Alan Paton
"Indaba" means important conference or gathering. In 1986 discussions which may have very important consequences for South Africa's future were held between 37 South African organisations. They met to draw up a multiracial system of government for the KwaZulu-Natal region. If the recommendations are accepted they could become the model for a democratic alternative to both a unitary democratic South African State and the present system of white domination and racial separation.
What were the events which led up to the Indaba? The most important was the setting up of the Buthelezi Commission, which was established by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by its resolution of 29 May 1980. Its Chairman was Professor G.D.L. Schreiner of the University of Natal, who was assisted by more than forty commissioners, widely representative of the whole communities of Natal and KwaZulu. The Commission was rightly claimed to be the first real black initiative in constitution making, and offered itself as a non-partisan middle way between white and black aspirations. In fact it set out to find an answer to that most difficult of South African questions, "What are white hopes and what are black hopes, and can they be hoped together?"
One can paraphrase very briefly the political recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission. They were that some single legislative body be set up to administer the area of KwaZulu-Natal, that it would not be constructed on the Westminster model in which the ruling party is inordinately powerful, and that the area would remain a part of the Republic of South Africa. The reality of white fears of black domination was honestly faced and there was discussion of the future constitution of the Republic itself, with a clear preference for some kind of federal dispensation. Two possible solutions were totally rejected. The first was the continuance of the present system of white domination and racial separation, even when it is decked out in the fine tricameral clothes designed by the indefatigable Minister Chris Heunis. The second rejected solution was that of universal suffrage in a unitary state.
The report of the Commission was presented to Chief Buthelezi on 2 March 1982. It was rejected, however, by both the National Party and the New Republic Party (NRP). The NRP was the successor to the once powerful United Party, which was formed by the fusion of Hertzog's Nationalists and Smuts' South African Party in 1934, and in 1939 was led by Smuts alone after he took South Africa into the Second World War at the side of Britain, a decision which meant the resignation of Hertzog. In 1948 Smuts was defeated by Malan in the fateful election of 26 May. In that same year Hofmeyr died, and this was followed in 1950 by the death of Smuts. This was the beginning of the decline of the great United Party, a decline hastened by the rapid growth of Afrikaner nationalism, which resulted in the gradual disappearance of the old "conciliation" policies of Botha and Smuts. The stronghold of the United Party was now in the Province of Natal, and it ruled Natal, first as the United Party and then in 1977 as the New Republic Party. It was therefore a great set-back to the supporters of the Buthelezi Commission when the most influential white politicians of Natal rejected the proposals. It seemed as though a great deal of thought and labour had come to nothing, and as though white Natal had no conception of the gravity of the racial situation and of the need to give all South Africans some message of hope for the future.
Fortunately for the people of the region, and ultimately for all the people of South Africa, the KwaZulu-Natal negotiations were not brought to an end by the rejection of the Buthelezi Commission Report by the NRP. The highly respected Mr. Frank Martin of the Party, and a prominent member of the Natal Provincial Executive (a body now appointed by the State President after the abolition of the Natal Provincial Council in 1985), was convinced that the administration of the region could not be carried out efficiently by two separate bodies. The self-ruling homeland of KwaZulu consisted of some fifty separate pieces of land, at least half of which were mere pockets. It was the intention of the Government to "consolidate" KwaZulu, which, presumably, meant to reduce the number of pieces to about twenty.
KwaZulu-Natal was lucky to have two men of the calibre of Buthelezi and Martin, two sensible idealists, both of whom preferred co-operation to conflict. They were prepared to work together, in the first place for a joint administrative authority, and in the second place for a joint legislative authority. So was launched what came to be known as the Indaba. "Indaba" is a Zulu word, and in this context can be taken to mean a gathering at which important matters are to be discussed. Chief Buthelezi nominated Dr. Oscar Dhlomo as the leader of the delegates from KwaZulu, and he acquitted himself with distinction, so also did Dr. Frank Mdlalose who represented Inkatha.
The organisers invited a wide range of organisations and persons to attend the Indaba. These included Chief Buthelezi's powerful movement, Inkatha, which claims to have more than a million members; the ruling National Party; the white Parliamentary opposition, both from left and right; the members of the Coloured House of Representatives and the Indian House of Delegates; representatives of business and the sugar industry, and a number of local and national experts. Labour was represented by the Trade Union Council of South Africa and the Black Allied Workers' Union.
The African National Congress was also invited but its representatives could not have attended if they had wanted to, the Congress having been banned in South Africa since 1960. The United Democratic Front (UDF) refused to accept the invitation. This was hardly surprising, since it is hostile to Chief Buthelezi and is ideologically committed to a unitary state with universal suffrage. Mrs. Winnie Mandela, who is strongly sympathetic to the UDF, had stated in public that the time for gatherings such as national conventions was past, and that the next inevitable step was for the National Party Government to abdicate and to hand over power to the black majority, a forthright but quite useless suggestion. For the same reasons the Natal Indian Congress did not attend. Nor did any of the trade union movements except those mentioned above. The National Party also attended as observers but not delegates, as indeed was expected, for the Party does not attend gatherings not called by itself. It was also not surprising that none of the Afrikaner conservative groups attended, because they are ideologically wedded to the Verwoerdian theories of racial separation, whereas the Buthelezi Commission, and consequently the Indaba, had already rejected the "Homeland policy" of the National Party as totally unacceptable on both moral and pragmatic grounds. However, non-party Afrikaners were represented as observers in three national organisations, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, and the Rapportryers, and one local organisation, the Durbanse Sakekamer.
What and whom did the Indaba represent? It represented the moderate, peace-loving, conflict-hating, middle-of-the-road people of KwaZulu and Natal. These people are often called the "silent majority" and are often supposed to be starry-eyed and useless. But for the eight months of 1986 that the Indaba lasted, from 3 April to 28 November, they proved themselves to be neither silent nor useless. Professor Desmond Clarence, retired Vice-Chancellor of the University of Natal, was invited by the organisers to become the chairman, and John Kane-Berman, Director of the South African Institute of Race Relations, to become the vice-chairman, and they earned the respect and the trust of the delegates. One should record that for eight months the deliberations were earnest and orderly; there were no what are called "racial incidents". I shall later record one incident of what might be called a sharp difference on racial grounds. The delegates from the Afrikaner organisations, while they could not be described as enthusiastic supporters of the Indaba and while they were to dissociate themselves from some of its findings, nevertheless acknowledged the urgent need in South Africa for such discussions. That is indeed what brought all these prominent people together. They realised that their country was in a mess and, for a variety of reasons, they wanted to find some way out of the morass.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS
It is now time to consider the findings of the Indaba, and I shall confine myself to its constitutional proposals, on the grounds that if they are accepted, all things will fall into place. If they are rejected, then the Government will proceed along its present course of trying to make the tricameral constitution work. The Indaba is in itself a recognition by a number of influential citizens of KwaZulu and Natal that the new constitution is unworkable and unacceptable -- and is in fact already obsolescent. This is a fact that will not escape the notice of the Government. The constitutional proposals contain a Bill of Rights, but this requires a separate treatment.
The first provision of the constitution is for the appointment of a Governor of the Province by the State President: one of his duties will be to ensure that the legislature does not exceed its powers and attempt to legislate on matters outside its area of competence, i.e. matters which fall under the central government. These matters include Foreign Affairs, Defence, National Intelligence, Police, Posts and Telecommunications, Mineral and Energy Affairs, SATS (i.e. Railways and Harbours), Aviation and Inland Revenue. In other words, the province will not be an independent state (as in theory the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei are), but a self-governing unit forming part of the Republic of South Africa.
There will be two Houses in the legislature. There will be a first chamber of a hundred members elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, with a prime minister and a ten-member cabinet. There will also be a system of proportional representation, which will mean that the minority groups -- and here we are speaking of racial groups, and particularly the English-speaking and Indian people of KwaZulu-Natal -- will be represented in the first chamber. The first must be regarded as one of the most important decisions of the Indaba, because it is the first acceptance of a large gathering of South Africans of the principle of universal adult suffrage. How was this possible? It was certainly not due to any noble recognition of the justice of such a franchise. It was due to the fact that the minority groups of KwaZulu and Natal are not afraid of Chief Buthelezi, Dr. Dhlomo and the other distinguished Zulu delegates. One other thing is worth noting. The Indaba was not characterised by any denial of racial differences, or any denial of racial fears, or by any lofty declarations that the concept of race was unimportant, and that all the delegates were brothers and sisters together. Ever since Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape on 6 April 1652, the concept of race has been dominant, and it became even more dominant in the following three centuries. The Indaba did not attempt to deny the importance of the concept. What it did do was to confront it openly and sensibly and to suggest ways and means of preventing it from endangering any further the lives of millions of human beings.
This was very evident from the proposals adopted for the constitution of the second chamber. This would consist of fifty members, comprised as follows:
- the African background group, ten members;
- the Afrikaans background group, ten members;
- the Asian background group, ten members;
- the English background group, ten members;
- the South African group, ten members.
Voters may decide, whatever their own racial origins, to declare themselves to be members of the South African group. I wrote earlier that I would record one instance of a sharp difference on racial grounds. This occurred when one of the Coloured delegations objected to the fact that there was no group for Coloured people, who constitute about two per cent of the population of KwaZulu-Natal. When one considers the disproportionate representation given to Afrikaners, English and Indians, this claim does not seem absurd, but although the criticism was sharp, it was exaggerated by one newspaper, and it was said to have created a crisis that threatened the whole Indaba. This was not so, and the delegation's ruffled feelings were finally assuaged. This was, however, further evidence of the dominance of the concept of race.
Naturally the proposals for the constitution of the second chamber have been heavily criticised by non-racial idealists and by radicals. Although I do not claim to be a radical, and regard myself as a non-racial idealist, I would be prepared to accept the proposals. After the past thirty years of strife and frustration, it gave grounds for hope that an imperfect solution should be accepted by so large and influential a gathering.
The rights of minorities are still further safeguarded by Clause 5(a)(i) of Section III, Procedures. It reads:
In the case of legislation which affects the religious, language, cultural or other rights of the members of a Background Group or the South African Group, such legislation will require in addition to majorities in both chambers, a majority of the representatives of that group in the second chamber.
One can hardly think of greater safeguards than these.
The important question now is, what will be the attitude of the central government (which means the National Party) to the Indaba proposals. There are several obstacles in the way of government approval of a self-governing KwaZulu-Natal. One is that the proposals do not come from the National Party. The second is that the very holding of the Indaba is not only an implicit rejection of the tricameral constitution, but is also a repudiation of the policies of racial separation, which still prevail in the political world in South Africa. A third obstacle is the Bill of Rights. How can a self-governing unit of the Republic affirm civil rights which are totally incompatible with laws of the Republic? One could give many examples of incompatibility but I shall give only one. The Bill of Rights declares that "everyone has the right to lawfully own land and occupy property anywhere in the province." How can the province guarantee such a right while the Group Areas Act expressly denies it? Will the central government legislate that the act will not apply to the new province?
In my view the greatest obstacle of all in the way of government acceptance is the fact that the Indaba proposals are in a large sense revolutionary, and the National Party has in the seven or eight years of the "Reform Era" shown no enthusiasm for revolutionary proposals, especially when they come from a non-Party source. The three Afrikaner delegations presented a minority report. In spite of the way in which the proposed new constitution protects minority rights, they found them unacceptable. They suffer also from the Afrikaner Nationalist fear of a future in which the conquered people become the equal of their conquerors.
A total or near-total rejection of the Indaba proposals by the ruling party would be a calamity. The total or near-total acceptance would give hope to many who despair of the future.
If a new province of Natal should become (in spite of the constitution of the second chamber) an example of a successful non-racial government, it might inspire the people of other parts of South Africa to set up Indabas of their own, and so open the way to the creation of a federal Republic of South Africa, which many believe to be not only the sensible constitutional solution of our most complex problems, but an alternative to the unitary state that they so fear.
The burden of responsibility that lies on the shoulders of the National Party is immense. It is the hope of many that the party would consider most earnestly its duty to those who worked so hard and faithfully for the Indaba, and for the country of which Natal-KwaZulu is only a part.
Appendix 1: Selected Documents
SPORTING SANCTIONS: THE GLENEAGLES DECLARATION
The Gleneagles Declaration of 1977 is supported by all nations of the Commonwealth and is designed to prevent sporting contacts with South Africa on the grounds that any such contacts may be seen as an endorsement of the practice of apartheid.
"The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing people of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London meeting, the Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.
They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstanding and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.
They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.
Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.
They fully acknowledged that it was for each government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.
They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and governments of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world.
Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries and their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally".
REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
The Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa composed at Nassau in 1985 emphasised the urgent need to institute "a process of dialogue" to hasten the dismantling of apartheid and establishment of democratic structures in South Africa. To this end, the Accord included the decision to "establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue". The Commonwealth Persons Group, co-chaired by Mr. Malcolm Fraser and General Olusegun Obasanjo, delivered its report in June 1986.
The Report begins by emphasising the human misery created by apartheid. It acknowledges that some changes have taken place in recent years, but is highly sceptical of the Botha Government's rhetoric of reform. On past record, even the abolition of the infamous pass laws, it argues, is no guarantee that similar regulations will not emerge in another form.
The Report notes that while much is said by the Pretoria Government about political rights, this is caged in terms of group and community rights, not individual rights. "In its unambiguous insistence on a political structure based on communities", the Report argues, "the Government is in reality seeking to preserve and entrench a society based on racial groups ... it is the clear intention of the Government that, in whatever constitutional structures that ultimately emerge, each 'group' will hold some form of veto over government decisions affecting it. This would enable whites to prevent the economic and social restructuring of South Africa that is essential if the legacy of four decades of apartheid -- and 300 years of discrimination -- is to be remedied".
The Eminent Persons Group spoke with a range of political parties, black activist organisations, business groups and churches. It had several interviews with the imprisoned black leader, Nelson Mandela, and concluded that any political settlement in South Africa would need to involve him. "Mr. Mandela, according to all the evidence is a unifying, commanding and popular leader", the Report states. "Recent opinion polls, as well as our personal observations, revealed that blacks, Indians and coloureds look overwhelmingly to Nelson Mandela as the leader of a non-racial South Africa".
The Group spoke to the ANC and concluded, against those who view it as dominated by Marxist influences, that the ANC is "a movement of pragmatists, not ideologues".
The Group also concluded that the churches are a force for change. It viewed South African business as "seeking peaceful reform along the middle-ground" although saw it as out of touch with black opinion. Business, the Report states, should do more to pressure the Pretoria Administration.
Overall, the Group concluded that "a striking identity of views on solutions" exists among the organisations to which it spoke.
The Eminent Persons Group submitted a "Possible Negotiating Concept" to the Botha Government based on steps set down in the Nassau Accord. The ensuing discussions encountered several points of disagreement -- a key one being the Pretoria Government's demand that the ANC publicly renounce violence prior to negotiations, rather than merely suspend violence as the Eminent Persons Group was suggesting. After May 19, the day of the South African Government's military strike on ANC bases in three neighbouring countries, discussions broke down completely.
The Nassau Accord specified five steps which it urged the South African Government to take. These, and the Eminent Persons Group's conclusions with regard to them, are as follows:
"Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.
We have examined the Government's 'programme of reform' and have been forced to conclude that at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid.
Terminate the existing state of emergency.
Although the state of emergency was technically lifted, the substantive powers remain broadly in force under the ordinary laws of the land which, even now, are being further strengthened in this direction.
Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.
Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison.
Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.
Political freedom is far from being established; if anything, it is being more rigorously curtailed. The ANC and other political parties remain banned.
Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across the lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.
The cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled and there is no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government".
C.H.O.G.M. COMMUNIQUE
The following statement on South Africa was issued at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting in London 3-5 August 1986. It lists the economic sanctions against South Africa agreed to by the Commonwealth leaders, including Prime Minister Hawke, who attended the meeting.
As agreed at Nassau last October, our meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".
At our request the co-chairman of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, introduced the report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.
The report of the EPG, Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions. That unanimous report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa.
We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's "negotiating concept" and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.
At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.
As we envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed; the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government". We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.
We receive the Group's finding with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work terminated its efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.
It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.
Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and that the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.
We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.
In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.
The British Government's position is set out below. The rest of us have agreed as follows:
The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.
We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation:
- All the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
- A ban on air links with South Africa,
- A ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,
- A ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,
- The termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,
- The termination of all Government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,
- A ban on all Government procurement in South Africa,
- A ban on Government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and
- A ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- The following additional measures:
- A ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,
- A ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and
- The withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render consular services.
- All the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned below.
We feel, however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.
The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:
- Put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa
- Put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- Accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.
As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.
We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate; and to contribute in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.
On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.
Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.
Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.
THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES
Named after their founder, an American pastor and civil rights worker, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, the Sullivan Principles constitute a voluntary code of conduct for foreign -- chiefly American -- companies operating in South Africa. Today there are nearly 200 signatories including all the major US employers in South Africa. The aim of the code is to promote racial equality in employment practices and, more generally, to help improve the living conditions of non-white South Africans.
The original Sullivan Principles are:
- an end to segregation of the races in all work areas;
- equal and fair employment practices for all employees;
- equal pay for equal work;
- introduction of training programmes that will prepare non-whites for supervisory positions;
- improvements in employees' conditions outside the work environment, in areas such as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.
Since the establishment of these Principles in 1977, a procedure by which signatories must report annually on progress in the implementation of the Principles has also been established. Data in the annual report must be audited by certified public accountants. In November 1984, the signatories committed themselves to a call for an end to all apartheid laws.
The Sullivan Principles have been accepted by most American companies operating in South Africa as a welcome alternative to disinvestment.
Critics have argued that efforts to improve the economic and social status of non-whites are hollow while blacks are denied political rights. But the defenders of the Sullivan Principles believe that the greater the economic power and educational level of blacks -- and the Sullivan signatories, they argue, are contributing to both -- the more successful blacks will be in making their political voice heard.
_________
Source: William Broderick, "The Sullivan Principles", Optima, Vol. 34 No. 4, December 1986.
Appendix 2: International Sanctions against South Africa
1 Applies only to government bodies
2 Imports allowed under licence
3 With exception of exports to the Keoberg nuclear power plant
4 Voluntary
Source: US State Department
Appendix 3: Selected Data on South Africa
Appendix 4: Map of South Africa
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