Teachers As Activists

Earlier this month, parents at Forestville Public School in the Northern beaches were invited to watch their children perform in a play entitled "Australia — You're Standing in It".  Much of the junior amateur production was apparently a light-hearted re-enactment of Australia's history, from Captain Cook's arrival on the shores of Australia to the iconic "Louie the Fly" advertisements which hit Australia's screens in the 1950s.

However, particular one scene which focussed on the stolen generation, entailed a group of students dressing up as "nuns" and proceeding to victimise the "Aboriginal" students by pretending to subject them to both physical mental abuse.  Concerned and angry parents who later complained about what had taken place on stage were subsequently told to "get a grip" from the parents and teachers who had written and produced the play.

Earlier in June, tearful Year 4 students St Justin's Catholic Primary in South West Sydney were duped by their teachers into thinking that they would be removed from their families at the end of the day.  During this particular activity, a "nun" informed the 7 year olds that the "Prime Minster" had said that they would be taken away from their parents due to neglect.  Many became so distraught throughout the course of the day that they had tried to escape at lunchtime.

By both allowing and actively encouraging this activity to take place, the teachers were clearly failing in their duty of care by causing undue suffering.  Under the guise of educators, these paternalistic peddlers of propaganda were so caught up in their own moral outrage at the perceived transgressions of our forebears that they were prepared to inflict suffering on young and impressionable children.

Australia's primary and secondary school children are being politicised through the history curricula.  Rather than being taught critical thinking skills, or a balanced version of historical events based on facts, they are being fed a diet of identity politics and turned into future activists by left-wing educators who are using schools as vehicles from which to push their political agenda.

Children are being deprived of real historical knowledge about their heritage.  In history classes, they are not being taught that the settlement of Australia was a good thing, for example.  They are not being taught that the British colonists brought with them the institutions and values that have made Australia the stable, peaceful and prosperous country from which all Australians continue to benefit in 2017.

Unfortunately, things do not get any better at university.  Those who go on to study history at university are no longer being taught about the history and substance of Western Civilisation which are essential to understanding our present and shaping our future.  Instead, the focus has shifted from the study of significant historical subjects to a view of history seen through the lens of identity politics, race, gender and sexuality.  Thus by the time that young Australians have gone through both school and university, they have been thoroughly and completely politicised, their actions and behaviour in the present shaped by their incomplete and skewed understanding and knowledge of the past.

Sadly, there appears to be a direct correlation between the identity politics being taught in our schools and universities and what is happening on the streets of Charlottesville.  Throughout their school and university years, Americans are being constantly told that their country is not worth maintaining because it was founded as racist, sexist, bigoted, homophobic immoral and illegitimate.

Thus, in the minds of the protestors who took to the streets last week, the only logical thing to do was to tear down, destroy and annihilate all the physical vestiges of those racist, sexist and bigoted men who belong to America's terrible past.  As a slave owning Confederate general, Robert E. Lee, was always going to be a prime target.  Following the riots, Donald Trump presciently asked the gaggle of journalists, "this week, it is Robert E. Lee ... is it George Washington next week and is it Thomas Jefferson the week after?  You have to ask yourself, where does it stop?"

Last year, the University of Melbourne capitulated without a whimper, to the demands of students that the Richard Berry building which had housed the Mathematics and Statistics faculty for several decades be renamed.  Professor Richard Berry was an English anatomist, neurologist and anthropologist who revolutionised the teaching of anatomy in Victoria and whose teaching produced an outstanding generation of surgeons.

However, during his life, Berry made an unwitting error of developing an interest in eugenics, which happened to be an extremely popular in the 1930s and which was later discredited as a pseudoscience.  For the sin of his perceived racism, the university has begun the process of erasing Berry and all his achievements from its history.

If the University of Melbourne is really serious about its associations with a "racist" such as Berry, it might want to take a closer look at its own namesake.  According to historian Boyd Hilton, Lord Melbourne's past was far from spotless.  "It was irrefutable" he claimed, "that Melbourne's personal life was problematic.  Spanking sessions with aristocratic ladies were harmless, not so the whippings administered to orphan girls taken into his household as objects of charity".  Surely these allegations are serious enough to warrant Lord Melbourne's erasure from history?

Both the "stolen generation" play and activity which took place at Forestville and St Justin's respectively, as well as the name changing lunacy seen last year at the University of Melbourne, are all part of a much larger global war that is currently being waged on the past by left-wing ideologues in an effort to purge the present of "bad history".

Perhaps if Australian teachers and academics returned to teaching a balanced version of Australia's history and left their Marxist identity politics out of the classroom, then Australia might not proceed quite so far down the anarchic path on which America seems to be well and truly set.

Australia Can't Be Silent Amid The Misery Of Venezuela

Venezuela is a failing socialist state.  The economy is 40 per cent smaller than a few years ago.  Nine in 10 households are unable to ­afford enough food.  Infant mortality has risen 30 per cent.  The ­opposition is being severely ­repressed, even murdered.

A decade ago Venezuela was the richest country in South America, with the largest known oil reserves on the planet.  Today, the failed socialist state is brutally cracking down on democracy through violence against protesters and a constitutional rewrite.

British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson recently tweeted that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was "acting like a dictator of an evil regime and has destroyed Venezuelan economy, eroded human rights and imprisoned thousands".

The US has imposed sanctions on Maduro, including freezing his personal assets and banning firms from doing business with him.

"The people are suffering and they are dying," President Donald Trump said.  In his typical hyperbolic style, Trump even refused to rule out a "military option".

So, where does Australia stand?  As a middle power, proud to "punch above our weight" in foreign affairs, we have surely taken a stand?  Well, the Australian government has said — nothing.  Despite the deteriorating situation — more than 120 people have been killed in protests since January, people are starving and children dying, and the corrupt regime is rewriting the constitution to solidify its power — our government has said zilch this year.

No emotional dispatches in parliament, no statement from Foreign Minister Julie Bishop or perfunctory tweet from Malcolm Turnbull.  The Foreign Minister's office did not even respond to a ­ request for comment.

The only written government position is to "reconsider your need to travel" on Smart Traveller, and the outdated Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade fact page that notes Australia's "cordial relations", and claims Venezuela has a "democratically elected representative system".

The only statement in parliament this year on the situation in Venezuela came from Greens senator Peter Whish-Wilson.  In June he spoke briefly about the "escalating human rights abuses and ­deteriorating political situation".

Worryingly, it was reported in The Australian that Bishop sent a letter to Venezuela's representative in Australia, distancing the government from criticism by Whish-Wilson of the regime.  "I spoke to (Ms Bishop) and she sent me a letter saying (Whish-Wilson's criticism) is not necessarily the position of Australia, which we understand.  She's right," Venez­uelan charge d'affaires in Australia Daniel Gasparri Rey said.

The Australian government is also rejecting temporary visa ­applications — from students, and parents coming to visit their children who live here — because of the volatile situation.

Perversely, we are turning people away at the precise time we should be letting them in.  And that's just visas for people who aren't seeking to live here.

Even Britain's socialist Opposition Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, a previous supporter of the regime, has feebly condemned the violence "on both sides".

We live in globally challenging times, facing threats to our values and way of life, both internal and external.

The old saying, often attributed to Edmund Burke, that all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good people do nothing, could not be more fitting.

Australian foreign policy, if it is to have any meaning and purpose, must be driven by our values as a nation.

If we believe in freedom, democracy and the rule of law, we should advocate for these values abroad as well as at home.

There's no such thing as centrism in foreign policy — you stand for something or you have no relevance.

Venezuela is, admittedly, of limited strategic importance.  As its economy contracted, Australia's trade with Venezuela has halved in the past year.  Last year, our ­exports to Venezuela were worth just $15 million;  imports were worth about $1m.  Nor is Venezuela a powerful foreign operator.

But that's just the point.  If there is no good strategic logic to remain silent it should be even easier to say something meaningful.

This situation presents an opportunity to clearly position ourselves in world affairs, and express our solidarity with the Venezuelan people and the thousands of Venezuelans in Australia.

Most important, it is an opportunity to stand up for our values.

Daniel Andrews' Inflated Power Bills Will Punish The Poor

Premier Daniel Andrews' claim that he can bring down power prices by increasing red tape is hogwash.  The more regulation government imposes on the energy market, the higher your bills will be.  State and federal government interventions in the energy market have had a massive impact on prices.  Australian Bureau of Statistics data shows that in the decade to 2016, electricity prices increased 115 per cent.

That hasn't stopped the state government from announcing an energy policy that will make matters worse.  Announced on Wednesday, the Andrews Government is claiming its policy would see a decrease in household power bills of $30 a year.

That argument doesn't hold water.  Victorians are smarter than Andrews gives them credit for.  They know if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is.  And when a politician stands up and says we can have more renewables and lower power prices at the same time, they know they're being sold a pup.

The ACT is about to find that out the hard way.  Its energy policy is the blueprint on which the Victorian plan has been based.  Household power prices there are expected to increase by $114 a year.

The mechanism by which Andrews expects to decrease prices by discouraging investment in the cheapest and most reliable source of energy production currently known to man — burning coal — is not clear.  That discouragement comes in the form of a state-based renewable energy target of 25 per cent by 2020 and 40 per cent by 2025.  A RET acts as a de facto tax on consumers.  It is coupled with government-mandated cross-subsidisation for renewable energy companies.  The reason subsidies are used is because green energy is not competitive in an open market.

It's remarkably suspicious that the government refuses to release its own modelling on the policy.  As a useful tool, economic modelling is often deeply flawed because of underlying assumptions and the inherent unpredictability of the real world.  But governments love to wave the figures that an economic model spits out to pretend they can see into the future.

Governments that choose not to release their modelling (including the underlying assumptions) usually do so because they aren't confident it will withstand scrutiny.  In this case, the modelling was done by a firm chosen by Energy Minister Lily D'Ambrosio, which makes the decision not to publish the results even more damning.

But the federal government is not without blame either.  The Coalition continues to enforce a renewable energy target of its own at the federal level.  Imposing federal policies that are destructive to the national energy market gives governments permission to do the same at state level.  Federal Environment Minister Josh Frydenberg was half right when he said of the Andrews proposal:  "By going it alone with a legislated state-based RET, Daniel Andrews is setting Victoria on the South Australian Labor path for higher prices and a less stable system."

He's right that Andrews is putting Victoria on the path to SA-style blackouts.  But he's wrong about the problem being that Victoria is "going it alone".

The RET is bad policy.  It doesn't matter which level of government imposes it, the result is the same:  higher prices and less reliable energy.  Bad policy doesn't become good policy because the federal government implements it.

The RET is bad policy because it force-feeds renewables into the energy market and creates excess supply issues.  Consulting firm ACIL Allen estimates total energy prices for consumers will be $30 billion higher over 2014-2030 as a result of the RET.

The problem of federal policy pushing prices up can of course be made worse by state governments.  But even if the states were to do nothing, federal policies would still be pushing power prices in the wrong direction.  As it stands, neither state nor federal governments are blameless.

And for the most part both major parties are on a unity ticket when it comes to unreliable and expensive renewables.  The notable exception is the Guy Opposition in Victoria, which is taking the fight to Labor by promising to scrap the state-based RET.

More should be done to fight back against policies that increase energy prices.  Artificially inflated power bills hurt the poor.  They dampen economic growth and result in lower employment and wages.

Such an agenda should be rejected, beginning with the vandalism that is the state government's energy policy.

Big Data Finds The Medieval Warm Period — No Denial Here

According to author Leo Tolstoy, born at the very end of the Little Ice Age, in quite a cold country:

The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already;  but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he already knows, without a shadow of a doubt, what is laid before him.

So, our new technical paper in GeoResJ (vol. 14, pages 36-46) will likely be ignored.  Because after applying the latest big data technique to six 2,000 year-long proxy-temperature series we cannot confirm that recent warming is anything but natural — what might have occurred anyway, even if there was no industrial revolution.

Over the last few years, I've worked with Dr John Abbot using artificial neural networks (ANN) to forecast monthly rainfall.  We now have a bunch of papers in international climate science journals showing these forecasts to be more skilful than output from general circulation models.

During the past year, we've extended this work to estimating what global temperatures would have been during the twentieth century in the absence of human-emission of carbon dioxide.

We began by deconstructing the six-proxy series from different geographic regions — series already published in the mainstream climate science literature.  One of these, the Northern Hemisphere composite series begins in 50 AD, ends in the year 2000, and is derived from studies of pollen, lake sediments, stalagmites and boreholes.

Typical of most such temperature series, it zigzags up and down while showing two rising trends:  the first peaks about 1200 AD and corresponds with a period known as the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), while the second peaks in 1980 and then shows decline.  In between, is the Little Ice Age (LIA), which according to the Northern Hemisphere composite bottomed-out in 1650 AD.  (Of course, the MWP corresponded with a period of generally good harvests in England — when men dressed in tunics and built grand cathedrals with tall spires.  It preceded the LIA when there was famine and the Great Plague of London.)

Ignoring for the moment the MWP and LIA, you might want to simply dismiss this temperature series on the basis it peaks in 1980:  it doesn't continue to rise to the very end of the record:  to the year 2000?

In fact, this decline is typical of most such proxy reconstructions — derived from pollen, stalagmites, boreholes, coral cores and especially tree rings.  Within mainstream climate science the decline after 1980 is referred to as "the divergence problem", and then hidden.

In denial of this problem, leading climate scientists have been known to even graft temperature measurements from thermometers onto the proxy record after 1980 to literally "hide the decline".  Phil Jones, the head of the Climate Research Unit, University of East Anglia, aptly described the technique as a "trick".

Grafting thermometer data onto the end of the proxy record generally "fixes" the problem after 1980, while remodelling effectively flattens the Medieval Warm Period.

There are, however, multiple lines of evidence indicating it was about a degree warmer across Europe during the MWP — corresponding with the 1200 AD rise in our Northern Hemisphere composite.  In fact, there are oodles of published technical papers based on proxy records that provide a relatively warm temperature profile for this period.  This was before the Little Ice Age when it was too cold to inhabit Greenland.

The modern inhabitation of Upernavik, in north west Greenland, only began in 1826, which corresponds with the beginning of the industrial age.  So, the end of the Little Ice Age corresponds with the beginning of industrialisation.  But did industrialisation cause the global warming?  Tolstoy's "intelligent man" would immediately reply:  But yes!

In our new paper in GeoResJ, we make the assumption that an artificial neural network — remember our big data/machine learning technique — trained on proxy temperatures up until 1830, would be able to forecast the combined effect of natural climate cycles through the twentieth century.

Using the proxy record from the Northern Hemisphere composite, decomposing this through signal analysis and then using the resulting component sine waves as input into an ANN, John Abbot and I generated forecasts for the period from 1830 to 2000.

Our results show up to 1°C of warming.  The average divergence between the proxy temperature record and our ANN projection is just 0.09 degree Celsius.  This suggests that even if there had been no industrial revolution and burning of fossil fuels, there would have still been warming through the twentieth century — to at least 1980, and of almost 1°C.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, relying on General Circulation Models, and giving us the Paris Accord, also estimates warming of approximately 1°C, but claims this is all our fault (human caused).

The Freedom Conundrum

Recently I attended the Centre for Policy Studies' Margaret Thatcher Conference on Security 2017 at the august Guildhall in the heart of the City of London.  The theme of the day was threats to the West — including tensions with Russia and China, terrorism, as well as emerging issues like bio-warfare and cyber-warfare.

The keynote address came from Henry Kissinger, at the ripe age of 94, who spoke about the external dangers the West faces — and delightfully commented during questions that Brexit will bring Britain closer to the US.  But the standout speaker of the day wasn't Kissinger.  It was Lord Jonathan Sacks — former Chief Rabbi of the Commonwealth.

Speaking at the beginning of a panel on What should "the West" stand for, Sacks made the important point that the West isn't a single line of thinking.  He pointed to Friedrich Hayek's distinction between the Anglo-American and the French concept of human rights, which is laid bare in two of the West's key revolutionary documents.

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declares that "all men are born and remain equal in rights".  In contrast, the American Declaration of Independence, influenced by John Locke, holds "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, (and) that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness".  They may sound similar, but they are not.

The French concept of human rights in effect calls for equality of outcomes ('created and remain equal'), not just equality of opportunity like the American Declaration ('created equal').  The French concept necessitates maximal government to keep people "equal".  This inevitably infringes on liberty to develop our differences — and, in many ways, is what sowed the seeds for the downfall of the French Revolution as it turned to The Terror to make people "equal".  In contrast, the American formula of human rights requires limited government to allow individuals to pursue their own concept of human flourishing.

In addition, the French idea of human rights is based upon the state as the guarantor of rights.

In contrast, the American Revolution was predicated on a very strong civil society.  This is one of the facets of America that fascinated Alexis de Tocqueville in his masterful Democracy in America:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite ... In America I encountered sorts of associations of which, I confess, I had no idea, and I often admired the infinite art with which the inhabitants of the United States managed to fix a common goal to the efforts of many men and to get them to advance to it freely.

These associations stand between the individual and the state, enabling the individual and society to achieve our common goals without coercion.

However, there has been an almost unnoticed cultural climate change in the past half-century:  the rise of the French concept of the state by elites.  "We are all French now," Sacks said.  The state is now maximal in its role, and so are the demands laid upon it.  Much of this links to the weakness of civil society.

Robert Putman's Bowling Alone diagnosed the death of "social capital", that is, the breakdown of civil society organisations and community bonds.  The book's title comes from his finding that more people are bowling than ever before — but instead of bowling in clubs, Americans are bowling alone.  The breakdown of community bonds, that operated through mutual benefit organisations, charities, and churches, has been enabled by a growing state and led to the perceived necessity for bigger government.

We often forget that, for example, unemployment benefits are quite a new concept.  In Australia, unemployment assistance was first introduced by the Labor Government in 1945.  Before that, people turned to the community for help when they lost their job.  Your neighbours and family dropped off food and donated clothes, and charities provided support.  Albeit for benign reasons, this all changed with the advent of unemployment assistance.  In effect, the growth in the role of government has crowded out community.

The consequences of this have proven dire.  "The French tradition leaves very little between the individual and the state, and the end result of that is that when the individual feels that the state is not meeting its needs, it turns to populist politics," Sacks says.  The state inevitably fails to deliver, and as Harvard professor Pippa Norris diagnoses in Democratic Deficit, there is a growing gap between expectations of the governed and outcomes of government.  Feeling powerless, people are now turning to strong individuals, who often are not friends of liberty, to defeat the elites.

Therefore, the threat facing the West is not in fact external — it is internal.  As Sacks concludes:

The great danger is the moral vacuum at the heart of Western political structures.  The French system believes that liberty is a political achievement.  The Anglo-American tradition believes that freedom is at least also a moral achievement, and without that moral substance, born, and cultured, and cultivated, in families, communities and traditions, some religious and some national, the West will be left with a vacuum out of which disorder will follow.

The internal dangers to the West were elegantly summed up by President Trump in the best speech of his presidency in Warsaw last month:

We have to remember that our defense is not just a commitment of money, it is a commitment of will.  Because as the Polish experience reminds us, the defense of the West ultimately rests not only on means but also on the will of its people to prevail and be successful and get what you have to have.  The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive.  Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost?

In challenging times, we don't need post-modernist moral relativism and self-doubt.  Our best security is understanding, and believing in ourselves.

With Little Thought To Consequences, Gay Marriage Could Reduce Freedom

After this country's politicians eventually work out who is and isn't entitled to sit in Parliament, hopefully they'll turn their attention back to more important things — like the plebiscite on same-sex marriage.

Despite the seemingly endless discussion about the issue and the cry from advocates for change for politicians to "just do it because it's popular", there's been remarkably little public debate about the consequences if a majority of people vote "Yes" to change the legal definition of marriage.

Partly this is because both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage are for the moment arguing about the technicalities of what marriage is, and partly it's because Australians take a narrow and utilitarian view of human rights and are reluctant to engage in philosophical arguments — unlike in the United States.

The debates around the free press and the Gillard government's attempt in 2013 to regulate the media, and now the ongoing controversy about the appropriateness of legislation which makes it unlawful to offend someone on the basis of their race reveal that in Australia when it comes to fundamental issues of principle, there's a tendency to pick a partisan side first and invent a rationalisation for it second.

LAW GRADUALLY PROSCRIBED WHAT WE CAN SAY

In the wake of a "Yes" vote, how we talk about same-sex marriage and how we're allowed by the government to talk about it, is part of a much larger conversation about how Australians talk about questions of sexuality, gender, race, and politics.  Gradually the bounds of what by law we can and can't say about these things are being limited, and at this stage there's certainly the potential for the legalisation of same-sex marriage to reduce our freedoms rather than extend them.

The question to be asked in the plebiscite:  "Should the law be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?" is at best disingenuous — and at worst dishonest.  The answer that many reasonable people would give is — "it depends".  It's completely consistent for someone to believe that two people who love each other should be able to get married, while at the same time also believing that those who publicly state that marriage can only ever be between a man and a woman should not be guilty of breaking the law for expressing such an opinion.

If the plebiscite passes, whether it will in fact be unlawful for say a Christian or Muslim school to teach the "traditional" view of marriage is unknown — as yet no politician has wanted to answer.  The question is not hypothetical.  Last year the Catholic Archbishop of Hobart was alleged to have breached Tasmania's anti-discrimination laws for distributing a brochure saying marriage was between a man and a woman.

WHAT ABOUT THE QUESTION?

It's surprising the "conservatives" in the Coalition who were so eager to have a popular vote on same-sex marriage did not demand that the public should vote on the actual legislation implementing same-sex marriage.  The result of a "Yes/No" plebiscite on same-sex marriage is as meaningless as that from Labor's own proposed plebiscite on Australia becoming a republic.

Same-sex marriage is often presented as a matter of personal freedom.  But freedom cuts both ways.  At the moment anyone is free — without threat of legal sanction — to describe traditional marriage as a product of the capitalist patriarchy that enslaves women.  In fact that's exactly how marriage is labelled in more than a few critical theory classes at universities across the country.  The advocates of a "Yes" vote in the plebiscite would increase their chances of success if they reassured the public that should the law be changed, same-sex marriage could be talked about in exactly the same way as is traditional marriage.

Marriage is more than a legal construct, it's a cultural and social institution and it's entirely appropriate the community should have a say on its future.  But it should be a real consultation about the specifics.  It's incumbent on those who want change — whether to the definition of marriage, or our head of state, or anything else so significant — to explain how the change will work in practice.

One of the lessons of history is that the habit of authoritarians is to talk in generalities.

Blockchain Offers An Innovative Solution To The Brexit Customs Puzzle

This week the government released a new paper calling for the "freest and most frictionless trade possible" with the EU.  Ideally, Britain wants no customs border, which, the paper admits, would be "unprecedented" and "could be challenging to implement".

In just hours, the European Parliament's Brexit negotiator Guy Verhofstadt dismissively labelled "invisible borders" a "fantasy".

The good news is that a new technology is very well suited to having no customs border:  blockchain.

Blockchain is a technology to create distributed trusted ledgers of information — it is a type of database that records blocks of information in a an efficient, verifiable manner.  Blockchain is the technology sitting underneath the cryptocurrency, Bitcoin — but it has, far wider applications.

It's become cliche in industry to say blockchain is the next big thing.  The Big Four accounting firms and banks are already testing the technology.  That's because blockchain will revolutionise how systems will operate, from financial transactions and supply chain management, to asset ledgers and government records.

Blockchain would be very well suited to managing a customs system.

In order to deliver a borderless solution, Britain needs to be able to track the final destination of imported goods, and apply the appropriate EU or British tariff, if it is to pursue the "New Customs Partnership" model proposed in the paper.

Blockchain technology could be used to store information about, for instance, a new package of goods imported into Britain but destined for the EU.  The data can be accessed immediately by all authorised parties, and include information such as the dimensions and weight of the package, and the origin and destination.  This could all be clearly linked to the producer and transporter.

The record could then be used by the government to determine the appropriate tariff — be it the EU rate for a package destined for the EU, or the (hopefully lower) UK rate.  If the destination of the goods were to change, this would be automatically updated on the blockchain, updating the payable tariff.  There would be no need to require businesses to inefficiently pre-pay maximal tariffs and receive a refund, as some have mooted.  The process of calculating duties could even be automated within the blockchain through what's known as "smart contracts", minimising administrative costs.

Blockchain is also highly secure.  Once information is added to the blockchain it is extremely difficult to modify.  In order to change some information on the new customs blockchain, such as inputting a new location for a package, all the other related blocks must be modified, allowing for efficient verification and auditing.  In simple terms, you can track and trace the origin of a good's record, and if it has been changed.  This significantly reduces the risk of fraud within the system.

In practice, every ship and vehicle carrying goods across the border into the EU would register the information of the consignments they are carrying on the new blockchain.  This would allow for secure cross-checking and tracing.  You would know the exact location of goods, be it in the dock, on the ship, or at the destination, the contents of each consignment, and the payable tariff.  The EU could even track this process on the blockchain, ensuring they are receiving the appropriate tariffs.

A blockchain could also help solve the complex issues related to Northern Ireland.  A blockchain could track cars crossing the border to maintain borderless travel and peace in the region.

Brexit, most will admit, is a very complex project.  Untangling decades of interconnected institutions is no easy task.  But it also provides an extraordinary opportunity.  In the future, all customs systems will be on a blockchain.  Rather than dismissing the possibility of frictionless trade, Britain and the EU could become world-leading adopters of the new technology.

Resilient Alliance With Us Underwrites Our Strength

For all the furore it generated, the prickly phone call between Donald Trump and Malcolm Turnbull was a blip in Australia's alliance relations with the US.

In the mid-1950s Canberra and Washington differed over how to respond to the communist threat in Indochina.  In the 60s we were at odds over Indonesia's claim to Western New Guinea (now Papua), the struggle for independence in Laos and open versus preferential trade arrangements.  The alliance was spectacularly imperilled when personal relations between Richard Nixon and Gough Whitlam broke down almost completely in 1973 over Australian criticisms of the "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi and Haiphong.

The alliance later experienced severe strains over Ronald Reagan's response to Soviet missile deployments in Europe, the Labor left's opposition to joint defence facilities, and the Hawke government's rejection of a US request to support MX missile tests.  With the end of the Cold War, Australia-US tensions again focused on trade.

Nor are periods of Australian doubt about US staying power and commitment to our region anything new.

Australian worries about US disengagement from the region have recurred periodically since 1945.  They were pronounced in the aftermath of Vietnam and the bombshell announcement of the Guam Doctrine, when Nixon called on US allies in Asia to take more responsibility for their own defence, and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

It's hardly a surprise, then, that doubts are resurfacing in the face of China's rise and a shifting power balance in Asia, and following the election of a US president sceptical of the value of America's alliance commitments.  Opposition to the US alliance is a longstanding minority strand of Australian foreign policy opinion, often dormant but virulent nonetheless.

This often manifests in calls for Australia to adopt a more "independent" foreign policy — a vacuous slogan that was popular in the debate about Iraq in 2003 and is resurfacing today in the context of China.

This ignores the reality that working with the US on security issues has not only contributed materially to our security and to the stability and prosperity of our region but hasn't held us back from pursuing our other interests, such as trade.

A second, related, argument is that maintaining a strong alliance with the US is inimical to nurturing close relationships in our region.

For all Labor's mythologising, it was Robert Menzies who declared in 1939 that "in the Pacific we have primary responsibilities and primary risks ... What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north", and it was Menzies' brilliant foreign minister Percy Spender who not only negotiated the ANZUS Treaty but launched the Colombo Plan in Asia.

But even more than Menzies it was John Howard who demonstrated — by building closer ties with Japan, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries as well as a deeper American alliance — that, far from jeopardising our relationships in Asia, a strong alliance with the US adds weight and value to Australia's regional engagement.

A third argument that is frequently made is that the ­alliance may endanger our economic interests in China.

The national interest is our lodestar when it comes to weighing closer co-operation with our allies.  But neither should we allow ourselves to be intimidated into compromising our fundamental national security choices or values through the threat of economic payback.

For one thing, China's economic leverage over Australia is less than many Australians assume.  The other key point, however, is that a strong alliance with the US strengthens Australia's hand when it comes to confronting possible economic coercion.

For all its domestic dysfunction, America will remain the world's richest and most powerful country for the foreseeable future.  Even if one were to accept China's inexorable rise, relative US decline and the emergence of a more multipolar world, what will matter most to Australia is how to shape our region and influence how other powers, particularly China, behave.

The notion that the best way to achieve this is to distance ourself from the US and to think that China will then respect and listen to us more flies in the face not only of logic and international theory but also of experience.

Nonetheless, the election of Trump as President has induced a rash of calls for Australia to do precisely that.

President Trump's temperament, Twitter outbursts, "America first" rhetoric and track record of ambivalence about US international security commitments have given opponents of the alliance a free kick.

We are already seeing the Labor Party abandon its traditional support for Israel.  Bill Shorten supports the US alliance, as does his party's current policy.  But we may be about to enter an era when bipartisan political support for the alliance can no longer be assumed.

Until now commentators have tended to worry about Australia being dragged into a war with China.

More recently, of course, it has been less "entrapment" in war between the US and China that has been in prospect than the risk of Australia being caught up in a conflict with North Korea.

To judge from much of the commentary you would think that President Trump's supposed unsteadiness is the real threat, rather than Kim Jong-un's nuclear and missile programs and brinkmanship.

In this context it is good to see the Australian government firmly supporting the Trump administration's position and declaring that Australia would invoke ANZUS in the event of a North Korean attack on the US.

No matter who occupies the White House, it has always been in Australia's national interest to build the strongest possible relationship with the US, and to maximise access and influence in Washington to help shape American policies in ways that support our national interests.

The Disappearing Australian Working Man

INTRODUCTION

In Men Without Work:  America's Invisible Crisis, American Enterprise Institute fellow Nicholas Eberstadt takes a close look at the rapidly growing cohort of American men who are out of work.

Eberstadt argues that the overemphasis of economists and policy-makers on the official unemployment rate is hiding the true state of joblessness in America.  This is because the unemployment rate measures only the proportion of the labour force that is out of work.  It does not account for the growing number of Americans who are leaving the labour force altogether and therefore do not figure in unemployment data.

The shrinking American work force is a problem that particularly affects men, a trend that has worsened for decades with no end in sight:

In the half century between 1965 and 2015, work rates for the American male spiralled relentlessly downward, and an ominous migration commenced:  a "flight from work", in which ever-growing numbers of working-age men exited the labor force altogether.  America is now home to an immense array of jobless men no longer even looking for work ... ⁽¹⁾

The most startling aspect of the male exodus from work is how little attention it has received, Eberstadt argues:

The collapse of work in America's men is arguably a crisis for our nation — but it is a largely invisible crisis ... Somehow, we as a nation have managed to ignore this problem for decades, even as it has steadily worsened. ⁽²⁾

This phenomenon is not, unfortunately, unique to the US.  Australia, it seems, has its own silent crisis in male employment.

Australia's shrinking male work force

As in the US, discussion of joblessness in Australia focuses largely on the official unemployment rate:  the percentage of people looking for work within the overall labour force.  On that measure, the Australian labour market is performing relatively strongly, both among men and overall.  Unemployment rates remain relatively low, at least compared with the historical "peaks" during the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s (see figure 1). ⁽³⁾

Figure 1 Unemployment rate of men (dark blue) and the general population (red)

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

However, as discussed in the previous section, the unemployment rate only measures the proportion of the work force without employment — that is, those who are out of work but looking for a job.

To gauge the overall level of joblessness in Australia, we must look at the work-to-population ratio:  the rate of employment as a percentage of the population as a whole.  On this measure, the rate of employment among "prime age" men (ages 20 to 54) has been in steep decline over the past few decades. ⁽⁴⁾

Figure 2 Work-to-population ratio, males aged 20-54.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics.

As figure 2 demonstrates, around 95 per cent of prime aged men were in paid employment up until the mid-1960s.  The work-to-population ratio fell sharply throughout the following decades and reached its low point after the 1990s recession.  Critically, however, it has basically remained at that low level ever since, despite Australia's considerable economic recovery.

The disconnect between the cyclical nature of the unemployment rate and the continual decline in the overall rate of male employment can be explained by an increase in the not-in-labour-force (NILF) rate — men who are neither working nor looking for work.  Figure 3 shows that, unlike the unemployment rate, the NILF rate among prime age men has been rising steadily since the Australian Bureau of Statistics started measuring it in the late 1970s. ⁽⁵⁾

Figure 3 Males aged 20-54, unemployed (blue line) and not-in-labour-force (red line).  Parts shaded pink are quarters in which negative economic growth was recorded.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Both the unemployment rate and, to a lesser extent, the NILF rate are driven by the economic cycle.  However, only the unemployment rate eases when the economy is performing well.  While sluggish economic performance does tend to trigger or accelerate growth in the NILF rate, there has never been a commensurate decrease when times are good.  Once Australian men leave the workforce, they do not come back.

In fact, there are several points at which the NILF rate and the unemployment rate have had an inverse relationship.  As unemployment eased after "peaking" in the early-1980s, mid-1990s and late-2000s respectively, the NILF rate edged upwards.  This suggests a "discouraged worker" effect:  While some men do find work as the economy recovers, others give up and "disappear" from the workforce altogether.

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MEET THE NON-WORKING MAN

In his extensive demographic analysis, Eberstadt concludes that in the US, there are three traits most common in prime age NILF men.  These factors also strongly influence the likelihood of being a NILF male in Australia.

Marital status

Firstly, NILF men are much more likely to be unmarried.  Of the almost 600,000 prime age men outside the labour force, less than one third are married.  Also, as figure 4 indicates, unmarried men are almost four times more likely to be NILFs. ⁽⁶⁾  Eberstadt attributes the similar pattern among US men to the difference in married men's "motivations, aspirations, priorities, values, and other intangibles that do so much to explain real-world human achievements". ⁽⁷⁾

Figure 4 Proportion of married (shown in blue) and unmarried (shown in red) men not in the labour force, by age group.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

Migration status

Men outside the labour force are more likely to be native-born Australians than migrants, with the former comprising almost two thirds of the male NILF population. ⁽⁸⁾  This corresponds with work rates among migrants overall, who record NILF rates of about half the general population. ⁽⁹⁾  Figure 5 breaks down the NILF rate and median income of a sample of migrants, compared with the general population.

Table 1 — NILF rate and median annual earnings of migrants in selected visa categories, surveyed after six months of arrival in Australia.

Source:  Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Not only do migrants surveyed have an average NILF rate of less than half the general population, median incomes across all migration categories — including skilled migrants — are lower.  This suggests an "aspirational" quality among migrants and a greater willingness than native-born Australians to take lower-paid jobs.

Criminal history

The third trait Eberstadt identifies that affects the likelihood of being a NILF male is criminal history.  The escalation of incarceration rates starting in the 1960s, Eberstadt argues, has been a strong driver of the accelerating NILF rate among American males since that time, as more and more men re-enter law-abiding society with diminished prospects.

We can assume that criminality is somewhat less of a factor in Australia's overall increase in the male NILF population, given that our incarceration rates are substantially lower than those in the US. ⁽¹⁰⁾  However, it still appears that criminal history may increase the likelihood of individual men leaving the workforce.  Data on former prisoners is limited, but one study estimates that as few as 20 per cent of prisoners on parole have paid employment. ⁽¹¹⁾  Another indicates that almost two thirds of prisoners are unemployed six months after their release. ⁽¹²⁾

Other demographic factors

Aside from the three traits identified by Eberstadt, there are few clear demographic factors common to NILF men.  Recent data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics indicates that:

1. the NILF rate does not vary widely between states, though it was slightly higher in states with weaker recent economic performance, such as South Australia (32 per cent) and Tasmania (35 per cent); ⁽¹³⁾
2. prime age men outside capital cities are only slightly more likely to be outside the labour force, with a NILF rate of 33 per cent compared to 27 per cent in metropolitan areas; ⁽¹⁴⁾  and
3. NILF men are not necessarily mostly unskilled, with a relatively even spread among "white collar" and "blue collar" workers, in relation to men who have previously held paid employment (see figure 6). ⁽¹⁵⁾

Figure 5 NILF men (all ages) who were previously employed, by previous occupation.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

In short, the male flight from work is not limited to men of any particular socio-economic group, region or even professional background.

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WHY ARE FEWER MEN WORKING?

The exodus of Australian men from the workforce appears to be the result of a combination of changes to the labour market that have caused them to leave paid work ("push" factors) and welfare entitlements that have allowed them to stay out ("pull" factors).  However, there is a much closer relationship between falling male work rates and pull factors.

Economic changes

Labour market changes may partly explain the growing NILF rate among men, but this is limited.  On the one hand, it is true that many traditionally "male" jobs — such as factory workers — have disappeared, while the number of traditionally "female" jobs in the services sector — such as nurses — have grown.  However, as figure 7 demonstrates, there has been recent growth in other "male" industries, such as construction and mining, as seen in hours worked across various industries. ⁽¹⁶⁾

Figure 6 Hours worked index by industry, 1986-2016.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

Accordingly, while it may be one factor, economic change alone is unlikely to account for the substantial decline in male work rates.

Social changes

A partial explanation may also lie in societal factors.  Three long-term trends in particular are relevant:

• increasing work rates among women;
• an increasing number of "house husbands" doing unpaid domestic work;  and
• the expansion of tertiary education.

However, as with economic factors, the relationship between these social trends and rising male NILF rates is complex.

On the one hand, there does appear to be a clear correlation between falling work rates among men and the post-war explosion of women entering the workforce.  Figure 7 shows that as the male work-to-population ratio fell from 93 per cent to 79 per cent between 1947 and 2011, the equivalent ratio for females soared from 23 per cent to 69 per cent in the same period. ⁽¹⁷⁾

Figure 7 Work-to-population of males (shown in blue) versus females (shown in red), 1947-2011.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

However, as women enter the workforce in greater numbers, there is little evidence of a "swap" in which men have assumed more traditionally "female" responsibilities, such as unpaid domestic work.  Nor do falling work rates among men seem to be the result of greater engagement with tertiary education.

Time use surveys by the Australian Bureau of Statistics suggest that NILF men spend little, if any, additional time on study or domestic work than men who work.  In fact, as figure 8 demonstrates, NILF men spend, on average, less time on education than part-time workers, and less time on child care than any men in the work force. ⁽¹⁸⁾

Figure 8 Average minutes spent per day on various activities by NILF men, compared to males in full-time and part-time employment.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Admittedly, these figures are somewhat distorted by the inclusion of all NILF men, including retirees, rather than just prime-aged men.  However, even among parents without employment (included as a subset of data in the same time use survey), differences in time spent by fathers and mothers further discounts the "house husband" theory (see figure 9). ⁽¹⁹⁾

Figure 9 Average minutes spent per day on various activities by fathers (shown in blue) and mothers (shown in red) without paid employment.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

A more recent study of NILF Australians in general confirms that prime age men outside the labour force spend significantly less time than their female counterparts on domestic work and childcare, as shown in figure 10. ⁽²⁰⁾

Figure 10 Main activity when not in labour force, men (shown in blue) and women (shown in red) aged 25-54

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

In short, societal changes do not, by and large, explain why there are so many men out of work.

Welfare spending

If "push factors" like economic and social trends have a limited impact, we see stronger evidence of "pull factors", specifically the growth of the welfare state that has subsidised the male flight from work.

However, jobless men are not necessarily subsisting from ordinary benefits such as the Newstart Allowance.  Instead, it appears that disability payments are contributing to the high NILF rate.  As figures 11 and 12 demonstrate, payments for "incapacity" have grown steadily in recent decades — unlike those for unemployment — and in close correlation with the NILF rate. ⁽²¹⁾

Figure 11 Payments for incapacity (shown in red) and unemployment (shown in blue) as a percentage of federal government spending.

Source:  OECD

Figure 12 Male Disability Support Pension recipients (shown in red) and male NILFs aged 20-54 (shown in blue), both in absolute terms (solid lines) and as a percentage of the total male population (dotted lines).

Source:  Department of Social Services;  Australian Bureau of Statistics.

The soaring number of men receiving disability payments corresponds with ABS data showing that almost 40 per cent of prime age NILF men give disability or illness as their "main activity" (see figure 13). ⁽²²⁾

Figure 13 Stated "main activity" of NILF men aged 25-54.

Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics

To be sure, it is unlikely that many men are deciding to quit their jobs to live off disability payments.  However, it appears that the Australian welfare state is enabling and even encouraging them to stay out of work.

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WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Soaring NILF rates in the prime age male population brings substantial consequences, both for Australia in general and for jobless men themselves.

Poorer living standards

The economic consequences of this growing army of men without work are largely self-evident.  As more men disappear from the workforce, a greater number of taxpayers — and women — will be needed to support them.

Arguably, however, it is the out-of-work men who will suffer the most.  For one thing, subsistence on welfare payments will obviously mean a lower income and poorer living standards.  As figure 14 indicates, even the relatively high Disability Support Pension is lower than the minimum wage and far lower than what is earned by the average worker. ⁽²³⁾

Figure 14 — Weekly government payments compared with wage levels.

Sources:  Department of Social Services;  Australian Bureau of Statistics;  Fair Work Commission

Poorer health outcomes

The consequences of long-term unemployment, however, are greater than just financial and economic costs.  Studies increasingly demonstrate a number of non-economic benefits to people from paid employment, such as greater happiness from "earned success", more social interaction and substantial improvements in mental and even physical health.

One of the most significant contributions to this body of research is a 2011 consensus statement led by the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP).  Signatories include medical research organisations, health insurance funds and key industry and employer groups.  (Curiously, Australian trade unions are absent from the statement's list of signatories, though a number of New Zealand unions are represented.) ⁽²⁴⁾

The RACP cites numerous studies showing significant health consequences of unemployment, including:

• poorer mental health, including higher rates of depression, anxiety and low self-esteem;
• poorer physical health, including higher rates of cardiovascular disease and respiratory infections;
• higher rates of medical consultation and hospital admission;  and
• increased mortality rates, including a higher likelihood of suicide. ⁽²⁵⁾

Relevantly — and importantly — the RACP states that "[t]he health effects of work and unemployment are generally most marked in middle working-aged men". ⁽²⁶⁾  In other words, all jobless people experience poorer health outcomes, but it is prime age men who are the most susceptible.

Where NILF men have dependent children, the consequences are particularly serious.  A study by the Department of Social Services found that children without a working parent are more likely to suffer from lower levels of cognitive ability, including in areas like receptive vocabulary and non-verbal intelligence, and higher rates of social and emotional difficulties. ⁽²⁷⁾  The RACP has also found that parental joblessness may result in poorer outcomes in physical health among children, including "a higher likelihood of chronic illness, psychosomatic symptoms and lower wellbeing". ⁽²⁸⁾

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CONCLUSION

The decline in Australia's working male population is a constant and serious trend that, unfortunately, is rarely discussed.  Yet this silent crisis brings significant consequences for Australia, for the rapidly growing cohort of jobless men themselves and for their families and children.

Worst of all, evidence suggests that children without a working parent are much more likely to experience joblessness themselves in adulthood. ⁽²⁹⁾  The effects of joblessness in prime age men therefore risk becoming intergenerational, resulting in a permanent underclass of Australians with lower living standards, health outcomes and future prospects.

Policy-makers must take urgent action to reverse the exodus of men from paid work.  Structural barriers in our industrial relations system must be removed to allow the long-term unemployed to re-enter the labour force.  The welfare benefits that are keeping men out of work should be pared back.

If we as a country do not undertake these vital reforms, we will condemn more and more men to life on the margins of society, hidden from view.

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REFERENCES

Cases

2016-17 Annual Wage Review [2017] FWCFB 3500

Reports

Australian Institute of Family Studies, The Longitudinal study of Australian Children — Annual statistical report 2012, accessed 21 July 2017, 55.

Cutcher, Degenhardt, Alati and Kinner, 'Poor health and social outcomes for ex-prisoners with a history of mental disorder: a longitudinal study', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, Vol. 38 No. 5 (2014)

Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Continuous Survey of Australia's Migrants: Cohort 2 Report — Change in Outcomes 2015 (2016), accessed 8 June 2017.

Department of Social Services, Characteristics of Disability Support Pension Recipients (June 2013), accessed 25 June 2017.

Department of Social Services, Occasional Paper No. 48 — Parental joblessness, financial disadvantage and the wellbeing of parents and children (2012), accessed 21 July 2017, 46-47

Emma Ogilvie, Post-release: The current predicament and the potential strategies (Criminology Research Grants: 2001), accessed 12 June 2017.

Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Consensus Statement on the Health Benefits at Work, accessed 21 July 2014.

Books

Nicholas Eberstadt, Men Without Work: America's Invisible Crisis (Philadelphia: Templeton Press, 2016)

Statistics

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1947, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, cat. no. 2109.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1954, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, cat. no. 2108.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1961, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, cat. no. 2107.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1966, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2106.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1971, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2105.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1976, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2104.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1981, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2103.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2102.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1991, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2101.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2017.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2001.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2001.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006, How Australians Use Their Time, cat. no. 4153.0, accessed 15 July 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011, Census of Population and Housing, cat. no. 2001.0, accessed 15 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014, Persons Not In the Labour Force, Underemployed Workers and Job Experience, Australia, cat. no. 6226.0.55.001, accessed 1 July 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015-16, Australian System of National Accounts, cat. no. 5204.0, accessed 2 July 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed — Electronic Delivery, May 2017, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001, accessed 25 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017, Labour Force, Australia, June 2017, cat. no. 6202.0, accessed 25 June 2017.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings, Australia, November 2016, cat. no. 6302.0, accessed 20 July 2017.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Social Expenditure — Detailed data', accessed 20 July 2017.

Statistica, 'Incarceration rates among OECD countries as of 2017', accessed 12 June 2017.

Department of Human Services, 'Disability Support Pension', accessed 20 July 2017.

Department of Human Services, 'Newstart Allowance', accessed 20 July 2017.

Royal Australian College of Physicians, 'Health Benefits of Good Work', accessed 21 July 2017.

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ENDNOTES

1. Nicholas Eberstadt, Men Without Work: America's Invisible Crisis (Philadelphia: Templeton Press, 2016), 3.

2. Ibid.

3. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017, Labour Force, Australia, June 2017, cat. no. 6202.0, accessed 25 June 2017.

4. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census data 1947-2011.

5. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 3.

6. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed — Electronic Delivery, May 2017, cat. no. 6291.0.55.001, accessed 25 June 2017.

7. Eberstadt, above n 1.

8. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014, Persons Not In the Labour Force, Underemployed Workers and Job Experience, Australia, cat. no. 6226.0.55.001, accessed 1 July 2017.

9. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Continuous Survey of Australia's Migrants: Cohort 2 Report — Change in Outcomes 2015 (2016), accessed 8 June 2017, 10.

10. See Statistica, 'Incarceration rates among OECD countries as of 2017', accessed 12 June 2017.

11. Emma Ogilvie, Post-release: The current predicament and the potential strategies (Criminology Research Grants: 2001), accessed 12 June 2017.

12. Cutcher, Degenhardt, Alati and Kinner, 'Poor health and social outcomes for ex-prisoners with a history of mental disorder: a longitudinal study', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, Vol. 38 No. 5 (2014), 424-429, 427.

13. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 6.

14. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 6.

15. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 8.

16. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015-16, Australian System of National Accounts, cat. no. 5204.0, accessed 2 July 2017.

17. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 4.

18. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006, How Australians Use Their Time, cat. no. 4153.0, accessed 15 July 2017.

19. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 18.

20. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 8.

21.

• Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Social Expenditure — Detailed data', accessed 20 July 2017;
• Department of Social Services, Characteristics of Disability Support Pension Recipients (June 2013), accessed 25 June 2017, 8;
• Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 3.

22. Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 8.

23.

• Department of Human Services, 'Newstart Allowance', accessed 20 July 2017;
• Department of Human Services, 'Disability Support Pension', accessed 20 July 2017;
• 2016-17 Annual Wage Review [2017] FWCFB 3500;
• Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings, Australia, November 2016, cat. no. 6302.0, accessed 20 July 2017.

24. See Royal Australian College of Physicians, 'Health Benefits of Good Work', accessed 21 July 2017.

25. Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Consensus Statement on the Health Benefits at Work, accessed 21 July 2014, 12-13.

26. Ibid, 13.

27. Department of Social Services, Occasional Paper No. 48 — Parental joblessness, financial disadvantage and the wellbeing of parents and children (2012), accessed 21 July 2017, 46-47.

28. Royal Australasian College of Physicians, above n10, 14.

29. See, for example, Australian Institute of Family Studies, The Longitudinal study of Australian Children — Annual statistical report 2012, accessed 21 July 2017, 55.

Timor's Prosperity Lies In Its Best Assets: Its Beaches And People

East Timor holds a special place in the Australian psyche.  It is our newest neighbour, and we played a critical role in supporting its road to independence in 2002 through the Australian-led INTERFET peacekeeping mission.

Australian troops also kept the peace after the bloody Indonesian withdrawal in the aftermath of Timor's 1999 independence referendum.

A half-century earlier, Australian troops were in East Timor fighting against the Japanese enemy in World War II.  Many Timorese sacrificed their lives to help the Australian soldiers during the year-long guerilla campaign in 1942, providing food, water and shelter, and carting equipment and supplies.  When Australia pulled out of Timor, the Japanese sought revenge on those Timorese who had assisted our troops, executing them in their thousands.

So what should Australia make now of its newest and youngest neighbour nation-state?

Like so many postcolonial states, East Timor's long journey to independence and democracy has been bloody and violent.  As a post-conflict nation, East Timor more or less had to build its democratic institutions and governance systems from scratch.

In the 15 years since gaining independence from Indonesia in 2002, East Timor — with the help of Australia and many others in the international community — has made good progress.  But there is more to be done.

As an international observer at East Timor's general election on July 22, I was impressed by a generally successful democratic process.  This was the first election administered without the UN's assistance.  The contrast in the conduct and outcome of the election in nearby neighbour Papua New Guinea with East Timor couldn't be more stark.  The PNG elections have been marred by intimidation and violence, attempted kidnap­pings and burning buildings.  In one electorate, the third-ranked candidate was declared the winner, while in another two candidates were declared to have won.

In East Timor, the formal month-long election campaign was calm and orderly.  In many respects, the campaign mirrored what we see in Australia, with slick party billboards calling for fairness and equality, better investment in roads, health and education, while candidates appeared on televised debates, held political rallies and used social media to disseminate their messages.

Some elements of the election process were odd.  Notably, there was a lack of criticism of other parties or political leadership.  This is still a new and fragile democracy, and there is a nervousness that negative or scare campaigns could incite violence.

The two major parties, Fretilin and CNRT, came out on top and are likely to form a national unity government once again.

The challenge for Timor's government and democracy now is to move beyond a tussle for support for the charismatic leaders of the independence movement, and to focus on the serious policy and development issues facing the country.  In a country where 40 per cent of its 1.2 million people still live below the poverty line, Timor's leaders must focus on its prosperity and development.

Understandably, during the past 15 years political leaders in East Timor have been focused on keeping the peace and stabilising a country still traumatised by a bloody independence movement in which more than 200,000 people died.  For Australia, a peaceful East Timor is of paramount importance.  We do not want to see a return to the violent clashes of 2006 when the country was on the precipice of civil war and Australia had to send troops in to keep the peace.

So far, Timor's budget expenditure has been sustained by dipping into the capital of its $16 billion petroleum sovereign wealth fund.  This year it accounted for 78 per cent of the budget.  This is unsustainable and the fund is expected to be depleted within the decade.

It would be folly to pin Timor's hopes of future prosperity on a favourable outcome to the present conciliation with Australia on the maritime boundary.  Economic development needs to move beyond oil and gas to other industries such as agriculture and tourism.  This is important for the 60 per cent unemployed Timorese youth who are yearning for jobs and opportunities.

As a tourist destination, it is clear that East Timor has considerable potential.  It offers beau­tiful beaches, friendly people, delicious locally grown coffee and a Portuguese-infused cuisine.  But so far the investment has failed to come.

Investment will come to East Timor only with a transparent and internationally competitive tax system, and a stable government without sovereign risk.  Ease of doing business in Timor is one of the worst in the world — it is ranked at 175 out of 190 countries.  While the country's tax regime looks relatively benign on paper, the local law requirement to have a local partner and inability of overseas investors to own private property has so far discouraged inbound investment.  Sovereign risk also casts a shadow over the economy.

A variety of local and international left-wing ideologues agitate for East Timor to tear up maritime boundaries and undermine major oil and gas investments.  This only undermines business confidence further.

With a new government and president, Timor has an opportunity to put itself on course for growth and prosperity.

The decisions made now are critical and will set up Timor for success or failure.  Let's hope it's the former.