Thursday, October 18, 2012

Razor cuts, not paper cuts:  A framework for rightsizing commonwealth government employment

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • Existing policy positions by the federal Labor government and Coalition parties to reduce public sector employment amount to nominal paper cuts, not meaningful razor cuts.
  • The policies, as they currently stand, will have an insignificant effect on the overall size of commonwealth employment.
    • The Labor government's budget announcement to cut about 3,100 positions this financial year is lower than the average annual level of resignations from the APS in recent years, and is not substantially greater than the number of age-related retirements.
    • The Coalition's 2010 election promise of 12,000 voluntary redundancies over two years is of a similar magnitude to existing levels of natural attrition from the APS.
  • That the Gillard government has ruled out any further public service employment reductions, beyond those indicated in the May 2012 Budget, to meet its significant budget shortfall is irresponsible public policy.
  • There are a number of reasons why fiscally prudent and economically responsible governments should seek to reduce public sector employment to those levels consistent with performing the core roles and activities of government.
    • Public sector employment is financed by distortionary taxes reducing private sector activities;  public sector employment tends to draw highly skilled labour away from private sector enterprises;  public-policy bureaucrats advise and administer taxes and regulations which compromise economic growth, whereas service delivery public employees tend to provide higher-cost, lower-efficiency services compared with their private sector counterparts.
  • This paper suggests an alternative framework of public sector employment reductions, ensuring that the subsequent roles and activities of government and the resulting labour requirements are consistent with hampering economic development to the least extent possible.
  • A number of commonwealth government entities could be abolished, privatised, or transferred to state governments, with results for public sector employment reductions in most cases greatly exceeding those presented by the two major parties.
    • For example, privatising the ABC, Australia Post, Medibank Private and SBS alone would transfer 44,200 employees to the private sector — an amount 15 times greater than the Gillard government's proposed 3,100 APS staff reductions for this financial year.


INTRODUCTION

In recent years a highly partisan debate has emerged concerning the feasibility of reducing the numbers of Australian Public Service (APS) personnel, as part of broader fiscal consolidation efforts at the commonwealth government level.

During the 2010 election campaign the Liberal Nationals Coalition announced a freeze on public sector recruitment, which amounted to a reduction in public service numbers by 12,000 employees over a two-year period through natural attrition.

Despite indications by the former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd prior to the 2007 election to apply a "meat axe" to the administrative structures of the commonwealth public sector, the Labor government and the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) has since opposed any proposals to reduce APS numbers at least through deliberate policy design.  Further, they have depicted the Coalition's proposals as "draconian" in that they will supposedly affect the provision of services to the general public.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the efficacy of alternative proposals to reduce commonwealth public sector employment.

The next section will profile the evolution of the APS, including growth in the numbers of people employed by the commonwealth and its staffing composition.  This is followed by an intellectual assessment of the case to streamline public sector employment, or at least restrain employment by government at a parsimonious level.

Next, existing policy approaches to reduce commonwealth government employment offered by the two major political parties will be examined, as will an alternative approach relying upon the assessment of appropriate functions and constitutional responsibilities of the commonwealth.

In conclusion the main thesis of this paper is that there is scope to substantially reduce the size of the commonwealth government APS, as part of a generalised program of fiscal consolidation.



A PROFILE OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SERVICE

Who is a commonwealth public servant?

Since its humble beginnings in 1901, in which Sir Robert Garran (Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, and parliamentary draftsman) was for six or so months the sole public servant employed by the commonwealth, the commonwealth public sector has assumed an increasing array of roles, responsibilities and functions.  These include the maintenance of the machinery of commonwealth government, delivering policy advice to Ministers, administering regulations, taxation and expenditure programs, and providing certain public services to, or on behalf of, the Australian population.

While public sector workers employed by the commonwealth are engaged in numerous activities, and the numbers of workers unquestionably large in aggregate number, there are numerous legislative definitions as to what actually constitutes a commonwealth public sector worker.

The Public Service Act 1999 (PSA) specifies the terms and conditions of employment applicable to the largest single bloc of commonwealth government employees, i.e. those employed by the core departments, executive agencies and statutory agencies comprising the APS.  In turn, the APS consists of agency heads (for example, a Secretary of a department) and non-agency head employees (including within the Senior Executive Service) engaged on an ongoing or non-ongoing basis.

The employment of staff by the commonwealth is not limited to the PSA, with employees of various other statutory agencies and other bodies employed under entity-specific or function-specific legislation.  For example, defence force personnel are employed under the Defence Act 1903 and Reserve Bank employees are employed under the Reserve Bank Act 1959, while members of parliament staff are employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (MoPS).

The provisions of the Constitution also enable the government to directly appoint personnel.  According to Section 67, "until the Parliament otherwise provides, the appointment and removal of all other officers of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the Governor-General in Council, unless the appointment is delegated by the Governor-General in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth to some other authority."

Until 1903 this provision represented the sole means by which commonwealth public servants were appointed, but has been rarely used since.  In June 2011, the government controversially appointed former Treasury Secretary Ken Henry as a part-time Special Advisor under Section 67 of the Constitution and outside the provisions of the PSA.


How many commonwealth public servants are there?

In addition to the varied legal definition as to who constitutes an employee of the commonwealth government, there exist numerous statistical sources with different methodologies used to estimate the size of commonwealth public sector employment.

Figure 1 provides a time series of civilian commonwealth public sector employment from 1901. (1)  While the data are derived from various sources, they are relatively consistent in that they capture staff numbers working under the PSA as well as under legislation pertaining to employment within commonwealth government trading enterprises.

Figure 1:  Commonwealth government civilian employment, 1901 to 2011

Head count of commonwealth total public sector employment, excluding defence force personnel and employees based overseas.

Source:  Alan Barnard, Noel G Butlin and Jonathon J Pincus, 1977, "Public and Private Sector Employment in Australia, 1901-1974", Australian Economic Review 10 (1):  43-52;  R A Foster, 1996, Australian Economic Statistics:  1949-1950 to 1994-95, Occasional Paper No. 8, RBA, Sydney;  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage and Salary Earners, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.001;  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.002.


During the first two decades of Federation the commonwealth government gradually increased its level of employment, including as a consequence of the gradual transfer of former colonial public servants to the commonwealth.  New government departments were established during this period, including the Prime Minister's (1911), Health (1921) and Commerce (1925), (2) with implications for future changes in the economically and socially interventionist roles undertaken by the commonwealth government.

As a part of its policy response to the Great Depression, the commonwealth government reduced its aggregate employment from about 53,900 in 1929 to about 47,700 in 1931.  This reduction in employment was a component of a broader plan agreed to by commonwealth and state governments to reduce government expenditures by 20 per cent (excluding some welfare payments), which had been subsequently credited as an important ingredient in Australia's relatively fast transition to economic recovery compared with other advanced countries.

The Depression-era trend of public sector employment reductions were reversed a decade later, with the total number of people employed by the commonwealth government increasing significantly from about 70,000 employees in 1939 to 192,000 in 1945.

This growth trend was due, in no small part, to the establishment of new departments and functions (including price and labour controls) specifically associated with the war effort, or created in response to perceived national post-war priorities such as post-war reconstruction, national development and social services, and the consequent hiring of additional personnel that such changes in public administration entailed.

The significant war-time upsurge in the numbers of commonwealth public sector workers can also be attributed to the centralisation of powers from the states to the commonwealth.  Some 2,800 state income tax employees from NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania were transferred to the Australian Taxation Office, while state public servants administering unemployment and labour market programs were transferred to the Commonwealth Employment Service.

During the year immediately following World War II the total numbers of civilian commonwealth government employees declined by about 22 per cent, including as war-time regulatory controls over the economy and society were relaxed, however aggregate commonwealth employment once again increased slightly during the late 1940s.

As part of the 1950-51 "Wool Boom" anti-inflationary budget, the Menzies government reduced PSA employment by some 14,200 people.  This included specific reductions for the Departments of National Development and Labour and National Service, and a general staff reduction (excluding Defence) elsewhere of five per cent. (3)  Since that period and through the 1960s, however, the commonwealth public sector continued its inexorable increase in employment.

During the Whitlam era, public sector employment increased by about 52,400 people to a total of 398,700 in 1975.  Many of these changes were induced by an expansion in the size and scope of commonwealth government expenditure functions including, but not limited to, the areas of welfare and social services, tertiary education, infrastructure, regional policy and local government.

Barring a temporary reduction in aggregate employment in 1977, and despite instigating a Royal Commission into commonwealth public administration, the employment increases instigated by Whitlam were largely left untouched by the Fraser government.

During the first two terms of the Hawke-Keating government public sector employment continued to expand, and significantly so during the 1980s, as a consequence of the continued expansion in the scope of government functions including in the areas of environmental policy and economic and social regulations.

In an effort to reduce commonwealth public sector debt and induce greater efficiencies concerning the provision of services, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments undertook asset sales in financial services, telecommunications, and air and rail transport from the late 1980s until the mid-1990s.  As a consequence of the privatisation policy there was a substantial reduction in the number of workers classified by commonwealth public sector employees.

Faced with a significant structural budget deficit and high levels of public sector indebtedness bequeathed by its predecessor, the Howard government sought to rein in the commonwealth government's expenditure commitments.

Key elements of the Howard strategy included the continuation of a program of privatisation, most prominently with respect to Telstra, as well as reducing APS size including through the outsourcing of government activities (including all functions undertaken by the Department of Administrative Services) to the private sector.  As a consequence of the Howard government's policies, total commonwealth public sector employment fell from about 354,800 in 1996 to a low of 243,600 in 2003.

However, these reductions in public sector employment at the commonwealth level have not been sustained.  Over the last few years of the Howard government, and during the two terms of the Rudd-Gillard governments to date, the total number of employees engaged by the commonwealth has increased to about 251,400 people in 2011.

Commonwealth public sector employment trends in absolute terms since 1901 are broadly mirrored in terms of employment as a share of both total and working age (15-64 years) populations (Figure 2).  Since the late 1980s there has been a significant reduction in the ratios of commonwealth employees to total population and the working age population, reversing the trend increases of previous decades.

Figure 2:  Commonwealth government civilian employment as a share of total population and working age population, 1901 to 2011

Head count of commonwealth total public sector employment, excluding defence force personnel and employees based overseas.

Source:  Alan Barnard, Noel G Butlin and Jonathon J Pincus, 1977, "Public and Private Sector Employment in Australia, 1901-1974", Australian Economic Review 10 (1):  43-52;  R A Foster, 1996, Australian Economic Statistics:  1949-1950 to 1994-95, Occasional Paper No. 8, RBA, Sydney;  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage and Salary Earners, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.001;  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.002.


Alternative statistical sources provide information on shorter term commonwealth public sector employment trends with varying degrees of coverage (Figure 3).

The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) provides head count statistics on commonwealth employees covered by the PSA, while statistics available in the government's annual budget papers provide details of average staffing levels (effectively full-time equivalents) of staff in the general government sector (including statutory authorities).  The ABS data entails a head count employment levels of all entities that report to parliament, including those covered under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997.  The APSC and ABS data exclude information on defence force personnel trends. (4)

Figure 3:  Commonwealth government employment, 1990 to 2013

ABS provides head count data on employment of all commonwealth government entities reporting to parliament, excluding defence force personnel and employees based overseas.  APSC provides head count statistics on employees covered by the Public Service Act, excluding defence force personnel.  Budget paper statistics provide average staffing level data on general government sector employment, including defence force personnel.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage and Salary Earners, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.001;  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0.55.002;  Australian Public Service Commission, APS Statistical Bulletin, various years;  Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Papers, various years.


Each of the three data series indicate that, since 2001, commonwealth public sector employment has grown on an average annual basis in the order of 3.3 and 3.4 per cent, whereas the ABS indicates a much more modest increase of 0.1 per cent per annum.

One reason for the smaller growth rate recorded by the ABS statistics is that its broad coverage of employment captures the effects of Howard-era reductions in public sector employment, which mainly affected entities outside of the APS.

In other words, the APSC and budget paper data implies that the employment reductions during the 1990s and early 2000s reform era affected PSA or general government sector employees to a much smaller extent than it did total commonwealth government employees as a whole, especially those working within government trading enterprises.

The budget papers also provide estimates of average staffing levels in the commonwealth general government sector for the coming financial year.  As will be discussed in further detail below, the proposed reductions in general government sector staffing by the Gillard government for 2012-13 will have a negligible impact on overall employment size.

An examination of employment structure by the APS entity reveals a "long tail" of small employers, primarily statutory agencies with regulatory powers (Figure 4).  In June 2011 there were 58 of these smaller agencies each employing less than 500 staff, cumulatively employing over 9,600 full- and part-time personnel.

On the other hand, commonwealth government entities specifically involved in welfare, tax and warfare — Centrelink, the Australian Taxation Office, and Department of Defence, respectively — each employed over 22,000 people.  These three agencies alone accounted for about 43 per cent of aggregate APS staffing levels in 2011.

Figure 4:  Distribution of Australian Public Service staff by agency, 2011

Data as at 30 June 2011.  Including ongoing and non-ongoing staff working on a full-time or part-time basis.

Source:  Australian Public Service Commission, APS Statistical Bulletin, 2010-11.


It is possible to disaggregate information on PSA employment by employment classification, with staff at levels between APS 1 to 6 representing the lowest strands of employment classification with staff accorded little or no managerial responsibilities (at least in larger offices), Executive Level (EL) staff representing middle management (including sectional heads within departments), and Senior Executive Service (SES) staff representing senior management.

Figure 5 illustrates changes in the relative shares of these employment classifications over the past two decades.  The relative share of APS 1-6 level staff has declined from about 83 per cent of total PSA staffing in 1991 to 71 per cent in 2011, reflecting in part the contracting out of certain lines of work to the private sector, whereas the share of SES level staff have increased marginally from about one to about two per cent over the same period.

The greatest source of growth by employment classification has been within the EL 1 and 2 middle management bands, increasing from about 13 per cent of total PSA staff in 1991 to about 26 per cent in 2011.  The trend increase in EL1 and EL2 employment had been maintained even during the first two terms of the Howard government, in which total PSA employment fell from about 128,700 in 1996 to 108,700 in 2001.

Figure 5:  Australian Public Service employment, staff by employment classification as share of total, 1991 to 2011

Data expressed as share of total employment of ongoing staff.  Total includes graduates, trainees and other staff.

Source:  Australian Public Service Commission, APS Statistical Bulletin, various years.


Reflecting broader trends in Australian society, the APS is ageing with growth in the relative representation of staff aged 45 and over within the overall staffing mix (Figure 6).

Figure 6:  Age composition of Australian Public Service Staff, 1991 to 2011

Data refers to ongoing staff.

Source:  Australian Public Service Commission, APS Statistical Bulletin, various years.


The most significant growth in APS employment, by age cohort, has been exhibited amongst those aged between 50 and 54, below the minimum age of 55 years at which APS personnel may receive superannuation benefits under the Commonwealth Superannuation or Public Sector Superannuation Schemes.

By contrast, since 1991 there have been relative declines in the share of APS employment of those aged less than 45 years.  In particular the numbers of people aged in their twenties working in the APS on an ongoing basis has declined by an average of six per cent over the period, even though these declines have been largely arrested since 2000.

Another characteristic feature of the APS is its increasing feminisation, particularly since 2000 when the female-to-employment ratio within the APS exceeded the male ratio (Figure 7).

Figure 7:  Gender composition of Australian Public Service, 1991 to 2011

Data refers to ongoing staff, including graduates, trainees and other staff.

Source:  Australian Public Service Commission, APS Statistical Bulletin, various years.


In addition to people directly employed by the commonwealth government in accordance with specific public employment or administrative legislation, a variety of functions including policy advisory services are outsourced to contracted private sector service providers.  Some of these providers depend upon commonwealth government funding for their main source of income, raising questions about the true extent of their operational autonomy from the state.

A recent investigation found that more than $500 million per annum has been spent on about 18,000 contracts awarded by the commonwealth government over the past four years.  Consultancy firms KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young collectively received contracts from 2008 to 2011 valued at about $220 million. (5)

In addition to selective purchaser-provider arrangements, governments have also fostered the creation of subsidised and regulated "quasi-markets" entailing significant service delivery functions undertaken by private sector organisations.

An example of this was the establishment of Job Services Australia (formerly the Job Network) by the Howard government in 1998, in which private, non-profit and government organisations are contracted by the commonwealth government to provide various employment services and labour market programs, including for the unemployed.

Private sector enterprises and other non-government organisations also tend to be encumbered by governmental regulations ensuring that government objectives are satisfied without recourse to explicit public funding.

The fiscal burden of commonwealth public sector employment, totalling some $28 billion in 2010-11, (6) reflects a combination of the total numbers of employees engaged by government and the salaries and other benefits accorded to employees.  While there exists a wide array of pecuniary entitlements allocated to public sector workers, the remuneration accorded to employees within the upper echelons of the commonwealth public service are significantly greater than the average remuneration earned by private sector employees (Box 1).

Box 1:  Salaries and benefits for the commonwealth public sector "top one per cent"

The entitlements provided to the head of commonwealth public sector departments and agencies, and for those working within the APS Senior Executive Service (SES), are well in excess of average earnings provided within the private sector.

Figure 8 compares the salaries of employees situated in the highest pay band in the Senior Executive Service with private sector total earnings, averaged across each year, from 1901 to 2011.

While the gap between SES and private sector earnings has closed in the long run, since the mid-1990s the gap has tended to increase as governments increasingly use remuneration as a mechanism to draw private sector executives to the public sector, or to prevent public sector senior officers exiting to the private sector.

Figure 8:  Average earnings for APS Senior Executive Service and private sector employees


Another indicator of the sectoral pay discrepancy is provided by a comparison of remuneration received by selected department or agency heads against total average earnings in the private sector for 2010-11.  Figure 9 expresses the total remuneration package of selected heads of commonwealth government entities as a multiple of total private sector average earnings.

Figure 9:  Total remuneration of commonwealth department/agency head as multiple of total average private sector earnings

In recent years considerable foment within the Australian community has been generated concerning top private sector remuneration.

The remuneration packages of senior private sector personnel whose enterprises are shielded from market competition through subsidies (and specific tax breaks) or regulation ought to be the subject of external scrutiny.  However, some of this community agitation has been misdirected against the salaries and other entitlements received by employees of other private sector entities who do not receive government fiscal or regulatory favours and, hence, should not represent the subject of community concern.

On the other hand, the taxpaying public is entitled to scrutinise the level and distribution of public sector employee entitlements given that they are forced by government to finance such payments.

With growing concerns that top public sector remuneration is growing out of line with community expectations, a combination of payment growth caps and absolute reductions in public sector employment will be necessary to ensure that the overall fiscal burdens of commonwealth public sector employment are appropriately constrained.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings Australia, cat. no. 6302.0;  Australian Public Service Commission, Remuneration Survey, various years;  A B Atkinson and Andrew Leigh, 2006, "The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia", Australian National University, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 514;  Anthony Sibillin, 2011, "Top public servants in pay bonanza", The Australian Financial Review, 17 October, 2012



RIGHTSIZING THE PUBLIC SERVICE:  WHY IS IT NECESSARY?  WHERE CAN STAFF REDUCTIONS BE FOUND?

The rationale for public sector employment reductions

Most classical liberal scholars acknowledge that some level of public sector administration is indispensable for a functioning system of constitutional government under the rule of law.  Indeed, a competent and professional bureaucracy is necessary to help ensure provision of those limited set of tax-financed goods and services, primarily associated with the tasks of ensuring protection of life, limb and property, which cannot be provided through competitive private markets guided by profit-and-loss mechanisms.

This idea was perhaps best explained in the writings of Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises.  In his important, albeit little-known, work titled Bureaucracy, Mises explained the rationale for public sector employment lies in the inherent distinction between bureaucratic and profit managements in the economic and social domain:

'[t]here are areas of man's activities in which there cannot be any question of profit management and where bureaucratic management must prevail.  A police department cannot be operated according to the methods resorted to in the conduct of a gainful enterprise.  A bakery serves a definite number of people — its customers — in selling them piecemeal what it has produced;  it is the patronage of its customers that provides the social legitimacy — the profitability — of the bakery's business.  A police department cannot sell its “products”;  its achievements, however valuable, even indispensable as they may be, have no price on the market and therefore cannot be contrasted with the total expenditure made in the endeavors to bring them about.' (7)

Elsewhere, Mises explained that "[a]s long as the activity of the state is restricted to the narrow field that liberalism assigns to it, the disadvantages of bureaucracy cannot, at any rate, make themselves too apparent." (8)

However, modern governments have progressively extended their roles and activities well beyond the range of protective functions and into those more efficiently and effectively managed by enterprises or individuals in their private capacities.  It is under these scenarios, typifying the Australian experience and of most other Western countries, that the costs of public sector employment become overly burdensome and therefore more apparent to the community at large.

First, public service wages and entitlements, and other costs necessary to maintain public sector employment, are coercively financed by the taxpaying public working within the private sector. (9)

Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have concluded that taxes impose significant efficiency costs hampering the functioning of the economy, as productive activities such as investments, savings, work effort and human capital accumulation are avoided to some degree by market participants in the presence of taxation.  This, in turn, has the effect of reducing private sector employment and, more generally, the rate of economic growth in the long run, contributing to foregone increases in living standards.

It is conceivable that the level of taxation conscripted to fund public sector employee salaries and benefits are typically higher than would otherwise be the case, as a consequence of industrial relations negotiations between governments and public sector workers (usually public sector union representatives).

In the case of the private sector the ability of unions to secure additional benefits for their members is constrained by the need of private enterprises to maintain their cost competitiveness.  In other words, implementation of excessive labour cost increases could lead to the closure of marginally profitable firms and retrenchment of workers thereby a reduction in union membership.

However, the insulation of government entities, especially those charged with advising and implementing public policies, from the competitive market fosters an institutional environment in which public sector unions and politicians (or senior bureaucrats acting on behalf of politicians) can agree to significant increases in employee entitlements, without direct repercussions to the survivability of their operations.

The greater prospects open to public sector unions, relative to their private sector counterparts, to secure significant salary and benefit increases is magnified by the fact that the tax costs of the concentrated benefits received can be spread thinly across the community, with little prospect of countervailing approbation by rationally ignorant or irrational voters.

Compounding the distortionary effects of additional taxation associated with growing public sector employment, the growth in employment opportunities provided by government agencies tends to attract labour toward the public sector, diverting them away from being more productively utilised within the private sector.

Other things being equal, the larger the size and scope of the public service the more attractive salaried employment within this sector becomes, diluting the relative attractiveness of private sector salaried or self-employment which are not insulated from changing market conditions. (10)  Increasing numbers of people may seek employment within a larger public sector for employment security or the opportunity of working in well-paying, but less productive environments not necessarily guided by the urgent need to satisfy final (i.e., non-political) customers. (11)

Perhaps the most insidious effect attributable to growth of governmental employment is that public-policy bureaucrats are employed, at taxpayers' expense, to explicitly advise and administer taxation and regulatory policies which further attenuate private sector employment and other activities.

In addition to the economic costs of taxation noted above, numerous cases have been raised concerning the compliance burdens and economic distortions posed by the significant growth in commonwealth government economic, environmental and social regulations (Figure 10).

Some notable recent cases of the commonwealth regulatory edifice hampering private sector activity include:  environmental laws affecting the construction, energy and mining sectors;  the contribution of renewable energy targets redirecting scarce capital towards inefficient non-coal fired electricity generation;  and the role of existing industrial relations regulation impeding the discovery and enforceability of decentralised, efficient employment arrangements.

Figure 10:  Pages of primary commonwealth government legislation, 1901-02 to 2011

Source:  Richard J. Wood.


Most individuals and businesses affected by commonwealth regulations are familiar with the administrative compliance costs that they generate, such as the costs of filling out official forms, providing information to government authorities, record-keeping expenses, and obtaining advice from external sources (e.g., accountants, lawyers) to comply with regulatory standards.  There also exist non-paperwork compliance costs, such as staff training and alterations to physical capital to meet obligations and costs associated with delays in receiving regulatory approvals. (12)

Regulations impose adverse effects upon economic performance by artificially redirecting the economic discovery process (i.e., which relates to what, how, where and when to produce value-added outputs to the satisfaction of customers in return for a profit) in ways not otherwise preferred by entrepreneurs, thus leading to foregone opportunities left unexploited.

The imposition of regulations by governments also encourages the proliferation of economic errors as prices and profit-and-loss signals are distorted and muted, magnifying efforts by entrepreneurs to invest scarce resources in the capture of regulatory rents rather than economic profits. (13)

Another important problem associated with government regulations enforced by public sector employees is that they may engender competitive neutrality conflicts of interests, in that regulations hamper the operations of for-profit or not-for-profit competitors of public sector service providers.

Proponents of a large and growing public sector employment base in Australia usually prefer to cite the role of various government employees in delivering tangible services to the public, rather than those advising and enacting growth-retarding taxes and regulations, and warn of the potentially adverse consequences of any public sector rationalisation for service delivery outcomes.

It is generally accepted, however, that public sector entities lack the incentive to restrain costs and ensure output quality, in essence maintaining value-added provision, as efficiently or effectively as their private sector counterparts providing comparable goods and services.

Politicians and bureaucrats allocate scarce resources in the absence of price systems or profit-and-loss signals, with decisions with regard to allocation made on the basis of political prerogative rather than economic imperative. (14)

The monopolistic provision of governmental outputs means that voters tend to lack interest in ascertaining if the prevailing "take-what-is-given" political allocation is consistent with individual economic desires, or even in many cases to challenge political authorities to the extent that a divergence between political allocation and economic preferences exist. (15)  This suggests that politicians face less feedback and less restraint, encouraging excessive employment of public sector workers in lines of activity detrimental to private sector growth. (16)

Creeping intervention by governments in fields in which they lack specialisation, and the increase in public sector employment that such a trend entails, can also contribute to a lack of efficiency in service delivery:

'[i]f any social instrument devised for a special service is made to act additionally for another, it will perform its own office badly as well as the one it usurps. ... On this account, the State is a poor head of a family, a poor commercial or agricultural leader, a bad distributor of labor and of subsistences, a bad regulator of production, exchanges, and consumption, a mediocre administrator of the province and the commune, an undiscerning philanthropist, an incompetent director of the fine arts, of science, of instruction, and of worship.  In all these offices its action is either dilatory or bungling, according to routine or oppressive, always expensive, of little effect and feeble in returns, and always beyond or apart from the real wants it pretends to satisfy.' (17)

Finally, the need for public sector employees to rigidly conform to legislation and other rules, as part of broader efforts to maintain some semblance of democratic accountability, suggests that the public sector lacks the features of enterprise, flexibility and innovation characteristic of competitive private sector firms:

'[t]he state is a rigid collective organ, which can only act by means of a complicated apparatus, composed of numerous wheels and systems of wheels, subordinated one to another;  the state is a hierarchy either aristocratic, or bureaucratic, or elective, in which spontaneous thought is by the very nature of things subjected to a prodigious number of controlling and hampering checks.  Such a machine can invent nothing.' (18)

Empirical evidence worldwide has shown that, despite severe regulatory impediments often placed on private sector entities, governments usually deliver services at lower levels of efficiency, and often substantially so, compared with private sector competitors in comparable industries.  This partly explains why governments tend to provide services exhibiting ever-increasing costs, in contrast with the private sector which tends to provide goods and services with improving quality and lower costs. (19)

In any event the commonwealth government practically plays a comparatively minor role within the Australian public sector of delivering direct services to, or on behalf of, the public.  Some services, such as the High Court and other components of the federal court system which assist in the adjudication of certain disputes, may play a role in facilitating private economic and other activities, (20) yet others can be perceived as being unambiguously detrimental to productive economic pursuits.

From relatively modest beginnings in the first decade of Federation, the welfare state now consumes a substantial share of the commonwealth government budget.  As Figure 11 illustrates commonwealth expenditure on social security and welfare is consuming a relatively greater share of national resources, as are expenditures on education and health care.  The available data also shows trend growth in the numbers of welfare recipients, despite astronomical improvements in living standards across the spectrum of personal incomes since the early twentieth century.

It is largely accepted that the welfare state hampers economic performance, reducing labour supply and entrepreneurial activities as some individuals choose to substitute a state of dependency on largely passive welfare payments for the disciplines and rigours associated with active participation in employment.  Studies have also established that valuable work skills and aptitudes among welfare recipients tend to atrophy over time, reducing the effectiveness of previous investments in human capital.

A growing phenomenon in the Australian context is the emergence of "fiscal churn" arising from the provision of welfare payments, including tax breaks for families and subsidies for child care and school education, to people on middle and high income levels.  As many critics have indicated, this trend is inherently wasteful in that the commonwealth collects taxes from middle to high income earners to redistribute welfare payments back to these same groups, less deductions to fund the administrative costs of a bureaucracy to administer the fiscal churn.

Figure 11:  Commonwealth welfare state expenditure as a proportion of GDP, 1901-02 to 2009-10

Data expressed in current prices.

Source:  Julie Novak, 2012, "The welfare state grows and grows", in Gary Johns, ed., Right Social Justice:  Better Ways to Help the Poor, Connor Court, Melbourne.


Surveys of political attitudes consistently show that Australian public sector employees, including those engaged by the commonwealth government, mainly tend to vote for left-of-centre parties which are ideologically committed to extending the sphere of governmental activities at the expense of the private sector.

The latest Australian Election Study, undertaken after the 2010 federal election, indicates that most public sector employee respondents (commonwealth, state and local) voted for Labor (48 per cent) and the Greens (14 per cent) while 36 per cent of respondents who were government employees voted for the Liberal-Nationals Coalition.

Government employees in effect represent a bloc who wield significant, and indeed unparalleled, influence within the Australian political system by virtue of their dual role as "suppliers" of government interventions (in their capacities as employees of public sector entities) and "demanders" of government interventions (in their capacities as voters).

Finally, it should also be recognised that the problems associated with growth in public sector employment in Australia are magnified by the effective growth in commonwealth government activities over and above its limited set of constitutional responsibilities as enumerated by Section 51 of the Australian Constitution.

As is well known the extension of the commonwealth's role in national economic and social affairs has been informed by a range of factors, such as constitutional ambiguities, the effect of High Court judgments in attenuating state fiscal autonomy, and the increasing exercise of legal discretion by the national Parliament to intervene in traditional state government activities. (21)  However, the growth in commonwealth influence over the states would not have occurred if it were not politically profitable to do so;  as Canadian economist Jean-Luc Migué explained, "once constitutional limits break down and functions overlap, two or more levels of government compete for the same voters in the supply of services in a given territory." (22)

Migué shows that when two or more levels of government compete to supply the same public services, it is in the interest of suppliers to gain votes by implementing an expenditure program first.  Conversely, abstaining from supplying the output would lead to a loss in potential votes to the rival government that supplies the output first.

Even with the restraining forces of factor mobility across states and territories at play, it is likely that the political dynamics described here will lead to an oversupply of governmental services as the commonwealth intrudes into the traditional constitutional fields of the lower levels of government.

Notwithstanding the skewed allocation of revenue powers across levels of government, the commonwealth government and its employment base is clearly larger than it should otherwise be as a consequence of centralised constitutional overreach which is the defining characteristic of Australian federalism.


Current proposals for public sector employment reductions

In the 2012-13 Budget the Gillard government announced a program of general government sector employment reductions of about 3,100 people (on a FTE basis) during this fiscal year.  Table 1 provides a breakdown of proposed reductions in average staffing levels by department.

Table 1:  Estimate of gross reductions in average staffing levels in commonwealth general government sector, 2012-13

Staffing reductions expressed in terms of "average staffing levels", reflecting the average number of employees receiving salary or wages over the fiscal year, with adjustments for casual and part-time staff, showing the full-time equivalent.  Data includes defence personnel, non-uniformed staff and overseas personnel. (a) Less proposed increases in general government sector personnel of 1,459 ASL.

Source:  Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, Budget Papers, Canberra.


Despite warnings by the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) and other interests for a relatively large commonwealth public sector that the proposed cuts to APS staffing numbers poses as an imminent danger to service delivery and policy implementation, it should be noted that the magnitude of the reported reductions for this year is dwarfed by the average annual level of resignations experienced from the APS in recent years and is not substantially greater than the number of age-related retirements (Table 2). (23)

Table 2:  Engagements and separations of Australian Public Service staff, 2008 to 2011

Financial year data.  Data refers to ongoing staff.

Source:  Australian Public Service Commission, 2011, APS Statistical Bulletin 2010-11, APSC, Canberra.


In an effort to sharpen the political divide between it and state Coalition governments, which are seeking opportunities for public sector attrition primarily through voluntary redundancies, the commonwealth government has recently stated that its fiscal policy objective of a budget surplus in 2012-13 will not be met by further public service reductions. (24)

As noted above, the opposition Coalition parties proposed a policy at the 2010 federal election to reduce the size of the APS by some 12,000 employees over a two-year period.  The key element of this policy was that employment reductions would occur under a process of natural attrition, which generally refers to a process in which the total numbers of employees are reduced through gradual means by retirement, resignation or death.

Information provided by the Australian Public Service Commission indicates that 8,396 ongoing APS staff in 2011 resigned or retired from, or died whilst employed in, the service. (25)  With data from previous years also revealing similar orders of magnitude of natural attrition from the APS, this suggests that the Coalition, if it won office, would easily have achieved its small staffing reduction target in the short term.


A framework to rightsize the Australian Public Service

The chief criticism of the prevailing approaches by the two major parties is that their policies to reduce commonwealth government employment are strictly minimalist by their nature.  They are designed to convey an illusory perception to the general public of tough-minded cuts for the stated purpose of achieving greater economy in public administration, but which in reality largely retain the size and architecture of the public sector intact.

In addition the approaches outlined by the parties are ad hoc in their nature, with a lack of public justification outlining the underlying policy rationales for the minimalist approaches offered.

An alternative to the unsatisfactory, piecemeal approaches offered by the Labor and Liberal-National parties would be to argue the case for systemic reductions to commonwealth employment, as part of a broader strategy to permanently reduce the size of the commonwealth government and its role in Australian economic and social affairs.

Three strategic approaches can be adopted by government to ensure meaningful reductions to commonwealth public sector employment:  privatisation;  transferring entities to states and territories;  and the abolition of entities which undertake unnecessary or economically damaging activities.


Privatisation

Privatisation may be broadly defined as the transfer of government-owned assets, including enterprises of going concern, to private ownership or control. (26)  A range of interrelated arguments have been advanced favouring privatisation as an economic reform option, including:

  • exploiting the relatively greater efficiencies of private sector operations compared with the public sector;
  • eliminating the lack of incentives faced by monopolistic public sector entities to improve performance;
  • deriving economic benefits associated with removing direct political allocation of scarce resources;
  • enabling capital markets and consumers to monitor the performance of privatised entities;  and
  • providing governments with sales revenues with which to repay debts or fund essential services.

The commonwealth government in the past had been particularly active in selling a number of its entities, either through offering equity to the public or through trade sales to private sector entities, from the late 1980s to the early 2000s (Table 3).  These sales, primarily in the areas of communications, financial services and infrastructure, provided the government with substantial sales revenue to the tune of at least $69 billion, the proceeds of which were used to help retire or contain public sector debts. (27)

Table 3:  Summary of major commonwealth government privatisations

The data in this Table refer to privatisations yielding proceeds $50 million or over. (a) Sale of National Rail Corporation was combined with sale of Freight Rail Corporation, owned by New South Wales government.  Figure refers to sale proceeds received by commonwealth government for its interest in National Rail Corporation.

Source:  Department of Finance and Administration, "Past sales" (accessed 2 May 2012);  Reserve Bank of Australia, 1997, "Privatisation in Australia", Reserve Bank Bulletin (December):  7-16.


Since this period the momentum for further privatisation at the commonwealth level has been largely halted.  However there remains scope for the government to proceed with a significant privatisation program, to enhance the productivity of existing services and deliver sales proceeds to assist in achieving fiscal consolidation objectives.

In particular, the commonwealth government should immediately proceed with privatising the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Australian Postal Corporation (Australia Post), Medibank Private and the Special Broadcasting Corporation (SBS).  A number of countries have liberalised their postal services (Box 2) and government broadcasting services, while there is no need to maintain a government-owned health insurer in a competitive Australian health insurance market.


Box 2:  The international experience of postal services privatisation and liberalisation

The means by which individuals and businesses communicate has changed radically over the last two decades, with the emergence of internet and mobile phone technologies allowing for instantaneous communications.  Falling transportation costs has also encouraged viable courier services markets to develop throughout the developed world.

These developments are challenging the viability of government-owned postal services, which have tended to retain inflexible modes of operation and high-cost structures (including to cross-subsidise other aspects of the government postal business, or certain classes of customers).  Some countries have responded by liberalising the monopoly privileges once held by public sector postal services and opening up the market to competition.

In some European countries the private sector has assumed a significant ownership role in postal services provision.  In Germany 69 per cent of the formerly government post office Deutsche Post is privately owned, while in the Netherlands an Australian courier company TNT completely owns the former government post office.  The United Kingdom in recent years has proceeded along a policy path ensuring the financial viability of Royal Mail in advance of prospective privatisation.

An ambitious postal privatisation agenda was pursued in the mid-2000s by the Koizumi government in Japan.  The proposal entailed splitting Japan Post into four separate companies (a bank, an insurance company, a postal service, and retail shopfront for the other three companies), to be privatised by 2007.  However pressure by trade unions and anti-reform politicians had subsequently led to a retreat from postal privatisation in that country.

Most other Western countries, including Australia, have "corporatised" their government postal services in an effort to inject market-like disciplines into the sector.  This has entailed obligating postal services to pay taxes and adhere to regulations on a similar basis to that of private sector firms.  In other countries, such as New Zealand and Sweden, postal monopolies have been eliminated to allow entrepreneurs to offer alternative services.  However these entities remain under government ownership, with the next step of outright privatisation expected to engender additional efficiencies within postal markets.

Source:  Eamonn Butler and Keith Boyfield, "Around the World in 80 Ideas", Adam Smith Institute (accessed 2 May 2012);  Consumer Postal Council, 2012, Index of Postal Freedom:  2012 Edition, Consumer Postal Council, Arlington;  Tad DeHaven, 2010, "Privatizing the U.S. Postal Service" (accessed 2 May 2012).

Privatising these entities would necessitate the transfer of staff, currently employed under commonwealth government legislative auspices, to the private sector.  It is estimated that the total numbers of people working in the ABC, Australia Post, Medibank Private and SBS are in the order of 44,200; (28)  a figure roughly 15 times greater than the APS staffing reductions proposed by the Gillard government, and four times than that proposed under the Coalition's 2010 election policy.


Transfer to states and territories

As discussed above, the Australian federal system is characterised by extensive duplication in functions and activities by various levels of government primarily due to the commonwealth's incursion into traditional fields of state constitutional responsibility.

Two fields of public policy in which the commonwealth government has assumed funding and policy roles at the expense of the states and territories are education and health care, which both account for almost one-quarter of commonwealth general government expenses in 2011-12. (29)  In recent months the government has announced its aspiration to alter the existing schools' funding model and introduce a dental health treatment program for low income earners, which is likely to place additional fiscal pressure on the commonwealth budget including as a consequence of any additional employment of additional public sector workers to manage these initiatives.

Annual reports published by the government indicate that about 8,100 employees were engaged by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (including the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority) in childcare and early childhood education, schooling, higher education and vocational education and training functions, and Department of Health and Ageing as at 30 June 2011.  Returning those functions and activities to the states would reduce the overall size of the commonwealth public sector by more than double the current government's 2011-12 APS employment reduction target, and would represent more than two-thirds the Coalition's employment reduction target. (30)

Other commonwealth government entities whose functions could be subject to a similar process of transference to the states may include the Department of Agriculture, Families, Infrastructure and Transport, Regional Australia, Resources and Sustainability, except for those responsibilities expressly allocated to the commonwealth under the Australian Constitution.


Abolition

In addition to privatisation and improvements in constitutional alignment between the commonwealth and states, some commonwealth government entities could be abolished altogether on account of the distortionary economic impacts of policies or programs, or unnecessary roles, undertaken by such bodies.

The policies developed and funding provided by the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, and related bodies such as the Office of Renewable Energy Regulator (Clean Energy Regulator) and the Australian Carbon Trust (Low Carbon Australia), is hampering the efficiency of the Australian economy through their distortionary impacts on production and consumption choices in energy markets.

Another commonwealth government agency which is contributing to policy-induced distortions in Australia's industrial structure is the Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, including as a consequence of its ongoing role in subsidising a largely inefficient domestic motor vehicle manufacturing industry.

The abolition of climate change and corporate welfare activities would reduce commonwealth public sector employment by some 4,600 personnel.  This magnitude of employment reduction alone would exceed the government's staffing reduction target within the APS by about 1,500 people, and would represent about 39 per cent of the Coalition's 12,000 commonwealth government employment reduction target announced during the 2010 election.

Commonwealth entities, such as AusAID (1,245 staff), the Australia Council (113) and Australian Sports Commission (808), should be abolished since their activities do not relate to the financing or provision of public goods.  A similar strategy could also apply to a number of other entities, including the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australian Human Rights Commission, Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Australian Trade Commission, Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, Future Fund Management Agency, NBN Co. and the Wheat Export Authority. (31)



CONCLUSION

Writing in the late 1950s the political scientist Alan Fraser Davies wrote that:

'[t]he characteristic talent of Australians is not for improvisation, nor even for republican manners, it is for bureaucracy.  We take a somewhat hesitant pride in this, since it runs counter ... to the archaic and cherished image of ourselves as an ungovernable, if not actually lawless, people.' (32)

The "talent" of the Australian political class to develop exotic rationales and methods conducive to bureaucratic expansion, and hence large government, is particularly manifest at the commonwealth government level.

Successive governments, of both political persuasions, have devised politically ingenious ways to create a large body of supervisors based in Canberra, whose main roles are to fund state governments and non-government organisations and then to watch these service deliverers as they attempt to dutifully perform the commonwealth's policy bidding.

While the commonwealth has developed a fetish for micromanaging how service deliverers they fund will actually deliver such outputs, the extent of service delivery undertaken by the commonwealth itself tends to be limited to basic protective functions and some redistributive services, such as doling out payments to welfare beneficiaries.

In addition to the federal supervisory state, the commonwealth's "talent for bureaucracy" has manifest itself in the form of a substantial regulatory state with numerous authorities solely charged with ensuring that the economic and social activities of every Australian individual and business conforms with politically acceptable modes of conduct.

With the need for Australia to repair its underlying structural budget deficit recognised by both major political parties, a unique opportunity exists for the commonwealth government to instigate major steps to halt, if not reverse, the growth of bureaucracy that has largely proceeded apace in an uninterrupted fashion for decades.

The reduction in expenditures that the rightsizing of the public service would eventually entail would assist in the return of the commonwealth budget back into balance or modest surplus, without recourse to new taxes which could stymie economic growth.

Furthermore, a substantial reduction in commonwealth government employment would ensure that other Australian talents that have been suppressed for too long — particularly the exercise of private sector entrepreneurship that creatively finances and provides high-quality products to the buying public on the domestic and global economic stage — can prosper.



ENDNOTES

1. For ease of statistical comparability trends in relation to the employment of non-civilian defence personnel (including permanent and reserve forces) will be excluded from this paper, unless otherwise specified.

2. Howard A Scarrow, 1957, The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia, Duke University Press, Durham, p. 72.

3. Australian Public Service Commission, 2004, A History in Three Acts: Evolution of the Public Service Act 1999, Occasional Paper No. 3, Canberra, p. 55.

4. Kirsty Laurie and Jason McDonald, 2008, "A perspective on trends in Australian Government spending", Economic Roundup (Summer): 27-49.

5. Edmund Tadros and Markus Mannheim, 2012, "Yes please minister: Labor spends billions on advice", The Canberra Times, 20 March.

6. General government sector figures, including superannuation expenses. Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, Final Budget Outcome 2010-11, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

7. Ludwig von Mises, "Preface to the 1962 Edition", Bureaucracy, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn.

8. Ludwig von Mises, [1927] 2005, Liberalism: The Classical Tradition, Liberty Fund Edition, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, p. 73.

9. While Australian public sector workers are liable to pay income taxation in similar fashion as their salaried counterparts in the private sector, the point made here is that net salaries and other benefits received by government employees are coercively financed by the private sector.

10. As noted above some private sector self-employees could be effectively classified as public servants, to the extent that they mainly provide consultancy or other services either directly to governmental entities, or to entities which indirectly rely upon the public sector for their existence such as political parties, trade unions and some non-government organisations.

11. It is usually argued, invariably by public sector workers themselves, that their motivation for employment is primarily to assist, or provide for, others, or to use the available policy apparatus of governments to improve society more generally. While such rhetorical sentiments are deep-seated within the public sector these should not be accepted uncritically. As "Director's Law" and similar theories suggest the immediate beneficiaries of expanding government programs or services are public sector employees, who siphon off a proportion of public funding in the form of wages and benefits, rather than the final beneficiaries of programs or services. The ability to engender genuine economic or societal improvements through bureaucratic or political solutions is also significantly compromised, in no small part, by the limitations of central planning as famously pointed out in the "socialist calculation" debates by Mises and Friedrich Hayek.

12. Productivity Commission, 2007, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation, Research Report, Melbourne.

13. Ludwig von Mises, [1949] 2007, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis; Israel M Kirzner, 1997, "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach", Journal of Economic Literature 35: 60-85; Bruce L Benson, 2004, "Opportunities Foregone: The Unmeasurable Costs of Regulation", Journal of Private Enterprise 19: 1-25; Bruce L Benson, 2011, "A Neo-Mengerian Examination of the Regulatory Process", Studies in Emergent Order 4: 193-208.

14. These political prerogatives may include the need to satisfy the overt political demands of prominent special interest groupings, who incidentally advocate policy positions not necessarily consistent with the interests of their own members let alone the broader community. Mancur Olson, 1971, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

15. Various institutional restraints on political action, such as federalism, have been proposed on the basis that interjurisdictional mobility and political competition for larger voting bases would ensure that the extent and quality of public services, and their cost, accurately reflect individual demands. However, as discussed later, the tendency towards fiscal and regulatory centralisation has significantly muted this "competitive federalism" impulse as a feature of Australian political affairs.

16. Tyler Watts, 2012, "Government Spending Cuts are Bad for the Economy?", The Freeman online.

17. "Hippolyte Taine on 'Abusive Government Intervention' (1890)" in Robert Leroux and David Hart, eds., French Liberalism in the 19th Century, Routledge, London, p. 270-272.

18. Paul-Leroy Beaulieu, 1891, The Modern State in Relation to Society and the Individual, Swan Sonnenschein & Co, London, p. 82-83.

19. For a survey of the issues, see Dennis C Mueller, 2003, Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. In addition, evidence from the United States, Europe and Australia has shown that former public sector entities, for example in utility industries, dramatically improve their productivity performance once privatised and exposed to direct market forces or contestability pressures.

20. However, the growth in disputes processed through court systems could be symptomatic of the growing range and complexity of government interventions whereby private parties seek to formally resolve disputes with public sector entities through courts. As American economist Matthew Mitchell notes, growth in legal disputation is reflected in growth in the numbers of lawyers which, in turn, "may be an indication of a nation's tendency to rent-seek". Matthew Mitchell, 2012, The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism, George Mason University, Mercatus Center, Research Paper, p. 20.

21. For a discussion of these issues see Bhajan Grewal and Peter Sheehan, 2003, "The Evolution of Constitutional Federalism in Australia: An Incomplete Contracts Approach", Victoria University of Technology, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 22.

22. Jean-Luc Migué, 1997, "Public choice in a federal system", Public Choice 90: 235-254, p. 235.

23. Australian Public Service Commission, 2011, APS Statistical Bulletin 2010-11, APSC, Canberra.

24. Senator the Hon Penny Wong, 2012, Transcript of Interview, Sky PM Agenda with David Speers, 24 September.

25. Ibid.

26. Privatisation is distinguished from other measures undertaken by governments to promote private sector involvement in the provision of goods and services, such as contracting out, leasing or private financing of infrastructure projects. Reserve Bank of Australia, 1997, "Privatisation in Australia", Reserve Bank Bulletin (December): 7-16.

27. RBA, Ibid.

28. This figure is sourced from the latest annual reports of the four entities, and refers to staffing levels as at 30 June 2011. Figures provided by Australia Post, Medibank Private and SBS are headcounts whereas the ABC figure is for average staffing levels.

29. Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, Final Budget Outcome 2011-12, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

30. As noted in previous research undertaken by the author, a transfer of commonwealth public sector functions and activities of the states should be accompanied by the decentralisation of taxing powers (e.g., personal income taxation) within the Australian federal system. However even if expenditure responsibilities were transferred to the states without the commensurate transfer of taxing powers, the states could seek to privatise or contract out activities as a means of minimising their fiscal exposure to the additional expenditure responsibilities provided by the commonwealth.

31. The staffing reductions associated with the abolition of these entities would have totalled some 2,300 persons as at 30 June 2011.

32. Quoted in Hal Colebatch, 2005, "A 'Talent for Bureaucracy': A. F. Davies and the Analysis of Government in Australia", Australian Journal of Public Administration 64 (4): 32-40.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Costs lost in the focus on climate

It is more than 25 years since the possibility that carbon dioxide and other human-induced greenhouse gas emissions achieved currency as possible causes of global warming.

In that period a large volume of legislation has been introduced.  The latest proposals link Australia's carbon price with that of the European Union and provide a one-way street for Australian firms to acquit part of their emission reductions by buying EU credits.  This is likely to transfer about $1 billion a year to the EU, perhaps a suitable form of aid to a political entity increasingly resembling a third world ''failed state''.

The proposed change to Australia's carbon tax/cap-and-trade will mean a lower price on carbon.  But it leaves unanswered how much Australia is currently and prospectively spending on emission reduction measures.

There are four families of such measures in place:  the carbon tax, the Renewable Energy Target, direct budgetary expenditures and standards on a range of products.

The government has never provided public estimates of the combined cost or benefits of all these imposts.

The carbon tax is unique to Australia, though the EU has a less comprehensive cap-and-trade variant.  Public estimates of its costs are $8bn a year in its present format.

The RET has been around since 2001.  It currently requires 20 per cent of electricity by 2020 to be derived from a mix of large-scale sources, dominated by wind, and small-scale installations, which include solar water heaters, heat pumps, and solar panels.  Wind requires a price of more than $110 per megawatt hour to be economically viable and small-scale systems at least twice that.  Coal-generated electricity costs $35-$40 per megawatt hour.

Together, the RET schemes, including the need for back-up systems, mean an impost by 2020 of about $5bn a year.  The third family of costs comprises direct budgetary expenditures, chief among which are those of the Departments of Climate Change, Energy and Resources, and Sustainability and Water.

In the current year's budget at least $2.7bn is clearly identifiable, added to which are the sums that every department, including Treasury, must allocate to addressing climate change.

Finally there are regulatory measures that force suppliers to feature energy-saving features in the products they offer.  Many of these standards started life as measures to conserve energy and were targeted at a previous scare — the forecasts that the world was running out of fossil fuels.

Although such forecasts were discredited, the conservation regulations remained and morphed into measures that are designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  They are imposed on many domestic appliances and on buildings.

These standards are uncosted but one that has been subject to some scrutiny is the 6 Star Standard on new housing.  The Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission accepted a cost estimate for this of at least $5000 per new house, an estimate that would translate into an annual Australia-wide cost of at least $500 million.

All in all the greenhouse emission measures therefore impose a cost of at least $15bn a year, for benefits that are probably zero.  Yet the debate on the issue has largely centred on the Coalition's opposition to the carbon tax.  The opposition seeks to replace this through ''direct action'' measures that select the most promising sources to target for reductions.

''Direct Action'', which also features in the government policy arsenal, suffers from its very selectivity.  Thus, while it might appear cheaper to target a particular source of emissions, emissions are fungible — closing down one source may see something very similar replacing it.

For example, the government's proposed replacement of the Hazelwood Power brown coal station by a gas station aims to halve the current facility's annual 16 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions.  At a cost of $3 billion if the life of the existing facility is 20 years, that translates into a carbon price of around $50 per tonne.  Not only is this well above the carbon tax but the operations of the National Electricity Market higher cost new facility would bring an increase in price for all electricity.

Greenhouse emission policies may well be the key issue dividing the Government and the Opposition.  But the goals of those policies have not been fully specified and the lack of costing on existing and proposed measures means there is no platform on which the desired level of emission reductions can be based.


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Tuesday, October 16, 2012

Romney finds momentum in moderation

A week is a long time in politics, Harold Wilson once observed at the end of a bad week, and the remark was considered so brilliantly penetrating that it was immediately entered into the Oxford Book of Quotations.  As he prepares for his second presidential debate tomorrow, Barack Obama knows exactly what the British Labour prime minister meant.

On the day of the last debate on October 3, the President appeared to be in an unassailable political position.  Holding comfortable leads over his Republican rival in several battleground states, Obama was the clear favourite to win the November 6 election.

Meanwhile, Mitt Romney was living on borrowed time, bedevilled by a series of gaffes and missteps, derided as a modern-day Gordon Gekko, and dismissed as lacking empathy and authenticity.  Most seasoned Washington observers had all but declared the race over.

Yet Romney defied the critics and, as the left-wing Guardian's Jonathan Freedland conceded, gave Obama ''such a good hiding in their first TV debate, you half expected the referee to step in and end the bout on compassionate grounds''.  The result is that Romney has come roaring back into contention for the presidency, with many polls now even putting him in the lead.  Somewhere, Harold Wilson is feeling Obama's pain.

There are still three weeks to go before America goes to the polls, and things could change.  But if the Democrats keep limping badly from Obama's wounds, many pundits are far from sure they'll heal in time.  And if the Romney momentum continues, there is every reason to believe he will be the 45th president.

So it is a good time to ponder a Republican White House.  What would be the defining characteristics of a president Romney?  And how would a new administration deal with the world?

The most important point to bear in mind is that Romney is neither a radical nor an ideologue.  Cautious, calculating, compromising — these qualities are precisely what make him suspect among those Tea Partiers who want the Republican Party to be doctrinally pure.  Recall all the conservative criticisms levelled at Romney during the primary process a year ago:  he was seen as either a serial flip-flopper or a closet liberal, which is heresy in Republican ranks.  Such concerns were understandable, given his behaviour since 1994 when he ran as a progressive Republican against Teddy Kennedy in a Senate race in Massachusetts.

After his tenure as governor of that liberal state (2003-07), Romney decided to convert himself into a ''Reaganite'', abandoning his set of moderate positions overnight and substituting the whole conservative laundry list, virtually without qualification.  From abortion and gun control to health care and emissions trading, he proved to be the political equivalent of the fictional comic-book superhero, Plastic Man.

Yet if Romney could twist himself into a conservative en route to his party's nomination, it is hardly surprising he is now turning towards the centre to win over independents who help swing elections.  In the past week, he has distanced himself from evangelical Christians on abortion and allowed some wriggle room in his tax plan in order to compromise with Congress should he win office.

This lack of ideological conviction is hardly what troubles the sleep of independents.  It also suggests that a president Romney would be the very soul of centre-right moderation, cautious to a fault and unlikely to take risky paths.  Take foreign policy, where he relies almost entirely on a disparate and fractious team of advisers (from hardline unilateralist John Bolton to moderate realist Robert Zoellick).

Romney champions a new American Century, the term coined in the 1940s to describe US global pre-eminence.  In this telling, the US will impose its will and influence across the world, increasing defence budgets, confronting China and Russia, and encouraging Israel to attack Iran.

Such a grandiose agenda, however, is fundamentally incompatible with the conservative priority of downsizing government at home.  It is also at odds with the reality that the US lacks the power to micro-manage a more plural world.

In a keynote foreign policy address last week, Romney — egged on by neo-conservatives from the recent Bush era — called for a new Marshall Plan in the Middle East.  To capitalise on the Arab Spring, he argued, the US should help build viable democratic states, a la Washington's generous support to western Europe after World War II.

But the circumstances have changed dramatically since the days of a Pax Americana.

As Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard University has observed, in 1948 the Marshall Plan allocated $13 billion, or 5 per cent of total GDP, in grants to kick-start Europe's economy.  By contrast, in 2012, an equivalent amount would be $700 billion.  There is no way that a debt-burdened Washington could devote even a tenth of that amount.

For all his American bravado on the campaign trail, a president Romney would more likely pursue a modest foreign policy with a prudent calculation of commitments and resources.

What's the crisis in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Fifty years ago, on the morning of October 16, 1962, the CIA delivered to John F Kennedy aerial reconnaissance photos revealing Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

Shortly after the CIA briefing, Kennedy showed the photos to his advisor Kenneth O'Donnell.

The president was alarmed.  ''You'd better believe it,'' he told O'Donnell, coming to terms with the missiles' significance.  ''We've just elected Capehart in Indiana and Ken Keating will probably be the next president of the United States''.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has become an icon of 20th century history:  the closest the Cold War came to a hot war, two great superpowers playing a game of brinkmanship that could have slipped into Armageddon.

But it was more a domestic crisis than a foreign policy crisis.  Fear of the November 1962 mid-term elections loomed larger than fear of nuclear war.

There's a lot of mythology about those 13 days in October.  It didn't take long for the tale of an heroic president pulling the world back from the precipice to take root.  But that mythology massively overstates the severity of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and, as a consequence, the likelihood of apocalyptic nuclear war at any time in the 20th century.

Put simply, the world never came to ''the brink''.

In his excellent 2010 book, Atomic Obsessions, the political scientist John Mueller demonstrates neither Kennedy nor Nikita Khrushchev had any intention of escalating to nuclear hostilities.

The Soviet premier, for all his bluster, was scarred by his experience of World War II.  One of the cables he sent Kennedy wrote of his fear of the ''death and destruction'' of total war.  Explaining himself later, Khrushchev said ''I'm not a Czarist officer who has to kill himself if I fart at a masked ball.  It's better to back down than to go to war.''

It's now clear Khrushchev placed the missiles in Cuba to deter an American invasion — that is, not in an offensive capacity.  But even then, some historians have suggested there was agreement in the Soviet leadership to withdraw the weapons if the US responded with military force.

The USSR never even went on a general alert.

The Americans were even less eager for conflict.  Put aside the warmongering General Curtis LeMay, who was nowhere near the decision-making team and exasperated Kennedy.  David Welch and James Blight, two historians who have worked closest with the tapes of White House meetings, say the odds the Americans would have escalated hostilities were ''next to zero''.

And the gambit that ended the crisis — Kennedy's secret promise to Khrushchev that he would remove American missiles from Turkey — wasn't much of a gambit at all.  The tapes reveal the president vowing ''I don't want to go to war anyhow, but I am certainly not going to war over worthless missiles in Turkey''.

Keeping the deal secret was just good domestic politics.

Of course, neither side knew of the other's true position.  But half a dozen times during October each side made missteps which, had the world been truly on the brink, would have pushed them off.  A U-2 was shot down trying to get a closer look at the missile sites.  Neither superpower budged.  Another U-2 strayed into Russian territory and was chased out by Soviet fighters.  Neither superpower budged.

Nobody wanted war.  And as Henry Kissinger once said, ''despite popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident.''

So what was the crisis in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

As usual, domestic politics drove foreign policy.

Kennedy had beaten Richard Nixon in 1960 by outflanking him as a hawk — charging that the Republicans had no plan to topple Fidel Castro and stoking fears of Soviet nuclear superiority.

But after the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle — where US backed Cuban exiles were routed in an invasion attempt — Cuba suddenly became Kennedy's political problem.  Cuba looked like it was going to be a big issue in November, and maybe even in the 1964 presidential race.

Two Republican senators in particular attacked him furiously over Cuba:  Ken Keating, a New Yorker with White House ambitions, and Homer Capehart, from Indiana.

These attacks had hurt.  Kennedy wanted to reassert his hawkish credentials.  The most fateful event of the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred, not in October, but in a press conference a month earlier.  On September 13 Kennedy declared bombastically that ''if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States ... the United States would act.''

Kennedy didn't know missiles were already on their way.  This September ultimatum was for a domestic audience — to counter Republican claims he was soft on communism — but it seriously constrained his choices in October.  He'd promised action.

Throughout the crisis, Kennedy regretted his September chest-beating:  ''I should have said that we don't care''.  But it was too late.  He'd ruled diplomacy out.  Blockading Cuba was the least warlike thing the administration could think of.

Kennedy famously declared on television that the missiles were an explicit threat to American security.

Privately however the administration thought different.  ''It is generally agreed,'' said Kennedy's advisor Ted Sorensen on October 17, ''that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of power — that is, they do not significantly increase the potential mega-tonnage capable of being unleashed on American soil.''

Defense secretary Robert McNamara was more direct.  ''I don't think there is a military problem here.''

The successful resolution of the crisis on October 28 blunted the Republican attacks.  The mid-term election was only a week away.  The Democrats picked up four seats in the Senate, one of which was Homer Capehart's.

October 1962 has become central to the JFK mystique.  It was quickly integrated into the legend of Camelot.

Not only that, but the episode defined how we think of nuclear politics;  as if we are, at all times, minutes away from global war.

But if the Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest the world has ever come to a nuclear exchange, then we've never come very close at all.


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Sunday, October 14, 2012

Rose-coloured glasses make for sentimental fools

Labor used to say John Howard had a shameful nostalgia for the 1950s.  The ALP is sentimental, too.  But Labor's nostalgia is entirely about itself.

That's the lesson from two recent books:  Politics with Purpose by former finance minister Lindsay Tanner and Speechless:  A Year in my Father's Business by James Button (a former Age journalistand son of John Button, a minister in the Hawke and Keating governments).

Tanner writes of the end of ''labourism'', a pragmatic, union-centred philosophy that dominated the 20th century.  Labourism had broad community appeal.  Labourism, Tanner argues, is gone now.

Button writes of his failure to recapture what drew his father to the ALP:  a world of political combat and idealism and Trades Hall.

Labor's soul-searching about whether the party has values, a base, a purpose, is essentially about the past.  It's odd for a progressive party to be so weighed down by its own sense of history.  Yet it is.  Just before Gough Whitlam staked his own claim to Labor mythology, he, too, was rueing the ALP's decline.  Even in the 1890s there were Labor people certain that their movement had abandoned its earlier principles.

You can understand why.  The Light on the Hill, the Tree of Knowledge, the turn-of-the-century strikes — how could anybody live up to these poetic legends?  They've been so built up they're weaknesses, not strengths.

Liberals fret about their history, too.  Malcolm Fraser's ghost haunted the Howard years.  No Coalition government wants to squib market reform like the Fraser government did.

Neither major party looks as it did half a century ago.  They're no longer ''mass'' parties at all.  Membership is shrinking.  Branches are closing.  Nearly 200,000 people were members of the Liberal Party in 1950.  It's now less than half of that.  Across the aisle, the 2010 review by John Faulkner, Bob Carr and Steve Bracks showed Labor membership had declined by a quarter since the 2007 election.

Only about 1 per cent of Australians are members of any party.  Labor feels the pain strongest.  It thinks of itself as a movement.  A movement without people isn't very impressive.

The conservatives are more stoic about their shrinking membership.  A review by Peter Reith on Liberal Party reform was produced with much less fanfare than the Faulkner-Carr-Bracks attempt.

But both reviews came up with the same ideas.  Parties have to give the rank and file more influence over policy.  They should experiment with American-style primary elections.  In his book, Tanner proposed expanding the ALP's national conference to accommodate some of the lowly branch members.

Many people claim primaries will counter the rising power of party machines.  Yet those machines have probably never been less powerful than now.  In recent leadership ballots the ALP factions have split every which way.  No longer is Australian politics controlled by anonymous warlords.  The faceless men are now publicity hounds.  They run internal campaigns on Sky News.  They taunt their opponents on Twitter.

It isn't lost values or machine politics or a desire for empowerment behind the decline of the mass-member party.  It's that the mass party doesn't make a lot of sense.

In the 1950s, Australians didn't have much choice:  if they were interested in politics they would have to go to a local branch meeting.  We are better off.  We can watch Lateline and 24-hour news and argue forever on the internet.  For political types, party gatherings were once the best entertainment around.  Now, surely, they are the worst.

Parties are vehicles to shepherd politicians into seats and form governments.  Why do they also have to be debating societies, ideas factories, or social movements?

But there's a deeper issue.  Sectarianism is passe.  Choosing a political identity is not a matter of picking one side or another side.  We prefer to join lots of causes rather than one team.  We tend to take bits and pieces from everywhere, and resent parties that fail to live up to our highly specific preferences. This is healthy — Australia is a nation of individuals, not tribes — but it is a hostile environment for a mass political party.

When federal Transport Minister Anthony Albanese said earlier this year he just wanted to ''fight Tories'' it struck a weird note.  There is nobody who thinks of Australia in such sectarian terms — nobody outside the tiny, declining fraction of the population who are party members.  But that's the dead-end of political nostalgia.  Pity those who still think like that.


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Friday, October 12, 2012

Australian politics gets the British disease

For a long time we worried Australian politics would end up like American politics.  We now know that fear was misplaced.  This week in Canberra proved Australian politics is fast turning into the modern British way of politics — personal, nasty and tawdry.  And obsessed with spin.

The pomposity and primness of the British makes their politics particularly susceptible to scandal.  And the British system of government actually encourages personal attacks between political opponents in a way that doesn't occur in the United States.

Politics in a parliamentary system is centred on the leader of the government and the opposition.  There's an incentive for each party to concentrate their attack on the other party's leader.  When the leader in parliament is personally damaged the party they lead is also damaged.  Personal conflict is embedded in the mechanics of parliament.  At question time the prime minister sits directly across the table from the opposition leader.

A presidential system like that in the US does not have the same sort of focus on conflict.  The president is intended to sit above the daily political fray.  In the US, political conflict at the national level is not centred on just two people.  US presidents don't have just one direct opponent;  they have dozens, which is exactly how the Founding Fathers intended it to be.

Australia modelled its government on what was inherited from Britain.  It's a good model and it has stood the test of time.  But it does mean that politics in Britain and Australia operates in a particular way.

Britain and Australia are not just alike in their systems of government.  The way the media works in the two countries is alike, too.  Britain has basically a single and a national media market, as does Australia.  London, as the nation's commercial and political centre, and 20 per cent of the country's population decides the national media agenda.  Sydney has 20 per cent of Australia's population and probably has less influence on the rest of the country than London has on Britain, but Sydney nonetheless is the home of the nation's news.  Canberra might be the nation's capital, but for all intents and purposes Canberra may as well be a suburb of Sydney.

In Britain the coverage of politics by newspapers is handled by a handful of titles, while the BBC dominates discussion about politics on television and radio.

In Australia, it's similar — except the ABC is even more left-wing than the BBC.  The US, with five times the population of Britain and 14 times the population of Australia, has much more diversity in its mainstream media.

The US has many media markets and it doesn't have a government-funded media company regarding itself as the arbiter of the country's political discourse.

There's group-think in the American media, on both the left and the right of the political spectrum.  But the group-think among the media in Britain and Australia is worse.  The degree of conformity in an entity is directly related to its size.  The smaller the entity the more conformity there is.  The smaller the entity the easier it is to impose conformity.

In Australia the pool of political reporters and commentators is small, so inevitably there is a lot of conformity.  If one or two or three leaders in the Canberra press gallery can be won over to a position, the rest of the gallery will follow.

Because most of the journalists who write about politics in Australia agree with each other, it's easy to get media gridlock.  Media gridlock occurs when everyone is talking about the same thing and no one is talking about anything else.

All it took to shut down the Canberra press gallery for a fortnight was a one-sentence comment about the Prime Minister from a radio host at a private function.

For days on end Alan Jones was the only thing any political journalist wanted to write about.

And just prior to the Jones episode there was also gridlock as the media pondered the consequences of a ''he said/she said'' incident involving Tony Abbott when he was a university student 35 years ago.

It might be coincidence that just at the time Julia Gillard hired as her media adviser someone from Scotland, steeped in British political strategy, the Labor Party stopped talking about policy and started attacking Abbott's alleged personal failings.  Or it might not be.


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Wednesday, October 10, 2012

The Essence Of Successful Nations

Why Nations Fail:  The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty
by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
Crown Publishers, 2012, 529 pages

Tolstoy famously wrote that while happy families are all alike, unhappy families are uniquely unhappy in their own way.  In their latest book, MIT economist Daron Acemoglu and Harvard political scientist James Robinson have found the Russian novelist's adage holds true for nations as well.

As Ronald Bailey argued in his review for Reason magazine, Why Nations Fail might be better titled Why Some Nations Succeed, as its real value lies in its analysis of the conditions required for a country to develop stability and prosperity.  Their answer, institutions, is compellingly simple.

Acemoglu and Robinson coin a neat phrase to describe the respective attributes of successful and failing states ― "inclusive institutions" versus "extractive institutions".  They argue that when nations develop "inclusive" political institutions, "inclusive" economic institutions follow suit to create a virtuous circle, propelling the nation towards success.  On the other hand, if nations continue to labour under "extractive" political institutions, "extractive" economic institutions will also emerge to form a vicious circle that prevents the country from reaching prosperity.

The author's list of factors that define inclusive political institutions reads like a catalogue of the best achievements of Western Civilisation:  democratic governance, the rule of law, property rights and a degree of political centralisation.  The development of these political institutions snowballs towards open markets, free trade and the fostering of an entrepreneurial spirit ― what the authors define as inclusive economic institutions.

On the other hand, extractive institutions prevent widespread participation in the political system, block economic growth and bar the path to prosperity.  As the authors write:  "extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate.  Extractive political institutions support these economic institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the extraction."  They are named extractive because they do exactly that ― they extract wealth and political power from the majority of the population and place it in the hands of a small set of elites.

Successful, wealthy nations almost invariably exhibit the traits of inclusive institutions.  For example, a series of critical junctures, coupled with a political system with nascent democratic features thanks to the Glorious Revolution, saw Britain play birthplace to the Industrial Revolution.  The creative destruction unleashed by the Industrial Revolution not only redistributed wealth, but also political power.  More pluralistic political institutions followed.

Another striking example the authors examine is Botswana.  Unlike many other African countries, some tribes in Botswana had already developed rudimentary democratic features before European colonisation.  After independence, Botswana quickly developed inclusive economic and political institutions.  Unlike many of its neighbours, Bostwana avoided bloody civil wars and rule by robber baron, and its people today enjoy prosperity almost unsurpassed anywhere else on the African continent.

Unhappily, Botswana's success has not been emulated by her neighbours.  Zimbabwe, which shares a border with Botswana, has become a by-word for the post-colonial quagmire many African countries still grapple with.

The book helps explain why other regions have lagged in economic development too.  Most of Europe was slow to industrialise because their political institutions were still dominated by the arbitrary rule of monarchies.  South American countries remained mired in poverty for years following independence from imperial powers, and are largely still counted as developing rather than developed countries.  Asia's autocracies such as North Korea and Burma are leagues behind their liberalised neighbours on almost all measures.

Prosperity continues to evade many of these nations ― they have that much in common.  Yet each have their own unique set of economic and political woes.  Whether it be brutal dictatorship or oligarchs masquerading as democratically elected leaders, there are dozens of variations of illiberal political and economic institutions that dot the developing world.

From time to time regimes may be overthrown, but all too often this only represents the transferral of wealth and power from one group of elites to another.  The vicious cycle repeats itself, because when economic institutions are extractive ― when tariffs are high and protection and monopoly are bestowed upon political allies ― political power becomes inextricably linked to economic wealth.

The extractive versus inclusive institutions model provides a far more convincing explanation of the differences between rich and poor countries than other popular theories that have gained currency over the years.  The authors tear the "geography hypothesis" to shreds ― the idea that poor countries are poor because of where they are located on the globe ― as proposed by Jared Diamond and popularised by Jeffrey Sachs.  They similarly rebuke theories that attempt to link prosperity to cultural values, or to some sort of knowledge gap among elites in the third world that well-meaning Western economists can fill.  Theories of geography, culture or ignorance cannot explain why Botswana is not Zimbabwe, why South Korea is not North Korea, or why the neighbouring border towns of Nogales, Mexico and Nogales, Arizona are so fundamentally different.  A theory based on institutional difference can.

Six years ago former World Bank economist William Easterly published his controversial book White Man's Burden, provocatively sub-titled "why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good".  The book caused outrage in the development community for its blistering attack on the success ― or lack thereof ― of aid programs delivered by well-meaning Westerners in developing countries.  Easterly argued that aid cannot make poverty history, and that NGOs ought to have more modest agendas rather than seeking to solve poverty in one fell swoop.

In many ways Why Nations Fail consolidates the missing piece of information in the ongoing quest to eliminate poverty in the third world.  When seen through the model of inclusive and extractive institutions developed by Acemoglu and Robinson, it seems breathtakingly obvious why Western aid efforts have failed so abysmally to eradicate poverty.  Ongoing economic growth can only occur when political and economic institutions are free ― something sorely lacking in Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries that remain mired in poverty.  Without the complex incentive structures of inclusive institutions that allow people to flourish, poor people the world over are unlikely to find prosperity.

For a country like Australia, which has enjoyed the fruits of inclusive institutions for much of its history, the book still has some valuable lessons.  The authors chart how a fear of creative destruction has led leaders across the world and throughout history to turn away from the virtuous circle of free economic and political institutions, instead choosing to protect vested interests.  History is littered with examples of societies who never quite break the mould or who reverse development in the name of protection from the forces of creative destruction.  The authors argue it is possible for countries to slip out of the virtuous circle if inclusive economic and political institutions are impeded.  Australian policy-makers would do well to remember this.

Why Nations Fail can be overly technical at times, but its sweeping narrative provides a convincing explanation of why the gap between the haves and have-nots persists throughout the world today.  The book marshals a wealth of historical and other data to prove it is no coincidence that wealthy nations are also liberal democracies.  Acemoglu and Robinson provide a comprehensive catalogue of the successes experienced by countries when they adopt free markets and democracy in tandem, and the failures of those who don't.

At a time when only 40 per cent of young Australians believe that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, this book is an important and timely reminder of why we ought to be grateful for our institutional heritage.

Canberra, Unplugged

The Marmalade Files
by Chris Uhlmann and Steve Lewis
Harper Collins, 2012, 320 pages

Australians don't normally do satire.  We're not quite serious enough.  That indispensable The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory helpfully points out that Samuel Johnson defined "satire" as a poem "in which wickedness or folly is censured".  John Dryden believed the purpose of satire was "the amendment of vices" and Daniel Defoe thought satire should bring about "reformation".

According to the Penguin Dictionary the satirist is "a kind of self-appointed guardian of standards, ideals and truth;  of moral as well as aesthetic values".  In the end "satire is a kind of protest, a sublimation and refinement of anger and indignation."

It's hard to imagine a better subject for satire than federal politics in Australia.  And there have been few better books about Australian politics than The Marmalade Files by Chris Uhlmann and Steve Lewis.  Uhlmann is the political editor of the ABC's 7.30.  He's also the country's best interviewer.  Steve Lewis has been a journalist at the Australian Financial Review, The Australian, and he's now the national political correspondent for News Limited's metropolitan dailies.  Together they've had nearly half a century reporting on federal politics ― longer if reporting on Kevin Rudd as prime minister counts double compared to reporting on any normal PM.  They've covered all the recent and exciting bits of Canberra politics, particularly the Rudd/Gillard/Greens/minority government saga.

The book hits the mark.  It's funny and sometimes very funny.  And sometimes it's uncomfortable in the way that watching Yes Minister or The Office is uncomfortable.  The Marmalade Files succeeds because it could almost be a work of a fact, which is what makes it so effective.  The plot is outlandish but not so outlandish such that it would be impossible to claim what's described could never ever happen.

The book is self-described as "an explosive novel of lies, lust and political bastardry".  Harry Dunkley, "a press gallery veteran with an instinct for trouble", receives an anonymous tip-off about a corrupt politician.  As he hunts down the story and the web of intrigue that inevitably follows anonymous tip-offs, Harry confronts trade union thugs, obstreperous and self-important ministerial advisers, and the national security establishment.  And around Harry's story Uhlmann and Lewis weave a cast of characters and present some brilliant cameos.  There's the breakfast TV program the Morning Glory and its hosts Thommo and Janny.  There's the Greens leader on Q&A who, amid delirious cheers from the live audience, proclaims "we must de-industrialise and de-capitalise" and "ending the enslavement of non-human animals is the next great liberation.  We humans are only a small part of Gaia."

There's GetSet! the online campaigning organisation ― "members could log into the state-of-the-art website, sign a petition on anything from live exports to climate change, watch their name and their issue appear on the front page, and then log off and get on with their day ... Activism and outrage now came free, with minimal effort and instantaneous gratification."

And then there's the politicians.  Not all of the politicians in the book are grasping, foul-mouthed, media-obsessed egomaniacs ― but most of them are.  Uhlmann and Lewis have got the process of modern-day politics in Australia pretty accurate.  The politicians no longer preside over the process, they are merely part of it.

Someone wanting to find out about early Georgian politics in England will learn more from looking at Hogarth's pictures and from reading Swift's Gulliver's Travels.  Likewise someone seeking an understanding of what happens in Parliament House in Canberra, and what passes between the media and politicians could well start with The Marmalade Files.

John Bright:  A 19th Century Freedom Fighter

John Bright:  Statesman, Orator, Agitator
by Bill Cash
I.B. Tauris, 2011, 328 pages

John Bright's fame was so high in the middle of the 19th century that early settlers in the village of Morse's Creek in north eastern Victoria decided to rename the place, Bright.

One imagines that few of the town's current population of 2,200 could tell you how it got its name.

They would not be alone.  According to his new biographer, Bill Cash, Bright is "almost forgotten" in England as well.  Cash implies that this forgetfulness is particular to Bright, but, with the possible exceptions of Gladstone and Disraeli, all 19th century British political figures have largely been forgotten by the general populace, as the teaching of political history has become less fashionable in recent decades.

In works of political history, however, Bright is still accorded a rightfully prominent role.  And so he should be.  Bright was a key figure in all the great debates of his time, many of which still resonate today.  Along with his great friend Richard Cobden, he was one of the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League, whose ultimate success in 1846 delivered cheaper food for generations of the British working class.  It remains the iconic political triumph for free trade.

Bright's other great campaign was for parliamentary reform.  His campaign began in the late 1850s and ultimately led to the Second Reform Act of 1867, which extended the franchise to include much of the working class.  He was also a vigorous opponent of British participation in the Crimean War;  an advocate of more humane policies towards India;  and a key international supporter of the North in the American Civil War.  To emphasise Bright's prominent standing in the United States, Cash relates how, when Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, the items in his pockets included a letter from Bright.

There is no doubt that Bright is worthy of a new biography and Cash released his work to coincide with the bicentenary of Bright's birth last November.  Cash brings to the task both a personal connection to his subject (Bright was his great-grandfather's cousin) and an understanding of politics, gleaned from being a Tory MP for 27 years.

Politicians often make very good political biographers and in England excellent examples include Roy Jenkins and William Hague.  Cash's work does not quite have the polish of some others and also suffers a little from his decision to write issue-based, rather than chronological, chapters, necessitating some repetition and making the narrative occasionally feel disjointed.  And, while Cash's assessment of Bright is generally sound, it is impossible to disagree with one British newspaper reviewer, who commented that the book "starts from the wrong place" in repeated attempts to claim Bright for "the Tory camp".  Bright was rightly known as a radical in his time, yet Cash constantly seeks to bring out what he terms Bright's "innate conservatism".  Other than Bright's opposition to Home Rule for Ireland late in his career, there was very little about Bright which was conservative.  Uncompromising support for free-trade was a radical position in the 1840s and it still is today.

However, the book has more strengths than weaknesses.  Cash neatly categorises politicians, using Bright and Disraeli as examples, between those interested in achieving "objectives and principles" (and rarely holding ministerial office), and those focused on "personal ambition".  Cash clearly sees his own career, which includes being one of the leaders of a rebellion over the Maastricht treaty that almost brought down John Major's government, as an attempt to emulate Bright's approach.

The book also lets readers appreciate how views of what entails good policy have changed.  While in modern times reform has often meant a shift to indirect taxes, in the 19th century it meant the opposite, as Cash makes clear in relation to Robert Peel's 1842 Budget:

"It was one of the most significant budgets of the nineteenth century, representing a huge tilting of the economy towards free trade and, consequently from indirect taxes on trade to direct taxes on income."

Another important issue Cash raises is what happens when two policy principles come into conflict.  The example he gives is when, on obtaining self-government, the Canadians used their new found democratic control to shift from a policy of free trade to protection.  The question arose of whether the Imperial government should intervene.  Bright plumped for democracy.

Cash sensibly does not attempt to boost Bright at the expense of Cobden, pointing out that historians have often tried to manufacture differences between the two men.  They had complementary talents.  Bright was a magnificent orator.  He put his talent to great use, gaining support for such great causes as free trade, democracy and opposition to slavery.

Hopefully, Cash's work will go some way towards ensuring that the achievements of this great freedom fighter are brought to the attention of a new audience.

The Population Conundrum

Bigger or Better:  Australia's population debate
by Ian Lowe
Penguin, 2012, 208 pages

The false dichotomy offered in the title of Ian Lowe's book Bigger or Better:  Australia's population debate hints at the one-sided polemic contained within.

Lowe puts a forthright case for "stabilising" Australia's population at or near current levels by cutting migration, particularly skilled migration.

But Lowe's argument for lowering skilled immigration to a point where Australia's population stabilises is utterly confused.

Firstly, it is never clear throughout Bigger or Better? whether Lowe's main gripe is against global population growth in general or Australian population growth in particular.  Apart from Australian society's "wastefulness" compared with poorer societies, the arguments he puts forth only apply to global population growth.

Using his own favoured method of economic and demographic analysis (back of the envelope calculations), if the global population is 6.97 billion and Australia's population 22.6 million, and Australia's net migration rate is 180,000 a year, that net migration rate affects the world's population exactly zero.

But even if net migration to Australia is the source of the world's woes, what exactly is Lowe suggesting?

Lowe seems to suggest that because Australians use more resources than those in poor countries ― including raw materials, fossil fuels, water and food ― the 180,000 people who might otherwise call Australia home should not be introduced to our resource-intensive lifestyles and instead be kept in the less wasteful state they are in.  In other words, in order to ensure the planet's resources are not overused, it is important that we safeguard our own wasteful, prosperous way of life and keep others in poverty.

As you might expect, Lowe is never so bold as to put it in these terms, but it is the only logical end-point of his opposition to population growth and his preferred policy solution of low migration to Australia.

Secondly, a problem that plagues Bigger or Better? is its inability to grapple with basic economic concepts.  He never canvasses the advantages of economies of scale, never supposes that prices can manage scarce resources or that necessity leads to efficiencies and innovation.  He worries about Australia's terms of trade when our endowment of natural resources, like iron ore and coal, run out sometime next century, never supposing that we, that is to say the market, might find a solution or a substitute without central planning.

Thirdly, Lowe argues that because humanity is endowed with the capacity for reason, it should decide its population and pursue it through policy.  He ignores the other side of reason;  that humanity is able to adapt its surroundings through the very faculties Lowe says compel humanity to choose a no-growth future.

Lowe should visit Israel.  He could see how nearly 8 million people live affluent lives in what is mostly arid desert using innovative irrigation practices and water conservation.  Israel's area is one third of Tasmania's, is largely uninhabitable, but has one third the total population of Australia.  Despite this, Israel's population growth rate remains higher than Australia's.

It is not hard to imagine the incredulity of an Israeli if they chanced upon Lowe's book;  they'd probably think the idea that Australia is under threat of overpopulation a neat joke.

Although it isn't central to Lowe's thesis, it is worth mentioning his eagerness to argue that stopping immigration will lessen racial strife in Australia.  Despite Australia's overwhelming success as a immigrant society, Lowe sees imminent Cronulla Riots wherever he looks.  If Australia continues to allow hundreds of thousands of migrants to enter Australia, Australia's "social fabric" and "social cohesion" will come under threat, according to Lowe.

Dog-whistling?  The Australian left spent years accusing conservative politicians like John Howard of using such tactics.  But Lowe ― the President of the Australian Conservation Foundation ― unwittingly demonstrates there is more similarity in views between no-growth greens and One Nation-style protectionists than he might like to admit.

Lowe is also needlessly partisan.

The book is peppered with references to the "Murdoch Press".  Tony Abbott is described as "generally supporting a population growth agenda", which is, unfortunately, not strictly accurate.  After gleeful accounts of Greens dominated local councils stopping growth throughout the country, Lowe even finds space to attack me for pointing out the common ground between greens and ultranationalists on immigration.

At one point, Lowe links transport congestion to the pro-natalist policies of the former Howard government (such as the baby bonus).  Personally, I'm yet to see a primary school age kid driving in heavy traffic.  Sure, the mini baby boomers born in the 2000s will eventually add to traffic congestion.  But since 2011 there are now more Australians leaving the workforce due to age than entering it, so our transport issues will need to be blamed on something else.

Worst of all, Lowe is incapable of looking beyond Green shibboleths.  This is most plain during his feeble rebuttal of nuclear power.  Echoing Bob Brown's National Press Club speech of 7 April 2010, Lowe revives the classic Greens Party non-sequitur that because the ingredient of nuclear power can also be used for nuclear weapons, we should not pursue nuclear power.  This is probably Lowe's biggest insult to the intelligence of his audience.

The range of logical errors like this, things taken as assumed and feeble rebuttals of major counter-arguments suggests this book was never meant to reach outside the green belt-way.  For Lowe's sake, he should hope it isn't.

Power And The Years of LBJ

The Years of Lyndon Johnson:  The Passage of Power
By Robert Caro
Random House, 2012, 761 pages

There is almost a cult amongst readers of political history and biography:  those who count down the years until the release of the next volume of Robert Caro's totemic biography of Lyndon Johnson.

Commencing with The Path to Power in 1982, followed by Means of Ascent in 1990 then Master of the Senate in 2002, the latest volume, The Passage of Power released earlier this year was a full decade in the making.  This latest volume covers the period leading into the 1960 election, when Johnson competed with Kennedy for the Democrat nomination, through to early 1964, the assassination of John Kennedy and its aftermath.

Caro has been working on this project since completing his first book, the Pulitzer Prize winning biography of Robert Moses, The Power Broker, published in 1974.  For an author of only 5 books over more than 40 years, Caro has an exceptional series of awards ― two Pulitzers and a clutch of National Book Awards and the National Humanities Medal and Presidential Medal of Freedom.

All the LBJ volumes are titled "The Years of Lyndon Johnson" and this is an important distinction.

These are more than simply a biography;  they are a history of the United States seen through the prism of the activities of one of its most influential figures.  Through Caro's extraordinary ability to paint word pictures, a different period of time is brought vividly to life.  This applies equally to his descriptions of the life of African Americans in the Deep South under Jim Crow as it does to the grief of Robert Kennedy following the assassination of JFK.

In an interview two decades ago, Caro outlined his aspirations for his writing:

"I don't regard my books as biographies so much as I do as history.  That's why I call them 'The Years of Lyndon Johnson' and I feel that in order to endure, a work of history has to be written, the prose, has to be at the same level as a novel that will endure, and I don't think there's enough emphasis in the writing of a lot of history, on the fact that this is a book."

The introductions to each of Caro's LBJ works invite the reader to continue into the large volumes, giving not only a taste of what is to come, but reminding a reader of past volumes as well.  This is just as well, with the almost decade-long average between publication.

His introduction to the third volume, Master of the Senate is the best short history of the US Senate yet written.  One hangs on every word of its almost 100 pages as it builds to the arrival of a man who would dominate it like no one had before.

The introduction to The Passage of Power is similarly enticing to the reader.  The key theme of Caro's work is about detailing the use of political power ― for good and ill.  In his introduction to The Passage of Power, Caro argues that power reveals the true nature of the person.  While one conceals characteristics in order to rise in political power, the elevation to supreme power reveals the true person.  This is as true in a presidential system as it is in a parliamentary one.  While the character of John Howard was revealed as he served as Prime Minister, so was that of Kevin Rudd and their respective longevity says something about both.

The Passage of Power moves away from the focus on legislative power outlined in Master of the Senate and his fight for office in Means of Ascent.  It focuses on Johnson's humiliation upon taking office as Vice President and his subsequent assumption of office amidst the first televised national tragedy.  It should not be forgotten just how momentous Johnson's ascension was.  Kennedy was the first television president, a signal of generational change, and this was the first assassination of the modern media era.

Johnson taking office also represented something profound ― the first President from the South, the old confederacy, since Andrew Johnson assumed the office following the assassination of Lincoln.  Apart from the fissures in the Democratic Party itself, which sometimes existed in name and banner only, the very notion of a President from the segregated South was anathema to much of the nation.

Yet, in the aftermath of the assassination, Johnson seized power in an extraordinary fashion.  Through what some may consider craven actions, he took control of Congress in a manner that had not been done since the very early days of FDR.

He smashed the conservative coalition of the Republican Party and Southern Democrats of which he was formerly a leader.  He passed the largest tax cut until that point, along with the pivotal civil rights bill that had both been bottled up in Congress with no prospect of proceeding.  In the words of Caro from a previous volume "it was Abraham Lincoln who struck the chains from black Americans, but it was Lyndon Johnson who took them by the hand, led them into the voting booth, drew democracy's curtain behind them and made them once and for all and forever a part of American political life."

This achievement can never be underestimated.  Bringing about the end of Jim Crow was the final step in removing a stain upon the Great Republic.  Despite many attempts, no-one else had even got close.  But LBJ did, and did so in such a fashion that the Southern Caucus was stunned.

When reading about these events, one at the same time admires LBJ's capacity to work and his insights into what makes his fellow politicians tick, but at the same time is repulsed by his seeming lack of moral boundaries.

The other main feature of this volume is Johnson's war with Bobby Kennedy.  One can learn a great deal about the Kennedys from this book:  the family project to get to the White House, the vanity of JFK, the Clinton-like ability to create a myth simply through allowing others to project their hopes onto you.

Robert Kennedy, long romanticised, is described in a manner that one cannot come away without being a little more sceptical about he and his Presidential brother.

If Caro is not the greatest writer of biography then he at least earns himself a position on the podium.  Regardless of what one thinks about LBJ, any student of history can learn a great deal about the United States, its government and this era through reading this latest volume.  It is not my favourite volume, that remains the previous volume about LBJ's time in the Senate.  But The Passage of Power greatly adds to understanding of those days in late 1963 and early 1964 following the Kennedy assassination.  In Caro's unique style, it does so by looking at past events as well as through an extraordinarily detailed description of the period itself.

Now the countdown begins for the fifth and final volume.

Tuesday, October 09, 2012

We do not need an internet overlord

At first glance, the United Nations' International Telecommunications Union (ITU) seems benign.

The agency helps coordinate global telephone interconnections so we can make overseas phone calls.  It manages radio spectrum and satellite orbits.  All tedious and technocratic work.

But the ITU is holding a meeting in December to decide whether it — and by implication, the United Nations — should take over the internet.

This meeting in December will be the culmination of a long contest between the decentralised, private internet and the leaden hand of state control.

A UN takeover of the internet could be incredibly bad.  Bad for liberty and free speech online.  Bad for technological innovation.

Why would we want to hand the basic structure of the internet to a committee of governments — many of which censor the internet at home?

ITU chief Hamadoun Touré pleaded in the Guardian earlier this year that only his organisation had the ''depth of experience'' to regulate the online world.

The ITU is an agency in decline.  It was founded in 1865 to negotiate connections between national telegraph lines, set technical standards, and manage the fees each network would charge each other.  Over time, it gathered more responsibilities, dealing with telephone networks from the end of the 19th century, and broadcast frequencies from the 1930s.  When the UN was founded in the 1940s, the ITU was wrapped in the blue flag.

This top-down control over telecommunications had a perverse effect.  As a paper in the journal International Organization argued in 1990, the ITU ''created one of the most lucrative and technologically significant international cartels in history''.  It picked winners and entrenched technological monopolies.

It is the last organisation we would want to govern the dynamic, bottom-up internet.

The political economy of communications has completely changed in recent decades.

During the 20th century, governments dominated telecommunications.  Telephone networks were state-owned.  Even in the United States, which avoided fashionable state socialism, telephone companies were legally-backed monopolies.

The ITU thrived in this environment.  When governments controlled the telephone system, negotiating a connection between two national networks was more an issue of diplomacy than private commercial contracts.

Then along came neo-liberalism.  Public utilities were privatised.  Monopolies were exposed to competition.  The need for a diplomatic body to manage the planet's spidering communications infrastructure dissipated.

It's been a quarter of a century since the ITU's mandate was renewed.  As such, the ITU has no authority over the internet.  Network companies have developed diverse interconnection contracts with each other, and have done so independently.  Technical standards have developed voluntarily and organically and in response to market demand.

Above all, the internet is largely decentralised.  It is a product of civil society, not government.  And what few centralised functions the internet does have — for instance, the management of domain names and IP addresses — are managed by non-government organisations based in the United States.

(This is not without problems.  The Bush administration intervened to stop the introduction of the .xxx domain, an own goal which undermined American claims of neutrality.  But for the most part, the internet still governs itself.)

The advantage of decentralised self-governance means internet architecture is mostly out of the reach of traditional politics and statecraft.

That's what the ITU power grab is all about.

The ITU doesn't want control over the internet's foundations merely to deal with technical issues like interconnection and standards.  No, ITU wants policy control:  to have a hand in regulating cybercrime, child pornography, even spam.  It wants to pursue social goals.  Hamadoun Touré talks about creating ''a fully inclusive information society'' — a phrase which would be easy to dismiss as meaningless if it didn't reveal an extraordinary mission creep.

Some countries want the UN to control what network operators charge each other.  Other countries even want to tax internet telephony firms like Skype to protect the revenue of their old national telephone monopolies.

It gets worse from there.  A coalition Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan want the UN to regulate online speech by curbing:

The dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism or extremism or that undermines other countries' political, economic and social stability.

Of course, their idea of what information undermines ''stability'' may differ from ours.

Will that authoritarian coalition get its way?  Probably not.  But the absurdity of this last proposal simply demonstrates the risk of UN control.  Under the ITU, the internet will be a geopolitical plaything.

It's hard enough protecting online freedoms from the national security excesses of liberal democracies.

Imagine vesting the power to tinker with the basic structure of the internet with as discreditable a political body as the United Nations.


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Saturday, October 06, 2012

Government's creeping hand

The federal government's proposed data-retention regime deserves every bit of the immense amount of public criticism that has been heaped upon it.  But focus on the Orwellian citizen spying program could allow the government to push through its other troubling proposals unchallenged.

There are more than 40 proposals in Attorney-General Nicola Roxon's discussion paper Equipping Australia against emerging and evolving threats.  The government has desperately tried to assert that it is attempting to strike a delicate balance between national security and individual rights.  But just one of the 40-odd proposals would move us in the direction of freedom:  the sensible suggestion that there should be a reduction in the number of government bodies that have access to otherwise private communications information.

Of course, not all proposals are created equal.  The reduction in the number of security agencies with communication access powers would have a positive, but relatively small, impact on liberty.  On the other hand, the gargantuan data retention regime would have a significant and thoroughly negative impact on online privacy.  It seems the government needs to spend much more time striking that balance:  currently it's less ''delicate'' and more ''horribly disproportionate''.  Another dangerous proposal is to make it an offence to withhold passwords from law enforcement.  The Attorney-General's Department has asked the committee to consider ''establishing an offence for failing to assist in the decryption of communications''.  Making crimes of a refusal to hand over passwords is outrageous.  It strikes at the heart of our legal system by removing our right to silence.

The proposal is deserving of heavy criticism.  But Roxon thinks we're all overreacting.  She thinks those of us who are concerned about losing our right to silence need to take a ''cold shower''.  Last week, she even uploaded a YouTube video in which she defended the contents of the discussion paper and said there was no proposal ''to force people to give up passwords''.  Yet decryption of communications necessarily involves the use of encryption keys or, in common parlance, passwords.

But there were also some striking omissions from Roxon's video.  For instance, the proposal to give the attorney-general the power to unilaterally vary ASIO warrants was left out.  The suggestion is that a variation should be allowed where it can be justified on grounds of ''operational flexibility''.  Such a test is absurdly broad and could be used to legitimise variations in almost any circumstance.  That these decisions would be made without any oversight from the courts is extraordinary.  The proposals relating to warrants don't stop there.  Currently, ASIO has 90 days to carry out their search after having obtained legal authorisation to do so.  But the discussion paper proposes increasing that period to six months.  This change requires significant justification.  Why can't Australia's top security agency get it together in the already generous three-month period?

This isn't the only generosity extended to the security agency under the legislation.  If ASIO makes a request of the attorney-general and they don't receive a response, they get to simply issue themselves with a warrant.  It must be one of the only cases in law where silence operates as sufficient acceptance.  Good luck using the same approach in contractual negotiations.

Apart from the dangerous and the extreme, there are also proposals that border on the bizarre.  The proposal to allow ASIO to add, delete or alter data clearly falls into this category.  This goes far beyond ordinary espionage — it would allow ASIO to plant files on your computer and modify existing ones in total secrecy.  One of the first chapters in the collection of evidence manual is on the importance of avoiding tampering.  Data obtained in this manner are likely to be inadmissible in legal proceedings.  And quite apart from the issue of evidence, it's shocking that we would give law-enforcement agencies that kind of power.

Government asking for more authority and more influence is not a new thing.  We have now had over 10 years of a continuously expanding system of security powers.  This most recent wave of proposals should be rejected.  Proposals that undermine the rule of law, trash civil liberties and erode privacy have no place in a free and democratic society.  There will never come a time when government agencies thank us for giving up our liberties and contentedly say ''now we have enough''.  The erosion of freedom will only stop when it is resisted by us all.  Benito Mussolini famously said:  ''The truth is that men are tired of liberty.'' Perhaps the federal government is tired of liberty;  Australians are not.


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Tuesday, October 02, 2012

Don't just tinker with government — reduce it

There are few concepts more nonsensical in Australian politics than the ''efficiency dividend''.

Yet in the politics of public service cuts, few are more heavily relied upon.

You'd think that an efficiency dividend was a financial benefit that came once efficiencies were found.  That's what it sounds like, after all.  Nope:  it's the other way around.  By cutting the public sector, governments take the dividends first — in the form of reduced payroll costs — and just hope the efficiency comes later.

The reasoning is pretty crude:  with fewer staff, the public service will simply have to be more efficient.  How, exactly?  They'll figure it out.  Efficiency through adversity.

Of course, there's nothing wrong with reducing the size of the public service.  It's worthwhile.

The Commonwealth employs 160,000 people;  the states and territories around 1.2 million.  These are huge figures.  So while it sounds pretty extreme that the Federal Coalition might cut 12,000 jobs over two years, that's a small part of the whole and roughly the pace of natural attrition.

Campbell Newman's target of 20,000 jobs is more ambitious, but even then that comes out of Queensland's public service pool of 207,000.

In any organisation, labour costs are among the biggest costs.  Governments that need to balance budgets tend to look at public service size first — particularly conservative governments, who don't see bureaucrats as a voting constituency.

Public service cuts have their own little ritual.  ''Frontline staff'' will be fine, assures the government.  ''Essential services'' will disappear, counter public sector unions.  Bureaucracies — for whom size is a measure of success — shift around staff and threaten to eliminate their most politically popular functions.  The press speak of promises broken and everybody tries to divine in the entrails of Newspoll and Essential what it all means.

By the end of this, the poor old government will be lucky if it gets its dividend.  It certainly won't get any ''efficiency''.

Because these big job cuts — a dozen thousand here, a dozen thousand there — are like taking a baseball bat to a photocopier:  briefly satisfying, perhaps, but it won't make it copy better.

The only way to meaningfully reduce the size of government is to reduce what government does.

There are, no doubt, inefficient elements within the public service.  But those inefficiencies will not be identified through orders from on high about across-the-board workforce reductions.

Cutting jobs without cutting the tasks which those jobs exist to perform will — in every likelihood — undermine service delivery, without sustainably lowering the burden on the taxpayer.

This is an uncomfortable reality.  Far easier to insist the public service goes on a diet.

The vast majority of public finances are tied up in health and welfare.  Take the Commonwealth, for instance.  Its largest agencies are Centrelink, the Taxation Office and Defence.  These agencies harbour between 20- and 27,000 staff each.  The next largest agencies are substantially smaller:  immigration has a labour force of around 7,000, Medicare just over 5,000.

You can see why for new governments, it is appealing to shave these departments by a fraction.

But they are also the departments most closely integrated within the political system.  Welfare and defence are two of the central features of the modern state.  You can tell how serious an opposition is about reducing the size of government by whether they talk about these biggies, or whether they just rabbit on about marginal things like foreign aid, which are, in truth, a tiny fraction of the budget.

So if governments want to reduce the public sector permanently they'll have to be creative and courageous.  Want Centrelink to be a lighter load?  Then your priority has to be welfare reform, not public service cuts.  Want the Defence Department to be less of a money pit?  Then reassess our defence strategy, or our wasteful acquisitions program.  Simplify the tax system if you want to shrink the tax office.

It's not completely hopeless.  There are many things that could be done.  For instance, a truly cost-cutting government could get the Commonwealth out of education — that is, return education to the states where it is constitutionally allocated.  (And, because they actually run schools, the states have a far better idea than Canberra about where money should be spent.)

In other words, find the efficiencies, and then take the dividend.

Of course, there is no government or opposition in the country that wants to seriously rethink what the public service does.  There's a lot of tinkering planned, but no reform.

Targeting the bureaucracy mistakes the symptom for disease.  If you really want smaller government, you need to reduce its functions.


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It's not about ''cranks'', it's about tax rises and high spending

You wouldn't know it from the media coverage, but Wayne Swan's foray into US politics showed a profound misreading of Washington's economic debate on the eve of the presidential election.

According to the Treasurer:  ''The biggest threat to the world's biggest economy are the cranks and crazies that have taken over a part of the Republican Party.''

How so?  Because their opposition to high spending could prevent Congress from resolving its budget problems, known as the ''fiscal cliff''.  That would mean a major withdrawal of government spending, which — in Swan's telling — could drive the US economy into recession.

Just what a debt-burdened US needed:  a lecture from an Australian Labor politician not to cut spending.

To understand the US economic debate properly, one needs to recognise two different fiscal cliffs.  The first cliff is the rise in tax rates because Bush-era reductions are set to expire at the end of the year.  The second cliff is the $1 trillion-plus in cuts in defence and domestic discretionary spending during the next decade as part of last year's compromise to reduce the debt.

Like most Keynesians, Swan misdiagnoses the real threat to the US economy:  it's the taxes, not spending, as The Wall Street Journal consistently editorialises.  Take some history:  in the past three decades, Washington has made two major efforts to cut federal spending.  The results:  long booms.

In the 1980s, a combination of tax and spending cuts led to a decade of economic expansion.  After the Republican Congress and Democrat Bill Clinton implemented budget reforms in the mid-1990s, spending began to fall as a share of gross domestic product until the early 2000s.  The economy and stocks boomed.

In the Bush and Obama eras, however, federal spending has increased from 18.2 per cent of GDP to 24 per cent.  In early 2009, White House advisers predicted the $830 billion stimulus package would deliver less than 6 per cent unemployment by now.  Obama himself declared his presidency would be ''a one-term proposition'' if he did not turn around the economy.

It's been more than three years since the recession technically ended.  Yet the economy is limping at less than 2 per cent growth and 8.1 per cent unemployment.  Meanwhile, real incomes have declined nearly 6 per cent, the US deficit has doubled and the debt has increased by more than $5 trillion.

Contrary to Swan, what could push the US off the fiscal cliff is the scheduled tax increases by year's end.  That may explain why 19 congressional Democrats have supported House Republicans to extend the current rates for another year.  (Memo to the Treasurer:  are these Democrats ''crazies and cranks'' too?)

But neither the President nor the Democrat-controlled Senate is co-operating.  That means liberals are essentially backing a gigantic tax increase in the New Year, which would put the brakes on the most sluggish recovery since the Depression.

There are, of course, other risks and uncertainties involved.  As Federal Reserve board member Richard Fisher conceded last week:  ''Nobody really knows what will work to get the economy back on course.''

But if a recession occurs next year, it's a fair bet the Democrats' refusal to pass the Bush-era tax cuts, taken together with taxes on capital gains, dividends and estates on January 1, will cop a lot of blame.

All of this is crucial to understanding how Swan misunderstands the legislative debate in the US.  It also helps clarify the stakes of the 2012 election.  Above all else, the Obama-Romney contest represents a philosophical debate about the size and scope of the federal government.

This debate has been raging since Barry Goldwater's failed bid against LBJ's Great Society in the mid-1960s.  It accelerated in the '80s with the Reagan agenda of tax cuts and deregulation.  Then the mid-1990s brought us the Republican takeover of Congress, which pushed Clinton into declaring ''the era of Big Government is over'' (welfare reform, balanced budgets, the North American Free Trade Agreement).

But the past decade has hurt the cause of smaller government and the US has gone down the road to higher levels of spending and regulation.

That is why Mitt Romney's running mate, Paul Ryan, the Tea Party and a new breed of Republican governors represent a refreshing change.  They repudiate Obama's let-government-solve-it liberalism, and Bush's don't-rock-the-boat Republicans.

That means reforming entitlement programs (Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security) that are on an unsustainable trajectory as well as proposing tax reforms that reduce rates in exchange for closing tax loopholes.  It also means finding a way to cut indecently high spending and insanely high debt while reviving a lacklustre economy.

A choice, not an echo.  Get ready to hear Romney make that pitch in the first presidential debate.