Sunday, September 27, 1998

Jobless Cancer Set to Spread Under Beazley

Mr Beazley is right, unemployment should be the top political issue in the current election campaign.  He is also right to set a target unemployment rate of 5%.

Unfortunately, his solutions are largely a collection of policies that were tried and failed in the past and will fail again.

Unemployment has clearly reached unacceptable proportions.  Over the last 25 years the unemployment rate has increased fourfold from 2.1% in 1973 to 8.3 % -- with the rate peaking at a higher levels with each successive business cycle.

Few see any hope for change under existing policies.  Even the most optimistic forecasters do not see the unemployment rate falling too far below 8%.  Most expect the rate to rise to a higher level with a slowing economy.

The problem is not so much the rate of unemployment as its composition.  Unemployment is concentrated amongst the unskilled -- particularly unskilled youth -- and in select regions -- such as Tasmania which has an unemployment rate of nearly 14%.  Moreover, unemployment is increasingly becoming a permanent state for many unemployed -- the average duration of unemployment has increased from 8 weeks in 1973 to 56 weeks in 1998.  This compares to 13 weeks in the open US labour market.

In other words, we are creating a low-skilled, regionally-concentrated, permanently-unemployed underclass.  This is a cancer which must be stopped.  Although the cumulative effects of twenty-five years of bad policy will take years to erode, it can be done.

This requires further fundamental deregulation of the labour market.  However, Mr Beazley proposes to do the opposite.  Mr Beazley will increase the powers of the Industrial Relations Commission including giving it the anti-secondary boycott provisions of the Trade Practices Act, increase the range of conditions to be included in awards, beef-up unfair dismissal laws, place additional limits on individual contracts and give priority to collective bargaining.  Mr Beazley plans increase the centralisation of wage fixing and thereby diminish the ability of regions and State to vary wages and condition according to their needs.  Tasmania is a cheaper place to live than Sydney, and wages should reflect this.

Another essential element in any successful job creation program is low minimum wages, particularly lower youth wages.  One of the main reason for the rise of unemployment amongst the unskilled has been that they have priced out of the market by excessive minimum wages.  Recent research has shown that employers of inexperienced school leavers are now effectively paying 40% more than they did 20 years ago.  Unsurprisingly, their unemployment rate is now much higher -- 30% now compared to 18% then.

Of course, allowing wages to move freely so people can get jobs is not part of Labor's plan.

A limited -- to restrict the job-destroying side-effect of taxes -- carefully targeted -- to ensure they deliver real net benefits -- set of training and job creation programs with strong incentives to participate are probably necessary given our large pool of long-term unemployed lacking basic work skills.

Unfortunately, Mr Beazley's plan gives no sign of such targeting.  Nor does it provide the serious institutional reform which is needed to fix the long-standing structural problems in our labour market.


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Double Jeopardy

The rise of Pauline Hanson and One Nation is at least partly the result of widespread anger at the perceived arrogance and hypocrisy of the major parties.  No doubt many people hoped that the new party might jolt other politicians into making a serious attempt to reduce the humbug in our political life.  Unfortunately, One Nation has had the opposite effect.

Although it is much less professional in its activities, One Nation has shown itself just as happy to try pulling the wool over people's eyes as any other party.  And its existence has led to fervent and counter-productive displays of moral vanity as politicians and others damn Pauline and all that she is supposed to stand for.  Such posturing is designed to convince us that the posturer is a truly principled human being, one who would rather forsake any hope of influence or power than dally with the satanic forces of One Nation.

While some of these denouncers may really believe that the angels are cheering them on, the reaction of Labor and other left-leaning groups to One Nation also involves a fair bit of cynicism.  This is evident in demands that the Coalition parties place the ALP ahead of One Nation on their how-to-vote cards for next Saturday's election.

With the exception of a handful of National Party candidates, these demands have been successful.  Consequently, in many crucial seats Labor will receive a much higher percentage of One Nation preferences than it would have obtained had Coalition candidates been able to make deals for a preference swap with One Nation.

Certainly, it is not in the interests of either Labor or the Coalition for One Nation to win any seats, either in the House of Representatives or the Senate.  So it makes sense for the Liberals and Nationals to allocate preferences so as to reduce the likelihood of this happening.

But in seats which are marginal, and where One Nation has little hope of victory, preference deals could make all the difference between a win to Labor or a win to the Coalition.  So if Kim Beazley becomes our next Prime Minister, it may well be because the Coalition parties were spooked into putting One Nation last.

Of course, Labor and many in the media claim that the issue is a big test of principle.  Mr Beazley has said that if One Nation gains the balance of power in the House of Representatives, he would never form government with their support.

But what if One Nation holds the balance of power in the Senate?  Will Mr Beazley treat them in the same way that John Howard has treated Senator Mal Colston in the past year or so?

In other words, will Mr Beazley promise never to rely on One Nation senators' votes to defeat or amend a Coalition government's legislation;  or if he becomes Prime Minister, never to rely on their votes to get legislation passed?  This is not an academic question, because on many matters -- and particularly those relating to the economy -- One Nation's position is closer to the ALP than it is to the Coalition.

The dubious basis of Mr Beazley's occupation of the moral high ground on the One Nation issue is even more obvious when we consider how Labor allocated its preferences in the 1996 election.

It should be remembered that the supposedly racist and objectionable aspects of One Nation's platform are very largely derived from two sources, Australians Against Further Immigration, and Graeme Campbell, the former ALP and then Independent member for Kalgoorlie, who now heads the Australia First party.  Campbell played an important part in Pauline Hanson's political development after she was elected to Parliament, and he makes no secret of his irritation at the success One Nation has had in running with "his" ideas.

Nevertheless, in the 1996 election, Labor had no qualms about giving its preferences to Campbell and AAFI before Coalition candidates.  While Paul Keating was still in charge then, in the by-election for the outer Sydney seat of Lindsay held a few months later -- after Beazley had taken over -- Labor still put AAFI ahead of the Liberal Party's Jackie Kelly.  The ethnic leaders who seem to think that Kim Beazley is a man who will have no truck with anti-immigrant parties must have short memories.

But One Nation is not playing things straight either.  Although it cannot admit the fact openly for fear of upsetting those of its supporters who hate Labor, One Nation's leaders would be absolutely delighted to see Mr Beazley win government.  There are two reasons for this.

Firstly, however much Mr Beazley may claim to have learnt his lessons from the overwhelming defeat of 1996, he will be unable to control the "get-up-people's-noses" section of his party.  Keating may have gone, but once they are back in power, Gareth Evans, Nick Bolkus, Cheryl Kernot and the rest won't know how to stop themselves.

We can expect to see the same kind of posturing on Aboriginal, ethnic and other victimhood issues that was so effective in alienating many Australians the last time around.  From One Nation's point of view, this will be like having a number of high-profile recruiting agents moving across the country, supported not out of its own funds, but by the Australian taxpayer.

Secondly, given the massive majority it took into the election, a defeat for the Coalition would be devastating for the morale and unity of both the Liberals and the Nationals.  So provided that One Nation wins at least some Federal seats, it could realistically hope to take advantage of the expected upheavals in the Coalition parties to capture significant numbers of their members and supporters.

It is not an appealing prospect.  People may be frustrated with the way that John Howard's government has foolishly squandered its opportunities and authority.  But those who think that a Coalition loss will lead to a more decent and unified nation are also going to be very disappointed.


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Saturday, September 26, 1998

Reply to Errol Simper

Letter to the Editor:

Media bias has been a long-standing issue in Australian politics, particularly with reference to the ABC.  In conjunction with the Fraser Institute of Canada, I have sought to provide independent hard data by application of content analysis to comments on party policies in prime-time TV news.

The media generally has treated this as straight news.  Some ABC staff, however, have done everything they can to kill the story, including ringing journalists and casting doubt on the methodology and the institute's funding sources.

The other exception has been Errol Simper, whose writings have long given the impression that in any criticism of the ABC, the story is the critics not the criticism.

In his "Angry Aunty" article he claimed that there had been an "orchestrated campaign of vilification" against the ABC and implied the institute was part of it.  The institute is not party of any campaign, it was not commissioned to undertake this study, nor did nay of the study's funding come from any political party.  I will be launching a campaign seeking public sponsorship to continue with media monitoring.

Use of content analysis to monitor media coverage is an important contribution to media accountability.  People who try to kill debate, and try to frustrate accountability, rather than fostering it, damage the health of our democracy.

Friday, September 25, 1998

ABC's dramatic shift in election coverage

For the last 30 years or more, media bias has been an issue in Australian politics, especially during election campaigns.

The ABC has been having a particularly bad time over the last year.

The ABC's own Minister, Senator Alston, referred to its "selective coverage" and the Prime Minister have made adverse comments about the "tired, old ABC line".

The first fortnight of this election campaign was a shocker for the ABC.

First was the public apology over Triple J's promotion of a concert called "Howard's End" when Triple-J announcer Adam Spencer interviewed the lead singer of the Whitlams on getting rid of the Liberal Government.

Then came the 7.30 Report's debate between Cheryl Kernot and Judith Moylan moderated by Kerry O'Brien when the ABC's switchboard was inundated with calls claiming the coverage was biased against Moylan.

This was followed by another dramatic own-goal when ABC WA radio interviewer Verity James asked the Prime Minister whether the GST would lower the price of heroin.

In case anyone missed the radio interview, it was broadcast in living colour on the TV news.  That lead to another public apology.

While this was going on, I released the first of its regular media monitoring reports.

Using content-analysis methodology developed over the last 10 years by the Fraser Institute in Canada, I monitored coverage of the major parties policies by the prime time TV News of the ABC and the free-to-air commercial TV stations.

I watched all election reports for information and commentary on Coalition or Labor Party policies.

Each comment on Coalition or Labor platforms was identified and coded according to the source (journalist, politician, expert, general public, etc.), the party (Coalition or Labor), the policy issue (health policy, tax reform, communications, etc.) and the appraisal (neutral, favourable, unfavourable).

Each appraisal was discussed by two researchers, and in the case of a disagreement between the researchers, an arbitrator was asked to make the final decision.

Appraisals were based on explicit assessments ("such and such a policy is good for Australia") or the potential impact ("the G.S.T. will raise the price of petrol in the bush").

The first media monitoring report -- covering the second week of the campaign -- found that the ABC provided more policy coverage than any of the commercial stations and its coverage was more critical of the Coalition.

The ratio of positive-Coalition-plus-negative-ALP comments to positive-ALP-plus-negative- Coalition comments on the ABC TV News was 2.2 to 1.  That compared to 1.5 to 1 on the commercial stations.

These findings, plus the ABC's own goals, led to a feeding frenzy in the newspapers and talk-back radio.

A public broadcaster which itself becomes a major election issue has real problems.  The ABC's response to all this was a classic bureaucrat's reaction:  "there's nothing wrong, we're checking ourselves anyway, trust us".

Well, something happened in week three.  My second report discovered a dramatic shift in the ABC's coverage.

The above ratio shifted from being hostile to the Coalition to being positive to the Coalition -- to a ratio of 1 to 1.6 in favour of the Coalition.

As a result, the overall ABC coverage for the fortnight was favourable to the Coalition.  There was a comprehensive shift in the ABC's TV News coverage of policies.

It became far less focused on the Coalition (in week two, 78 per cent of the comments on the major parties' policies were on the Coalition, in week three 65 per cent were).  The ABC's coverage became far less critical.

In week two, 63 per cent of the coverage of major parties policies was negative, 22 per cent positive and 16 per cent neutral.  In week three, the figures were 45 per cent negative, 31 per cent positive and 24 per cent neutral.

Of course, this could be the ebb and flow of the campaign.  The biggest single event of the third week of the campaign was the Liberal Policy Launch -- a five minute montage of Howard on the ABC Sunday night TV News did generate a lot of the positive coverage.

The attention on the ABC masked a continuing -- indeed increasing -- tendency towards negative coverage of the Coalition on prime-time commercial TV News.  The overall balance of coverage on the commercial stations shifted from 1.5 to 1 to 1.75 to 1 in favour of the ALP.

The Seven's networks coverage was the most even-handed -- over the two weeks the balance of coverage favoured the ALP slightly 1.1 to 1.  The Seven network also provided least policy coverage of any of the networks.

Nine -- which sources close to the ABC claim is favourable to the Coalition -- was the most hostile to the Coalition of all the stations covered.

Over the two weeks, its coverage favoured the ALP 2.1 to 1 (3 to 1 in the first week, 1.9 to 1 in the second).

Ten was in the middle, with its coverage favouring the ALP 1.78 to 1 (1.6 to 1 in week two and 1.9 to 1 in week three).  Ten also provided the most policy coverage of the commercial channels.

All networks dramatically increased their coverage of policy in the third week of the campaign compared to week two (100 per cent in the case of ABC and Seven, 75 per cent for Ten and 335 per cent for Nine).

The dramatic divergence in the balance of coverage of the major parties' policies by the four networks' prime TV news is the most interesting finding of the media monitoring so far.

As for the issues, unemployment -- which regularly tops polls for public concern -- is running a poor second in policy coverage.

Overwhelmingly, TV news is treating this election as a referendum on Howard's tax plan with tax making up almost 40 per cent of coverage compared to 17 per cent for employment.

Ironically, the two issues which have dominated politics over the last two years -- industrial relations and indigenous issues -- between them have amounted to a mere 3 per cent of coverage of major parties' policies.

Sunday, September 20, 1998

Is Labour Market Deregulation Good For Australian Workers?

Voices Column:

Yes.  No-one can guarantee your current job.  The only real guarantee is the capacity to quickly get a new job if needed.

The only way to deliver that to all is through an open and flexible labour market that allows workers to negotiate (either together or collectively) their own terms and conditions.

A labour market bogged down in complex rules and regulations discourages employment and locks people out of jobs -- which is why the duration of unemployment is climbing in the highly regulated Australian labour market and falling in the open US labour market.


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Unrepentant Communists Just as Unwelcome

I must begin by acknowledging something that fills me with deep shame.

In my youth I was favourably disposed towards communism, and believed that anti-communists in the West were greatly exaggerating the brutality of marxist regimes in Europe and Asia.  Even if communism wasn't appropriate for a country like Australia, it seemed the only system that could offer hope for the Third World.

I did not deny that dreadful excesses had occurred under communism -- although I was certainly blind to many of them.  But I thought that the excesses were aberrations, which were at least partly explainable by the exceptional military and other threats that communist states had to face.

In my terrible naiveté, I believed that if only the Soviet Union and like-minded regimes were treated reasonably by the West, they would do everything possible to bring about a more just and peaceful world.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 forced me to reconsider my views.  But it was not until the 1990s that I finally accepted that the passionate anti-communists I had once ridiculed, men such as B.A. Santamaria and Melbourne academic Dr Frank Knopfelmacher, had been right all along.

Now, only a few holdouts in the loonier reaches of our universities and unions would refuse to concede just how nasty and murderous communist regimes really were.  In The Reds, his recent, rather sympathetic history of the Australian Communist Party, even Professor Stuart Macintyre, who responded to what he calls "the aura of communist tradition" by joining the party in the 1970s, readily admits that the "tradition" was responsible for millions of innocent deaths.

In fact, Stephane Courtois, the editor of The Black Book of Communism, which caused a sensation when it was published in France last year, calculates that communists have killed between 85 and 100 million people.  This makes communism the most lethal political movement in history, far more destructive than nazism, which was responsible for around 25 million deaths.

Many apologists for communism -- including, I am very sorry to say, my younger self -- attempted to differentiate between the honourable aims of founders such as Lenin, and the malignant regimes created by the likes of Stalin or North Korea's Kim Il-Sung.  But as The Black Book of Communism and other historical studies make painfully clear, communism was criminal in its nature from the start, rejecting the rule of law and committed to achieving its aims through mass terror and violence.

Whereas nazism practised a genocide based on race, communism practised a genocide based on class.  The bourgeoisie and other so-called "enemies of the people" were to be "crushed";  destroyed "like noxious insects", in Lenin's chilling phrase.

In the first five months of their rule in Russia, the communists executed nearly three times as many political opponents as the Tsarist authorities had killed during the whole of the previous century.  And the number of communism's victims during its seventy-five year long reign in Russia is only a fraction of the number during China's half century of communism.

There is a fundamental question about this bloody legacy.  It relates to what the English writer Ferdinand Mount calls the "asymmetry of indulgence" with which western intellectuals treat communists compared to the way they treat nazis -- or even people who supported the far less murderous fascism of Benito Mussolini's Italy.

For the past half century, nazism has rightly been seen as an abomination in the West.  People who profess any support for nazism place themselves completely outside the bounds of acceptability.

It is virtually unthinkable, for instance, that anyone claiming that Hitler was "a man who seems to have been Christ-like, at least in his compassion", or "one of the greatest teachers of humanity" -- as Professor Manning Clark said about Lenin -- would be allowed to participate seriously in Australia's intellectual or political life ever again.

And unless he wished to commit professional suicide, no academic would write a history of the Australian Nazi Party -- or even a less reprehensible party of the extreme right -- which was as charitable in tone as Professor Macintyre's treatment of Australian communists.  Statements that involvement with nazis had given an author "warm friendships that still endure, loyalties and interests that persist", or expressions of hope that anti-nazis would "exhaust their exultations" at the defeat of nazism, would scare off any reputable publisher, whatever criticisms of the party such a history contained.

Nor would a work with such disagreeable sentiments be given the non-fiction Book of the Year award by the Melbourne Age, as has just happened with Professor Macintyre's history.

Even if they repent, former supporters of nazism or fascism are never really forgiven.  But for supporters of communism repentance is completely optional, no matter how compromising the activities in which they took part.

Prominent communists and fellow travellers are allowed to erase their former enthusiasms without any embarrassing questions being asked.  Indeed, howls of outrage would greet any suggestion that without proper repentance such people should be just as unwelcome in our universities, cultural institutions and public life as are nazis and fascists.

The "asymmetry of indulgence" also works against anti-communists.  Last year, when it was revealed that in the 1940s George Orwell had given a friend in the British Foreign Office a list of fellow intellectuals sympathetic to Stalin, he was accused of monstrous betrayal.  But the actions of communists -- such as the Australian writer Katherine Susannah Prichard -- who provided comparable advice to marxist regimes about "unreliable colleagues" are shrugged off.

Australia has become home to hundreds of thousands of European and Asian refugees from communism.  Called fascists and worse by pro-communists when they first arrived, it must really stick in their craw to see the local apologists for those who drove them from their home countries treated so indulgently.  In the climate of apology and reconciliation which is now so popular, perhaps it is time for a National Sorry Day in which the former supporters of communism in the universities and elsewhere are asked to atone for their guilt.


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Is Labour Market Deregulation Good For Australian Workers?

Voices Column:

Yes.  No-one can guarantee your current job.  The only real guarantee is the capacity to quickly get a new job if needed.

The only way to deliver that to all is through an open and flexible labour market that allows workers to negotiate (either together or collectively) their own terms and conditions.

A labour market bogged down in complex rules and regulations discourages employment and locks people out of jobs -- which is why the duration of unemployment is climbing in the highly regulated Australian labour market and falling in the open US labour market.


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Friday, September 18, 1998

Australia Has to Find Another Way

Since 1985, the Commonwealth has spent almost $17 billion on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians.  That is almost $54,000 per indigenous Australian.  And it does not include extra spending by state and territory Governments, or spending on general services also used by indigenous Australians.

Yet, indigenous Australians continue to have health profiles much worse than other Australians -- with life expectancies 15 to 20 years below the national average.  Many of their communities continue to be ravaged by domestic violence, high rates of incarceration, high unemployment.

If we could point to improvements, that would provide some hope -- but in so many of these areas, there has been remarkably little gain.  The welfare model of public policy -- of indigenous advancement through income support and other welfare expenditure -- has not worked.

Nor, despite the current fuss, will native title provide much basis for indigenous advancement.  Only a very limited number of indigenous Australians are likely to end up with confirmed native title rights.  Second, native title is a studiously non-commercial form of title.  It is held collectively, so individual title-holders have little or no incentive to invest effort in improving the value of the title since any benefits are shared with every other title-holder, but every incentive to use as much of it themselves as they can.

Nor is it a recipe for improved community relations to tie a set of non-commercial rights to land in with highly commercial pastoral lessees.  Particularly when lessees who bought their leases face the uncertainty of sharing with persons as yet unknown, with rights as yet undetermined and who did not have to pay for those rights.

Nor is looking at matters through the prism of discrimination helpful.  History is full of ethnic groups which were discriminated against, but have still been disproportionately successful -- Jews, Chinese-Malays, Japanese-Americans, Armenians, etc.  These groups have not been successful because some benevolent state dropped a pile of money on them or gave them special property rights.

What they have in common is cultural traits reinforced by circumstances which encouraged commercial success:  strong family structures, commitment to education, internal networks and trust.

The frayed family structures, lack of cultural background in formal education or mercantile society and divided clan and tribal structure of indigenous Australia do not provide good bases for successful participation in the wider economy.

These have not been created by a lack of money, nor can they be solved by throwing money at them.

Indeed, welfare can be positively harmful.  Huge spending on specific indigenous programmes directs talent in indigenous communities to careers in qualifying for, and administering, government funding.  It weakens incentives to change behaviour in ways which might mean losing such funding.

Australian institutions must be open to all Australians willing to participate in them.  But that does not get you very far, as individuals, families and groups ultimately have to do it themselves.

Indigenous Australians can only achieve similar health, employment and income profiles to other Australians if they participate fully in the economic and other life of Australia.

Public policy can partly bridge the gap by ensuring access to the normal services and programmes.  But much of the bridge has to be built by indigenous Australians themselves if they want achieve the full benefits of participation in society.  This does not mean surrendering their cultures, but adapting them to the modern world.  Which is, to a greater or lesser extent, what everyone else has had to do.


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Sunday, September 13, 1998

Hong Kong's Intervention is Australia's Opportunity

Australia's chance of becoming the major financial centre in Asia got a real boost over the last month from the Hong Kong Government.

During the past three decades, Hong Kong has emerged as one of the major international financial centres (IFCs) of the world -- some say it is now the third largest IFC in the world after New York and London and the largest IFC in Asia.  It is home to 85 of the world's largest banks and to over 1,000 investment funds and unit trusts.  It is also the fifth largest foreign exchange market in the world.

Not bad for an island state of 6 million hard-working people, which two decades ago was a primarily a manufacturer of cheap clothes and toys.

The Hong Kong's success has been primarily based on good governance.  The territory had a business environment that international investors trust;  low taxes, high standards of corporate disclosure, rule of law, open capital markets, limited government and a sound currency.

A crucial part of Hong Kong's success has been the refusal of its administrators to become directly or indirectly involved in bank ownership, the stock market or the currency market.

Another critical fact was Hong Kong's currency board.  Under this system the Hong Kong Monetary Authority -- the de facto central bank -- maintained free exchange between the HK dollar and the US dollar at a reasonable fixed rate ($HK$7.8 to $US1).  Crucially, under the currency board system, the Authority did not intervene in the currency markets to defend, or otherwise support, the peg.  Instead any run against the currency was defended by raising interest rates to whatever level required.

When China took over Hong Kong last year there was concern that Beijing would discontinue these policies and thereby cause the decline of financial sector.  These concerns were allayed some what by China's promise to maintain "one country-two laws" and to foster the growth of the financial sector.

Over the last month, however, the Hong Kong Government has jettisoned these policies and intervened deeply in the markets.  During late August, in an attempt to prop up local share prices, the Hong Kong government went on a buying binge on the local stock market.  It spent around $US 15 billion in just the last two weeks and as a result has become the largest shareholder in the market and the largest shareholder in the island largest bank -- the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank.

Around the same time the HK Monetary Authority succumbed, it began to use its foreign reserves to support the local currency by buying $HK in contravention of the currency board system.

Not surprisingly, these moves sent shock waves through the financial sector.  They also failed to achieve there objective -- which was to stop the speculators.  As a result, speculators and financiers expect more of the same and Hong Kong's attraction as a international financial centre is damaged.

Hong Kong's cloud is Australia's potential.  Australia is now the only real competitor to Hong Kong as an Asian international financial centre.

However, to reap this potential, the next Australian Government will need to develop a much more investor friendly-taxation climate than is currently envisaged by the competing tax packages.


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Wednesday, September 09, 1998

The ORG's Discussion Paper on Powercor's Application for a Variation to their Distribution Licence to Include the Docklands Area

Submission

BACKGROUND AND CONCLUSIONS

The ORG is considering whether to vary the Powercor distribution licence so that it may distribute electricity in the Docklands site in competition with the host distributor, CitiPower.  The Powercor application is couched in terms of it being an "inset" licence rather than posing a direct threat that might strand some of CitiPower's existing assets.

The ORG recognises that competition tends to enhance efficiency and that contestability is adequate to confer these benefits.  It points out that the licences for the five distribution businesses were non-exclusive.  Powercor has sought the right to distribute electricity in the Docklands "inset".

The ORG has said the key issue

  • is to determine whether it is appropriate for Powercor to have this right and thus for more than one licence holder to have the right to distribute power in the Docklands area.

There may have been assurances offered to the distribution businesses at the time of their sale that they would have exclusive franchises to their territories, although the ORG offers no information on this matter.  If any such assurances were given, they would form an important part of the property rights that the businesses hold, even though any such assurances would have been inconsistent with the competitive principles which form the basis of the Victorian and national markets.

Abstracting from such matters, in general, we believe that the ORG should confirm the general principle that by-pass is automatically allowed and that dual supply to an area is permitted.  We believe that this principle is so fundamental to the competitive market that in the future such matters should proceed without the businesses concerned having to justify this to the ORG.  In other words, any business with a distribution license should automatically be able to build or take over existing lines in any part of the State.  This right should not be confined to greenfield sites.


ADDRESSING "INSET" APPOINTMENTS

COMPETITION AND REGULATION

The application is for an "inset".  If this implies some exclusivity to distribute in the area, it would seem to offer little advantage to the existing regime.  To be sure a form of auction will have been held and a winner selected by the users.  But if the successful firm is then granted a franchise over the area, little has been gained in terms of placing the discipline of contestability over the new supplier.

The ORG should reconsider some of the basic premises on which its discussion Paper is based.  Thus, in addressing the basic considerations relating to inset appointments (p.6,7):

  • It seems to suggest that once firms have embarked on competition, they may subsequently collude to raise the price so that their average costs are covered.  The fact is that such collusion is both rare and illegal.  In suggesting that this requires continued regulation, the ORG could be accused of wishing to retain regulation for the benefit of its own workload.  It would be just as reasonable to require continued regulation of electricity generation or of the two airlines or supermarket prices or any other business where competition is limited.
  • The ORG is concerned to protect businesses from making unfortunate decisions on behalf of their shareholders when it argues, "There is a legitimate public policy concern about the possibility of unnecessary and inefficient duplication of network.  Even if shareholders rather than consumers were forced to bear the costs."  This places the Regulator in a position where He arbitrates each possible piece of competitive provision against some vague economic welfare criteria­the imprecision of which is the very reason why market forces rather than government control is preferred.
  • The suggestion that the inset grant could be made conditional on the new provider compensating the incumbent is akin to arguing that if another motor manufacturer is permitted to build cars, he should compensate any factory owners who lose business as a result.  This is utterly different to any of the criteria that normally apply in business and would lead to a much more cautious approach to competition and undermine efficiency.

DISTORTIONS TO COST REFLECTIVE PRICES

ORG recognises that "postage stamp" pricing can bring departures from cost reflective prices and this can lead to distortions to incentives for efficient investment and demand management.  The present arrangements also set in place a cross subsidy from urban to rural customers.  The cross subsidy is a charge on metropolitan distributors.  In the case of CitiPower, this raised the ODRC value of their assets by 27% ($129 m) and the Transmission Use of System charges by 28% ($5.9 m per annum).  This may give incentives to non-host distributors (not just rural distributors) to offer by-pass, because the incumbent is loaded with excessive costs.  The latter should however have incentives to meet any competitive threat by lowering prices, if necessary to marginal costs.

Nonetheless, there is merit in the ORG view that the level playing field should recognise regulatory impositions on incumbents and, if it is not possible to have these unwound, require the same imposition on all providers for the same area.  That said, it is almost certainly impracticable to estimate the full nature of the impositions in each area that might be contested.  It is also difficult to reconcile the present market arrangements with the notion of a regulator imposing an equalisation tax on each new contestant (and an equalisation subsidy on those seeking rural business?).  Even so, requiring the new entrant to offer compensation to the incumbent in the event that the latter faces stranded assets is not a sound approach.

Also unfounded are the ORG's fears that the outcome will be an increase in prices to existing customers.  This certainly would not eventuate where there is a close proximity of alternative lines.  In such circumstances, raising prices to existing customers is likely to be a prelude to the incumbent losing even more of the market and converting a partially stranded asset to one that is fully stranded.  It is far more likely that the two sources will provide on-going competition to the benefit of consumers.  In this respect, the evidence is that prices tend to be lower in those US locations where electricity is supplied by more than one line, than where a monopoly is mandated.

The transfer of income with the asset value adjustments and the TUOS equalisation involved substantial sums.  In the case of the asset values, the three metropolitan distribution businesses had their values raised by $326 million and the costs of TUOS increased by $23 million per year until the year 2000, reducing by 20% in each of the future five year periods.

In any consideration of the present situation in the light of the newly discovered potential for competition in distribution, these matters will need to be addressed.  One way of doing so would be:

  • to reallocate the annual TUOS charge to distribution businesses operating within each of the original host territories on some methodology that would leave each paying a fair amount;
  • to simply consider the asset value adjustment as a fait accompli and proceed as if it makes little difference.

With regard to the asset values, two factors are worth noting.  First, the buyers had no assurances about future tariff levels beyond the year 2000 review.  Secondly, the prices paid were in all cases were around twice those of the higher of the adjusted or original valuation.  Even though these valuations reflected an expected revenue stream, this could not be thought of as being locked in at the current level of returns.

The present issue raises fundamental matters of market design which must be reviewed in the light of sound theory of regulatory management and whatever assurances were offered in the past by the Government to the future owners.

The Discussion Paper skirts these fundamental issues.  Indeed, the Discussion Paper sets out conditions and objections to market based approaches that offer the impression of an agency established to thwart rather than promote competition.


RECOMMENDED APPROACH

INSET APPOINTMENT APPLICATIONS

The ORG sought responses to its checklist (section 6.7), which comprised the following:

  1. What are the full circumstances surrounding the inset appointment application, for example, in terms of the nature of the development, the proposed source of supply and the characteristics of the supplier and the customer or customers?
  2. Is the application based on an agreement with the customer(s) which covers the full costs of operating the infrastructure, including the capital costs?
  3. What is the basis of this agreement?
    • Has there been an open, competitive tendering process relating to the supply?
    • Did the selection process reflect the appropriate efficiency criteria?
    • Has there been competitive neutrality between the potential suppliers to the inset area in so far as is relevant to the appropriate decision making efficiency criteria?
    • What are the underlying factors which make the inset appointment applicant a more efficient supplier for the area than the incumbent licence holder.
  4. If the inset appointment applicant is not the final consumer, is it appropriate for the regulator to determine a separate tariff to cover the inset area?
  5. In the case of by-pass, do the agreed terms and conditions of supply fall within the bounds of what is currently permitted in the licensed area?

The Office invited specific comments on the issues raised including:

  • the appropriateness of the checklist of questions for review;
  • the efficiency based decision making criteria;  and
  • the appropriate ways to deal with the short term impacts of inset appointments on incumbent operators.

With regard to these matters, we make the following suggestions:

  • ORG should view by-pass as a means which allows regulation to be reduced.  There should not even be a specific requirement to seek approval and any "inset" appointments unless those appointments are for some exclusive franchise (and exclusive franchises should never be permitted).  Nor is it of consequence whether or not a tender process has been entered into;  consumers can only gain by increased competition and the Regulator should not specify how that competition should be put in place.

TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, PRIVATIZATION ADJUSTMENTS AND COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY

The ORG invited Submissions (section 7) to address the following questions on this issue:

  • Are the adjustments to asset values and prices made by the government at the time of privatisation relevant to the assessment of Powercor's application?
  • If so, what adjustments are necessary to ensure that the decision made in relation to the inset appointment reflects a competitively neutral situation between Powercor and CitiPower?
  • If Powercor was to reduce charges in the Docklands area, to what extent will they be a result of real efficiencies and savings rather than the result of price distortions arising from Government imposed distortions prior to privatisation?

With regard to these issues we make the following recommendations:

  • Postage stamp charges that do not fully reflect costs are inevitable to some degree in all businesses.  Competition will force the least cost reflective of these to be unwound.  As regards asset values, competitive forces require any by-passed or partly by-passed assets to be written down to a realistic value.  The originally specified asset values also become less relevant in setting rates where evidence of potential by-pass is provided by competitive incursions or tenders.
  • The best approach is to accept the prices that are in-place but to allow them to be undercut or adjusted as the market determines.  This should be married to a wider approach which recognises this intrinsic contestability of distribution systems.  A major corollary of the approach would be not to impose a CPI-X regime on distribution systems but instead apply the existing price level, adjusted simply by the increase in the CPI as though this was the price contracted by customers.  This will allow the prices that are in excess of the competitive market levels to gradually unwind.

PROMOTING COMPETITION, FACILITATING ENTRY AND PREVENTION OF MISUSE OF MONOPOLY OR MARKET POWER

The ORG invited Submissions (section 8.1) to address the following questions on this issue:

  • Is competition at the construction stage sufficient to extract the benefits without changes to the current licensing arrangements?
  • To what extent will the approval of Powercor's licence variation promote competition in the electricity supply industry?
  • Would overlapping distribution areas impose an appropriate level of "competitive discipline", as submitted by Powercor?
  • Can the Office be satisfied that sufficient or effective competition will exist with more than one licensee approved to supply the Docklands area to enable the relaxation of price controls?
  • What considerations need to be addressed in assessing the competition efficiency trade-off resulting from the Powercor application?

With regard to these matters, the we submit that:

  • Competition in construction is useful but, like out-sourcing elements of a government monopoly, it only addresses part of the efficiency promoting possibilities.
  • Approval of Powercor's licence variation will promote competition but a much more comprehensive statement along these lines is necessary.  The Powercor proposal illustrates the considerable potential for competition across Victoria's distribution businesses.  Its implications go beyond the need for regulation in the particular, a matter upon which in the absence of government assurances prior to privatisation, there should be no dispute.  All regulation of distribution line prices should be replaced by a requirement that distributors price no higher than the current level adjusted for inflation.
  • In other words, the competitive rivalry we are observing demonstrates the real potential for "light handed" regulation and an abandonment of the highly intrusive regulatory approach presently being contemplated.

EFFICIENT AND ECONOMIC ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS

The ORG invited Submissions (sections 8.2 and 8.3) to address specifically the following questions:

  • To what extent, if any, should the Office consider stranded assets?  If so, on what basis should compensation be determined?
  • Is the least cost method appropriate for determining whether to grant Powercor a licence to cover Docklands?
  • Is there a difference in the pricing implications between the normal network expansion and expansion via a discrete inset network?  Does it matter?
  • Is there a minimum size that the Office needs to take into account in determining if a site is to be issued with an inset distribution licence?
  • Should Docklands be regarded as a "Greenfield" site?
  • Are CitiPower's assets in and around the area significant?
  • To what extent, if any, should the Office consider stranded assets?  If so, on what basis should compensation be determined?
  • How do the tariffs proposed by Powercor for Docklands compare with those of CitiPower?
  • Should the Office allow more than one network service provider to distribute electricity in the Docklands?
  • Is the development of dual (or more) networks in the Docklands likely to be economically efficient?
  • How will the granting of Powercor's application or otherwise impact on the interests of existing and future customers in Powercor's and CitiPower's existing licensed areas as well as future customers in the Docklands?
  • How can the Office be assured, in granting a distribution licence to Powercor to supply the Docklands area, that the interests of consumers will be protected without knowing Powercor's proposed tariffs?
  • If Powercor was to charge lower tariffs in the Docklands area than CitiPower, to what extent will they be a result of real efficiencies and savings rather than the result of cross-subsidy by other Powercor customers or the consequences of the urban/rural cross-subsidy arrangements?
  • Will Powercor's proposed network design result in an acceptable technical standard for reliability?
  • How will the approval or otherwise of Powercor's licence variation affect the financial viability of the industry?

The issues arising on the efficient and economic electricity systems and customer protection raised in Parts 8.2 and 8.3 seek answers to a great many questions that are superfluous to the central issue of how to promote competition and ensure as small a role as possible for the regulator.  Perhaps the pinnacle of this is the question that seeks views on how the proposal will affect the financial viability of the industry.  The ORG's role is to act as a surrogate for a market outcome where competition is considered unlikely to provide this.  To frustrate the development of competitive provision is not only inimical to the ORG's charter but extends the Office's role into that of a central planner.  The following material addresses the questions posed:

  • Contrary to statements in the section, the Office will need to undertake little in the way of investigation of CitiPower's or any other assets in the region.  There should be no protection of incumbents.  There should be no oversight of the conditions or tendering process Powercor was involved in.  Those selecting Powercor can be deemed better placed than the ORG to make a decision in the best interests of themselves and parties for whom they act as agent.  There is no need to review the tariffs Powercor proposes;  at worst, the other users in the area have the existing tariff as a fall-back and cannot be made worse off by the additional competition.
  • As previously discussed, it is alien to market philosophies to do what the ORG contemplates doing and require a firm to compensate a competitor when it has taken business from it.  The only context in which such a measure may be contemplated is one where certain property rights were granted by the government.
  • Under the proposals of this submission there would be no need for the ORG to consider whether the tariffs proposed by Powercor are subsidised by other Powercor customers.  It is, moreover, impossible to conceive that such a subsidy may be possible or in Powercor's interests to pursue.  If Powercor is making high profits on its established customer base, it would not be in the interests of the firm's shareholders to dissipate these on unprofitable ventures.
  • Again as previously discussed, there is no case for the ORG to concern itself that there are too many distributors capable of supplying a region.  This is the case even if this means cut-throat competition.  It is inappropriate for the ORG to see a role for itself in protecting businesses' shareholders from the consequences of unwise actions on the part of the businesses themselves.  The shareholders willingly take on this risk and are both better placed and better motivated than any regulator to ensure the executives they appoint are looking after their interests.
  • Nor is the reliability of a new and duplicated system a matter that should concern to the ORG.  Users have different trade-offs between price and reliability and a duplicated line offers an excellent opportunity to allow diversity in this regard.

SHOULD THERE BE A SEPARATE LICENSE OR AN AMENDMENT MADE?

The ORG invited Submissions (section 8.5) to address the following questions on this issue:

  • Should Powercor be required to hold a separate licence specific to the Docklands and if so how should the fee be determined?
  • How should the Office ensure regulatory separation between the Docklands and Powercor's other distribution area if the inset appointment is approved?

On the issue of whether a separate licence is required, we would put the following points:

  • Licensing is required only to ensure that a particular pricing regime is in place.  Under the light handed regulatory proposals of this submission, the licensing role would be vastly reduced.  There need be no price control in areas subject to more than one source of supply and a licence to extend into these areas should not be required.  Licence costs are largely to offset the cost incurred by the ORG and under the proposals of this submission those costs would be reduced considerably.

Wednesday, September 02, 1998

The Evil Empire Strikes Back

Book Reviews

Going Public:  Education Policy and Public Education in Australia
edited by Alan Reid
Published by Australian Curriculum Studies Association (ACSA) in association with the Centre for the Study of Public Education at the University of South Australia, 1998.  120 pages.  Price:  $35.

As readers would well realise, the Australian education system, especially schools, has undergone significant change over the past five to ten years.  Beginning with the reforms introduced by Dr Terry Metherell in NSW, carried on by the Kennett Government in Victoria and taken up federally by Dr David Kemp, school systems have been dramatically reshaped.

Reforms include introducing Statewide testing and making schools accountable for their performance, devolving power to individual schools and giving parents greater flexibility and choice when choosing a school.  The belief was that the education system suffered from "provider capture" and that something needed to be done to reduce the influence of teacher unions and centralised bureaucracies.

Have these reforms helped or hindered the work of schools?  Is the public education system in crisis and, as result, is there a danger that Australia's social fabric is beginning to unravel?  According to the contributors to Going Public:  Education Policy and Public Education in Australia, the answers to these last two questions are clearly "yes".

The Preface suggests that the recent changes threaten "the survival of the public education system itself" and Eva Cox, in her Foreword, argues that social capital and the common good are being undermined because "education is moving towards being a private consumption item rather than a public good".

The aforementioned quotations set the context for the remainder of the book, which presents a range of chapters analysing current policies, identifying their impact on schools and putting forward political strategies to "enhance the social democratic values that lie at the heart of progressive aspirations about public education".

The one good thing about the ACSA book is that the Editor is brutally honest when he states, in the Preface, that it is "unashamedly, a partisan book".  There is no pretence that the book is balanced and impartial and, in fact, there is an admission that the contributors were chosen because they would adhere to the party line.  This explains why the contributors are made up of the usual suspects -- including left-wing, postmodern and feminist academics and teacher union apparatchiks.

Given the pedigree of the contributors, there should be no surprise about the arguments developed.  Attempts to make schools more accountable and answerable to parents and students are condemned as a free-market ploy to destroy the public system and "residualise" government schools.  Attempts to support parents' choice about schooling is seen as undemocratic, divisive and socially unjust.

Contrary to mounting evidence about declining standards and the failure of schools to educate properly, the crisis in literacy and numeracy is a manufactured one that governments are using to justify reducing funding and, once again, to attack state schools.  The so-called "crisis in the basics" is also used, we are told, by governments to convince the public that teachers are not doing their jobs.

Instead of supporting all students and schools fairly and equally, conservative governments -- and the wealthy and powerful groups on which they depend -- are only concerned with bolstering the position of elitist, wealthy, non-government schools.  Forgotten is the fact that the overwhelming majority of non-government students attend schools in the Catholic system -- a system which in no way can be described as elitist, or awash with funds.

Contributors to the ACSA book also argue that arrangements by the Federal Government to ensure that funding follows students, if they move from the government to the non-government system, is a calculated plan to destroy state schools.  Contrary to the fact that, if students opt out of the state system then the recurrent costs of the system will be less, the ACSA book argues that State and Territory departments of education should be financially rewarded for losing market share.

Given that the Australian Education Union (AEU), in the words of the book's editor, offered "moral and financial support" for the publication, it is not surprising that Chapter 10 presents a defence of the teacher union and a critique of conservative governments.  Dr David Kemp is singled out for wanting to "marginalise the AEU" and the argument is put that we can only have effective government schools if the AEU is allowed to regain its once privileged position.

To achieve this, the chapter argues that conservative governments must consult with union members and accommodate the demands of union executives -- in part because "education unions have generally remained independent of party politics".

Ignored is the reality that the teacher unions over the last 20-or-so years have been closely associated with the ALP.  Not only does the AEU contribute money to the ALP through its affiliation with the trade union movement, it is also currently undertaking a marginal seats campaign to unseat the Kennett Government in Victoria.

Over the last 10 to 12 months, a coalition has emerged to attack recent changes in education and to defend state schools against the supposed dangers of the market.  The irony is that this alliance of teacher unions, left-leaning academics and Labor Party spokespersons are, more often than not, the very people who controlled schools during the 1970s and 1980s -- the very time that parents were voting with their feet and deserting the government system in preference for non-government schools.  The alliance's distaste for parental choice and consumer power is entirely understandable.

The Right Error

Global Spin:  The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism
by Sharon Beder
Scribe Publications, 1997, 288 pages

This is a vile book.  It is also a very revealing book.  It conveys quite nicely the self-righteous authoritarianism, the distrust of pluralism, the near monomaniacal reduction of complex questions to a single perspective, the over-weening confidence in one's own presumptions and perspectives which is such a striking feature of much of the "green" movement.  The tone of Dr Beder's book is that she and like-minded people are proponents of a truth so self-evidently correct that those who disagree or demur are not only wrong, they are also completely illegitimate and have no right to put their point of view in any effective way.  The old Catholic doctrine that error has no rights is alive and well and living in the green movement.

Despite being written by an Australian engineer and academic from the University of Wollongong, the book largely concentrates on American practices and cases.  In part, this is clearly meant as a warning -- on the John Kenneth Galbraith view that the advantage of living on the same planet of the US is that you know what will happen to you in about 20 years' time -- an example being the denunciation of Australian think-tanks as "clones" of pernicious US and UK models (pages 83-92).  It is also a natural genuflection towards the country which has been the main source of inspiration for "progressive" politics since the 1960s -- despite the reflexive anti-Americanism which has become so much a part of Australian Left and "progressive" culture.  But then, American "progressives" are themselves anti-American.  Finally, America throws out a mass of relatively easily accessed data -- it is just easier to look at American cases.

The latter point is not only a matter of the greater transparency of American governance -- the separation of powers, the presumption of citizen authority and weak party structures promote much more openness of government as politics becomes much more an ongoing, vote-by-vote, process of persuasion -- but the greater activism and willingness to cite general principles characteristic of American politics.

Beder takes the reader through a tour of the various techniques that American business and other groups have used to counter environmentalist pushes for more regulation and bans.  Some of these techniques certainly represent fairly robust uses of the American political and legal system.  But then, so does much of what the environmentalist movement gets up to -- but the question of environmentalist tactics is not something the book concerns itself with at all.  It is so easy to paint one side of the debate as completely wrong and wicked if one does not bother to examine the other side at all.

The perspective that underlies the book's commentary is a very simple, indeed simplistic, one.  On one side is wisdom and altruism -- the environmentalists -- whose public policy prescriptions must simply be adopted.  On the other side is greed, ignorance and stupidity -- business and their dupes -- who misuse political and legal processes to oppose the people of wisdom and light so that they can continue to rape the planet for their own short-term gain.

In talking about the Wise Use movement Beder says "Why do environmentalists bother if there is not really a problem? ... most environmentalists have nothing personal to gain from environmental regulation and can therefore legitimately argue that they are concerned with the common good.  Few Wise Use Movement members or supporters can make the same claim" (page 54).  The idea that the people best able to make decisions about proper uses of resources are those with no direct involvement in those resources is not one that the experience of our century has been very kind to.  As for the alleged virtues of altruism -- there were plenty of altruistic Nazis and Leninists;  people prepared to make great sacrifices for what they perceived were higher ideals.  Neither movement was in anyway redeemed by this.  Indeed, one could argue that that idealism increased their appeal, allowing them to do much more damage.

The Error Has No Rights mindset shows up again and again.  For example, "[c]orporations have utilised think-tanks and a few dissident scientists to cast doubt on the existence and magnitude of various environmental problems, including global warming, ozone depletion and species extinction" (page 91) -- the use of the word "dissident" is no doubt utterly un-ironic, alas, and shows a complete misunderstanding of the scientific process.

Woe betide anyone who crosses the sacred boundary between righteous environmentalism and wicked business "[t]here are numerous examples of activists who now work for the industries they once opposed.  For example, Paul Gilding, formerly executive director of Greenpeace International, does consultancy work for big business and bodies such as the Queensland Timber Board." (page 132) The forestry industry no less!  How could he?  Fortunately "[n]ot all environmentalists are so willing to capitulate to corporate agendas;  it is normally the more conservative groups that will cooperate" (page 133).  The blighters.  Of course, any suggestion that there could be common grounds and common goals is completely out of the question.  This is a crusade of good versus evil, with no shades of grey.

The preference for political mechanisms over market mechanism is quite clear -- "A market system gives power to those most able to pay.  Corporations and firms, rather than citizens or environmentalists, will have the choice about whether to pollute (and pay the charges or buy credits to do so) or clean up" (page 104).  "[T]he market, far from being free or operating efficiently to allocate resources in the interests of society, is dominated by a small group of large multinational corporations which aim to maximise their private profit by exploiting nature and human resources." (page 105).  The gross economic and environmental failure of the command economies is an experience which has clearly passed this alleged concerned citizen entirely by.  Such wilful ignorance of gigantic human tragedies should be the subject of scorn but is, alas, perfectly respectable in many quarters.

As is the case with many promoters of the belief that politics is the path to nirvana, Beder is perfectly capable of documenting what she regards as bad practices -- such as movement of officials to and from PR and lobbying firms -- which have clearly become staples of the political process, without in any way lessening her faith that massive government intervention is far and away the best mechanism for dealing with any problem with which society might be confronted.  The problem is not with politics, it is that bad people get involved.  If politics became the domain of good people pushing good policies -- if we got "the hogs out of the creek" (page 243) -- then all would be well.  Markets, on the other hand, are irredeemable.  It is amazing what intellectual sludge can be hidden behind articulate language.

Mind you, corporate executives can read the book with profit -- stripped of the tendentious commentary, there are actually quite a few good tips about dealing with environmental issues and activists.  The main lesson, however, is provided by that commentary -- the lesson that many environmentalists have a mindset that fundamentally does not accept business as legitimate:  that not only is not willing to "make a deal", but which regards such dealmaking as literally supping with the devil.  Only by being prepared to defend the fundamental legitimacy of business -- and free debate, and pluralism -- can such people be effectively opposed.

Beder's denunciation of use of language and catchphrases to deprive environmentalists of the moral high ground is richly ironic, given her linguistic hatchet-job on those who disagree with the environmentalist agenda as she conceives it.  As she says "Propaganda is often associated with dictatorships.  However, in a "free society", where official bans on free speech are not tolerated, it is necessary for those who would rule to use subtle means to silence threatening ideas and suppress inconvenient facts.  (page 121).  Indeed.

Yes, But

Civilising Global Capital:  New Thinking for Australian Labor
by Mark Latham
Allen & Unwin, 1998

Civilising Global Capital is a Procrustean book:  on the one hand, a thorough and thoughtful attempt to grapple with the realities of globalisation and market economics;  on the other, an attempt to trim and even hack these realities to make them fit Labor ideology.  Latham faces the same constraint as all serving politicians, of how to be both intellectually honest and politically loyal, simultaneously.

His courage (particularly in the Sir Humphrey Appleby sense of being politically rash) is demonstrable.  A few examples:  "The path to national economic sovereignty will not be found ... in reductionist critiques of so-called economic rationalism." (4)  "Indeed, no society has found a better way of facilitating growth and generating wealth than by holding out personal incentives and the profit motive." (38)  "Whereas in its origins unionism was a force for economic change and progress, it has now fallen into the habit of opposing change in its contribution to most issues." (85)  "A recurring theme in this book is the need for government to abandon its assumption that "one size fits all" in the making of social provision." (xxxix.  Not a misprint -- the introduction reaches xliii.  We're into serious Roman numerals here.)

Reading such comments, this Liberal felt comfortably at home.  While there is the occasional obligatory sideswipe at the Howard Government or the Liberal Party, Latham's fundamental thesis reads like the Liberal Party platform:  a defence of individual incentive and economic rationalism;  criticism of the operation of the union movement;  recognition that too-high tax will cost jobs, as global capital flees;  acceptance that the big-government nanny state has failed, and respect for the individual and scepticism about the capacity of state planning.(xxxvi)

And as Tim Shaw might say -- wait, there's more.  Latham treads perilously close to calling for voucher systems in education and health, although he carefully avoids the V-word.  He abandons the traditional Labor equality-of-result call for equal outcomes in education, in favour of "an education environment within which the innate qualities of each individual are developed to their maximum skill and cognitive potential." (237)  His method for achieving this is a form of charter schooling, with freedom for schools to develop their own individual charters, and with strong competition between schools, including closing down schools "which fail to add value to the learning capabilities of their students" (243).  Presumably, students and parents would be allowed the freedom to choose the school most suitable to their needs, or such a system would be meaningless (how would the poor schools be revealed, other than by customers voting with their feet?), but Latham does not make this clear.  At the adult, tertiary level, his "learning accounts" (248), entitlements allocated to individuals, are simply vouchers by another name.

He calls for a similar "policy devolution" in health care, with each citizen being paid a "risk-rated capitation amount" to cover their health care needs. (305)  Patients could then pool their vouchers (whoops -- risk-rated capitation amounts) into mutual funds.  The goal is for individual empowerment, and the establishment of a demand-side market.

Then there is his critique of welfare based on "behavioural characteristics" such as gender, culture and race (164):  the welfare state has lost legitimacy and public support, as well as becoming overloaded, as "[c]ommon ground has collapsed into a contest of targeted entitlements." (162)  Latham skims over the role of Labor in creating these entitlements, although he does admit that "the ALP needs to abandon its segmentation of policy based on the behavioural characteristics of life." (192)  His credibility is considerably dented, though, when he attempts to blame divisiveness and "wedge-issue politics" (167) on the Howard Government.  It was community anger over the previous government's wedge-issue segmentation politics that, as much as anything, brought the Howard Government to power -- an anger that we are still seeing in the response to Pauline Hanson's calls for welfare based on need not race, and to her attacks on multiculturalism.

Again, Latham is courageous in confronting the realities of a Labor migration policy that resulted in one in four migrants remaining on welfare five years after their arrival, and that added to the stresses of urban underclass neighbourhoods (250).

In short, Latham's thesis is the need to replace big government and mass welfare with individual empowerment, equality of result with equality of opportunity.  Welcome to the Liberal Party, Mark!  But not so fast -- the problem is not with the thesis, but in how he applies it.  What he wants is more of the same, or in his words, a social democracy that is not "vulnerable to the small government agenda of the political Right." (191)

Establishment of demand-side markets in education and health may not be cheap, depending on the generosity of the government voucher -- and Latham's scheme sounds very generous.  There is no attempt, for instance, to address the problem of middle-class welfare:  entitlement is for every citizen.  So, how is it all to be paid for, in an economy where toohigh taxes will drive investment capital overseas?  Latham's answer is a progressive expenditure tax (PET) -- a GST on steroids.  Like the GST, it is levied on consumption, but unlike the GST, the level of the tax depends on one's expenditure per annum.

One has to look deep in the back of the book, in Appendix III, to find the details of this tax, and they are not pretty:  on an annual expenditure of $40,000, the marginal tax rate would be 400 per cent.  So you want to buy groceries?  Quadruple the bill -- and that's just the tax.  An interesting result of such punitive taxes for high earners would be the massive brain drain Australia would experience, with those capable of earning high incomes (and trained to that capability by Latham's generous higher-education vouchers) looking for less punitive pastures overseas.  It is not just capital that can flee in the era of globalisation.

In spite of his disavowal of the nanny state and recognition of individual need, Latham cannot quite bring himself to trust individuals to make their own choices.  So his "devolution paradigm" is half-hearted:  he sees citizens "aggregat[ing] their entitlements into selfgoverning units of public administration" (301).  Of course, this would solve his dilemma of what to do with all the public servants whose jobs might otherwise disappear with the empowerment of individual citizens.  To give him his due, he also sees such units as a way of building trust and co-operation, those necessary building blocks of civil society.  However, as coercion is the least likely way to produce these civic virtues, the success of Latham's plan would depend considerably on just how far he was prepared to empower -- trust -- the individual.  Latham's thesis throughout the book is built on the failures of the state, yet the solutions he proposes are ultimately statist:  he cannot accept the consequences of his own arguments.

In his words, the devolution paradigm "recognises the limits of state control and coercion, while also rejecting the primacy of the individual as an answer to social needs and the logic of collective action." (299)  In a century when the logic of collective action has brought us governments from Nazism to Communism and the failed welfare state, one wonders what it takes to destroy faith in such a system.  Nor will such "logic" bring trust, as Latham argues.  A society and its government need a healthy respect for the individual before that individual will reciprocate with trust:  the insecure don't trust.

Apart from the many disjunctions in the book arising presumably from the attempt to be both intellectually honest and politically loyal, there are a number of arguments which do not stand up.  For instance, Latham criticises Australia for not having developed "the voluntary networks of civic life" (283).  Had he grown up in the country, as I did, he would never have made such an assertion.  Even in urban Australia, there has been a flourishing network of community organisations, from Rotary clubs to rosegrowers.  Such community networks are now in decline across the developed world (although bushfire brigades and other organisations are still a fundamental feature of rural communities), but our history cannot be reduced to a "bi-polar" dichotomy between "State paternalism and mateship bonding" (283).  That is too simplistic by half.

Again, Latham uses John Rawls' theory of justice to defend his big-spending welfare policies.  This argues that, ideally, resources should be allocated behind a "veil of ignorance" -- with the allocators not knowing whether or not they would benefit -- and should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution is to everyone's advantage (152-154).  Apart from the slight inconvenience that the veil of ignorance can never be more than theoretical or at best partial, the problem with Rawls is that his theory is a justification for all the sorts of "segmentation" that Latham argues against elsewhere:  discrimination on the basis of group and behavioural characteristics.  And where to stop?  As the American Steven Landsburg has demonstrated in his refutation of Rawls (Fair Play:  What Your Child Can Teach You about Economics, Values, and the Meaning of Life), the logical consequence of Rawlsian theory is to tax arbitrary traits that are reliable indicators of earning power -- for example, maleness and height.  Then again, as I am neither female nor short. ...

Yet these criticisms and others should not discredit Latham's enterprise.  The book is a rich mine of ideas.  Some of them may be fool's gold, but there remain many seams to be exploited, and the overall result is an enrichment of political debate in Australia.  I still have hope for the author:  anyone who can say things like "most forms of competition, be they economic or social, are underpinned by active co-operation and social interdependence" (292) and "the state ... needs to get out of the habit of telling people what to do" (304) is surely ripe for recruitment to the Liberal Party.

Tuesday, September 01, 1998

A Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vigorous competition delivers increased efficiency, more jobs and the higher living standards to which most of us aspire.  Competition policy works in tandem with secure property rights in bringing about these benefits.

The National Competition Policy operates in two broad fronts:

  • the review of laws that restrict competition;  and
  • a national access regime and price controls over "essential facilities".

The review of laws and regulations agreed to by all Australian jurisdictions is to be undertaken from a deregulatory perspective.  It continues a policy, which commenced over fourteen years ago, that recognised the deleterious effect on Australian productivity of excessive regulation.  We welcomes the continued review with the incentive payments the National Competition Policy has put in place.  Our submission demonstrates the vast improvements in productivity in the electricity supply industry since competition has been permitted.

The National Access regime is designed to combat the excessive prices that might arise for the use of infrastructure facilities that are natural monopolies.  The regime carries substantial merit where system were previously built under monopoly franchises.  It is an especially useful in ensuring that a government owned facility is opened to all suppliers and customers on terms that are fair and reasonable.

In other circumstances, the National Access regime could frustrate the achievement of efficiency.  Where owners or builders of facilities are under government direction in operating those facilities and in the price other parties can obtain access to them, they will be excessively cautious in embarking on new projects.  Such caution is likely to have been intensified by draft decisions of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Victorian Office of the Regulator-General in setting low prices in their draft decisions on Victorian gas pipelines.  Low regulated prices also adversely affect owners' incentive to maintain and improve service with existing assets.

In fact, natural monopolies are extremely rare.  Normally, if an incumbent supplier's price is deemed excessive new suppliers will emerge.  Such a process is already being observed in Victoria with electricity distribution.  This was previously considered to be a natural monopoly but rival businesses are planning to "invade" the territory of incumbent businesses with new lines where they have spotted profitable opportunities.  This brings an automatic restraint on prices, which is far superior to a regulator.

Aside from our reservations on the access policy, we take the view that the adverse socio-economic consequences of the competition policy are negligible.  Some employees may regret the trend, which deregulation is accelerating, for working arrangements centred on the needs of the consumer rather than the producer.  One example of this change is the longer opening hours of shops.  But this is a major benefit to the public at large who have more convenient access to shopping facilities.

Competition policy has no adverse environmental or regional community effects.


INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT COMPETITION REFORMS

Building upon a reform perspective that dates back to the early years of the Hawke Government, Australian Governments have sought to reduce regulatory impediments to the efficient operations of business.  Prime Minister Hawke, addressing the Business Council of Australia in September 1984, said:

I am convinced that after eighty-four years of federation, we have accumulated an excessive and often irrelevant and obstructive body of laws and regulations.  We will examine critically the whole range of business regulation, most importantly with a view to assessing its contribution to long term growth performance.  We will maintain regulation which upon careful analysis, clearly promotes economic efficiency, or which is clearly an effective means of achieving more equitable income distribution.  And we will abandon regulation which fails these tests.

The dominant theme running through this quotation was to "excessive and irrelevant regulation".  This offered a clear signal favouring deregulation -- perhaps the clearest such signal previously given by an incumbent Government in Australia.  But it was tempered by an agnostic view that some regulation promotes economic efficiency and that some regulation may be a justifiable means to the promotion of equity in income distribution.

Following the Hawke initiative, regulation review units were set up in the Commonwealth and most States (1) with a view of arresting and reducing the plethora of regulatory barriers to the supplier/consumer interface.  Insufficient powers and resources were given for these regulation review watchdogs to have a major impact.  But the initiative marked a change in attitude of government intervention in the economy.  Previously government leaders had largely taken the view that their actions were unambiguous in bringing benefits.  The initiative recognised that the sand thrown in the wheels of commerce by governments was itself often the problem.

In this respect, the Hawke initiative echoed, albeit palely, the reforms that underpinned the economic take-off that we call the (English) industrial revolution.  The 200 years to the 1870's marked a systematic culling of laws and regulations.  Of the 18,110 Acts passed since the Thirteenth Century, over four-fifths were repealed.

In Australia, most areas of intervention of governments in business decisions have been much reduced over recent years.  Social regulation over standards, pollution and the like has tended to mount but the regulation of businesses through tariffs and subsidies, and directions to offer services, has been much reduced.  The net position has been little change in the explosive growth in regulation which is illustrated in the chart below.

One area where regulation has been increased, ostensibly on the basis that increased regulation is necessary to promote competition, is access to monopoly services.


ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:  THE ROLE OF COMPETITION AND THE RULE OF LAW

Over the longer term, successful economic performance requires market competition with established property rights.  Competition means a ceaseless striving to steal a march on rivals by cost-cutting and better pleasing the customer.  Established, secure property and contract rights offer the incentive of personal gain from searching out new and changing needs of consumers and continuously seeking ways meet these more cheaply.  The Socialist or command economies collapsed under the weight of bureaucratic controls and lack of incentives that are the inevitable corollary of attempts to improve upon the atomistic outcomes of market processes.

Stable institutions with the ultimate backing of law are essential to sustained growth in living standards.  Government intervention, whether through owning businesses, directing resources into favoured areas, or reviewing commercial decisions will detract from and possibly arrest this process.


COMPETITION POLICY

OVERVIEW

On 11 April 1995, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) signed three agreements establishing a National Competition Policy (NCP) for Australia.  The three agreements are:

  • the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA);
  • the Conduct Code Agreement;
  • the Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms.
  • The reform measures that comprise national competition policy are designed to improve the efficiency of the economy.  This is effected by injecting increased competition into economic interchanges, by removing regulatory impediments to the achievement of higher levels of productivity and ensuring that public sector businesses operate along the same market and profit oriented lines as are required of private sector businesses.

    Recognising that the dividend to government exchequers will largely accrue to the Commonwealth, under the NCP Agreements, the Commonwealth agreed to make special payments to States and Territories that made satisfactory progress in implementing the national competition policy reforms.  If a State or Territory does not take the required action within the specified time, its share of the payments will be withheld.  The National Competition Council (NCC) program is to assess whether the conditions for payments to the States and Territories, have been met.  The first formal assessment was made prior to 1 July 1997, and basically required only that a program be in place.  The next assessments are to be made prior to 1 July 1999 and 1 July 2001 and will examine the outcomes of reforms in greater detail.

    The money which has been allocated to these special payments is set out in Figure 1 below (estimated nominal $ million).

    Figure 1:  Competition Payments

    1997-1998428
    1998-1999646
    1999-20001113
    2000-20011369
    2001-20021888
    2002-20032184
    2003-20042499
    2004-20052833
    2005-20063188
    TOTAL16147

    Source:  National Competition Council Brochure (October 1996)

    The agreements are best grouped into five facets of reform:

  • the review and, where appropriate, reform of all laws which restrict competition by the year 2000;
  • the restructuring of public sector monopoly businesses and the implementation of reforms agreed to by COAG covering the electricity, gas, water and road transport industries;
  • the introduction of competitive neutrality so that public businesses do not enjoy unfair advantages when competing with private businesses and the extension of the operation of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to government business enterprises and unincorporated businesses;
  • access to nationally significant infrastructure services to promote competition in related markets;  and
  • the extension of prices surveillance to government businesses to deal with those circumstances where all other competition policy reforms prove inadequate.

  • REVIEW OF LAWS THAT RESTRICT COMPETITION

    The Review Procedures

    The regulation review and competition principles offer a prospect of improving business efficiency with considerable consumer benefits.  The key provision on general regulatory measures is Clause 5 in the Competition Policy Agreement.  Under this, governments agreed that legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:

      a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh the costs;  and
      b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting competition.

    Each government has prepared a timetable for its reviews of restrictive regulation and provided this to the National Competition Council.  The reviews are to be completed by the year 2000.

    The review guidelines proposed two criteria for identifying legislation which restricts competition:

  • legislation restricting entry to a market;  and
  • legislation restricting competitive conduct by those in a market (2)
  • These matters complement the regulation review procedures that are in place in most States.  Thus, the Victorian Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 requires economic analysis and public scrutiny of all substantive regulations via a Regulatory Impact Statement. (3)  This applies to all existing regulations, which expire ten years after their enactment, and to new regulations.  The Act draws attention to the possibility of regulatory failure and seeks to ensure that any regulation that is deemed necessary is the most efficient solution to the identified problem.

    Other states have similar mechanisms.  Indeed, Queensland has formally integrated the competition policy review process falling under the aegis of the Business Regulation Review Unit (BRRU) within the Department of Tourism, Small Business.  The BRRU completed a Systemic Review of Business Legislation in 1996.  Tasmania has adopted a similar approach.  As in Victoria, regulations in these States are sunsetted after 10 years (under the Statutory Instruments Act 1992).

    Outcomes in Reducing Government Controls

    The process of regulation review under the competition policy agreements is now well underway.  It would take an extreme optimist to take the view that this will lead to the sort of culling that occurred in the previously mentioned English review, if only because of the time span the latter encompassed.

    Even so, the process is useful in signalling the continued march of regulatory reform that commenced with the Hawke address to the Business Council in 1984.  All States have developed a compendium of regulations which must seek renewed justification if they are to remain on the statute books.

    The NCC's role in assessing the performance of the individual jurisdictions could assume some importance.  It has indicated the matters that can be taken into consideration in establishing interventions in the public interest.  The criteria for doing so adopt a deregulatory approach but make clear the ultimate objective is not competition per se but using competition and deregulatory measures to enhance the community's living standards and employment opportunities.

    Under Clause 1(3) of the CPA, several issues may be taken into account in determining what constitutes the "public interest".  These cover a wide range of matters including:

      (d) government legislation and policies relating to ecologically sustainable development;
      (e) Social welfare and equity considerations including community service obligations;
      (f) government legislation and policies relating to matters such as occupational health and safety, industrial relations and access and equity;
      (g) economic and regional development including employment and investment growth;
      (h) the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers;
      (i) the competitiveness of Australian businesses:  and
      (j) the efficient allocation of resources.

    The NCC noted (4) that there were no weightings to these particular provisions.  It argues that the onus is on those promoting an exemption of an arrangement to demonstrate that it will be a superior approach.  In this respect, the NCC draws attention to the "net public benefit" test applied by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).  The ACCC approach is that, unless there are clear arguments to the contrary, competition is to be enhanced in order to meet the objectives of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) on which the competition reforms are largely predicated.  The TPA's objective is to "enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition".

    Deregulations likely to Emerge from Regulation Review

    The specific areas where reviews might bring deregulation in the short term are difficult to predict.  Some areas that would appear to be prime targets include:

  • agricultural marketing authorities
  • shopping hours
  • Licence Reduction Program
  • Reforming Planning, Land Use and Natural Resource Approvals Systems
  • Local government local laws and planning schemes
  • occupational registration and performance standards for good and services.

  • THE NATIONAL ACCESS REGIME AND PRICE CONTROLS

    The New Legal Regime

    With regard to wires, ports and pipelines, we can say with confidence that the lowest consumer prices and the optimum production rates will be achieved if there are many customers competing for the capacity and many independently owned producers vying to supply those customers.

    The Hilmer recommendations rightly focus upon the importance of competition in bringing about a more efficient and productive economy.  Government should do all possible to prevent its own agencies and institutions from inhibiting this process.  This means abandoning exploitative monopolies in the form of utilities and outlawing procedures that create barriers to commercial entrants or which prevent the full force of competition.  Where, as in the case of electricity, provision of a good has been supplied by a vertically integrated business, a common strategy is to de-integrate the business to allow rival provision of those parts (e.g. electricity generation) that can be offered competitively.

    A new part, Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act was introduced in 1996 which gives a legal avenue to a firm to require another firm to give it access to certain infrastructure that it owns.  This is intended to promote greater competition in supply of the gas, electricity water, etc. carried by that infrastructure.

    The notion of requiring business to give access to their facilities is one that derives from the US legal system's development of the concept of an "essential facility".  It also has similarities with the way some of the traditionally shared facilities, like roads, are operated.  The key difference between roads and the other shared facilities is that the former are usually government owned and impose no specific charge for usage.

    Some Consequences of the New Legal Regime

    While it makes sense for businesses to share common delivery systems -- and many do so without government intervention -- governments must be careful in requiring such a sharing.  Requiring a facility to be shared brings reduced incentives to undertake the risky entrepreneurial activity of building it in the first place.  It is also likely to deter a business from embarking on a new development if it thinks another business will take the risk and it can subsequently "free-ride" on the investment.

    Requiring access must also, in the final analysis, mean setting the price for that access.  If a regulator is to determine the price at which a facility may be accessed, that price is likely to be lower than the price sought by its owner.  If this were not so the parties would come together without the regulatory intercession.

    The importance of a national access regime is strongest in those industries where governments have previously legislated to forbid competition.  The most entrenched monopolies -- perhaps the only ones with durability -- are those supported by government.  The heart of the Australian competition reforms was to dismantle these.  What is left is residual apparent monopolies covering wires, pipes, ports and roads.

    Disaggregating vertical government owned monopolies so that those parts which are potentially competitive can be made subject to commercial rivalry is a fundamental reform.  Ensuring open access to the core essential facilities of these previously protected assets, is an essential component of the reform, at least in the early stages until the potential of rival providers is tested.

    But while government is at liberty to insist on certain access rules for its own facilities, it must be careful not to impose these on private facilities that are already in existence and that were built under different contractual arrangements.

    The requirement for open access to these facilities might have perverse effects both on the competitive process itself and on economic efficiency.  Some entrepreneurs will want to have greater control of the sources of supply and the throughput of the facility than would be permitted under open access.  Either they would build a suboptimal facility so that only their own booked capacity is transmitted or they may be discouraged from building any facility, with consequent loss of additional supply to the market.

    Is a Regulated Requirement to Share Facilities Necessary?

    The codes covering access and pricing to gas and electricity networks are subject to requirements on price and access that presume they are monopolies.  Yet, recent events have demonstrated the potential for active competition in this area of supply.  In Victoria rival electricity distributors are planning to drive new lines into each others' territory.  Further evidence of the potential is observable in the skill that AGL has shown over many years in setting their NSW pipeline charges at a level that allows them to profitably ward off rival facilities.  AGL has responded to competitive threats by reducing prices in areas where those threats have greatest potential.

    The nightmare for a utility business is that it will face a rival supplier which will leave its asset "stranded".  Fear of having "stranded" assets means that little by-pass is actually likely to eventuate.  But the control over excess prices that competition brings does not require that a competitor physically emerges.  Contestability for the market is quite adequate.

    Competition or contestability is much superior to a regulator.  Indeed, the regulator's role is to make judgements that, in his view, correspond to those that would emerge in a competitive market.

    The problem with a regulated price is that it is likely to bring distortions.  If set too high, and the facility is indeed a monopoly, excessive prices will shift customers towards activities and expenditures that offer less value than would be the case with market-determined prices.  Of course, if the facility is not a genuine monopoly, prices set too high are irrelevant because competition will force them down to market determined levels.  If prices are set too low, entry will be unprofitable and competition will be pre-empted, and the facility owner will have inadequate incentive to properly maintain and expand the system.

    No facility -- at least no facility unprotected by government franchise -- has untempered monopoly powers.  Many facilities can be by-passed and almost all others supply products, like gas, that compete with electricity.  That facilities have an element of natural monopoly is not cause of itself for the suppression of property rights.  Nor is it incompatible with the concept of access for others' product.  Where excess capacity exists, access can be marketed at a price which reflects the tremendous level of capital and expertise necessary to construct a large scale system.  The alternative to a market based on the assignment of property rights may be that of significant under-investment in the gas sector, at a significant loss to suppliers and consumers.

    This has a bearing on recent decisions by the ACCC and the Victorian Office of the Regulator-General.  In the draft decisions, the regulators opted to set a much lower return than the Victorian Government had sought.  The most appropriate return on a monopoly facility is that which is presently in place or lower if the owner so wishes.  As owner, the Government had decided to reduce prices from those previously in operation.  But the regulators' adoption of an even lower price, while conferring consumer benefits in the short term, carries considerable disadvantages over the long term.  These are:

  • the disincentive offered to present operators to incur costs and improve service reliability and other carriage features;
  • the pre-empting of competition simply because the service is under-priced;
  • although the existing assets may be "sunk" the specification of a low price for them gives a market signal that will discourage entrepreneurs from embarking on new risky projects;
  • Regulators that pursue pricing decisions that apparently favour consumers in the first instance are likely to see these backfire over the longer term.  In these respects the national access regime and its associated price controls has to be carefully managed if it is not to prove counter-productive.


    EXPERIENCE IN INDUSTRIES THAT HAVE UNDERGONE REFORM:  THE CASE OF ELECTRICITY

    Electricity reform has been the touchstone of the Hilmer reform agenda.  At least since the 1991 IC report on electricity generation, (5) it had been recognised that Australia was experiencing low levels of productivity in this industry.  Victoria was the least efficient system and the Cain/Kirner Governments commenced a program of tackling its over-staffing prior to 1990.

    The following two charts compare productivity in Australia to that in other countries.

    Chart 1:  Electricity multilateral TFP for Australian states and the US, 1975-76 to 1993-94

    Chart 2:  Electricity customers per employee -- predominantly thermal systems, 1993-94(a)

    (a) Employee data excludes construction personnel.

    Data source:  BIE 1996.

    Since the early 1990's, a very rapid improvement has taken place, especially in Victoria and NSW.  Productivity in Victorian generation increased threefold and that in NSW increased by 70%.  The following chart illustrates the trends (Tasmania is distorted because major new construction activity was completed during the period).

    In fact, the productivity performance of the Victorian stations is greater that shown -- over the period since 1989 staffing in what was the State Electricity Commission has been reduced from over 12,000 to less than 2,000 (plus the equivalent of 500-1,000 in outsourced staff).  Queensland, previously acknowledged as the most efficient of the Australian systems, has not shown an increase over recent years -- a major factor in the reforms introduced in that State in 1996.

    Not only was productivity increased in terms of number of employees per GWh generated but the plants themselves are more available to operate than in the past as shown in the chart below.

    Similar gains have been made in much of the distribution side of the electricity industry, again with the most spectacular gains being seen in Victoria.  In Victorian distribution, numbers were reduced from about 14,000 in the bad old days to rather less than this at privatisation.  Since then numbers have been further reduced and are rather less than half their pre-reform levels.  One CBD distributor now employs only 40% of the staff it employed at the time of its sale, prior to which numbers had already been reduced.  Its rule of thumb has been that the employment saving has yielded a 30% cost saving with about 70% of the jobs being essentially outsourced.  Another Victorian business has outsourced much of its maintenance to an electrical contractor and made comparable savings.

    Measures of reliability, notwithstanding misinformation published in certain areas of the media, have generally improved.  These measures are monitored by the Office of the Regulator-General and show outages to be lower than under the old SECV.  In this respect, the power disruptions in Queensland and Auckland have often been erroneously attributed to privatisation.  In neither case was a single share of the businesses concerned owned by a private investor.

    Although full information on the actual prices paid by customers is confidential, the competition amongst retailers and generators means that the greater part of the gains from cost savings and the termination of monopoly provision will have been picked up by the customers.  Those customers which are "contestable", and free to strike their own deals, have done particularly well.  Other customers have also benefited from the reforms, with a regulated price reduction -- in Victoria for small commercial customers this is scheduled to be 22% between 1995 and the wear 2000.

    The major price reductions result from the intensified competition among generators.  Generation accounts for about 60% of the total price for the medium and large business customers which are free to contract on this basis.  Spot prices for electricity in the first six months of 1998 averaged about $12 per MWh in Victoria and NSW.  This compares with pre-reform notional prices prior to the market set at about $40 in Victoria and $44.5 in NSW.  Very few customers would have negotiated the full amount of the reduction because it was not anticipated (and, indeed, since July 1998 prices have risen to an average of $22 per MWh, a level closer to the expected long term price of $35-$40).  But anecdotal evidence indicates an average reduction in price of about 30%.

    As a share of firms' total costs, electricity accounts for anything between 3% and 30% (the latter comprising aluminium smelters, the great bulk of whose power is contracted ahead).  Hence the fall in costs would have been translated in a fall in prices and increase in real value of goods and services throughout the economy.  Even if these prices eventually rise, there are benefits to all from the present glut in supply, benefits that are unlikely to have emerged under the previous monopoly regimes.

    Additional gains are likely to follow from the regulated change to the line charges.  Under the competition principles, the prices charged for these "essential facilities" is determined by the ACCC for transmission lines and the jurisdictional regulator for local distribution lines.  In making these determinations, the regulatory authorities have to guard against a temptation to make reductions that are too severe and reflect the "sunk" costs of the assets rather than their genuine market worth.


    BROADER SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

    Employment Gains

    Gains from reform in all these areas have been identified and quantified by agencies like the Productivity Commission.

    Australia has for several decades experienced low levels of productivity growth.  The Industry Commission (IC) demonstrated that multi-factor productivity growth in Australia was 55% below the average of the small OECD countries in the years from 1970. (6)  Multi-factor productivity is the residual increase in output that is not explained by increases in capital and labour inputs.  The IC also points out that Australian productivity appears to have outpaced that of the rest of the OECD in the period 1989 to 1994.

    The IC (7) and Economic Planning and Advisory Commission (EPAC) (8) have estimated future gains from the reform process at between 5.5% and 15%, with (in the case of the IC estimates) increased real incomes of 3% and the creation of 30,000 extra jobs.

    The reforms have been underway for too short a short period to fully estimate their actual effects.  However, there are indications of a lift in Australian growth rates caused by factors other than inputs of labour and capital.  Dowrick (9) estimated the "residual growth" -- that part that can be attributed to increased general efficiency -- has averaged 0.8% per annum in the 1990s having been negative in the previous 30 years.  Such gains provide the essential springboard for wider gains in incomes and employment.

    For the individual business, its reform generally means a reduction in its levels of employment.  The previous levels were normally supported by measures that protected the industry itself from competition.  But employment artificially supported by such means brings higher costs elsewhere in the economy and a net reduction in aggregate employment levels.  This is now generally understood and has been the premise upon which import tariff reductions have been implemented over a great many years.

    Often, however, the downsizing in employment in a particular business within an industry is accompanied by increases elsewhere in the industry, sometimes as a result of the consequent price reductions and greater market orientation bringing increases in demand.  This and the underlying increase in demand has been the case in telecommunications.  Even though Telstra, the dominant player has shed tens of thousands of jobs, the sector has been experiencing employment growth at twice the national average.

    Changed Working Conditions

    One change that has been occurring in all economies, in the wake of greater consumer orientation from increased competition, is a change in working conditions.  This is especially likely where valuable capital investment is incurred, since it is usually most productive to have the capital in operation for as much of the day as possible.

    The effects of this are best illustrated in the deregulation in shopping hours, a measure likely to be expedited by the National Competition Policy.

    Shopping hour limitations have a long history but are fundamentally in place to ensure that shop employees are not required to work outside certain core hours, to protect smaller shops (which in the main are not covered by the regulations) from competition from major outlets, and to protect those businesses that prefer not to open outside certain core hours from competitors which are prepared to open at those times.

    Since the competition restraints adversely impact upon the interests of consumers, they must be examined critically under the deregulatory thrust of Clause 5 of the CPA.  The restraints increase costs and reduce convenience to consumers.  And the growing incidence of working wives means the inconvenience has increased over time.

    Some retail employees and outlets would doubtless prefer to open at times of their own choosing rather than the times preferred by their customers.  But customer orientation involves balancing the needs of consumers with the costs they are prepared to pay for that service.  In the case of employees, the working arrangements are subject to negotiation between retailers and their employees (or the employees' agents, the trade unions).  There is no monopoly of retail outlets and therefore no possibility of the outlets being able to exercise coercive powers on employees to work particular hours.  Subject to industrial relations regulations, the parties involved can arrive at mutually agreeable working arrangements.

    The gains from increased productivity in shopping more than counterbalance any loss in convenience to shop workers (especially bearing in mind that the shop workers themselves will prefer the increased remuneration they receive for working the unfavoured shifts).

    Some incidence of the gains from deregulating shopping hours can be derived from a Mckinsey report, (10) which estimated that Australian retail productivity lagged that of the US partly because of restrictive regulatory requirements.  In addition, a report delivered to a Productivity Commission Industry Economics Conference (11) estimated that deregulation of trading hours in Victoria would bring increased benefits to consumers of $330 million per annum and bring an increase in retail employment of around 2%.

    Broadly speaking, if shops could open for 25% longer under a deregulated regime, this increases the productivity of the capital tied up in them. (12)

    These sorts of changed working relations are likely to be seen increasingly as the economy shifts more towards services rather than goods.  Workers preference for working in core 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. hours is likely to have been diminished over recent years and a great many workers -- like nurses, policemen, bakers and those in transportation -- never enjoyed working hours of this nature.  The gradual breakdown of restrictive labour award conditions is likely to accelerate the trend away from the standard and traditional core working hours.

    Social Welfare, Equity and Social Dislocation Issues

    The increased efficiency in the economy's operations offers opportunities to address improvements in social welfare.  Adverse effects on social welfare and equity are difficult to envisage.

    Social dislocation from change is a feature that has received much prominence.  Indeed, the downsizing of electricity employment would have resulted in certain dislocations.  In Victoria, the reduction of staffing at the Latrobe Valley's stations from 12,000 to 2,000 certainly resulted in disruption in that regional economy.

    However, the aggregate data fails to demonstrate a marked shift in the pattern of employees' longevity within their current job.  If anything, the data shows a slight increase in tenure of jobs over the past 10 years.  This is depicted in the following chart.

    Source:  ABS Cat. No. 6209. February 1998.

    A similar pattern is revealed by examining the data on those who changed their jobs in a particular year.  Thus in 1988, 13.3% of people changed their employee/business, a figure that fell to 11.4% in the year to February 1998.  Similarly, there was a reduction over the period of people changing their locality but not employer/business.

    There is much anecdotal evidence about people being less secure in their jobs and this should not be dismissed.  It may well be that, although the pattern of employment duration in a specific job has actually increased, the reasons for parting with employers have changed.  In the past, people seldom left jobs for reasons other than their own choosing.  It may be that competitive pressures in the economy have resulted in a greater number leaving their employment either unwillingly or with a compensation package, rather than under their own volition to take up a new opportunity.

    Environmental Impacts

    Greater efficiency in the economy will, broadly speaking, allow improved environmental outcomes.  Taking the broad sweep of environmental measures -- air and water pollution, noise, parkland, the built environment, etc. -- the richer an economy the better it compares.  Over time, as Australia has prospered, its measured air and river pollution levels have been reduced.  Land set aside from production has vastly increased.

    One element of concern to some parties is the effect of the energy reforms on greenhouse gas emissions.  A lower cost for energy, which is the aim and to date the outcome of reforms in electricity, will bring increased demand.

    Of itself, greater competitive pressures will also put to test the claims of those who maintain that solar and other exotic supply sources provide a competitive solution.  With businesses facing the full gale of commercial rivalry, the ability to offer subsidised power rolled in to overall power costs and therefore disguised is reduced.

    With regard to greenhouse gas emissions, we made a submission to the House of Representatives in February of this year. (13)  This sought to measure the price impact of a tax on carbon emissions.  It recognised that per unit of energy, brown coal produces far more carbon emissions than black coal, which in turn produces more than gas, while hydro, solar and nuclear produce negligible amounts.

    The effects of a tax at $10 and $100 per tonne of carbon on sources of power for electricity is indicated in the following table.  Based on present estimates of costs of different fuel sources, even a $10 carbon tax tilts the competitive advantage away from brown coal.  A $100 tax makes gas a cheaper option than black or brown coal providing the increased demand does not result in a scarcity driven price increase for gas.  For renewables to be competitive, a carbon tax of at least $215 would be required.  This would apply to a solar based system and even with such a tax advantage, the value of the renewable energy is likely to be discounted because of its dependence on weather conditions.

    Chart 6 offers some estimates of different power source competitiveness under different carbon tax regimes.

    Chart 6:

    Beyond a point, imposing a cost penalty on brown coal supplied stations means they cease to be viable and the power source becomes redefined as dirt.  There is therefore a wealth effect with brown coal.

    On these estimates, a tax at $100 per tonne would bring a 3 cents increase in price, or about a 25% increase in fuel bills once transmission and distribution costs are included.  In addition, Australia has a comparative advantage in low power costs.  Australia's future development is critically dependent on low cost power.  Power intensive industries focus heavily on the price of electricity in their location decisions.  This is readily seen after the 1974 oil crisis with the shift of Japan's aluminium production to lower cost energy locations like Australia.

    Victoria, with its brown coal sourced electricity, is especially vulnerable to measures that force reduced greenhouse gas emissions.  Phasing out brown coal electricity in the State would mean writing off assets worth over $11 billion and a migration of energy intensive industries from the State.  Other States would see a similar reduction in later periods as further measures to reduce emissions became necessary.

    An increase in carbon dioxide emissions from power generation is a likely outcome of the reforms in the electricity supply industry.  Attempts to combat that increase would be likely to frustrate the intent of the reforms to the great detriment of the Australian consumer and industry.

    The Relative Effect on Urban, Rural and Regional Communities

    The reforms to competition policy are likely to be felt across all communities.  This is not to say that some regions will face relative decline and others experience expansion.  But the cheaper provision of goods and services, which is the main objective of the reforms will make activities more competitive across the entire spectrum.

    In the case of many regional economies, the reforms to gas and electricity will see services provided that would otherwise not have been.  Early evidence of this is the extension of reticulated natural gas to areas in the north of Victoria and Mildura.  These extensions would have been difficult under previous arrangements since they would have required subsidies that were increasingly less affordable.  They bring the benefits of cheaper power to relatively remote communities and offer opportunities for industry expansion in those areas.

    The Treasurer announced on 28 August 1998 that the Productivity Commission is to examine this facet of competition policy.



    ENDNOTES

    1.  In fact, embryonic units were set up in South Australia and Tasmania prior to the initiative.

    2.  The two criteria are derived from the Hilmer Review which recognised that the two principal ways in which legislation affects competition are through barriers to market entry and restrictions on competitive conduct by those in the market.  See:  Hilmer, F.G., Rayner, M.R., Taperell, G.Q.  Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry, August 1993, National Competition Policy, AGPS, page 191.

    3.  See Regulation Impact Statement Handbook, Office of Regulation Reform, Department of State Development, Government of Victoria.

    4Considering the Public Interest under the National Competition Policy, National Competition Council, November 1996.

    5.  Industry Commission Energy Generation and Distribution, January 1991.

    6.  Industry Commission, Assessing Australia's Productivity Performance, Research Paper, September 1997 (page 67).

    7.  Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms, 1995.

    8.  Economic Planning and Advisory Commission, Tariff Reform and Economic Growth, 1996.

    9Explaining the Pick-Up in Australian Productivity Performance, Dowrick, S., in Microeconomic Reform and Produjctivity Growth, Workshop Proceedings, ANU February 1998, Productivity Commission, AGPS, 1998.

    10What Ails Australia?, The Mckinsey Quarterly, 1996, No. 1, pages 90-102.

    11.  Brooker R.J., and King, G.  H., Open All Hours:  the Economic Consequences of Deregulated Shopping Hours, Paper presented to the Productivity Commission Industry Economics Conference, Making Competitive Markets, Melbourne 1997.

    12.  Though probably not by the full amount of the increased opening hours since the productivity would tend to diminish with each extra hour of opening.

    13.  Inquiry into the regulatory arrangements for trading in greenhouse gas emissions, Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, Wood & Associates.