Stuart Harris
This article argues the case for Australia's policy of applying selective sanctions to South Africa and addresses some of the questions which frequently arise regarding the basis and mechanisms of this policy.
What are Australia's interests in the South African issue? In South Africa, as elsewhere, Australians generally would like to see a society which shares to a reasonable degree the liberal, democratic values that we, as a community, regard as important. We want a society that by and large adheres to the international rules and we want a prosperous region with which we can have profitable economic relations or which contributes to the general prosperity and economic stability of the West. And finally, we are interested in political and strategic stability in South Africa, preferably as part of a Western-oriented region or at least one that is neutral and non-aligned.
When we look at the South African situation in practice, the evidence suggests substantial shortfalls in each case.
As far as common values are concerned, given the overwhelming influence of apartheid and all that goes with it in South Africa, the South African regime falls far short of what most Australians have consistently declared to be our political and social values.
Moreover, we have consistently taken a strong international position on the democratic ideals of universal suffrage and here again the South African system is grossly deficient. So it is too with respect to human rights as exhibited by police and judicial repression, which is directed mostly against blacks but also against whites that help the blacks.
With respect to adherence to international rules, and quite apart from what one judges is happening within South Africa itself, the international community as a whole has accepted that the South African Government's occupation of Namibia is illegal. South Africa has also invaded the territory of neighbouring countries both in contravention of general international principles and against the letter of agreements recently signed with its neighbours at Nkomatie and Lusaka.
The South African economy is strong in African terms but, although it is often described as vigorous and dynamic, there are valid doubts about its structural soundness. It is affected by various structural distortions -- such as the effects of various embargoes, particularly of oil, the policy of industrial self-sufficiency and considerable direct government involvement in industry, the increasingly constraining immobility of black labour and the small domestic market -- all factors which in Australia we would regard as crippling. It has the advantages of mineral resources, including gold, and of cheap labour, but its law enforcement and military budget, including the high costs of its involvement in Namibia, are a substantial and increasing budgetary drain.
The recent financial squeeze on South Africa's credit partly reflected the growing lack of confidence in South Africa's international profile but was encouraged by a weakening in the domestic economy, not solely due to international recession.
The common view that the West needs South Africa's minerals is exaggerated. Dependence on South African minerals, according to a US Congressional 1979 report, is substantially a matter of habit rather than necessity; a 1985 report suggests that, as well as stockpiles, other sources of supply, including Australia, exist for all essential needs; and substitutes, e.g. ferrochrome or white nickel for chrome are widely available even though South African supplies are cheaper.
In addition there are obviously profound and growing doubts about the political and strategic stability of South Africa and concern about the consequences for the countries in the region. The white's ability to maintain full control of the country is becoming less certain. The military might of South Africa is considerable but combined policy and army deployments have not so far succeeded in restoring order fully in the black areas. Moreover, it is argued that military weaknesses will become evident and will grow in importance in the face of mounting black opposition, increasingly radicalised by the repression, the lack of political involvement, and the evidence of change in neighbouring countries.
AUSTRALIA'S INVOLVEMENT
The increasingly desperate situation does not explain why Australia has to be involved. There are several reasons.
We are unavoidably concerned wherever there is violence, human suffering, oppression and the denial of human rights to large numbers of people. Such happenings provide a moral imperative which much of the Australian community finds difficult to ignore; and in Australia, as in other countries including the US, pictorial evidence and media reporting have helped raise South Africa on the political agenda.
We also have commonly felt a responsibility, as members of an international community, to support moves by oppressed groups in any country, for a full and effective exercise of democratic rights including universal participation in the political process.
Furthermore there are practical reasons. Despite its distance, we would be affected by any upheaval that might develop in South or southern Africa. The external strategic impact of such a development may not be great, despite claims to the contrary. South Africa has a relatively limited strategic importance in global terms -- which may explain the very limited Soviet interest to date -- but even if it had, few now regard white South African rule as an effective barrier to communism. Even so, its strategic importance regionally is not negligible and has great influence on the surrounding countries with eventual effects on us. Moreover, should violence and anarchy develop, we could be faced with a major problem of refugees from that country, posing for us a variety of problems. As well, of course, in Australia many family and other relationships already exist that would give rise to more immediate concerns at such a development.
Similarly, we have important relationships with the other African states and indeed with Commonwealth countries as a whole which means that we cannot stand back and avoid taking a position without producing many adverse effects on ourselves. And of course South Africa is forcing itself upon us in a real and divisive way, only one aspect of which is sporting ties.
A further reason, however, embraces much broader questions. It is commonly asked why we "pick on" South Africa. Is our morality selective? Are we grandstanding morally or reflecting the West's conscience over its earlier treatment of blacks or of its colonialist past? Why not object similarly to the policies of countries such as the Soviet Union, Chile or Uganda?
Whatever mix of motivations may be involved, what is clear is that South Africa claims to be part of the Western, predominantly Christian, and substantially white West. It appeals to the Christian religion in its Constitution, and it commonly characterises opponents to its regime as Marxists opposing a Christian country. It uses claims of kith and kinship as a basis for its demands on us and on other Western countries. In other words, it espouses the broad ethical values and standards of our Western Christian society. It can be argued, therefore, that it has to be judged on Western Christian ethical and moral standards.
On this argument the doctrine of racial inequality and racial discrimination enshrined in the apartheid laws and practices in South Africa conflicts directly with these ethical values and standards. Of course, racial discrimination exists and often widely in many countries. Only in South Africa, however, is racial discrimination legalised and thereby institutionalised officially and enshrined in its recently reformed constitution. This does make South Africa a special case to the West.
Not just Australia but the whole international community has singled out South Africa in the United Nations, in Commonwealth meetings and elsewhere. Moreover, all the world's major religions have judged South Africa's legalised and institutionalised racism to be incompatible with their faiths.
A further part of the answer concerns the moral authority of the Western community of nations. Rightly or wrongly, the West claims for itself a moral superiority in the world as a whole. It claims a leadership role, a guiding role, based on that moral superiority. Given that claim, its moral authority, the strength of its leadership and the validity of its example are greatly weakened if it tolerates South Africa's existing policies. On these grounds, therefore, the West (and its member countries) are obliged to take a stand.
To those who reject the basis of this argument, believing in the importance only of relative power, this argument is weaker but it does not disappear. On the purely practical grounds, not of moral authority but of relative power and influence, regard has to be paid increasingly to world public opinion. The West could still be disadvantaged in these terms by being upstaged in the moral field. Although in fact the Soviet involvement in the South African issue has been minimal, the continued existence of apartheid offers them a wonderful propaganda opportunity as well as other opportunities. There are signs of their growing interest in the area and without adequate concern by the West they could gain the moral high ground without too much effort.
POLICY OBJECTIVES
In these circumstances, and given the overwhelming desire to avoid intensified violence, we need to consider the options open to decision makers.
We need, however, to be clear about the policy objectives. These were stated by Mr. Hayden in his 19 August 1985 statement as peaceful change to a multiracial society with universal adult suffrage and the standard of human rights proposed by the UN Declaration. This is essentially what Mr. Hawke said in this statement of 20 October 1985.
To achieve this, a negotiated settlement would involve talks essentially between the National Party under Mr. Botha and the African National Congress, including Nelson Mandela. Other groups might be involved as minor players. The difficulties are extreme. Some, however, may be over-emphasised. Thus the common argument that the blacks will degenerate into tribalism is possibly exaggerated. With their common culture (Nguni) the major black racial groups in South Africa are probably ethnically closer to each other than the two white groups there.
In any case, given this objective and what is required to achieve it, Australia has several options. The first is to do nothing except to condemn apartheid verbally and to rely on persuading the almost five million whites that the 24 million blacks must be given full political rights and that all elements of apartheid must be disbanded.
Experience suggests that this is most unlikely to work, and that violence would not thereby be avoided. There have been some limited changes to the political position of the three-and-a-half million Indians and coloureds who have been given a degree of political representation at the national level. But virtually no change has been made to the political position of the blacks.
The South African Government has committed itself to a gradual process of political reform for blacks and has talked in general terms of negotiations with the black communities leading to constitutional changes to give blacks positive rights. In addition, major changes have been foreshadowed to black citizenship rights, black land ownership rights, influx control, the pass laws and forced removals. Other changes are largely cosmetic -- those to the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts, while important, affect only a very small proportion of blacks. Others might or might not be important -- we cannot tell without clearer explanations and statements of objectives from South Africa.
AUSTRALIA'S POLICY OPTIONS
The main pillars of apartheid, however -- the race classification legislation, the group areas legislation, the homelands structure and the black education system -- remain largely untouched and the South African Government has continued to defend most of them. Although the reform process has developed a momentum that would be difficult to reverse completely the process seems likely to be very slow and the existence of basic injustices to continue. Hence Australia's existing policy, together with that of other countries, has not been limited to verbal condemnation.
Another option, that of constructive engagement, has been widely discredited because of its lack of success in Namibia. Indeed, many argue that this policy, intentionally or not, has encouraged the South African Government in the belief that it did not need to change -- even that the West was conniving in its existing policies. Certainly, during constructive engagement, South Africa's grip on Namibia tightened and its pressures on its neighbours, in its growing regional superpower role, intensified. Even if these unfavourable judgments about constructive engagement are not wholly valid, the process, as with the option of verbal persuasion, is very slow. An increasingly large body of opinion judges that there is little, if any, time left to bring about peaceful change in South Africa. Indeed a great many fear that a violent solution is already inevitable. Whether that is so or not, South Africa seems increasingly unable to maintain effective military control while black power is increasing. Violent revolution and the civil war next year are unlikely, to say the least -- the situation could continue to deteriorate over many years. Two significant factors in the present situation are, however, under pressure and could rapidly worsen the situation -- apart from the growing political influence of the police and the military in South Africa.
So far the blacks have deliberately not directed their attacks to the whites, conscious that this would make a peaceful solution more difficult. They may have a potential to make the black townships "no go" areas, uncontrollable by the whites, which would give black militants and the African National Congress (ANC) a base within South Africa from which they could operate.
Further, the present black leaders are essentially moderates, most having strong religious backgrounds. Unless their moderation shows some results, however, their credibility will be undermined and younger more radical leaders will replace them. In such circumstances, increasing violence -- as happened in Rhodesia -- is likely, escalating on both sides.
If the need is accepted for more rapid reform in South Africa, a further option involves the application of pressure. Sanctions are not the only way to bring about pressure -- formal official disapproval by the world community is another. Such disapproval has been expressed but with insufficient effect. Hence the consideration of sanctions.
SANCTIONS
The debate on sanctions is confused and it would probably be desirable to stop using such an obviously ambiguous term. Mrs. Thatcher says that sanctions never work -- and US spokesmen have agreed with her. Curiously, they are a policy instrument commonly used by both countries (including the current administrations of both countries) notably against countries such as the USSR, Poland, Iran, Argentina, Uganda, Nicaragua, Libya and, of course, earlier during the Suez crisis and then Rhodesia.
In a crude sense, it is possible to argue that there have been many occasions when sanctions have worked. They did work at Suez (in two directions); they contributed to Allende's, Idi Amin's and Somoza's downfalls and helped with Ian Smith; they have worked to stop nuclear arms developments in Korea and Taiwan; and of course South Africa itself uses sanctions against its own neighbours and presumably regards their use as successful. Economic leverage, which is what economic sanctions really amount to, is widespread and often successful.
Of course, sanctions have often not worked. And, really, we can only judge whether sanctions work or not if we know what objectives are being pursued. If the objective were to undermine and topple the South African economy -- and this tends to be what those who most strongly oppose sanctions have in mind -- sanctions most probably would not work. At least, they would not work without much more commitment and unity of purpose than is usual among the international community in peacetime. But that is not the objective in mind. Mr. Hayden has said that the objective is not to bring South Africa to its knees but to its senses. To cripple the South African economy would not be consistent with either the objective of peaceful change or of a negotiated settlement.
Sanctions can have many objectives. As well as being designed to destabilise an economy, they can aim at a specific economic or political objective. The US was reported recently as having threatened sanctions on fishing rights in order to pressure Japan to change its whaling policy. In addition, they can be used to indicate strong disapproval of a breach of the international rules (or of bilateral arrangements) either to the country itself or to the international community; to send a message of moral support to those disadvantaged in a dispute, such as the blacks in South Africa; or to send a clear message to particular interest groups that they may be directly affected unless they use their political influence to encourage change.
Since the stated objective of Australian policy is to ensure peaceful change by means of negotiation the intention is to maintain pressure on the parties involved to engage in dialogue. Moreover, the threat of sanctions, if credible, and if sensibly targeted, usually exerts more pressure than the sanction itself. Hence the importance of the step by step process to which Mr. Hayden referred in his press statement of August 19. Hence, too, the importance of the consequent procedure -- Mr. Hawke's two-pronged strategy, adopted at Nassau, of tying the step by step process of applying pressure to the specific objectives of encouraging dialogue and reform in South Africa.
The emphasis is also on selective sanctions. These have a considerable symbolic element but they are clearly designed to maintain and increase pressure on South Africa, without at this stage seeking to impose major penalties. The ANC has stressed its interest in a solution in which whites and white investment would remain and this, they acknowledge, implies maintaining the economy in working order.
Acceptance of the selective sanction option has certain implications beyond the fact that the sanctions won't destabilise the South African economy. It implies that there is inconsistency across sectors -- some will be affected, and some will not, and not only in South Africa but also in Australia. Hence the sporting boycott -- which has been a relatively effective measure but is also, by definition, selective.
A concern about more intensive sanctions is that if the South African economy was seriously destabilised, not only would the neighbouring countries be adversely affected but those blacks within the country who are in employment would be at risk. While the argument about black prosperity is often overstated -- the average income of all South African blacks is arguably less than in many other African countries, including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Botswana -- blacks in employment in South Africa could be affected along with the whites. This argument is stronger if the employment of the blacks in South Africa is contributing to their political, social and economic advancement, which the code of conduct for business operating in South Africa seeks to ensure.
Rather than talking about sanctions, it is more logical to talk in terms of pressure -- political or economic. It is often argued, particularly by the South Africans, that pressure is counterproductive -- that the "laager mentality" will make South African whites more rather than less resistant. Such reforms that have been made in South Africa have come from the pressures of domestic economic needs, and those from outside -- including oil and sports sanctions. These do seem to have generated a response in Pretoria. History also tells us that, contrary to such a "laager mentality" operating, British sanctions against Kruger's Transvaal were working at the time of the outbreak of the Boer War.
The option of selective sanctions applying graduated pressure is, as we saw, predicated on the need for negotiations for a relatively peaceful transition towards a multiracial society. A major difficulty in developing such negotiations is that apartheid has itself prevented effective communication between black and white in South Africa. Moreover, the ultimate settlement could take many forms. The need to consider various options, as well as the problem of establishing dialogue between the parties involved, led to the adoption of the Australian proposal for an eminent persons' group at Nassau.
NEXT STEPS
Australia, and the international community, will have to judge at some stage what should be the next steps. This will depend upon progress. It will also depend largely upon the international community's judgment on three things: the time available to achieve a peaceful political transition in South Africa; the effectiveness of exerting increasing pressure through sanctions in preventing a situation in which more damaging pressure from greatly increased violence and bloodshed would be required to get the parties to the negotiating table; and the likely costs if the international community did not take such action.
These are hard questions to answer. But continuing silence or imprecision on the part of the South African Government about its objectives for a future society and the time over which reforms might be effected can lead only to greater frustration and heightened violence. Sanctions should be seen in this light as an attempt to register upon the South African Government the need for more rapid change while the possibility for peaceful transition remains.
One questionable argument is that our own economic interests in South Africa are small, and that countries such as the US, UK and West Germany, with greater economic interests, should alone determine what international action should be taken. If the assumptions of the policy framework I have outlined are only partly right, and leaving aside what to many are the overriding moral arguments, the issue is essentially one of accepting some costs now to avoid much greater cost later. Those with the greatest investment in South Africa, therefore, have the most to gain from peaceful political change in that country and from action now to bring it about.
There are optimists who will -- and do -- argue that there is plenty of time left for a solution in South Africa to emerge. Many, however, think little time remains. For those, the possibilities in South Africa are rather frightful to contemplate in human terms. For this reason, the policy makers believe that they have to try to encourage peaceful change. History does not encourage the view that those directly involved will themselves recognise sufficiently the dangers -- or will take a sufficiently long view. One wonders whether or not the French aristocracy would have accepted a realistic political alternative to the guillotine.
