The Sacking of the South

CONTENTS

Introduction

The Sacking of the South
Roelof "Pik" Botha

The Australian Government's Response to Apartheid
Bill Hayden

South Africa:  Why Australia Has Involved Itself
Stuart Harris

The Folly of Australia's South Africa Policy
Colin Howard

South Africa's Victory Against Capitalism
Walter E. Williams

Where the ANC Stands
An Interview with Oliver Tambo

ANC-SACP Alliance
Oliver Tambo

Black Opposition to Disinvestment
Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi

South Africa:  The Solution
Frances Kendall and Leon Louw

Experiment in Democracy -- The KwaZulu-Natal Indaba
Alan Paton

Appendix 1:  Selected Documents

Sporting Sanctions:  the Gleneagles Declaration
Report of the Eminent Persons Group
CHOGM Communique
The Sullivan Principles

Appendix 2:  International Sanctions against South Africa

Appendix 3:  Selected Data on South Africa

Appendix 4:  Map of South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

This collection is designed to throw some light on the turbulent and complex situation in South Africa and on the policies adopted by and available to Australia in response to that situation.

South Africa appears to have entered a state of chronic racial unrest.  While relying solely on the media as a source of information may lead to an exaggerated impression of the extent of violence and instability in South Africa, it remains true that in the past two years the death rate from violence there has more than doubled.  Nor is violence confined to black-white relations;  it has spread through the black communities with clashes between conservatives and radicals and between opposing factions among radicals.

As an attempt to place a clamp on the rising tide of unrest, the South African Government in July 1985 imposed a state of emergency in the most disrupted districts and on June 12, 1986 declared a nationwide state of emergency with a wide expansion of police powers and the arrest of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of anti-apartheid dissidents.  Since then further anti-apartheid organisations have been banned and the media have been subject to increasingly severe censorship.

Divisions in the country are deep and political polarisation is increasing, with the visibility of extremists on both the Left and the Right growing.  To aggravate matters further the South African economy is looking shaky.  Aggravated by economic sanctions and the withdrawal of investment by foreign companies, the value of the Rand has fallen and unemployment has risen.

Whether deserved or not, South Africa has been given the role of international pariah:  expelled from the United Nations and the regular target of diatribes from that body and its agencies, condemned by the Commonwealth Heads of Government;  rejected by nations of the East, West and Third World;  the object of international trading and sporting sanctions, condemned by the world's churches.

In relation to its size and position in the world South Africa receives a large, disproportionate amount of international media attention, most of it unwelcomed by the South African Government.  Like it or not, South Africa has captured the international imagination and looks as if it will continue to for some considerable time to come.  It has, moreover, entered a period of instability which presents enormous complexities and difficulties for those seeking a solution to its problems.  These alone would be sufficient reasons to justify this collection on the South African situation;  but an added reason is that Australia is no longer merely an observer, but a participant in international action to induce change in the internal affairs of South Africa.  South Africa is thus a topic of some importance for Australian public policy debate.

The aim of this booklet is to explore the key questions on South Africa rather than arrive at a consensus on the answers.  The contributors represent widely divergent viewpoints and backgrounds:  the policies of the Australian and South African Governments are presented;  views of South African blacks both moderate and radical are included;  the cases for and against the imposition of sanctions are represented, as are the Commonwealth statements on sporting and trade restrictions;  attempts to locate the South African situation in an international context are examined.

Most observers of South Africa agree that the system of apartheid -- of enforced racial segregation and inequality -- is morally unacceptable.  Indeed, even in South Africa itself -- and this is one of the signs of hope there -- the ideology of apartheid has all but lost its legitimacy, except among the parties and supporters of the extreme Right.

To accept that apartheid is morally repugnant, however, does not answer the question:  "What is to be done?"  All the contributors to this collection, including South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Botha, at least profess a desire to see the end of apartheid, but they remain quite strongly divided on their interpretations and policy prescriptions for South Africa.

Nor is moral indignation alone a sufficient basis for Australia to formulate its foreign policy.  Consideration of Australia's own interests is essential.  The question of what weight should be given to moral ideals and what weight to pragmatic self-interest in the formulation of foreign policy is one that divides commentators on South Africa.  (It is one of Colin Howard's key contentions that too little weight has been given to Australia's own interests in the formulation of its South African policy).  Are we justified in attempting to influence the domestic affairs of another nation, as we have chosen to do, especially when that nation represents no threat to Australia?  This question is just one of several central issues that divide observers of the South African situation.  Any serious policy analysis on South Africa must also take a position on at least each of the questions which follow, although this is by no means an exhaustive list.

SELECTIVE MORALITY?

The world is riddled with oppressive regimes and social injustice and the African continent has more than its fair share of both -- much of it, by most criteria, worse than South Africa (see Adam Wolfson, "The African Regimes You Never Read About", Review, Summer 1985-86).  What, then, is the justification for selectively targeting South Africa for special sanctions and displays of moral outrage?  Is it simply a reflection of political bias (against a right-wing regime) or white liberal guilt (ultra sensitive to white racism, but willing to overlook black racism elsewhere in Africa).

One attempt to find a rational justification for targeting South Africa is made by Stuart Harris who argues that because South Africa claims membership of the (predominantly) Judeo-Christian West then it should be judged according to the values of the West.  The rest of Africa does not claim any such relationship to Western culture and so, by implication, should be judged by different standards.  Interestingly, for some other commentators, South Africa's cultural links with the democratic Judeo-Christian West, however ambiguous, feature as a reason for not antagonising the South African Government.  After all, it is argued, Australia does not exactly have an abundance of allies in Africa and South Africa's allegiance with the West is thus an asset to be valued not alienated.

Another more pragmatic line of justification for selective indignation against South Africa concerns the moral authority the West (and, in this case, Australia) can gain in the eyes of the Third World by being seen to be tough on South Africa, thereby neutralising any mileage our enemies can gain by linking apartheid with a capitalist, allegedly racist West.  Stuart Harris and Colin Howard tackle this argument from opposing perspectives.

COSMETIC OR REAL CHANGES?

Over the last four years the South African National Party Government has announced its intention to dismantle the system of apartheid (see Roelof "Pik" Botha's article) and has embarked on a programme of reform.  There is, however, division among commentators on whether President Botha's professed intention to be rid of apartheid is genuine and whether the reforms instituted by his Government represent significant progress or are merely cosmetic.  Bill Hayden thinks they are merely cosmetic;  Roelof "Pik" Botha disagrees.

Some of the recent reforms include:  South African citizenship has been returned to the citizens of the independent homelands resident in South Africa, enforced segregation in places of entertainment has ended and the prohibition on inter-racial marriage has been lifted.  Most importantly is the phasing out of the infamous pass laws and influx control system designed to regulate population movement and, in particular, the drift of black labour into white cities in search of work.  On the other hand, trespass laws, which restrict black residence in white areas, have been strengthened and racial segregation and inequality in many areas such as education persist.  Coloureds and Indians have been enfranchised by the Botha Government (each group has a separate house of Parliament), but blacks remain without the vote.

Indirect evidence of the claim that P.W. Botha is a genuinely reformist President is the antagonism he has elicited from the extreme Right in South Africa.  Indeed, Botha's declaration of a revised constitution in 1983 so angered the Right that it split the National Party, leading to the formation of a new break-away political party.

Yet, the resignation in 1985 of Zyl Van Slabbert from the position of the leader of the (liberal) Progressive Federal Party in despair at the slow pace of change under the Botha Government reflects the views of many who doubt whether Botha is prepared to go voluntarily all the way along the road to full democracy and power sharing.  After all, it is asked, why would the white minority willingly relinquish power over a system from which it has prospered so well?  It is also possible that the state of emergency will mark a longer term shift back to a more authoritarian style of government, the experiment with "liberalisation" being deemed to have failed.

PACE OF CHANGE

How rapidly should reform proceed in South Africa?  President Botha's programme is one of gradual, evolutionary change.  It is the view of the Australian Government and many others, including the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, that this programme does not adequately respond to the urgency of the situation.  The extreme of this view held by the African National Congress (ANC) and its supporters, is that the general situation in South Africa and the intransigence of the Government justifies the pursuit of violent, revolutionary change.

There are certain outcomes which liberal-democratic observers of South Africa -- and this includes the Australian Government -- should be particularly concerned to see avoided:

• an increase in violence to the point of civil war, the outcome of which would be unpredictable, except to the extent that many -- both black and white -- would suffer along the way;
• the instalment of a communist government, hostile to the West, sympathetic to Soviet interests and oppressive to its own citizens;
• a white backlash leading to the instalment of a government of the extreme Right.

The likelihood of each of these possible developments is liable to be affected by the pace of reform in South Africa, but again there is division among commentators as to how.  Some (such as Malcolm Fraser) have argued that unless the pace of reform is quickened then the black population will become further frustrated and further radicalised.  This would not only stimulate an increase in violence but play into the hands of left-wing extremists, thus paving the way for a communist revolution.  A corollary of this view is that the far Left -- the ANC -- must be involved in negotiations for change.  Continued exclusion from the political process will serve only to fan the flames of extremism.

The opposing view holds that to speed up the process of change would alienate a high proportion of the white population and thus risk a right-wing backlash.  There are parties in the wings, such as the increasingly prominent neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) readily capable of taking advantage of such a situation.  This school of opinion also maintains that to quicken the pace of reform would not necessarily subdue the discontent and unrest, and might actually aggravate further violence.  The great French political scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville, observed that revolutions often occur not as a response to oppressive conditions under an intransigent authoritarian ruler, but as a consequence of rising expectations stimulated by the improvement of conditions under a reformist government.  This may be what has happened in South Africa over the last four years, accounting for the increase in racial unrest over this period.

The South African Government has refused to include the banned ANC in negotiations.  Its case is that the ANC advocates the use of violence, practises terrorism and is aligned with the South African Communist Party which in turn is an apologist for the Soviet Union.  On its part (see the interview with Oliver Tambo) the ANC claims to be a nationalist movement whose use of violence is a response to the South African State's illegitimate use of violence to maintain an unjust social and political order.

ROLE OF BUSINESS

Is capitalism the friend or enemy of apartheid?  Commentators on the Left -- and this view is popular among those loyal to the ANC and SWAPO -- see a symbiotic relationship between capitalism and apartheid, with the authoritarian State the instrument of the owners of productive property whose economic and political interests are served by the exploitation and oppression of black labour.

This view, however, runs into fundamental difficulties.  First, it is contradicted by the widespread opposition to apartheid in the South African business community.  (In January 1986, for example, the Federated Chamber of Industries, one of South Africa's biggest employer groups, called for the Botha Government to abolish apartheid and extend political rights and freedoms to all races in South Africa.)  In part, this widespread opposition is due to international pressure -- the economic damage threatened by disinvestment -- and in part to the outstanding leadership of businessmen of liberal beliefs such as Harry Oppenheimer, Gavin Relly and Raymond Ackerman.  But a not insignificant factor is the inherent tension between apartheid, which after all is social engineering in the extreme, and the existence of a genuinely free market economy.  While it is argued that business has benefited from the supply of cheap black labour (Bill Hayden, for example, makes this point), the long-term efficiency of business is impaired by dictatorial apartheid regulations restricting the free movement and social mobility of labour.  The best stimulant to political reform in South Africa may well lie in economic growth, the increasing economic interdependence between black and white and the expansion of free enterprise.  The decreasing gap between black and white wages (the wage gap between white and black miners' average pay, for example, has narrowed from 18:1 in 1972 to 4:1 today) and the gradual emergence of a black middle class give cause for some optimism.

Apartheid has two sides however, one socio-economic, the other political.  The first appears to be breaking down as a result of economic pressures and the initiatives of business (sometimes in defiance of government laws on race relations);  but the extent to which this will flow on into the political arena and lead to the enfranchisement of blacks is uncertain.  The experience elsewhere in the West has been that the complex of processes usually grouped under the heading "modernisation" (which includes capitalism and democracy as well as individualism, urbanism, secularism etc.) tend to come as a package.  Each nation, however, has its own idiosyncratic conditions and history with which to contend;  there is nothing inevitable about "progress".

SANCTIONS

The issue of whether to impose economic sanctions on South Africa -- and if so with what severity -- is the most pertinent policy question on South Africa facing Western Governments.  It cannot be considered independently of the other areas of contention raised in this Introduction;  nevertheless there are some immediate issues which can be considered.

Within South Africa, as outside, opinion -- including black opinion -- is divided on the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  Proponents argue that the impact of sanctions on South Africa's economy will force the Government to introduce democratic reforms.  This is the position of both the ANC, Archbishop Tutu and all governments of the Commonwealth apart from Britain.  Others, including Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of the single largest black organisation in South Africa, oppose sanctions on the grounds that they will primarily harm poor blacks.

There are other "unintended consequences" of running down the South African economy to consider as well.  First, sanctions may act as a catalyst to civil war which would mean widespread harm to all races;  second, they may cut off the supply of employment and exports, including food, to surrounding African countries which depend economically on South Africa.  Opponents of sanctions have also argued that such measures would encourage a siege or laager mentality on the part of the white establishment rendering it even more impervious than it already is to calls for reform.

These issues and a range of others relevant to the question of sanctions are addressed, from a variety of perspectives, by the writers in this booklet.

To date the Australian Government has adopted Commonwealth initiatives on economic and sporting sanctions (those pertaining to the CHOGM communique of August 1986, and the Gleneagles Declaration on sporting contacts of 1977).  A voluntary code of conduct for Australian business operating in South Africa -- based on the US Sullivan principles -- has also been adopted and an officer appointed to administer it.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

If it is accepted that the system of apartheid must go, what is to replace it?  While we may agree that a liberal-democratic society would be highly desirable in South Africa, this says nothing about the prospects of achieving it.  Politics, as the maxim runs, is the art of the possible.  To be workable, any plan for political reform must be based on clear recognition of the constraints imposed by South Africa's history and current reality.  It cannot be assumed that with a changed political structure, long-standing divisions in the society -- both racial and tribal -- will simply dissolve.  The long-term survival of democratic structures and institutions depends on the presence of deeply ingrained democratic sentiments among citizens.  Such sentiments are not widely spread in South Africa;  they cannot develop overnight.

Proposed solutions to the South African conflict range from partition -- the creation of separate nations for each racial grouping with links between them modelled perhaps on the EEC -- to the proposal for a one-man-one-vote unitary democratic state encompassing all racial and tribal groups.

The partition solution is not popular, apart from among whites on South Africa's Far Right.  Besides, the extent of economic interdependence between South Africa's racial groups would probably render partition unworkable.  At the same time, not only whites, but Indians and other minority groups, including black tribal groups, have expressed concern that if a system of one-man-one-vote is instituted, minorities will have no effective governmental representation or protection in South Africa.  Moreover, as matters stand, a one-man-one-vote election would almost certainly lead to a UDF-ANC government (the United Democratic Front -- is a coalition of hundreds of radical black groups and closely linked with the banned ANC).  Given its allegiances, a future ANC-led government would most likely be authoritarian and socialist.

A middle way between the "separate nations" solution and a one-man-one-vote unitary state is a federal system with universal suffrage and constitutional protection for minority rights.  Such a system has gained the support of whites and blacks of moderate persuasion, including the Federated Chamber of Industries and Inkatha, the million strong black organisation led by Chief Buthelezi.  The recommendations of the Kwa Zulu-Natal Indaba and the proposals of Kendall and Louw, discussed in this collection, present possible models of a federal system.

A one-man-one-vote unitary democracy requires the existence of a large ground of shared values in the society and a willingness to co-operate.  This, argue the federalists, is too much to hope for in a country where the history of division and antagonism runs deep.  The question is whether the history of division and authoritarianism in South Africa and the current extent of civil strife will permit the emergence of any sort of liberal democracy, federalist of otherwise.  The answer defies prediction.

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THE SACKING OF THE SOUTH

Roelof "Pik" Botha

This article states the views of the South African National Party Government.  It defends restriction of the media and argues that externally imposed punitive measures are both exacerbating tensions within South Africa and hurting the many thousands in neighbouring countries who are dependent on the South African economy.

No other country is faced with problems as complex, as sensitive, as emotional or as potentially dangerous as those confronting the diverse South African leadership.  And yet we are expected to come up with a solution overnight.  The Commonwealth gives us six months to produce results, the adequacy of which it will determine, and the prospect of further punitive sanctions is held in the offing if we do not provide satisfaction.  How many member states of the Commonwealth could themselves comply with the demands that that organisation makes of South Africa?  What if South Africa should agree to all their demands on condition that each and every Commonwealth country does the same?

Internal considerations have always provided the predominant reasons for reform in South Africa.  Positive international involvements have helped this process.  The same cannot, however, be said of punitive actions.  Indeed such actions have aggravated our problems in promoting reform.

Consider what we have already achieved.  No informed observer will doubt that the prime motivation has been domestic.

We have publicly rejected:

• political domination by any one community of any other;
• the exclusion of any community from the political decision-making process;
• injustice or inequality in the opportunities available for any community;
• racial discrimination  and  impairment of human dignity.

And we have already repealed or amended legislation which is not reconcilable with these ideals, or given notice of intention to repeal or amend such legislation.  We have launched investigations of other legislation or practices which might seem to us to be out of keeping with these principles.

A few areas where reform, providing for the removal of discrimination, has taken place in recent years or is underway are described on the next page.  The list is not exhaustive nor in any specific order.  I mention these points merely to indicate that we have not been dilatory in carrying our reform programme forward.  In addition we have now also produced a political programme which:

• provides for a united South Africa, a common citizenship for all South Africans, black and white, coloured and Asian, living within our borders and a system of universal franchise within the structures chosen by South Africans jointly;
• provides for the full political participation in government in respect of matters of national concern of all our communities;
• accepts in other words the principle of power sharing in government in respect of matters of national concern subject only to the principle of the protection of the rights and interests of minorities through group autonomy;
• recognises that white domination will disappear in accordance with the principle that no one community should dominate any other;
• provides for the creation of the structures required to give effect to these principles through negotiation with the leaders of all the communities of this country;
• spells out that the Government will not prescribe who may represent the other communities or what the agenda will be for the negotiations.

In short, the door is wide open, for the first time in our history, to the achievement through negotiation of a constitutional future in South Africa which could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities.

I believe we have a policy and programme which spells out clearly our intention to end inequality between South Africa's ethnic groups.  Most of the issues which the international community has raised with us from time to time have been addressed in principle, even to the extent of undertaking to release from prison those who are prepared to renounce violence.

There is still much to be done and it will be done, but having clearly stated our objectives, we are now focusing our attention on providing impetus to the negotiation process.  This is the key to the solution of our problems and it is the impact on this process of the international action against South Africa which causes serious concern.

Some Areas of Reform

Constitutional	Asians and coloureds represented in Parliament, as well as Asians and coloureds holding ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in government
Public amenities	Many desegregated -- hotels, restaurants, parks, trains, buses
Property rights for blacks	Accepted, as well as permanency of black communities in urban areas
Local government	Full participation of all communities
Education	Parity for all population groups is the declared objective and action to this end is under way
Sport	Opened to all races
Labour	Modern, sophisticated trade union system opened to all races.  Job reservation removed
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act	Repealed
Immorality Act	Offensive racial provisions repealed
Immigration	Provisions for white immigration only to be repealed
Influx control and pass laws	President's Council's recommendation for phasing out, under sympathetic consideration for action during the next parliamentary session
Forced resettlement	Discontinued

The situation in South Africa at the moment is sensitive and delicate.  The circumstances could hardly be less conducive to the process of negotiation.  Any future constitutional system here must be the product of negotiation between our communities.

We have said that we seek an agreed, not an imposed, system of constitutional government, and we shall not achieve such a system if we cannot further stimulate the process of negotiation.  As it is, black leaders across the political spectrum are reluctant to come forward and participate publicly in the negotiations.  To do so would place their lives, their families and their possessions at risk.

Any action which pushes up the temperature, or undermines or threatens our economy, or further polarises opinion within the country, or serves as an encouragement to any faction or group in its opposition to others, further undermines the climate for negotiation.  It is against this background that one must judge the actions of the Commonwealth and the industrialised countries.  However well-intentioned they might be, the measures they have imposed against South Africa, and their threats of further action, will be interpreted as action against the government or as support for opposing groups.  This is divisive.  It is not the way to encourage dialogue within South Africa.

I might add that even visits of church groups, academics and others are proving problematic.  Some are ostensibly on fact-finding missions, others are less well-intentioned but all are seen as supportive of one or other faction in this country, or simply as anti-government.  This is not constructive in present circumstances.  Certainly it is no encouragement to the less moderate black leadership to embark on negotiations.

South Africans of all ethnic origins know what is required of them.  They know that they have to meet across the table, develop trust and confidence in each other and resolve their differences by means of dialogue and communication.  This is not therefore the time for the world to be promoting greater divisions within the country.  It should be promoting reconciliation.

In the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the security authorities are obliged to resort to methods which they dislike as much as our friends abroad.  Detention without trial is one such device.  We believe we have a viable, civilised alternative to violence in this country.  Those who go out of their way to frustrate our attempts to promote negotiation between our communities, and promote disruption, boycotts, disorder instead, should be prevented from doing so.

Legitimate opposition is one thing, disruptive action which parallels the action of the advocates of violence is another.  I hope that as the negotiation process gains momentum, there will be an increasing acceptance of this process as the answer to our problems, and that detention without trial will become more and more irrelevant.

The confrontation between our security forces and the instigators of violence is unfortunately a feature of any violent situation.  The objective of the security forces is the maintenance of order, but violence leads to confrontation in the course of which scenes are played out which are grist to the mill of television crews.  Brutality should not be countenanced.  Judicial and other machinery exists which has been mandated to investigate each and every allegation of unacceptable action on the part of our security forces.

Nonetheless, the international media is having a field day in South Africa at the moment, given the nature of the disturbances in the black towns, and the savage methods employed by radicals to coerce moderate blacks into rejecting negotiations and joining their ranks.  The coverage overseas has been shockingly negative, but we simply have to try to contain the violence which is being deliberately instigated.  I cannot conceive of more adverse circumstances, given also the pressure from abroad, in which to get the negotiating process moving forward more rapidly.

The recently announced limitation on television and camera crews in the districts in which security measures apply is not intended to prevent the world from knowing what is happening in this country.  On the contrary, accredited journalists are able to work in the areas concerned and to report on events there.

The mere presence of TV cameras has served as a stimulus for violence which has led to the loss of lives and the destruction of property.

There have been numerous, well-documented instances where violent actions have commenced only after a sufficient number of television crews have arrived.  A distorted picture of South Africa has been portrayed abroad:  tunnel vision would be an appropriate way to describe the scenes shown.  Overseas viewers get a picture of a country going up in flames, which is exactly the perception which the instigators of violence desire overseas viewers to obtain.

The over-concentration on, if not the obsession with violence by visual media to the virtual exclusion of anything else has, in the view of the Government, encouraged and generated further violence.  It is the Government's duty to stem the violence in order to protect lives and property.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

In many Western countries there is a great deal of pressure for economic sanctions against South Africa.  The morality, motivation and objectives of such sanctions are ostensibly two-fold:  to coerce the South African Government into applying reformist policies;  and to do this by what are purportedly peaceful means of suasion.

In sum, economic sanctions are said to be "a peaceful alternative to violence" which are capable of forcing the South African Government to change its policies.

This view is based upon two fundamental fallacies.  In the first instance, there is the unfounded belief that South Africa will change because of foreign pressure.  This is fallacious because, as we have already demonstrated, South Africa is changing because the government is responsive to domestic needs.  We have changed because we are conscious of what is right and what is wrong.  What we simply cannot accept is that persons who rule over many of the most oppressed and downtrodden people on this earth should prescribe to us what is right.  After all, it is the actions of tyrants, not their abstract prescriptions, that determine the lot of their peoples.

Secondly, we are faced with the fallacy that economic sanctions are peaceful instruments of policy.  Not only peaceful -- but also precise.  They supposedly affect only the South African Government.  No one else gets hurt.  Everyone else will somehow benefit.

The facts reveal the magnitude of this lie.  Sad to say that truth will not always prevail.  Be that as it may, the facts bear repeating.

Firstly, while there is no doubt that all peoples of South Africa, black, coloured, Asian and white would suffer, it is not generally realised that the consequences will, in the first instance, affect the whole southern African region.

The reason is simple.  In many respects South Africa is the mainstay of the entire region.  Services and assistance provided by South Africa are often the most important stabilising factor in the subcontinent.

About 350,000 foreign blacks are legally employed in the Republic.  (This figure excludes workers from the independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.)

These men come from all over southern Africa.

About half of their total earnings is remitted every year.  Several of the neighbouring countries derive a substantial proportion of their national income from these remittances.  In fact, in 1983 they accounted for more than 50 per cent of Lesotho's gross national product.

African families are traditionally large.  If it is assumed that each of these 350,000 legal workers support six people at home, it means that nearly two million women and children in southern Africa depend on their menfolk's earnings in South Africa.

Foreign blacks working and living illegally in South Africa far exceed the number of legal guest workers.  Their number is estimated at 1.2 million.  These men are unable to find jobs in their own countries.

These illegal workers also come from all over the region, but mostly from Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

Many of them also remit funds and support families in their countries of origin providing a livelihood to possibly millions of women and children.

The benefits accruing to the neighbouring countries go far beyond quantifiable earnings and contributions to gross national product.  Employment of both legal and illegal workers in South Africa relieves the pressure on their labour markets to an enormous extent.  This, in turn, promotes social and political stability in the countries concerned.

Owing to worldwide recessionary conditions, unemployment in South Africa has assumed serious proportions, particularly among blacks.

If employment opportunities were to be reduced further by extraneous forces such as sanctions, the government would be obliged to give preference to the needs of its own citizens in the labour market.  This would not be "retaliation", as has been alleged.  After all, charity begins at home, even in international exchanges.

Public sector borrowing is a prime target of the sanctions lobby.  In debate with the latter, I have invariably come up against the view that such forms of sanctions can be selectively targeted against the South African Government alone.  Once again, our enemies either do not know the facts or they will not admit to knowing them.

The South African Government per se is a relatively small international borrower.  The two largest public sector borrowers on overseas capital markets are the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) and South African Transport Services (SATS).  The infrastructure and services of both these utilities are indispensable for the economic well-being of a substantial part of Southern Africa.

The loans raised by Escom are used to build large new power stations to meet the power needs not only of South Africa but also of several neighbouring states.  Escom at present supplies 100 per cent of the electricity used in Lesotho, 79 per cent in Swaziland and approximately 52 per cent in Botswana, as well as 60 per cent of the power used in Maputo, capital of Mozambique.

SATS is the undisputed leader in railroading in Africa.  It not only runs 24,500 route kilometres of railways (or 25 per cent of Africa's total) but its unrivalled expertise is based on a century of experience of African conditions.

South Africa's railways and harbours have long served as a lifeline for most countries in southern Africa.  At least 45 per cent of the combined total imports and exports of Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire are carried to and from South African ports by SATS.  Virtually all imports and exports by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are routed through South Africa.

The South African postal and telecommunications administration also borrows large amounts on international capital markets for development programmes -- for the benefit of both South Africa and neighbouring states.

All Lesotho's and Swaziland's international telecommunications traffic and some of Botswana's is routed through South Africa.  Eleven telegraph lines have been extended to Swaziland through the South African system to link that country directly with the United Kingdom.  The South African Post Office has established a new microwave system to handle the increasing number of calls to and from Botswana which are routed through South Africa.

South Africa is a substantial supplier of credit to Africa.  This credit is provided by both the public and private sectors and amounts to some R1.6 billion (TBVC excluded) at present.

South Africa and the so-called BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) are members of the Southern African Customs Union, the only such union on the African continent.  The agreement provides for the free flow of goods among the member states, which levy the same tariffs on goods imported from outside the common customs area.

All major ports of entry are in South Africa, which collects the customs duties which are then distributed among the member states.

Customs revenues received by these states have increased in proportion to the growth of the South African economy.  The greater the flow of imports into southern Africa, notably South Africa, the higher the amounts accruing to the BLS countries.  If the South African economy were to be damaged by sanctions to the extent that the flow of imports were substantially diminished, this most important source of revenue of the BLS countries would be eroded, with serious consequences for the economies of these countries.  If the rand's value should be depressed by sanctions or for reasons other than economic, as has been happening during the past few months, Lesotho and Swaziland, like South Africa, would have to find extra funds to pay back their foreign loans.  A depreciation of the rand also makes their imports more expensive and erodes the value of their foreign reserves held in rand.  All this represents an additional burden on the vulnerable economies of these two countries.

Extensive trade relations between South Africa and the rest of Africa have been built up over the years.  In 1983 South African exports to Africa amounted to R1,800 million.

South Africa supplies the lion's share of imports by Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana -- either directly or through South African agents of foreign producers.

If sanctions were to be effective, they would undermine South Africa's capacity to supply Southern Africa with vital imports, especially intermediate and consumer goods.  Admittedly, alternative sources of supply could be found elsewhere, but these substitutes would be more expensive.  Payment for these imports would also tax the frail economies of these countries to the utmost (most suffer from chronic shortages of foreign exchange).  Longer delivery times would compound the problem.

Many neighbouring states rely on South Africa for their supplies of fuel and petroleum products.  If an effective oil embargo were to be imposed on South Africa, this could lead to a sudden and catastrophic cut-off of supplies to a number of neighbouring states.

The trouble with economic data is that we lose sight of people.  In the bluntest of terms, sanctions are all about jobs, welfare and livelihood.  Nowhere is this more true than in Africa.  We all know about starvation in Ethiopia.  Some know about starvation in Chad.  How many know that:

• almost half of Africa is on the United Nations' emergency food aid list?
• an estimated five million children will die of starvation on our continent this year?
• Africa's population has increased by 10 per cent over the last decade -- while food production has decreased by the same amount?

That is the background against which the sanctions debate takes place.  That is the real problem.  Those who advocate sanctions must say what responsibility -- if any -- they accept for adding to this misery.  Will they feed those for whom we may no longer be able to provide?