effect

The canton system tends to ensure good government regardless of who governs because it provides a demonstration effect whereby it is possible for everyone to see for himself which policies bring about the best results.  People will move to the cantons and communities which offer jobs, good wages, and attractive living conditions.  Canton governments will have to compete with each other for people just as shop-keepers compete for customers.  As a result, the economic and social policies of the successful cantons will soon be copied by others.  This is the case in Switzerland, which despite being small, mountainous and land-locked is one of the most prosperous and peaceful nations in the world.

Meeting black aspirations

South Africa's problems will not be solved until apartheid is dead.  People of all racial groups -- blacks, whites, Indians and coloureds -- must be equally free to live where they choose, to buy land and houses, start businesses, seek employment and vote for their leaders.  All of these rights, and more, would be made possible by the Bill of Rights and the system we propose.  Every level of government would be required to be colour-blind, and the constitution would prohibit any government law from applying to one race group and not to another.

Overcoming white fears

Many white South Africans fear that if everybody has a vote, the black majority will victimise whites and take away white freedoms.  The Bill of Rights and the canton system would make this impossible.  Moreover, because people would be free to move to the canton of their choice and to participate in the decisions which affect their daily lives, nobody would have to live under a government they dislike.

But at the same time, whites or blacks who do not want to mix with other race groups should not be forced to do so.  The Bill of Rights includes the right to association and disassociation.  This means that all people may mix with, or separate from, whomever they please in their own homes, or on any other property they own.  Thus the owner of a swimming pool, restaurant or hotel could restrict admission to redheads, or women, or tall people, or any other group he chooses.  But all government facilities would have to be open to all.

Whites who do not want to be governed by any other group could cluster together, buy most of the businesses and land, and create a numerical majority in a given area.  Provided they employed little or no black labour white nationalists could in this way avoid having to share power in their own community.  Black nationalists -- or Indian or coloured groups for that matter -- could establish similar segregated areas of their own.  Segregation would therefore be accomplished solely at the expense of those who desired it, and without one group imposing their will on any other.

The majority

Most South Africans are reasonable people who want a future in which they can live together in peace and prosperity.  The leaders of the various race groups and political parties already meet regularly and know each other well, and it is likely that in many or most cantons they would form alliances.

Some cantons, especially in the beginning, would probably introduce socialist measures.  Indeed, it would be possible for them to become communist -- but in order to do so governments concerned would have to buy all businesses and land on the open market and would not be able to prevent people who wanted to leave from doing so.

Other cantons might follow the example of Ciskei and become tax havens with very few economic regulations.  Hopefully the homelands would choose to be incorporated as cantons.  But all homeland citizens would be entitled to South African citizenship and allowed to move freely into South Africa -- so that homeland leaders who did not govern well would lose all their people across the border.

COMMON OBJECTIONS TO THE CANTON SYSTEM ANSWERED

Objection

Many South Africans are simple third-world people who would not be able to cope with a canton system.

Answer

When cantons were first formed in Switzerland in the 12th century the Swiss were in many ways less sophisticated than rural black South Africans are today.  Moreover, traditional African tribal systems are strikingly similar in many ways to the canton system.  To this day in many parts of South Africa small local governments hold "indabas" at which people debate issues in the village square just as they do in small Swiss cantons and communities.

Objection

Cantons with natural resources, such as those on the Witwatersrand, would be far richer than those with no resources such as those in Zululand.  This would be unfair.

Answer

Every country in the world has rich and poor areas.  In Switzerland the canton of Zurich, with excellent roads, transport facilities, hospitals and universities, is much more affluent than the tiny mountain canton of Appenzdl.  This is also the case in countries which do not have cantons, such as Australia;  the city of Sydney is rich while the outback is very poor.  Wealth inevitably concentrates where there are natural resources, excellent climatic conditions or navigable waterways.

These differences are not a problem as long as there is freedom of movement so that a person who lives in a poor canton does so through choice.  People choose to live in "poor" areas for many different reasons.  They may like the lifestyle or traditions there, or the economic system, or the scenery.  These things are of greater value to many people than material wealth.  In any case, there are many poor people in all the richest cities of the world.

Moreover, not all countries with natural resources are wealthy.  Indeed, many of the most richly endowed countries in the world are economic failures -- for example Mexico, Angola, Nigeria, the USSR and India.  By contrast, many of the world's most dynamic economies are in countries with few or no natural resources such as Hong Kong, Switzerland, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.  This may seem strange, but the reason is simple.  Countries with very few laws regulating their economies do well, while countries with controlled economies perform badly.

Objection

The system proposed in The Solution makes no provision for wealth to be transferred from the rich to the poor, bad laws have kept blacks poor, and it is not enough simply to remove these laws.  Something must be done to compensate for past wrongs.

Answer

There is no way in which wealth can be taken from the rich and given to the poor without seriously damaging the economy as a whole so that in the end everyone is worse off.  Already taxes on high income earners in this country are amongst the highest in the world.  Economic studies have shown that when taxes reach such high levels people stop producing wealth because they see no point in working hard when so much of their income is taxed away.  If it became government policy to seize the houses and cars and other assets of rich whites to give to blacks, the rich people (who help the economy as a whole, and provide many jobs for others) would pack their bags and leave.  Moreover it is impossible to determine who has suffered the most in the past, and who is most to blame.

Nonetheless, black South Africans have suffered terrible injustices.  And there is a way in which money can be raised so that a substantial sum could be paid to every black person in partial compensation for these past wrongs.  This could be done by selling off government-owned businesses and assets such as the SA Transport Services, the Post Office, Iscor and Escom, state forests and lands, etc. to private individuals and companies.  Privatising state assets in this way is presently taking place all over the world, and it is the only way to raise many billions of rands relatively quickly without damaging the economy.

The money raised in this way could be paid to black people either in the form of a cheque or bank deposit to be used as they choose, or through welfare vouchers.  In other words, vouchers or lOUs could be given to every black person, who could then exchange them for housing, education or medical services, or use them to start a business.

PEOPLE NEED FREEDOM, NOT WELFARE

It is important that any compensation awarded to blacks be a once-off gesture and not an on-going programme.  Black South Africans do not need welfare programmes to help them get on in the world;  what they need -- like anyone else -- is freedom.  This is clear from our history.  During the second half of the 19th century blacks in the Eastern Cape were allowed to compete freely and equally with whites in business and agriculture.  As a result, by the 1870s they were extremely successful traders, artisans and farmers.  They excelled particularly as farmers, walking away with most of the prizes at agricultural shows.

One of the reasons blacks achieved so much at this time was the similarity between their traditional way of life and the market economy.  For example, before Africa was colonised tribal people owned their stock, crops, huts, handicrafts and weapons.  Land was privately allotted or subject to private grazing rights.  There were no laws to stop people from trading freely and there were almost no taxes.  Chiefs and headmen had few autocratic powers and usually required the approval of their people for any decisions they made.

There is a widespread but mistaken belief today that black tradition and temperament call for socialism.  Many people argue that blacks can be properly housed and fed only through massive welfare programmes.  This is an insult to blacks, who have a proud history of achievement.  In our view, such measures are in fact in direct conflict with black tradition and temperament and would inevitably lead to greater poverty and misery.  The only way to break the chains which shackle South Africa's black people is to repeal all the laws which discriminate against them forthwith.  If they are free to participate fully in a market economy, as they did 100 years ago, within a few years there will be an explosion of economic growth in South Africa that will astonish the world.

CONCLUSION

The history of the Afrikaner is a history of a people's struggle to free themselves from government interference in their lives so that they might live according to their own values.  But this heritage of individualism and the pursuit of freedom has been largely forgotten.

In the course of the twentieth century the Afrikaner nation has become inextricably linked with the concept of the paternalistic state and powerful central government.  Now it is the Afrikaner who has taken on the role of interventionist, and the blacks who are fighting for their rights -- ironically much the same freedoms for which the Afrikaners shed their blood.  In the 19th century there were certain key similarities between Afrikaners and blacks.  In both cultures, if people didn't like the rules governing their local community, they were free to move off and join another.  Both were characterised by a minimum of central government and numerous small, semi-independent communities in which people were directly involved in decisions affecting their own lives.

The time has come for all South Africans, black and white, to rediscover the principals of true democracy and limited government which were upheld by their forbears, because these are the only principals on which a fair and enduring solution to our problems can be based.

Black Opposition to Disinvestment

Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi

While sharing with the banned African National Congress a firm opposition to apartheid, Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha, the movement he heads, reject the ANC's strategies of economic disinvestment and political violence as well as its ideological commitment to socialism.  The two organisations are also divided by tribal differences.

There have always been South African voices crying against apartheid.  And since the Act of Union in 1910, when the British Government supported the Transvaal Republic, the Republic of the Orange Free State, the Colony of Natal and the Cape Colony in establishing a whites-only Parliament, blacks have been struggling to establish an open, race-free democracy in South Africa.

Vehement black opposition to apartheid over the decades was met with ever more oppressive legislation.  Nevertheless, there has been no capitulation to subjugation by black Africa -- only an escalating struggle which should command the respect of every democratic nation in the world.

Nor has the struggle for liberation been confined to black political organisations.  Every year hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens, claiming their right to be free in the land of their birth, are arrested and thrown into jail because they defy influx control regulations, pass laws and the Group Areas Act.  It is their liberation that I seek;  their will that I express.

Inkatha now has a paid-up membership approaching one million, which makes it quite the largest black political constituency ever to have been formed in black South Africa.  Ordinary people dictate Inkatha's tactics and strategies, elect its leadership and bring it to account at annual general conferences.  Inkatha's voice must therefore be regarded as the voice of ordinary people in South Africa.

Its membership is represented through thousands of branches across the length and breadth of the country;  in cities and towns as much as in rural areas.  In Soweto, which serves as a dormitory town for South Africa's industrial heartland, Inkatha has over 30 branches and tens of thousands of members.

It is in Soweto that I hold one of my annual rallies for people who have made their own political decisions;  up to 40,000 fill a soccer stadium to express their solidarity with Inkatha and encourage its leadership to continue on course.  Every democrat in the United States of America, every congressman and every senator, should therefore heed the voice of the black South African masses as they express themselves in Inkatha.

No year passes without my putting the disinvestment question before Inkatha's annual general conference.  This body of 3,000 to 4,000 representatives -- elected by the people at local, branch and regional level -- every year unanimously rejects disinvestment as a strategy.  No year passes when I do not address mass meetings in different parts of the country -- and every year tens of thousands of ordinary South Africans roar their disapproval of disinvestment as a strategy.  Can America, as the world's leading democracy fighting against totalitarianism in whatever form it is expressed, reject the pleas of ordinary black South Africans to abandon once and for all those who seek to ally America to disinvestment strategies?

Inkatha stands for the rule of law in an open, race-free society and for progress through the responsible development of free enterprise.  It rejects totalitarianism and all forms of state control over matters which are best managed by the people.  It rejects violence as the best means of bringing about radical change in South Africa, and is committed to non-violent tactics and strategies, to the politics of negotiation.  It stands, in other words, for the very things which America epitomises.  How, then, can Americans ignore the voice of Inkatha?

Of course Inkatha is grateful that Americans are rising to express their indignation and their disgust with apartheid;  putting pressure on Pretoria to introduce real and fundamental reforms in South Africa's social, economic and political systems;  sharing black South Africa's dream of one day establishing a free and open democracy that can take its rightful place in the Western community of nations.  We are grateful that great Western traditions lead to the condemnation of apartheid in every Western country.

Among Inkatha's massive membership there are hundreds of thousands of ordinary people who sent an African National Congress (ANC) mission into exile to rally support for the struggle at home.  Inkatha's roots run deep into South African history;  it is the modern expression of the aims and objectives so clearly stated by the ANC's founding fathers.  We have repeatedly and publicly committed ourselves to these aims and objectives.  In short, Inkatha is not a third force which has emerged in the latter-day struggle, but represents a continuity of the black political tradition.

Black South Africa did not send an ANC mission into exile in rejection of democratic opposition and the politics of negotiation;  to adopt the armed struggle as the primary means of liberating our country.  Joe Slovo, as one of the foremost thinkers of the ANC's mission-in-exile, wrote an article that was published in the ANC's official organ, Sachaba.  In it he said:

"The attempts, particularly in the West, to question this policy and to influence the ANC to consider the adoption of a "peaceful road to change" is nothing less than a recipe for submission and surrender of national liberation aims.  We must bear in mind that the ANC was declared illegal long before it adopted a policy of armed struggle.

"If you are a black man (born and bred in Soweto or other black ghettoes, like 75 per cent of South Africa's black people), what peaceful road of change is open to you?  Is there a single constitutional way forward for the voteless and rightless Africans in the black urban ghettoes and in the neo-colonies of the Bantustans?"

The mission-in-exile adopted the armed struggle years after it went into exile, and it did so without having had the opportunity of consulting with ordinary South Africans.  I raise this point because it is pertinent to the disinvestment debate.  The foremost protagonists of disinvestment are those who support the armed struggle directly or indirectly by working to make South Africa ungovernable through violent protest, and the use of violence in the form of petrol bombings, stonings, and burning directed at fellow black South Africans.

The latter reject the armed struggle because the threat of future violence has no usefulness.  Americans who support the politics of non-violence and of negotiation should therefore ask themselves why America should support disinvestment when, within South Africa, it is championed solely by those who seek to establish a non-capitalist state through the use of violence.

WIDESPREAD CONSEQUENCES

Not that I expect America to take sides against them.  I mention them simply because I believe that the West is in danger of swallowing a falsehood:  that the (ANC) mission-in-exile speaks for the majority of people in South Africa.  On no single occasion have black South Africans arguing in the United States in favour of disinvestment, returned to South Africa to report back to a mass-meeting and to be acclaimed for what they said.  I, on the other hand, do just this and am repeatedly acclaimed for my stand on disinvestment.

Nor is my stand on disinvestment taken with an eye solely on its effects on South Africa.  If we in South Africa destroy the foundations of the future, we'll do so to the detriment not only of South Africa but also of the whole sub-continent.  President Machel is doing everything in his power to step up trade with South Africa, while Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana already trade heavily with South Africa.  All are under-developed countries and, in a very real sense, wait anxiously for the liberation of South Africa so that Southern Africa can be truly free, not only of political oppression, but also of poverty, ignorance and disease.

But it must be faced that the destruction of the South African economy would have widespread consequences for the whole of Southern Africa.  Those who clamour for disinvestment seek to bring about change regardless of the consequences for the well-being not only of millions of South Africans but for many more millions in neighbouring countries.

African history has already revealed the dangers of pursuing political objectives with no regard for economic realities;  of achieving political victories that leave millions of people in poverty and despair.  The unemployment problem in South Africa is huge. ⁽¹⁾  There are vast backlogs in black housing, education, health and welfare.  Political victories will be real only if they lead to these backlogs being wiped out within the foreseeable future.

Not only will the poverty and misery of black South Africans be increased by a successful disinvestment campaign;  political progress towards positive change will also be impaired.  White South Africa has now accepted that it is irreversibly dependent on blacks for economic survival.

Job reservation has gone by the board and concerted efforts are being made to train blacks for responsible technical and managerial posts.  Foreign investors are in the forefront of those who spearhead these developments.  It would be tragic if their positive contribution towards the upliftment of black South Africa was terminated by their withdrawal.

The economic interdependence of black and white thus favours the politics of negotiation.  Black South Africa is moving into an era of increased bargaining power, based on its hitherto unexploited buying power and the power of its organised labour.  If the West wants to increase black bargaining power, it must double up on its investments, not disinvest.

Foreign companies should remain in South Africa to spearhead new developments in job advancement and the process of generating black managerial and entrepreneurial skills.

Everything we know about radical change tells us that one of the generating forces for it is produced by those who, being upwardly mobile in social and economic terms, are particularly irked by political restraints.  Economic development on a vast scale is therefore needed to produce many more such people.

It is politically significant that, in opposing disinvestment, the majority of ordinary black South Africans find common cause with a wide range of white allies.  Black rejection of disinvestment is part of a multiracial rejection of disinvestment, and reflects the parameters of the new arena in which the struggle for liberation will be waged.  Only those working for a future communist state see disinvestment as being in the best interests of South Africa.

ENDNOTES

1.  A report by the Bureau of Market Research at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, entitled "An Assessment of the Development of Welfare of Employees in the Republic of South Africa" (1986) concludes that total trade sanctions against South Africa are likely to increase the numbers of black unemployed by 644,000, white unemployed by 152,000, coloured unemployed by 114,000 and Asian unemployed by 18,000. (editor)

ANC-SACP Alliance

Oliver Tambo

This declaration of solidarity by the President of the ANC with the South African Communist Party and socialist movements around the world was delivered at the 60th anniversary meeting of the SACP in London on July 30, 1981.

Let me commence by thanking you, Comrade Chairman, and the South African Communist Party (SACP) for inviting the African National Congress to be a party to this occasion and in particular, for the opportunity of sharing a platform with the Communist Party of Great Britain, represented here by the General Secretary Gordon McLennan and with the Communist Party of Ireland, represented by Comrade Michael O'Riordan.

These are our allies:  they are part of the international movement of solidarity which gives us strength and confidence in the certainty of our victory.  These parties, together with other communist and workers' parties around the world, are parties which we can always appeal to for solidarity in the conviction that they will respond.

It is a great pleasure for us, a great honour to participate with them on an occasion of great significance in our struggle in South Africa ...

We congratulate the SACP on this occasion particularly for the dedication and commitment of its leaders and cadres that has ensured its survival these 60 years, despite intensive repression and desperate attempts to destroy it.

We applaud your achievements, for the SACP has not only survived, but is today stronger, and increasingly makes more significant contributions to the liberation struggle of our people.

The ANC speaks here today, not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign organisation.  Rather we speak of and to our own.  For it is a matter of record that for much of its history, the SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people against oppression and exploitation in South Africa.  We can all bear witness that in the context of the struggle against colonial structures, racism, and the struggle for power by the people, the SACP has been fighting with the oppressed and exploited.

Notwithstanding that it has had to concentrate on thwarting the efforts to destroy it, cadres of the SACP have always been ready to face the enemy in the field.  Because they have stood and fought in the front ranks, they have been amongst those who have suffered the worst brutalities of the enemy, and some of the best cadres have sacrificed their lives.

And so, your achievements are the achievements of the liberation struggle.  Your heroes are ours.  Your victories, those of all the oppressed.

The relationship between the ANC and the SACP is not an accident of history, nor is it a natural and inevitable development.  For, as we can see, similar relationships have not emerged in the course of liberation struggles in other parts of Africa.

To be true to history, we must concede that there have been difficulties as well as triumphs along our path, as, traversing many decades, our two organisations have converged towards a shared strategy of struggle.  Ours is not merely a paper alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement by leaders.  Our alliance is a living organisation that has grown out of struggle.  We have built it out of our separate and common experiences.  It has been nurtured by our endeavours to counter the total offensive mounted by the National Party in particular against all opposition and against the very concept of democracy ...

COMMON OBJECTIVES

Today the ANC and SACP have common objectives in the eradication of the oppressive and exploitative system that prevails in our country:  the seizure of power and the exercise of their right of self-determination by all the people of South Africa.  We share a strategic perspective of the task that lies ahead.

Our organisations have been able to agree on fundamental strategies and tactical positions, whilst retaining our separate identities.  For though we are united in struggle, as you have already pointed out Comrade Chairman, we are not the same.  Our history has shown that we are a powerful force because our organisations are mutually reinforcing.

It is often claimed by our detractors that the ANC's association with the SACP means that the ANC is being influenced by the SACP.  That is not our experience.  Our experience is that the two influence each other.  The ANC is quite capable of influencing, and is liable to be influenced by others.  There has been the evolution of strategy which reflects this two-way process.

In fact the ANC was quite within its right to tell the SACP that we are sorry we cannot release Comrade Moses Mabhida from his tasks in the ANC -- find another comrade to be General Secretary.  Yet we agreed he would make a good General Secretary for the SACP.  He was not grabbed.

This kind of relationship constitutes a feature of the South African liberation movement, a revolutionary movement, a feature of the SACP which helps to reinforce the alliance and to make it work as it is working.  It is a tribute to the leadership of the SACP.

We are therefore talking of an alliance from which, in the final analysis, the struggle of the people of South Africa for a new society and a new social system has benefitted greatly.

Within our revolutionary alliance each organisation has a distinct and vital role to play.  A correct understanding of these roles and respect for their boundaries has ensured the survival and consolidation of our co-operation and unity.

As stated in its programme, the SACP unreservedly supports and participates in the struggle for national liberation led by the ANC, in alliance with the South African Indian Congress, the Congress of Trade Unions, the Coloured People's Congress and other patriotic groups of democrats, women, peasants and youth.

The strategy of the African National Congress sees the main content of the South African revolution as the liberation of the largest and most oppressed group:  namely the black population.

And by black I do not mean what our enemy have elected to designate as black -- namely just the Africans.  By black, we mean all the oppressed, those who were formerly called non-whites and whom we prefer to call black.

Of course it does not suit the enemy to club all the oppressed and exploited together.  It is better for the enemy that this vast majority be split up into what they call blacks and then Indians and coloureds.  That fits their strategy -- serves the interests of their strategy best.  But I am talking about the oppressed population as the blacks.

Whilst concerned to draw in and unify all progressive and democratic forces in the country, including those amongst the whites, our priority remains the maximum mobilisation of those who are the dispossessed, the exploited and the racially oppressed.

That is only a priority, for we recognise that victory requires that we build up maximum unity of the forces for progress.  Indeed we need to break up this white racist clique, win friends from among the ruling class and isolate the fascists.  Then a united people of South Africa can deliver the final blow, crush the colonialist structures and move to a new South Africa.

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

The ANC has received and continues to receive international support and solidarity from a variety of sources.  We must today acknowledge especially, with appreciation, the very significant support we receive from the socialist countries.  You have mentioned many of these countries -- all of them without exception have given freely by way of supporting our struggle and meeting our demands.

We appreciate in particular that they and some African countries have not hesitated to deliver weapons to people fighting for their liberation.  The enemy likes to squeal that we have been fighting with either Soviet made weapons, or communist made weapons.  It does not matter what weapons they are.  But we are glad to have them, and shall continue to use them if they are effective -- and they are.

This support has been given during the liberation struggles in southern Africa and the rest of Africa, and has been extended to the independent states that have been forced to defend their own victories.

On an occasion when we are observing the 60th anniversary of the SACP, we are bound to give some thought to struggles, many of which have arisen since the SACP was established.  Today, in the anti-imperialist struggle, we have won new allies like the struggling people of Palestine.  We have thrown up new enemies of peoples, like those who murder civilians in Beirut.  We have seen the unutterable brutalities of the junta in El Salvador -- the ruling fascists in Guatemala.

We have seen how the US has sought its allies among these enemies of freedom and democracy and progress.  And we send out on this South African day, our greetings, our solidarity and our support to those whose struggles place them in the same trench that we occupy.

We greet Polisario and Fretlin.

But finally, let us once again greet our South African Communist Party

LONG LIVE THE SACP!

LONG LIVE THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE ANC AND SACP!

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF ALL PROGRESSIVE AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN OUR COUNTRY AND IN THE REST OF THE WORLD!

Where the ANC Stands

An Interview with Oliver Tambo

Although banned by the South African Government, The African National Congress (ANC) is a major participant in the conflict over South Africa.  No solution to the South African problem can ignore the base of active support which the ANC commands among radical blacks.  The Commonwealth Eminent Persons group, among others, has argued that the ANC must be involved in any serious negotiations concerning South Africa's future.  In 1985 a group of leading businessmen met with the exiled ANC leadership in Zambia for discussions.  Since then white student representatives and leaders of the Progressive Federal Party have also met with the ANC.  Yet the Botha Government has remained largely intransigent on the question of the ANC, raiding its bases in Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in May 1986 and pointing to the ANC's practice of terrorism and its links with the South African Communist Party as justification.  The ANC admits to receiving arms from the Soviet Union, but claims that it is an independent, nationalist movement which would renounce violence once apartheid collapsed and that an ANC-led South African Government would be non-aligned in its foreign policy.  In the interview published here, Oliver Tambo defends the ANC against its critics and gives his views on political violence, the ANC's links with the communist movement and the nationalisation of industry.

The ANC is officially portrayed in South Africa as a communist, terrorist type organisation, almost presented to the public as demons.  Now, since the public (in South Africa) have no access to your views, how would you answer this, particularly the charge of being a communist controlled organisation?

It is important to observe that this has been a persistent portrayal of the ANC by many people who are opposed to us.  But the ANC is an ANC, as it ever was.  It is true that the ANC includes members of the Communist Party.  That has been the case almost since time immemorial.  The ANC was established in 1912 and the SA Communist Party in 1921, and so there has been an overlapping of membership all along the line.  But ANC members who are also members of the SACP make a very clear distinction between these two independent bodies.  We co-operate a lot but the ANC is accepted by the SACP as leading the struggle.  There is absolute loyalty to that position.  It is often suggested that the ANC is controlled by the Communist Party ... by communists.  Well, I have been long enough in the ANC to know that that has never been true.

The Communist Party has its positions and ANC has its positions.  The ANC is guided in its policy and all its members are loyal to the Freedom Charter ⁽¹⁾ and that is where you find all the positions of the ANC.  They are reflected in the Freedom Charter.  We don't depart from the Freedom Charter, so there is no problem of the ANC being controlled.  Now this is also extended to control by the Soviet Union, much of this is propaganda.  We go to the Soviet Union as we go to Sweden, Holland or Italy to ask for assistance in one form or another.  And in all these countries we do get assistance, and assistance is given quite unconditionally.  The Western countries, who do support us, and we very much appreciate the assistance they give us, do not give us weapons of course, because they generally do not approve and their laws do not allow it.  But in the socialist countries we get the weapons, so we go there to get what we can't get elsewhere.  And that's all there is in it.

Are you getting more support from the West now?

We are getting a great deal of support from the West, increasing support;  in material terms, too, that support is growing.

So the charge that you are a communist organisation, you would reject strongly?

We would reject that.  We would say that there is a Communist Party, so we are fortunate because if one is looking for a communist party it is there, but the ANC is not the Communist Party.

Now the other aspect of being terrorists:  again, there is a lot of exaggeration about this terrorism.  Long before we had injured a soul, when we were very, very careful in our sabotage actions to avoid hurting anybody, and that is what we have been doing for the better part of twenty years now ... even when we started, this was called terrorism.  We knew what terrorism was.  We could have been terrorists, if we had wanted to, but chose not to be.  So even that has been an exaggeration.  It is true that more recently, as for instance in May 1983 when a bomb exploded and others were attempted, this was stepping up things.  It is proper to recognise that this was after twenty years at it.  We started in 1961 and twenty years later you get a bomb exploding.  We could have done this much much earlier on numerous occasions.  We did not want to be seen as terrorists, we are trying to put on pressure, and we have been notoriously restrained in our armed actions -- notoriously.

What future do you see for whites in the future South Africa?

The ANC, and all of us in the ANC, have always considered and accepted that whites like ourselves belong to our country.  They are compatriots, fellow citizens.  We took the earliest opportunity to dispel the notion that we were fighting to drive the whites out to somewhere and we made it clear that they belong to South Africa.  They had their role to play as we would like to think we had a role to play although we are excluded, and so this has been basic.  We have asked whites to join us in the struggle to get rid of the tensions that come with the apartheid system.  We have hoped that we could together build the future non-racial South Africa, and by non-racial we really do mean non-racial.  We mean a society in which each one feels he or she belongs together with everybody else, where the fact of race and colour is of no consequence, where people serve according to their abilities and their skills, where we together work to unite our people, and we have adopted policies which discouraged the polarisation of our people either into ethnic groups or into white versus black.

Is there any reassurance or assurance that you could give whites about their physical safety, their jobs and their home security under an ANC-led government?  How would you address the question of their insecurity, which is manifest at the moment?

What we would hope our white compatriots will learn to understand is that we don't really see them as whites in the first instance.  We see them as fellow South Africans.  They are as good as black, in fact, let us say, they are Africans.  We see them as Africans.  We are all born there in that country, or most of us are.  We live on this continent.  It is our country.  Let's move away from these distinctions of Europeans and non-Europeans, whites and non-whites.

So it is security for all, as it were?

It is.  It is security for all, and it would be in the interests of us all that everybody feels secure.  The culture is secure.  We believe our cultures will begin to merge.  We have got a rich variety which, when it comes together, is really going to be something we can put out to the world.  So all this would be respected, there would be room for it all.  But the main thing is, and the sooner we begin to grapple with this problem the better, not to proceed on the basis that the Africans are going to do something to the non-Africans, but to begin on the basis that we all belong to that country.  Let us not look at one another's colour.  Let us see one another merely as fellow citizens.

How do you view the business leaders, the PFP (Progressive Federal Party), the nominees who have been seeking talks with the ANC?  How do you feel about this?

We feel very good indeed because, you see, in the fifties when we were a legal organisation we were getting across very effectively to the white community.  The ANC was getting accepted and its objectives were getting generally accepted among the whites.  We were uniting the country where apartheid separated it.  Now this is because we had access.

I recall Chief Albert Lutuli (the late ANC leader), going to Cape Town ... and do you remember the effect he had, the impact he made.  Well, when he came back to Johannesburg from that trip, there were thousands of white people at Park Station, thousands who came to meet him as a result of the impact he had made.  So this is the kind of situation that had developed.  Then we got banned and this contact was broken, and now the white community has been brought up to regard the ANC as something very, very dangerous.  The one effect of this visit by the business people has been to open the lines of communication because I am sure they saw us as something very different from the way we had been projected all the time, and I think they said as much.

Are you keeping in touch?

We do keep in touch.  And then we next looked forward to the visit of the young people.  We thought what a good thing that they should get together and begin to look at their future together.  This was a very good thing, and the contribution is not one-sided.  It is not as if we are giving or receiving all the time.  I think we are enriching one another with views about what should be done with our situation.  We had hoped to see the ministers of religion who wanted to come.  We thought that was another opportunity.  Then of course the PFP came along and we had very good exchanges with them.  All this is much needed communication especially at this time because at some point we have got to agree on what to do about our own future.

Could you briefly set out your economic theory, particularly on questions like nationalisation and wealth distribution?

I don't know if I would call it a theory.  It appears in our Charter and all we do is to interpret what the Charter says.  We have not attempted to depart from that in any way.  We start with what the Charter says and broadly the interpretation is that the state would control some of the industries, solely with a view to ensuring an equitable distribution of the wealth that we have.  And I think that this was at the back of the minds of the people who drew up the Charter.  We said our country is very wealthy, our country is poverty stricken as far as the blacks are concerned and by blacks I mean coloured and everybody else.  They are very poor.  Even the whites are not really wealthy but the wealth is contained in the hands of a few.  And we look at the country:  thirteen per cent overcrowded by millions of landless people who are starving and dying.

What do you do about this?  Where do you get the land from to give them?  You have got to address that question.  You have got to say how to end this poverty, how do we handle the wealth we produce in such a way that we can relieve some of these problems.  The solution we saw was one of nationalisation, and of course, when we meet the business people they say that nationalisation will destroy the South African economy.

Do they accept some measure of redistribution?

They seemed to.  Yes they do.  They accepted some measure of redistribution.  It is the method, the mechanism, how to achieve it -- this is of course where we did not agree and could not agree.  But they accepted, they understood, what we were trying to get at:  that you cannot have a new South Africa which does not address this problem.

What about private property:  how far would nationalisation extend, as you see it?

It would be a mixed economy, and certainly nationalisation would take into account the situation as we find it at the time -- the realities of the situation in which we find ourselves.  But there would be private ownership, there would be levels of private enterprise and it would all be geared to the situation that obtains at the time.  Also, we don't envisage fighting in the streets over it.  We think that we will have to approach this from the point of view of what the people want.  If the people want one form of distribution above another, well, it must be like that.

There would be a debate about the level of nationalisation?

Yes, there would be a debate.

What sort of environment could that debate take place in?  Would you see free media, free expression, freedom of newspapers?

Absolutely.

What about violence?  In what circumstances would you as leader of the ANC be prepared to renounce violence and start talks?  What are the circumstances that can bring that about because I think that's what, frankly, everyone wants, on all sides:  in other words, the violence, on all sides, to stop.  I am sure that no one wants it to go on forever.

No, not even we.  This question of violence worries many people.  The unfortunate thing is that people tend to be worried about the violence that comes from the oppressed, and so the tendency is to want to know as you want to know, on what terms would we end violence.  Really, there would be no violence at all if we did not have the violence of the apartheid system.  And even if there was, and there has been for two decades, it's been restrained.  But if you look at what comes from the other side, during those two decades there has been massive violence.  So we then have to say to ourselves:  of course we can stop our struggle, we can stop even our violent actions, but on that basis what would be the reason for that?  And in return for what?

Is there a possibility of a truce?

There is always a possibility of a truce.  We see the possibility of a truce.  It would be very, very easy if, for example, we started negotiations.  We have said that negotiations can start, serious negotiations.

With the Government

Yes, with the Government, when they are ready because at the moment we think they are not ready.  And we have said to them that if you wanted negotiations, we would not go into that without Nelson Mandela and other political leaders and the political prisoners.  Now, a serious indication of readiness for negotiations would be the release of all these leaders, because they have got to be part of the process of preparation for serious negotiations which will not just be talks for the sake of talking.  It is quite conceivable that in that situation of preparing for negotiations and looking at necessary conditions and so on, this question could arise.  But we have had a problem about just saying we are now suspending our struggle, which is what it would mean.

On one side, as it were?

On one side, without any indication on the other side of their willingness to do anything about what everyone of us knows is their violence.  We have said:  lift the state of emergency, pull out the troops from the townships, and the police.  And release the political prisoners.  We have even said unban the ANC.  Do all these things to create a climate.

Which you would welcome?

We would welcome a climate of that kind, and if the rest of the leaders were there I think it would be time to get together and put the question:  Can we really do anything about this?  Everybody would then be there.  But we are getting this persistent refusal on the part of Botha either to release Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners, and we say:  What are you going to do with treason trials ... it is simply a form of repression.  Who are you going to negotiate with, if you want to negotiate.  If he withdrew the treason trials and did all of these things by way of lifting the pressures that rest on us, we would begin to see that the other side are ready to talk.

Violence against people, civilians.  What is the ANC's attitude on this, bearing in mind the fact that down the years the ANC has, in my opinion, held back to a great extent on what one might call indiscriminate violence or going for soft targets?

I am glad you have put it that way, because it is often forgotten that we have been at the receiving end all the time, and we have held back.  And it is not conceivable that we could go on like that indefinitely without anything changing.  But one must see in this holding back the reluctance of the ANC on questions of violence.  But once, of course, we have decided we have got to fight then we must fight.

What about soft targets?

The question of soft targets has been exaggerated out of all proportion.  As I observe, when the police go into a township and shoot, when they did on March 21, 1985, repeating Sharpeville, they were hitting soft targets, and this whole year has been a year of shootings of really soft targets.  So people are being killed.  It has never been quite like this, but they are being shot and even children are being killed ... so when the ANC talks about soft targets this creates an alarm and yet the ANC is going no further than saying that we have got to intensify our struggle if we are in a struggle.  If we stop, we stop.  But if we are in struggle and we feel the demand of the situation is that we struggle, then we must intensify that struggle.  We have held back for too long.  Now, if we do intensify we are not going to be choosing carefully to avoid hurting anybody, but we will move into military personnel, police and so on.

But you won't go for civilians as such?

No, we will not go for civilians as such.  We think that civilians will be hit as they are hit always.  They were hit in Zimbabwe...

In a crossfire situation?

A crossfire situation, in any war situation.

But not cinemas, and supermarkets and ...?

We will not go into cinemas and bars and places like that.  We won't do that.  But we will certainly be looking for military personnel, police and so on.

Why will you hold back, because often in a guerilla war the limits do get more and more extended?  Is it a moral feeling about killing civilians, or what?

Because we are not fighting against people, we are fighting against a system, and we can't kill people.  Why?  Why would we kill them?  We cannot even kill whites because we are not fighting whites at all.  We are fighting a system.

On foreign policy, do you see South Africa as pro-Western, non-aligned, or as a Soviet-socialist-leaning country?  For instance, in the sale of minerals and raw materials -- would these be denied to anyone?  What about Commonwealth membership?  Where do you see South Africa standing in the world?

First of all, non-aligned in terms of East-West, developing trade with all the countries of the world, strengthening trade links, so maintaining the lines of trade for mutual benefit.

So the Americans can be sure of getting their needs?

The Americans will be sure to get it, if they are willing to pay for it.  We would want to trade with all the countries of the world, in the interests of our own economy.

We would come back to the Commonwealth because the basis for the exclusion of South Africa would have gone, and we will establish very peaceful relations with countries.  We will work very closely with the rest of the African continent, and certainly with the countries of Southern Africa.  We would become members of SADCC ⁽²⁾ or it might be called another name by then, and we could build together a small Common Market of our own.  South Africa would therefore be admitted into this wider economic grouping that we have in Southern Africa.  And we would be a very influential country in the world.

I presume you favour sanctions.  Do you to the point where people lose jobs and the economy suffers seriously?

We think the economy must be put into difficulties because the economy strengthens the regime.  It enables them to do all the things that they want to do.  This question of losing jobs, for the victims of apartheid it is nothing.  To be a victim of apartheid means to be many, many things above losing a job which you are losing all the time anyway.  And the way we look at it is:  the more effective the sanctions are, the less the scope and scale of conflict.

If there was a new grouping in South African white politics, with liberal Afrikaners who were formerly nationalists and Progressive Federal Party people like Slabbert forming a new bloc, would you be prepared to deal with them and on what basis?

We have met Van Zyl Slabbert and we hope to meet various leaders of organisations.  An organisation that is opposed to the apartheid system we regard as on our side.  I don't think that we would refuse contact with such an organisation because we would see it moving in the direction that we are.  We do of course encourage our white countrymen to mobilise and make their contribution to changing the apartheid system.  And on that basis we ought to be able to find a modus operandi with them.

You strike me as a somewhat reluctant revolutionary.  With what measure of enthusiasm did you turn to accept that there had to be violence?  How did you yourself personally respond to this?

I suppose I was angry and frustrated, like we all were, and I continued to be angry and frustrated, to feel that this system must be fought.  But I was a full supporter of the policy of non-violence because we thought it would bring us the fulfilment of our objective.  When that failed then we had to look for an alternative, we found the alternative in combining political and armed actions and it is one of those things that you have to do as there is no alternative.  I don't think I am peculiar in this respect.  I think that many people in the ANC would be glad if there was no need for violence, but the need is there and we have got to go ahead with it, bitter as it is.

It is painful to see anybody being killed, to see children being killed, no matter who kills them.  The death of children is a painful thing and you do have to say what brought us to this situation where these things are happening.  We naturally feel that it is the system that has made it impossible for us to avoid what we strove to avoid with such resolve when we were first confronted with this violence.  But as individuals, and certainly as an individual, I don't like violence.

ENDNOTES

1.  The "Freedom Charter" is the ANC's declaration of rights for which the organisation claims to strive.  It includes equality before the law, socialisation of industry and land, freedom to publish, associate, worship, right to social security, free universal education etc. (editor)

2.  Formed in 1980 by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe the SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference) has economic development and regional self-reliance as its objectives, (editor).