Sunday, November 30, 2008

Labor's choice an unfair work in progress

Introducing the new industrial relations package this week Julia Gillard had a tough job.

The minister was aware that unions account for only 12 per cent of working people in the private sector.  But she had to reward her soul mates in the union movement, who are also the Labor Party's foot soldiers and bankrollers, with prospects of increased income.

Her task was made easier by Malcolm Turnbull throwing in the towel.  In announcing the death of Work Choices he declared that employees were incapable of looking after themselves in their job selection and on-going working arrangements.

Even so, Ms Gillard had to avoid sticking business with too many extra costs and creating an environment for a replay of the industrial turmoil that took its toll on the economy up until a couple of decades or so ago.

Overwhelmingly, existing employees of firms, especially those in smaller businesses, share a mutual benefit with employers.  The employee knows the ropes of the business, making for easier and less stressful work.  This means better productivity thereby benefiting the employer.

The new blueprint, Forward with Fairness, cautiously rolls back reforms to labour relations introduced by the Howard Government.  The title itself is designed to be non-threatening.  Who, after all, can be against fairness?

But the fairness turns out to be all one way.  Any such legislation only restrains an employer.

A dissatisfied employee can always quit, but the employer is prevented from taking action that would make his or her business more competitive and better focused to meeting customers' needs.

The new arrangements cover thousands of different matters and their actual effect will not be known for some time.

Two matters to be changed concern unfair dismissals and individual contracts.  Restoring the highly bureaucratic procedures of the Hawke-Keating Government's unfair dismissals laws has long been a cornerstone of industrial relations law.  The threat of unfair dismissal underpinned the ACTU advertising campaign that played so well in last year's election campaign.  Myths, such as a working mum facing dismissal if she refused overtime, are counterbalanced by real life experiences of unsackable, poor performing employees creating a poisonous workplace, diverting management effort and adding unwanted costs.  The new arrangements will reintroduce measures that make it more difficult to fire such people.

Another area concerns individual employment contracts.  In future, any new individual contracts are likely to bring higher costs than is currently the case.  The impact of this will be felt most strongly in highly paid mining employment and in the (relatively low paid) hospitality sector.

If employers are forced to return to double time payments, increased costs must be passed on in higher prices and businesses less oriented to the customer.  That would also mean less employment.


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Saturday, November 29, 2008

Talking down v acting up

There's an old saying:  "If you keep your head while all those around you are losing theirs, you don't understand the situation."  It's one thing for politicians to try to keep their heads.  But it's something entirely different if politicians use the requirement to keep calm as an excuse not to reveal the truth.

For the past few months, we've been assured time and time again by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Treasurer Wayne Swan that the federal budget won't go into deficit.  After all, the Prime Minister was meant to be an "economic conservative".

And then suddenly two days ago on his return from the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation meeting, the Prime Minister announced we were facing a "temporary deficit".  Obviously his meeting in Peru was a life-changing experience.  Apparently he now believes there's no point in "sugar-coating" the situation.

One minute the Australian public is being instructed not to "talk down the economy", the next minute we're informed "we're all in this boat together" and "it will get worse before it gets better".  It shouldn't have taken a visit to Lima for the Prime Minister to realise that financial conditions are, depending on how you look at it, bad, very bad, or terrible.

Politicians, central bankers or Treasury officials should not be in the business of either talking the economy up or down.  Their task is to present the facts so the public can make up its own mind.

Reserve Bank of Australia governor Glenn Stevens has also been preaching the mantra of not talking the economy down.  Last week, he told the Committee for Economic Development of Australia annual dinner that "about the biggest mistake we could make would be to talk ourselves into unnecessary economic weakness".

Presumably he thinks such talk would be worse for the economy than the Reserve Bank keeping interest rates too high for too long.  The governor admitted that, "yes, the situation is serious", but he went on to say the situation was not so bad as to warrant "some of the gloomy talk that is around".  These words are not dissimilar to those attributed to Austro-Hungarian bureaucrats facing defeat in World War I and the disintegration of the empire.  "The situation is critical, but not serious."  One wonders just how bad things need to get before they're serious.

For all the discussion about it, no one has yet explained what "talking down the economy" actually means.  And it's doubtful whether anyone actually takes any notice of what politicians say about the economy anyway.

The electorate and home owners are more sophisticated than politicians give them credit for.  Six months ago, shop assistants and waiters were noticing what the Reserve Bank missed.  A restaurant owner who comments that bookings have fallen by 20 per cent is hardly "talking down" the economy.  He is simply stating a fact.

Presumably politicians think that pondering doom will stop consumers spending their money.  We're now coming to fear the so-called "paradox of thrift" whereby an economic recovery is delayed as people become too scared to open their wallets.  However, the collapse of economic growth is the product of something more than just weekend shoppers in suburban malls deciding to buy two DVD movies rather than three.  In the face of immense uncertainty, stopping or at least delaying spending is probably the most rational thing consumers and businesses can do right now.

Stevens's remark that "the biggest mistake we could make" would be to talk ourselves into unnecessary economic weakness is somewhat of a rhetorical flourish.  There are plenty of things worse than talking about the dire condition of the world.

For example, we could introduce an emissions trading scheme before anyone else in the world and so guarantee a cut in our economic growth.

Or in the face of what might be the worst financial downturn since the Great Depression, we could change the law to make it harder for businesses to sack underperforming employees.  Or just at the time when we need to attract the best talent to public company boards, we could impose even more liabilities on company directors.  Or we could introduce new arbitrary restrictions on foreign investment.  Or we could spend billions of taxpayer dollars propping up unviable manufacturing industries.  And the list could go on.

Funnily enough, these are all things the Labor government has done or promised to do.  If the choice is between having a populace talking about how bad things are and having a government implement bad policies, there's no contest.


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Friday, November 28, 2008

Gains in restoring powers to states

This weekend sees yet another round of executive federalism at work, with Kevin Rudd to meet premiers and chief ministers on funding issues.

Since its ascension to power 12 months ago, the Rudd Government has repeatedly proclaimed its determination to fix federalism through cooperation between governments.  This strategy was to take advantage of the alignment of the then wall-to-wall Labor governments, and through it end the much despised "blame game".

After a considerable honeymoon period between the Commonwealth and the states, the rumblings of discontent have emerged once again.  Drawn from the top shelf of political opportunism, the states are again firing their well-worn charges of federal under-funding at Rudd and Wayne Swan.

The first salvo was from an economically and fiscally crippled NSW Government over funding contributions from the Commonwealth's so-called digital education revolution.  Then the states criticised the feds, and warred among themselves, over the prospective division of money from the infrastructure fund.

The federal mid-year economic outlook document sent shockwaves through the states over the prospect of reduced GST funding, and now the blame game is back on in earnest.

This strained environment sets the backdrop for the Federal Government's ambition to push through some changes to federal financial relations.  The Commonwealth aims to streamline the labyrinth of existing specific-purpose payments into five or six broad funding agreements.  This will be complemented by National Partnership Payments for specific agreed projects.

As always, funding will be central to whether or not these changes are approved.  The states see more funding from the Commonwealth as the key to reaching just about any agreement.  However, with a federal budget likely to descend into deficit, the Commonwealth's capacity to deliver more funding compared with that already budgeted is questionable.  On that score alone, the Council of Australian Governments' meeting may deliver political fireworks similar to intergovernmental meetings of the past.

Another source of tension is likely to be the kind of performance benchmarks the Commonwealth will impose on payments to the states.  A number have already resisted conditions flagged by federal ministers, such as consistent school and hospital performance reporting.

One is struck at the extent to which the states participate in the vehicles of executive federalism from a position of weakness.  The Commonwealth holds the lion's share of revenue, and can use its powers to subject the states to a vast array of policy and program targets.  This will remain the case even after this week's COAG meeting.

With such extensive Commonwealth involvement in state affairs, the benefit of federalism in dividing up total government power among governments is substantially weakened.  Taxpayers are left with the problem of working out which government is responsible for what substandard service.

With two levels of government involved in the same field, be it education, health, transportation or community services, it also becomes more difficult to restrain the total size of Australian government.  With other countries reducing their taxes to attract capital and skilled workers, our government spending duplication and overlaps are holding us back on the global stage.

These basic problems will be left unchanged after the COAG meeting, as the much-touted reforms being pushed through are simply more of the same.  Australia should instead capture the true spirit of federalism.

The Commonwealth should not only relinquish its policy controls over state services but return personal income tax powers to the states.  With sufficient revenues to fund essential services, the states can transform themselves from begging bowl-holders of federation to serious competitors for footloose economic resources.

A more competitive federalism will ensure that services are better tailored to communities' needs.

This "federalism first" agenda is not on the agenda for the COAG discussion, but should be if we want to put our federal relations on a more sustainable footing.


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Topsy-turvy temperature

So much of government policy is now about reducing carbon emissions on the basis that the earth is heating-up.

But measuring the earth's temperature is not easy.

The traditional way, still used by the United Kingdom's Meteorology Bureau and NASA's Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS), involves collating data from weather stations across the world.

These are based in places as cold as Siberia ranging through to the hot tropics of Indonesia.

The number of weather stations has changed with time and many weather stations, even in the United States, are not well maintained and positioned in wrong places -- including next to new air conditioning outlets.

There had been many stories in the local and international media suggesting that last month was unusually cold.

It snowed in the Blue Mountains, and again last weekend as far west as Orange.

London experienced its first October snow since 1922 -- ironically as the British Parliament debated a new climate change bill.

I saw a report of the "the worst snowstorm on record" in Tibet -- 144,400 head of livestock dead.

Then, contrary to expectations, GISS published a temperature anomaly for October showing global warming and not just a bit of warming.

It was reporting a +0.88°C -- the anomaly was the largest ever for October, and one of the steepest jumps in global temperatures ever recorded.

Two Internet web blogs, one run by US meteorologist, Anthony Watts, and another by Canadian statistician, Steve McIntyre, were quick to find one of the errors -- many temperature records from Russia were not based on October readings at all, but rather figures for September that had simply been carried across.

It is much colder in Siberia in October than in September.

The Goddard Institute admitted the blunder and admitted that it was the bloggers who had discovered it.

However, when GISS published the correction it was evident that while adjusting down the temperatures for Russia, they adjusted up the temperatures for Australia and the Canadian Arctic.

Apparently the Australian data was not in when GISS did the original analysis which begs the question:  What was the basis for the first guess estimates for Australia?

It seems extraordinary to me that governments across the globe are planning and implementing expensive and intrusive policies based on the notion the earth is warming, but there doesn't appear to be a lot of quality control on much of the data actually driving this mania.

An alternative to the weather station data is satellite data which has been collected since 1979 also by NASA.

But this doesn't show significant global warming and perhaps for this reason is rarely quoted by politicians and climate scientists who have hitched their reputations to the so-called climate crisis.


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The need for oversight and the Foreign Investment Review Board

FOREIGN INVESTMENT OUTCOMES

  • ABS Study 2000-01
  • 7864 foreign affiliates
  • $65.9 billion in foreign investment
  • 783,000 workers
  • $12.6 billion in Gross Fixed Capital Formation
  • $78 billion in Value Added.
  • 21% of total Value Added in Australia

DOES THIS SOUND AND LOOK LIKE XENOPHOBIA?

  • The Foreign Investment Review Board has a record of saying "Yes" to foreign investment proposals.
  • This hardly constitutes the track record of an authority with "an irrational fear or hatred of foreigners"

LET'S MOVE FROM ASSUMPTIONS TO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

  • Review does not mean Restrict
  • National Interest is a Valid Basis for Review
  • Sovereign Funds
  • Australia needs to ensure that Multinationals operate on a level Playing Field

A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

  • Specific Issues Include:
    • Transfer Pricing-Paying a Fair Share of Tax
    • The common multinational practice of not allowing Australian affiliates to export
    • Moving Value Adding offshore

ALAN GREENSPAN

  • In "The Age of Turbulence" Greenspan says:
    • "Australia has always fascinated me as a microcosm of the United States in many ways"
    • "I continually monitor Australia's Current Account deficit which has persisted far longer than that of the United States with no significant macroeconomic impact than large increasing foreign ownership of Australian corporate assets."
  • Page 292

FOREIGN DEBT AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT

  • The Deficit has been continuous and growing for more than twenty years.
  • The 2008 minerals bubble created small surpluses in two quarters. They wont continue.
  • We owe $615 billion mostly in US dollars.
  • We can only reduce imports, increase exports or sell assets to reduce this deficit.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

  • What's wrong with Australia reviewing asset sales when they are substantial or strategic?
  • All major industrial economies do the same thing. They are not as transparent as Australia in their processes.

FINAL COMMENTS

  • What do we know about the level of foreign ownership of Australian Assets now?
  • The last ABS study was 2000-1. Individual Sector studies were mostly undertaken in the seventies and eighties
  • It would be a good idea if the Rudd government initiated a study.
  • I am more comfortable with facts than unsubstantiated opinions and assumptions.

Capital xenophobia and the "national interest"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the significance of international investment in Australia, arguing that foreign capital is not to be feared, but instead should be welcomed in view of its beneficial economic effects.

It first highlights the inconsistency between official support for liberalising trade in goods and services, but not further liberalising international investment.  The same kind of protectionist, economic nationalist thinking that promotes trade restrictions and supports "Buy Australian" campaigns influences foreign investment policy.  However, economic arguments similar to those used to support liberalisation of trade in goods and services can be applied to foreign investment.

By investing excess saving through equity participation, loans to resident firms and purchases of real assets from residents, foreigners finance that much more domestic investment.  Moreover, the pool of funds available for investment is also supplemented when real domestic assets like property are bought by foreigners.

Foreign direct investment in particular confers productivity gains via technology transfer, international management practices and product development and can spur greater domestic competition and imitative behaviour by existing locally-owned firms.

When foreigners buy existing Australian assets at higher prices than other residents buyers would be willing to pay, the Australian residents who sell such assets to foreigners make capital gains which they otherwise would not have made.  The proceeds of the sale of assets may then be used to create new domestic assets, be spent on consumption, or ever be used to acquire new foreign assets.

Estimates of national income gains attributable to foreign investment, broadly defined, confirm that the gains have been positive and significant because the extra production made possible by foreign investment has on average significantly exceeded investment income paid abroad.

The term "national interest" has not been adequately defined in this context and is really devoid of any economic meaning.  It only makes sense in the context of quarantining defence and national security related industries from foreign control.

In light of the economic benefits foreign investment bestows, this paper proposes that the true "national interest" would be better served by re-examining the purpose and role of the FIRB with a view to eliminating restrictions on foreign investment that stymie growth in Australia's living standards and wealth.


INTRODUCTION

Capital xenophobia is an acute form of economic nationalism that becomes most virulent whenever foreign investors target iconic Australian brand names for takeover.  Trade protectionism, the other major strain of economic nationalism, is motivated by aversion to foreign-produced goods and services.  Like trade protectionism, aversion to foreign capital implies a major role for government intervention in commercial transactions between residents and foreigners. (1)

The role of foreign investment, especially foreign direct investment and multinationals has been extensively debated for a century, most notably beginning with claims by Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the former Soviet Union.  Lenin asserted that foreign investment was inherently exploitative of host countries and a manifestation of the final stage of global imperial capitalism.  This inimical view of direct foreign investment contrasts markedly to the attitudes of contemporary governments in the developed and developing world.

Governments of varying ideological hues around the world actively seek higher shares of transnational investment flows.  Yet the Australian Government, through the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) continues to discourage certain forms of foreign investment, particularly in the financial, media, real estate and transport sectors.  Indeed, there is a popular view that Australia's foreign investment policy is not restrictive enough and the idea that foreign acquisition of Australian enterprises should be blocked by government has in the past found strong support from fringe political parties at both the left and right ends of the political spectrum, such as the Australian Democrats and One Nation.

The ultimate official justification for protecting segments of the economy from foreign acquisition is that a move to foreign ownership of firms in certain industries somehow contravenes the "national interest".  However, this phrase, though frequently invoked, has never been properly defined and, as we will see, is really devoid of any economic meaning.

In highly globalised economies households, firms and governments are integrated via inward and outward flows in markets for goods and services that manifest as exports and imports.  They are also increasingly integrated through asset markets, as the global financial crisis has reminded us, which manifest as foreign capital inflows and outflows.  These two-way flows are illustrated in Figure 1.  While copious attention has been devoted to liberalising and expanding opportunities for international goods and services trade, the same can not be said for cross-border trade in assets.

This paper addresses the significance of international trade in assets. (2)  Its primary aim is to advance the argument that foreign capital is not to be feared, but instead should be welcomed in view of its beneficial economic effects.  This argument is developed first by highlighting the inconsistency between advocacy for freer international trade in goods and services but not for freer international trade in capital.

Figure 1:  International Trade and Investment Linkages

Next it advances macroeconomic and microeconomic economic arguments against capital xenophobia.  In light of the economic benefits foreign investment bestows, it then questions what the "national interest" really means in this context.  It concludes with recommendations for foreign investment policy.


WHY FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE INVESTMENT?

Generations of economists have argued that free trade in goods and services improves economic welfare.  A corollary of their arguments is that trade restrictions, especially in the form of tariffs and quotas on imports, reduce economic welfare because they impose additional direct costs on consumers and indirect costs on exporters.

What is apparently not recognised by policy makers is that many of the economic arguments used to support liberalisation of trade in goods and services can also be applied to thinking about international trade in assets and funds for investment.  As a general principle, the greater the international trade in assets, the greater the potential economic welfare gains.

Though the idea that freeing up international trade in goods and services is widely accepted as welfare enhancing, somewhat inconsistently when it comes to thinking about international trade in assets, both financial and real, the gains arising from mutual exchange are often ignored.

Increased foreign investment could conceivably play as important a role in Australia's economic development as increased international trade in goods and services because trade in assets and investment allows funds to move to places where capital can be used most productively. (3)

Calls to protect domestic firms from foreign takeovers in particular are influenced by the same kind of economic nationalist thinking that urges consumers to "Buy Australian" in the sense that locally grown enterprises warrant special patronage regardless of the quality and price of products these enterprises make available for sale.  Ironically, in the case of foreign investment it is often only when foreigners are actually allowed to Buy Australian (firms, not goods in this case) that product quality improves.

Industry protection, particularly in the form of tariffs has been thoroughly criticised in the past on the grounds that tariffs on imports allow inefficiencies to develop at the firm level which, in turn, delays adoption of the best international techniques available.

Similarly, protecting domestic firms from the threat of foreign takeover through investment restriction also creates an environment where inefficiencies may develop.  Further relaxation of foreign investment policy to allow foreign takeovers in now-quarantined sectors would conceivably motivate managers of domestic firms to further maximise their firms' profit opportunities thus ensuring the wealth of resident shareholders is at its highest level.

There is an anomaly when it comes to thinking about free trade and foreign investment.  On one hand, calls for higher tariffs to restrict trade in specific goods or services in order to protect owners and management from overseas imports now verges on the unmentionable.  This is a direct result of the academic arguments and prevailing policy consensus that exists on the benefits of free international trade in goods and services. (4)

But on the other hand, it is still quite acceptable to propose restricted international trade in assets even though there are strong arguments to support unrestricted capital flows.  Admittedly however these are not as yet elaborately developed as centuries-old arguments for free trade in goods and services.  Let us now turn to some basic economic arguments in favour of liberalising foreign investment.


THE ECONOMIC CASE AGAINST CAPITAL XENOPHOBIA

This section presents both macroeconomic and microeconomic arguments in favour of foreign investment.  Before elaborating these arguments, consider the following preliminaries that facilitate understanding of the issues.

According to national accounting conventions foreign capital inflow is linked to domestic saving and investment as shown below.

Figure 2:  Domestic Saving, Investment and Foreign Investment

Figure 2 shows that according to national accounting conventions an economy's use of foreign saving or net inward foreign investment, equals its investment- saving gap.  Hence, increases in the domestic real capital stock are partly financed by domestic saving and partly by foreign investment, broadly defined.

By investing excess saving through equity participation, loans to resident firms and purchases of real assets from residents, foreigners finance that much more domestic investment.  Moreover, the pool of funds available for investment is also supplemented when real domestic assets like property are bought by foreigners.

In other words, net capital inflow that matches the current account deficit enables Australia to accumulate more real capital.  Another way of thinking about the significance of foreign investment is that it measures the volume of consumption spending that Australia would have to forego as a nation in order to lift domestic saving to the level required to fund our investment needs.  The extent to which a steadily increasing share of foreign investment combined with domestic saving to fund domestic investment in Australia over recent decades is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3:  Domestic Saving, Investment and Foreign Investment, Australia, 1995-2008.

Based on data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various.

Foreign capital has on average funded around one-fifth of total gross domestic investment in Australia over this period which is high by OECD standards.  However, this foreign capital inflow has overwhelmingly been in the form of foreign borrowing, with the small share of net foreign direct investment, presently under one per cent of GDP, actually declining over this time.


MACROECONOMIC ARGUMENTS

The following simple model allows us to draw the macroeconomic implications of foreign investment. (5)  If foreign investment, broadly defined, was prohibited completely, total investment spending has to be funded from domestic saving, the residual between national output and private and public consumption.  Let the demand for capital funds as a function of the real interest rate be depicted by the schedule I in Figure 4.

Figure 4:  Macroeconomic Gains from Foreign InvestmentForeign Investment and Domestic Saving and Investment

In a closed economy the market for funds would clear at the equilibrium real interest rate, iA given a fixed supply (SA).  In contrast, with open capital markets, a small economy's investment requirements over and above available domestic saving can be satisfied by foreign investors providing funds at the given international cost of capital (or world interest rate), i*.

Domestic investment therefore exceeds domestic saving at i* to the extent of foreign capital inflow.  This ex ante foreign inflow is shown by distance fc in Figure 4.  Hence, if capital inflow is initially nil, it reaches level fc by period end.  As the real world interest rate is lower than the real autarky interest rate, investment under autarky is always lower than when international investment is permitted.

Figure 4 also reveals how foreign investment raises national income.  The marginal product of capital determines the slope of the investment demand schedule, so that given i*, the extra units of foreign financed capital, times their marginal product, add to GDP to the extent of the area abcd.

However, of that, the rectangular area afcd is paid to foreign lenders, leaving a net national income gain equivalent to the triangular area fbc.  International investment therefore enables lower domestic interest rates and higher national income, provided the productivity of the extra foreign-financed capital exceeds its cost.  This approach is consistent with McDougall's (1960) two region neo-classical foreign investment model. (6)  However, the difference is that here we focus on saving and investment flows and assume the economy is small.

If foreign lenders perceive high foreign liabilities, especially debt, as a sign of heightened country risk and diminished creditworthiness, they may demand an interest premium (ρ), to compensate.  This explains the foreign lending schedule rising from the world interest rate, i* in the Figure.  The more averse foreign investors are to rising foreign debt, the steeper the slope of the SρF schedule and the higher the risk premium.  At some point, foreigners could judge the level of lending risk prohibitive, equivalent to the foreign lending schedule becoming vertical.

In the presence of a risk premium, the foreign investment schedule is no longer flat.  The risk premium is the difference between the interest rate foreign lenders demand under imperfect capital mobility and the interest rate i* under perfect capital mobility.  Hence, id = i* + ρ where id is the equilibrium domestic interest rate and ρ is measured by the distance gf in Figure 4.  Foreign investment-related risk therefore limits potential national income gains.  In the Figure 4, the welfare loss is area fgec but foreign borrowing still confers a net welfare gain of gbe.

In sum, at the macroeconomic level, total foreign investment in all forms is reflected in the capital account surpluses which match the regular current account deficits of a host foreign investment nation.  What is generally not appreciated is that the more foreign investment an economy attracts, the higher its current account deficit and foreign liabilities are likely to be.


MICROECONOMIC ARGUMENTS

At the disaggregated level, foreign investment can take many forms as shown in Figure 5.  Of these types direct foreign investment involving the establishment of new subsidiaries of foreign multinationals or the takeover of domestic firms by foreign interests generate most controversy.

Figure 5:  Forms of Foreign Investment

The economic impact of direct foreign investment and multinationals (MNCs) is best considered at the enterprise or industry level.  The reason that governments of all ideological persuasions are actively vying to attract ever greater shares of direct foreign investment is that multinational corporations can directly and indirectly generate productivity benefits through the transfer of technology and through product development.

Furthermore, domestic employees of foreign-owned firms are exposed to international management practices and the presence of new entrants in domestic markets stimulates imitative behaviour and acts as a spur to greater competition.

In turn, the higher labour productivity also allows domestic wages to be higher than would be possible with the smaller capital stock, resulting from reliance on domestic saving alone.  The amount of additional economic activity in a range of domestic activities would not be as great and overall GDP growth would be lower without the benefit of foreign investment.

It is of course possible that foreign dominance of certain industries could result from foreign merger and acquisition activity which in turn could limit domestic competition in those industries.  However, this then becomes a matter for the ACCC treating the foreign owned firm no differently from domestically owned firms.  Similarly there could be problems with transfer pricing by multinational firms.  But this too need not be an issue for foreign investment policy per se, but a matter for the Australian Tax Office.

A commonly expressed concern about private foreign investment in Australia relates to direct investment specifically to the loss of control of established domestic firms through foreign takeovers or the acquisition of real estate by non-residents.  It is often said that whenever this happens on a large-scale we are either "selling off the farm" or, for the more urban minded, "selling off the family silver".

Against these nationalistically inspired concerns however, there are always economic benefits which accrue to the residents who choose to dispose of their assts to foreigners.  It is generally not appreciated by opponents of foreign investment that whenever domestic financial or real assets are purchased by non-residents, the quantum of funds available to residents for additional spending is supplemented as a result of the asset sales.

When foreigners buy existing Australian assets at higher prices than other residents buyers would be willing to pay, the Australian residents who sell such assets to foreigners make capital gains which they otherwise would not have made.  The proceeds of the sale of assets may then be used to create new domestic assets, be spent on consumption, or ever be used to acquire new foreign assets.

Such economic gains suggest that, as a nation, we may be better off allowing foreigners greater freedom to purchase domestic assets, including all forms of real estate.  Colloquially speaking, sales of domestic assets by residents to foreigners actually enable residents to upgrade the old set of silver or spend the proceeds acquiring something else entirely.


ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL INCOME GAINS

To the extent that, in aggregate, the productivity of the extra physical capital acquired through foreign capital inflow exceeds the servicing costs on that foreign investment, then national income can grow faster than otherwise.  The total size of Australia's capital stock is now a large multiple of the value of its foreign liabilities and the extra production made possible in Australia from using foreign funds has indeed on average significantly exceeded interest and other investment income paid abroad.

Estimates of national income gains attributable to capital inflow confirm that the income gains have indeed been positive and significant.  Based on an economic growth accounting method using national accounts data to compare the productivity of foreign capital with its cost, these estimates show that over the decade 1996-2006 extra real national income stemming from foreign-funded investment has been close to $25 billion.

This translates to around $2,500 extra income per worker per year, roughly equivalent to a $50 a week tax cut.  It is also equivalent to around $1,100 per head of total population.  Moreover, the data clearly shows that the total size of the nation's capital stock is a large multiple of the value of its net foreign liabilities. (7)  The estimates may however understate the income gains as they do not include the extra productivity benefits that accompany the direct foreign investment component of capital inflow.

In the meantime, the high current account deficit remains the best measure of the extent to which foreigners are voting with their own money to express confidence in the Australian economy.  It will persist as long as that confidence is warranted.


WHAT REALLY IS THE "NATIONAL INTEREST"?

The idea that foreign investment in Australia needs to be officially monitored and occasionally blocked in the national interest originates from federal government policy initiated back in the 1970's -- the height of economic nationalism in this country.  It was then that the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) was established which thankfully no longer operates as restrictively as it used to.

Restrictions which impede international exchange of assets and funds impose sometimes hidden costs.  In Australia's case most of these costs stem from the existing regulations governing international investment, notably those involving takeovers of domestic firms.

Other legislative restrictions specifically governing foreign investment in banking and the media also exist and date from even earlier times.  These restrictions deny resident shareholders of firms in proscribed sectors the opportunity to reap higher capital gains than otherwise and therefore limit national wealth.

From FIRB annual reports we do know that billions of dollars worth of foreign investment has been rejected outright by successive Treasurers over recent decades.  Because additional investment was effectively prevented from taking place, Australia's existing stock of real capital is consequently smaller than it could have been.  So too is its national income.  This is contrary to the true national interest which requires setting economic policy in ways that maximise Australia's living standards and wealth.

Encouraging more not less foreign investment is really in the national interest to the extent it enables faster growth in the size of the nation's capital stock.  This would create additional employment opportunities and via the technology transfer that comes with direct foreign investment improve the overall productivity of the workforce.  The phrase "national interest", though frequently invoked in this context, has never been properly defined and is really devoid of any economic meaning.  It only makes sense in the context of quarantining defence and national security related industries from foreign control.

It is difficult to think of other industries that warrant special protection from foreign investors, although there may be grounds for treating the banking sector a little differently for prudential and monetary control reasons.  Quarantining other commercial sectors of the economy from foreign ownership, such as real estate and media, is arguably against the national interest.

Moreover, as argued above foreign investment improves the Australia's economic welfare to the extent that it frees the nation from the constraint of its own saving level.  Without foreign capital inflow, the level of long-term interest rates would also be higher, as the economy would then be totally reliant on domestic sources of funds to finance its investment requirements.  If we consider improving the nation's economic welfare as central to the national interest, then it follows that we should have a less restrictive foreign investment policy.


SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:  A CAUTIONARY NOTE

Heavily managed exchange rates and persistently large trade and current account surpluses have enabled East Asian central banks and Middle Eastern oil exporters to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserves that have reached multi-trillion dollar levels.

No longer simply invested in US and other government bonds that helped keep world interest rates low, these massive money holdings are now directed elsewhere, via sovereign wealth funds established by these countries to amass a wider portfolio of higher yielding assets worldwide.  With inflexible exchange rates and controls over private capital outflows, the more these economies accumulate foreign reserves, the more this signifies their currencies are undervalued.

What we need to understand is that the ever-growing capacity of these economies to invest abroad, including in Australia, largely reflect their fixed exchange rate policies.  Quite simply, if these economies allowed their currencies to find their own level in the absence of further capital account liberalisation, they would appreciate quickly and strongly.  So in effect, accumulating foreign reserves and mushrooming sovereign wealth are indicative of congealed currency undervaluation.

This does not suggest that foreign investment by sovereign wealth funds in Australia should be discouraged, just that its lineage is quite different to capital inflow from more traditional sources such as the United States and United Kingdom.

If sovereign wealth fund investment raises domestic asset values and induces more domestic investment it should in principle be welcomed.  But revalued exchange rates would not be as politically sensitive an issue and perhaps just as beneficial if that boosted Australia's exports to those countries undervaluing their currencies.


CONCLUSION

In general, foreign capital inflow in aggregate improves Australia's economic welfare to the extent that it frees the nation from the constraint of its own saving level.  As the above theory suggests, without foreign capital inflow, the level of long-term interest rates would also be higher, as the economy would then be totally reliant on domestic sources of funds to finance its investment requirements.

Foreign direct investment in particular should also be welcome because it delivers productivity gains via technology transfer, international management practices and product development and can spur greater domestic competition and imitative behaviour by existing locally-owned firms.

The national economic interest is therefore best served by encouraging, not discouraging, foreign investment because in general, official restrictions which limit the purchase by foreigners of Australia-owned asset impose an overall cost on the economy to the extent that they needlessly deprive the economy of much needed capital for economic development.

The FIRB has now been operating without interruption for a long time.  Since it was established, the world has globalised immensely and views about foreign investment and the international policy climate have changed markedly.  It is timely to ask what the economic rather than political rationale of the FIRB is.

The modus operandi of the FIRB could in fact be completely changed, so that instead of deterring foreign investment as it now does, the FIRB could reinvest itself and play a new role as the primary public sector advocate of foreign investment.  The existing anomaly between Australia's policy towards international trade in goods and services and its policy towards international trade in assets – supporting one but not the other is likely to become more internationally apparent in the near future.

Whereas foreign capital was once generally discouraged in many advanced and emerging economies via extensive economic nationalist controls it is now generally welcome around the world.  The OECD has long been advocating freer capital movements through the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, first draped in the early 1960s and a new OECD agreement on global capital flows proposes that foreign investment be treated no differently to domestic investment.

Not only does Australia's foreign investment policy inadequately recognise the benefits of freer capital movements, it is also inconsistent with the 1994 APEC Bogor declaration which advocated "free and open investment in the region" on the same principle as contained in the OECD code that foreign and local investors face equal treatment.

The point often missed by those suspicious of foreign capital and which is unrecognised by present foreign investment guidelines is that foreign investment creates extra economic activity and raises national income and wealth.  Hence it would be in the national interest to re-examine the role of the FIRB, and substantially further liberalise foreign investment policy by dispensing with the bulk of existing regulations prohibiting foreign acquisition of Australian owned firms and assets.  Less restrictive foreign investment policy would then maximise national income and wealth.

This is ultimately what lies in the national interest.  Foreign investment flows can be interpreted as a measure of how much money foreigners are willing to invest in the economy's future.  Hence, foreign investment in its many forms should, as a rule, not be feared but feted.



REFERENCES

Baldwin, R. (2004) "Openness and Growth:  What's the Empirical Relationship?" in R. Baldwin and L. Winters (eds) Challenges to Globalisation:  Analysing the Economics University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Carkovic, M. and Levine, R. (2005) "Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth?" in T. Moran, E. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds) Does Foreign Investment Promote Development? Institute for International Economics, Washington.

Chandra, A. (2005) "The Influence of Capital Controls on Long Run Growth:  Where and How Much?" Journal of Development Economics, 77, 441-466.

Grubel, H.G. (1987) "Foreign Investment", in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2, Macmillan, London, 403-6.

Haveman, J. Lei, V. and Netz, J. (2001) "Internationa Integration and Growth:  A Survey and Empirical Investigation" Review of Development Economics, 5 (2), 289-311.

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington.

Kasper, W. (1984) Capital Xenophobia, Centre for Independent Studies, St Leonards, Sydney.

Kirchner, S. (2008) Capital Xenophobia II:  Foreign Direct Investment in Australia, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Rise of State Capitalism Centre for Independent Studies, St Leonards, Sydney.

Klein, M. and Olivei, P. (2005) "Capital Account Liberalisation, Institutional Quality and Economic Growth:  Theory and Evidence" NBER Working Paper 1112, NBER Massachusetts.

MacDougall, G. (1960) "The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad" The Economic Record, Special Issue, May.

Makin, T. (2007) "Foreign Investment Pays a National Dividend" Australian Chief Executive Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, CEDA, July, 14-17.

Makin, T. (2006a) "Foreign Takeovers in the National Interest" The Australian Financial Review 13 September.

Makin, T. (2006b) "Has Foreign Capital Made Us Richer?" Agenda 13(2), 225-237.

Makin, T. (1996) "Liberalising Foreign Investment Policy", Agenda, 3(2), 135-142.

Makin, T. and Robson, A. (2006) "The Welfare Cost of Capital Controls" Economic Analysis and Policy 36(2), 13-24.

Ruffin, R.J. (1984) "International Factor Movements", in P.B. Kenen and R.W. Jones (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, vol. 1, North-Holland, Amsterdam, Ch. 5, 237-88.



ENDNOTES

1.  "Capital xenophobia" was the title of a 1984 monograph on foreign investment by Wolfgang Kasper, recently revised by Stephen Kirchner (2008).

2.  Some of these points have previously been expressed in Makin (1996a, 1996b, 2006, and 2007).

3.  International empirical evidence on the gains from foreign investment flows is provided by Carkovic and Levine (2005) and Chandra (2005) and Haveman, Lei and Netz (2001).

4.  See Baldwin(2004) for related discussion.

5.  This sub-section draws on Makin and Robson (2006).

6.  See also Grubel (1987) and Ruffin (1984).

7.  See Makin (2006) for elaboration.

Counting the cost of regulation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since European settlement Australia has relied heavily on foreign investment, either by borrowing abroad (foreign debt) or by allowing greater foreign ownership of domestic assets (foreign equity).  This has helped to generate faster economic growth and progressively higher living standards.  As a result, Australia usually runs a current account deficit and the accumulated deficits represent the gap between domestic investment and domestic saving.

The increasing tendency for Australian firms to invest abroad has added another dimension to the contribution that foreign investment makes to Australia.  Increasingly they are using investment abroad to expand beyond the domestic market.  By extending their market presence and access to resources, expertise and technology in other markets, Australian firms are able to become more efficient and competitive in global markets.

Foreign investment is regulated by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975.  All foreign investment over specified monetary thresholds has to be screened and approved by the Government as being in the "national interest", prior to its execution.  The Government is able to decide cases as it sees fit.  Some 30 per cent of approved investments by value have conditions imposed on them by the Government.

The emergence of a new group of global investors owned or controlled by governments from jurisdictions without appropriate standards of government or business conduct or which provide their investors with unfair advantages.  While such cases raise legitimate concerns about the state of the global "playing field", any discrimination against a class of investors strikes at the heart of the international trading system, on which Australia depends.

To address these issues, the Australian Government has published six principles for considering investment by entities, which are owned or controlled by foreign governments.

These principles are, however, likely to restrict investments simply because they are owned or controlled by a foreign government, and not because they represent a clear and present danger to the welfare of ordinary Australians.  As China is one of Australia's most prospective sources of inwards foreign investment, the strict application of these principles is likely to adversely affect the broader economic relationship between the two countries, as well as reduce investment in the Australian economy.

Even before it adopted the six principles, Australia had one of the most restrictive foreign investment regimes in the OECD, not to mention in comparison with the rest of the world.  Of the 43 countries that are monitored by the OECD, only China, India, Russia, Iceland and Mexico have more a more restrictive foreign investment regime.

Australia's regime needlessly restricts incoming investment and Australians suffer as a consequence.  ITS Global estimates that the economic cost to the Australian economy from the foreign investment foregone is at least $5.5 billion a year.  The OECD has estimated that the removal of Australia's restrictions would increase its stock of inwards foreign investment by nearly 50 per cent over the long term.

Since the 1980s there have been major reforms in every aspect of economic policy in Australia.  The reforms have opened the economy to the rest of the world and have underpinned its recent unprecedented economic growth.  While the tariff wall has been effectively dismantled, however, the moat against foreign investment remains firmly intact.


INTRODUCTION

Since European settlement Australia has relied heavily on foreign investment to underpin its economic development.  This partly reflects the country's extensive endowments of natural resources, such as pastoral land and minerals, as well as the capital intensive nature of the development path that the country embarked upon. (1)

Australians tap foreign savings by either borrowing abroad -- short- or long-term foreign debt -- or by letting foreigners to increase their ownership of Australian assets -- foreign equity.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one form of foreign ownership. (2)  Portfolio investment is another.  FDI involve either the acquisition of existing assets or the creation of new ones but only the latter increases the nation's capital stock.  After allowing for that distinction, foreigners have been a relatively small source of funds for domestic investment.  Since the early 1960s, inwards FDI flows have only been around 7 per cent of domestic gross fixed capital expenditure. (3)

By drawing on foreign savings Australians have been able to finance greater investment than their own savings would have allowed.  FDI has also increased international competitiveness by exposing local management to international business standards and best practice.  It has provided access to advanced technologies and business innovations through the establishment of new businesses and the modernisation of existing ones.  All have helped to raise productivity and living standards.

Despite its considerable importance to Australia's economic development, Australian politicians have exhibited a pronounced ambivalence towards foreign investment.  As a consequence public policy in Australia towards foreign investment has veered between classical liberalism and economic nationalism.

The zenith of the classical liberal approach to foreign investment in Australia occurred in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.  At that time Australians enjoyed a much higher standard of living than the citizens of the UK or the US. (4)  Australian banking sector was mature and sophisticated. (5)  There was no central bank and only minimal regulation of banking.

The retreat to economic nationalism began with the introduction of central banking in 1911 and the imposition of controls on foreign exchange transactions in 1931.  Following the Second World War, the Commonwealth Government began to use its foreign exchange controls to regulate inwards foreign investment from time to time.

In 1975 the Commonwealth formalised a policy explicitly based on economic nationalism.  It wished to encourage foreign investment but "…on a basis that recognises the needs and aspirations of Australians". (6)  It involved complex tests of the net economic benefit of proposed investments, a preference for Australians as directors and/or employees of foreign-owned companies, and requirements for Australian equity participation in foreign-owned companies in the natural resource industries.

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the regulation of foreign investment was more restrictive than either previously or subsequently. (7)  In combination with high trade barriers, these restrictions lead to a misallocation of domestic investment and a severe decline in capital productivity over this period, which has been estimated at around 30 per cent. (8)

Since the late 1980s the approach to economic policy has swung back towards classical liberalism with the near complete liberalisation of all trade barriers, the floating of the Australian dollar, financial deregulation, and improvements in business regulation and taxation.  These reforms have been critical to the historically unprecedented rates of economic growth that Australia has enjoyed since the early 1990s.  They have not, however, been accompanied by an equivalent liberalisation in foreign investment policy, which continues to impose significant costs on the Australian economy.


AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIME

Australia's policy regime on foreign investment is given legal force by the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 made under that Act. (9)

The Act requires foreign investment proposals to be screened prior to their execution wherever they exceed the monetary thresholds specified in the Regulations.  After screening proposals may be allowed to proceed unless they are judged as not being in the "national interest".  The screening thresholds are as follows:

  • acquisitions of a substantial interest in an Australian business with gross assets in excess of $100 million;
  • proposals to establish new businesses involving a total investment of $10 million or morel;
  • portfolio investments in the media sector of 5 per cent or more and all non-portfolio investments irrespective of size;
  • takeovers of offshore companies whose Australian subsidiaries or gross assets exceed $200 million and represent less than 50 per cent of their global assets;  and
  • direct investments by foreign governments and their agencies irrespective of size.

There are additional restrictions in "sensitive" industry sectors.  They include banking, civil aviation, airports, shipping, the media, telecommunications, and residential real estate.

Due to the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), the equivalent thresholds for US investors are now much higher:

  • $105 million for investments in prescribed sensitive sectors or by an entity controlled by a US government;  or
  • $913 million in any other case.

Moreover, a proposal by a US investor to establish a new business in Australia does not have to be notified to the Government, except when it is made by an entity in which a US government has a prescribed interest.  They are, however, subject to all other policy requirements that are relevant to the case in question.

The screening process is conducted by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB).  The Treasurer is responsible for making the decisions on individual investment proposals.  In cases where the proposal does not conform to the policy, the Government can block the proposal, or to order the sale of any property that was purchased contrary to its guidelines.

In February 2008, the Federal Treasurer announced that the following principles would apply to screening of investments by entities owned or controlled by foreign governments.

  1. An investor's operations are independent from the relevant foreign government.
  2. An investor is subject to and adheres to the law and observes common standards of business behaviour.
  3. An investment may hinder competition or lead to undue concentration or control in the industry or sectors concerned.
  4. An investment may affect Australian Government revenue or other policies.
  5. An investment may affect Australia's national security.
  6. An investment may affect the operations and directions of an Australian business, as well as its contribution to the Australian economy and broader community.

On 24 August 2008 the Federal Treasurer announced the result of the first review under these principles, which was to allow the Aluminium Corporation of China Limited (Chinalco) to acquire 11 per cent of the Rio Tinto Group.


ECONOMIC COSTS OF REGULATORY REGIME

The regulatory regime in the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act and its Regulations generates significant costs for the Australian economy.  The regime reduces the funds available for investment in Australia and thereby foregoing increases in living standards.

  • The screening process imposes significant transactions costs on prospective foreign investors.  These costs restrict the funds available for investment.
  • Approval of a foreign investment proposal rests on it being in the "national interest".  The ambiguity of this concept and its application significantly increases the uncertainty faced by prospective foreign investors, regardless of how well the screening process has been streamlined.  This also reduces the funds available for investment.
  • The new principles for screening investment proposals by entities owned or controlled by foreign governments will simply add to the transaction costs, while duplicating existing regulatory requirements.  They will not, however, resolve the key issue of how best to protect national security.

Each of these issues is elaborated below.


REGIME RESTRICTS INVESTMENT

Some argue that the current regulatory regime does not restrict foreign investment to any significant degree.  This is generally rationalised by referring to the low rate of rejection of applications to the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB)

Each year, the Treasurer rejects around 100 of all applications to the FIRB and executes a small number of divestiture orders. (10)  Since 2000-01, an average of 1.3 per cent of proposed investments by value has been rejected following the screening process, although rejections tend to be relatively infrequent. (11)  Table 1 has the year-by-year details of the applications to the FIRB and the outcomes from the review process.

The conclusion that the regime is not particularly restrictive is misplaced for two reasons.

  • A number of investment applications are never fully assessed by the FIRB but are withdrawn before the Board can complete the process.
  • Some investments, which would be commercially sustainable in the eyes of the potential investors, are never put forward to the FIRB for a formal review.

The foreign investment foregone as a consequence of the review process is a clear cost of the regime.  It is likely to have increased due to the increasing share of domestic savings being invested offshore.  Loss of such investment is, however, inevitable given the transaction costs that prospective investors confront in participating in the process.

Table 1:  Foreign investment applications considered & decided, 2000-01 to 2006-07

Outcome of Foreign Investment Application to FIRB2000-012001-022002-032003-042004-052005-062006-07Average
No. of applications submitted to FIRB3,8585,0975,3155,0364,8845,7817,0255,285
Share of applications exempt from FA&T Act5.0%3.4%3.8%4.1%3.7%3.2%2.8%3.6%
Share of applications withdrawn from review8.2%7.9%6.9%6.3%5.9%6.5%9.0%7.3%
No. of applications decided by review process3,3474,5234,7474,5114,4155,2236,1964,709
Proposed investment for applications decided by FIRB ($ billion, current prices)116.0118.085.899.1119.585.8156.4111.5
Share of proposed investment rejected by review process8.4%0.1%0.1%1.3%
Share of proposed investment unconditionally approved69.0%59.5%62.4%60.4%50.5%84.5%89.7%68.8%
Share of proposed investment conditionally approved22.7%40.4%37.5%40.5%49.5%15.5%10.3%30.1%
Proposed investments as a share of GDP16.8%16.0%11.0%11.8%13.3%8.9%14.9%13.1%

Source:  FIRB [Foreign Investment Review Board], 2006, Annual Report 2005-06, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, and FIRB 2008.

Transaction costs are the resource costs involved in concluding any exchange, such as the purchase or sale of a good or service.  They include the search and information costs in locating the other party, the bargaining costs in concluding the terms for a contract with them, the costs to police and enforce that contract, as well as any the costs of any taxes or regulatory compliance associated with the exchange.

Such costs are an inevitable part of the screening process.  Decisions on foreign investment proposals are meant to be made within 30 days of their being submitted to the FIRB and the Act allows a further 10 days for the interested parties to be advised of the outcome.  Moreover, the review period may be extended for up to 90 days.  Applicants may also be allowed additional time to provide information required by the FIRB and interested parties may be given time to address issues arising from a proposal.  Proposals that are not subject to the Act are handled under the policy but are not subject to the statutory deadlines. (12)

The transaction costs created by the screening process include the following.

  • Professional services fees -- for example for legal, accounting, investment and operational advice -- are involved in preparing an application of any consequence.
  • There are opportunity costs associated with the time and effort of investors, their executives and their staff in preparing an application for and in participating in the review process.
  • Prospective investors face highly uncertain outcomes from the review process.

Rational foreign investors have to assess the rate of return from prospective investment opportunities in Australia after making due allowance for the opportunity cost of the resources in question as well as the probability of their receiving approval on terms and conditions that would be acceptable to them.  If the net rate of return is greater than what they can obtain elsewhere, they will proceed with the FIRB application.  If it is less than the alternative, they will pass up the Australian opportunity.  The opportunities foregone as a consequence may not be readily evident but they are real nonetheless.

The uncertainty in such assessments can have a powerfully negative effect on foreign investors' willingness to proceed with an application to the FIRB.  This reflects uncertainty about what constitutes Australia's national interest as far as foreign investment is concerned -- an issue which is taken up in the next section of this paper.  The extent of the uncertainty is such that there are probably investment opportunities that could well be approved by the Australian Government but never get to be considered due to the miscalculation of the prospective foreign investors and their natural aversion to such uncertainty.

A prospective investor's decision to proceed with a FIRB application, however, is merely the start of the review process and it impact on investment.  Foreign investors will tend to modify how they structure their proposed investments so as to improve their chances of approval.  They will progressively review their decision to apply and update their evaluation of the net worth of the Australian investment opportunity in the light of new information, both as a consequence of their interaction with the review process as well as more generally.

The uncertainty for foreign investors in doing so is considerable.  As Table 1 shows, some 30 per cent of approved foreign investments have had terms and conditions imposed on them by the Government.  Some of these are likely to have been unacceptable to the relevant investors and, as a consequence, they did not proceed with the proposed investment.

All of this means there are likely to be losses of prospective foreign investment at every stage of the review process, compared to what would have happened in the absence of the regulatory regime.  The loss of any foreign investment almost certainly means lower domestic investment, a smaller capital stock, lower productivity, and lower living standards.  In other words, restrictions on foreign investment have a similar impact on the domestic economy as restrictions on foreign trade.

A key issue is how large are these economic losses for the Australian economy.  The following evidence suggests that they are likely to be significant.

The policy regime imposes a delay on all inwards foreign investment that is subjected to review.  In 2006-07, 90 per cent of investment proposals were decided within 30 days of their receipt by the FIRB, compared to 92 per cent in 2005-06 (FIRB 2008).  The FIRB does not publish details of the average time taken to decide investment proposals weighted by the value of the proposed investment.  This is likely to be significantly longer than the median decision time, which the FIRB also does not publish.

Such delays represent a permanent and continuing cost to the domestic economy.  The cost is the return foregone on the investment approved by the Government over the period of the delay.  Based on 2006-07 data, we estimate that the economic cost of the delay in making the investment is around $4 billion a year.  This estimate is based on approved foreign investment totalling $156.4 billion in 2006-07 and an assumed average delay of three months for each approval when they are weighted by the value of the proposed investment.  The Social Opportunity Cost of the capital services foregone by the delay is assumed to be 10 per cent per year in real terms.

This estimate does not, however, include any allowance for those foreign investment proposals that are either withdrawn from FIRB review.  It also excludes those that are not put forward to the Board due to an expectation that they would not be approved or not approved on terms and conditions, which would be acceptable to the investors in question.

Over seven per cent of investment applications to FIRB are withdrawn before the review process is completed.  The FIRB does not publish details of either the applications that are subsequently resubmitted in a modified form or the investment that is involved.  Based on 2006-07 data, we estimate the economic cost of the withdrawn investment could be as high as $1.5 billion a year.  This estimate assumes that the value of the investment in withdrawn applications is equivalent to that in approved ones, that withdrawn applications are never resubmitted, and that the Social Opportunity Cost of capital is 10 per cent per year.

Some 30 per cent of the investments that are approved by the Government have restrictions placed on them.  These vary considerably but apparently relate to ensuring or preserving the Australian character of the business being established or acquired.  Given the absence of information on the precise nature of the restrictions that have been applied in each case, it is difficult to estimate the economic benefits and costs.

An unknown number of investment opportunities are never even considered by the FIRB.  These cases do not generate an application due to the assessment by the relevant foreign investors that the probability of success is too low and/or the time and effort involved in making an application to the FIRB is too high.  The lack of hard information on such cases makes it near impossible to estimate the foreign investment suppressed by the regime.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has confirmed the restrictiveness of Australia's regime.  The OECD Investment Committee has developed an index to measure the restrictiveness of national regimes for regulating inwards FDI. (13)  The OECD Index covers nine industry sectors in 43 countries.  The industry sectors are business services (legal, accounting, architectural, and engineering services), telecommunications (fixed line and mobile telephony), construction, distribution, finance, (insurance and banking), tourism, transport (air, maritime and road transport), electricity and manufacturing.  The countries in the Index are:

  • the 29 OECD member countries; (14)
  • the ten non-OECD signatories to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise(15)  and
  • China, India, Russia and South Africa.

The OECD Index measures deviations from "national treatment" -- i.e. the discrimination against foreign investors compared to domestic ones.  Regulations that apply equally to foreign and domestic investors are not considered, except for state monopolies.  The Index accounts for barriers to entry such as limitations on foreign ownership, special screening procedures, and post-entry management and other operational restrictions.  The methodology used is a variant of that developed for a Productivity Commission study of FDI in APEC economies. (16)

Each of the restrictions in the OECD Index is weighted for its severity on a scale from zero -- no restrictions on foreign investment -- to one -- a complete prohibition of foreign investment.  The heaviest weights are reserved for foreign equity restrictions and the lightest for screening and approval processes.  The somewhat arbitrary nature of these weights means that the OECD Index does not always measure restrictiveness accurately.  In combination with other known explanatory factors, however, it has proved to be very useful in assessing foreign investment regimes. (17)

The latest results from the OECD indicate Australia has one of the most restrictive regimes inside or outside the Organisation.  Only China, Russia, India and Iceland are more restrictive than Australia.  Were Australia to remove its restrictions, its stock of inwards foreign investment is expected to rise by nearly 50 per cent over the longer term. (18)


REGIME INCREASES UNCERTAINTY FOR INVESTORS

Australia's foreign investment regime is based on the superficially appealing notion of the national interest.  The concept, however, is open to numerous interpretations and there is no generally agreed definition of it in either common or academic usage. (19)  It cannot be distinguished from related concepts, such as "the public interest", "the interest of the state", "national welfare", or "community welfare".

Notwithstanding the importance of the concept to Australia's foreign investment regime, the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act does not provide a definition of the "national interest" but allows the Government to decide it on a case-by-case basis.  The Act provides no guidance on how the concept is to be applied and does not constrain the Government in how restrictive or liberal it may be in doing so.

The FIRB has been equally silent on the issue.  It does not publicly comment on how it applies the concept in assessing proposals and in framing its recommendations to the Government.  It does not discuss these issues in its annual reports, despite the fact that they are central to its mission.  Indeed, the FIRB regularly opposes requests under the Freedom of Information Act from members of the public for additional information on foreign investment matters under its jurisdiction.  It generally justifies its opposition on the grounds of protecting commercially sensitive information provided by applicants. (20)

In such an environment the only substantive constraint on the Government's handling of foreign investment issues is democratic accountability thorough the Australian Parliament.  This makes all foreign investment issues inherently political and policy tends to reflect the views of the median voter, regardless of how little the median voter knows about foreign investment or the economic trade-offs that are involved in restricting it.

For prospective investors, political uncertainty is the hardest form of uncertainty to address.  There are several reasons for this.

  • Political uncertainty is qualitatively different to other forms of uncertainty investors have to contend with.  For example, its adverse consequences can be far more extreme, given the coercive power the state has at its disposal
  • Unlike most commercial uncertainty, political uncertainty is well outside the knowledge and experience of most investors.  Their ignorance is exacerbated by the relative opacity of the political process.
  • Given the complex and diffuse nature of political uncertainty, it is outside the ability of most prospective investors to manage in any practical way.
  • Finally, there is generally little scope for investors to insure against the adverse consequences of political uncertainty. (21)

Most investors exhibit a high degree of aversion to political uncertainty.  For this reason, foreign investment regimes involving a high degree of uncertainty are much more restrictive of investment.  While successive Australian Governments have liberalised aspects of the foreign investment regime, the continuing heavy reliance on "the national interest" remains the least liberal component of the regime and is inconsistent with the direction of policy reform in other areas of economic policy.


REGIME SELECTIVELY RESTRICTS FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

The principles announced by the Treasurer are inappropriate for assessing the implications of foreign government ownership or control in the cases Australia is most likely to confront.  These are expected to involve Asian countries, such as China, which have a fundamentally different view of the respective roles of the public and private sectors in commercial life.

The principles are likely to increase the restrictiveness of Australia's foreign investment regime and to result in the Government turning down substantial amounts of foreign investments that would have benefited the country.  The following canvasses the reasons for this conclusion by examining each principle in turn.  In doing so its discussion focuses on prospective investments by Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOE).


Investor independence

A strict requirement for investor independence would almost prohibit any economically significant merger or acquisition by a Chinese SOE.

The lack of commercial independence of Chinese SOEs reflects China's institutional development as it evolves from a centrally planned to a market economy.  Property rights are weak, the Chinese judicial system is politicized;  and executive and legislative transparency is poor.  The State maintains tight control over the financial sector and directly or indirectly owns all the banks.  Investment is tightly controlled and regulated. (22)

In such an environment there is little or no basis for expecting that a major investment decision in a foreign country by a Chinese SOE could be taken without at least the tacit approval of the Chinese Government.  This is widely believed to have been the case even for the proposal by Chinalco to acquire what was a minor stake in the Rio Tinto Group. (23)  Indeed were positions to be reversed and an Australian SOE to be completing a major investment in China, it would be unthinkable for the Board of Directors to proceed without at least the informal blessing of the Australian Government.

In such circumstances, the real issue is not the commercial independence of the investing entity but the objectives of its owner in allowing it to make the investment in the first place.  If those objectives are essentially commercial in nature, and are expected to remain so, there would seem to be little point in worrying about the formal independence of the SOE.  The main policy concern for a recipient country should be to ensure the transparency of the decision-making processes of the investing Government.


Adherence to common legal & business standards

In 1998 China had 5.6 million SOEs.  They accounted for 80 per cent of all enterprises, employed 122 million people, and produced 57 per cent of non-farm gross domestic product (GDP). (24)  By 2006 the role of the State in the economy had shrunk so dramatically that there were, at that time, only 1.8 million SOEs employing fewer than 76 million workers to produce only 35 per cent of non-farm GDP. (25)

The extensive SOE reforms China has implemented to date have been an unqualified success.  China has deliberately avoided the "shock therapy" of rapid privatisation, which had occurred in the former Soviet Union.  Although the Chinese Government kept key sectors under State ownership, it formalised and clarified SOE objectives, streamlined the legislative regimes to regulate business and the agencies that administered them, broke up sectoral monopolies into multiple competing businesses, gave SOE management and staff strong incentives to improve financial performance, including thorough employee ownership, and allowed foreign investors to buy into its SOEs. (26)

The performance of Chinese SOEs has significantly improved but they are still not as efficient as their private sector counterparts.  The efficiency gap between them is substantial and there is no evidence it has narrowed. (27)  Moreover, transparency has not improved to anywhere near the same degree as efficiency.  Most Chinese SOEs operate thorough opaque holding entities and it is generally impossible to determine the exact ownership structure of Chinese business corporations.  This includes those that claim to be privately owned. (28)

For these reasons the strict application of this principle would probably prohibit an investment by any Chinese business entity, regardless of its formal ownership.  If the Chinese Government's policy aims are essentially commercial and are expected to remain so, there would seem to be little point in prohibiting the proposed investment.  The better approach would be to give the entity in question the opportunity to demonstrate how well it observes the laws and business standards of the host country.


Implications for competition

The competitive implications of any merger or acquisition, which involves at least one business that operates in Australia, are clearly important from a public policy perspective.  For this reason, all such transactions are subject to the Trade Practices Act, which, among other things, prohibits any merger or acquisition that is likely to reduce competition, unless they can be shown to have some offsetting public benefit.  This is regardless of who owns the Australian businesses or assets in the transaction or where those owners reside.

The ACCC enforces the Trade Practices Act.  As a consequence, it reviews mergers and acquisitions before the event and may authorise potentially anti-competitive transactions, provided it has assessed them as generating an offsetting "public benefit".  Given this, it is not clear why the FIRB should undertake a second, parallel assessment of the competitive implications as proposed by the Treasurer's principles.

Doing so simply imposes additional compliance costs on prospective foreign investors and additional administration costs on the Australian Government for no obvious benefit for the Australian community.  Moreover, of the two review processes, that by the ACCC is to be strongly preferred:  it has to observe the requirements of the Trade Practices Act;  its process is more transparent than that of the FIRB and is protected from political influence;  and all decisions taken by the ACCC are subject to judicial review in Australian courts.


Implications for tax & other policies

Clearly, all foreign businesses operating in Australia should be expected to observe all Australian laws.  This includes any obligations to pay the taxes, fees and charges levied by every level of government and to comply with appropriate Commonwealth and State regulation, such as environmental protection.

The obligations in this regard, however, should be no more onerous than those imposed on locally-owned businesses.  Should existing Australian legislation fail to implement this principle in an even handed fashion, the best solution is to correct the anomalies at their source rather than to refuse entry to particular investors or particular investments.  There is no sound argument for the Australian Government making any approval under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act conditional upon an assessment of these issues.


Implications for national security

Sovereign governments have the right and the obligation to protect national security.  Recent international arbitral decisions have confirmed such rights vis-à-vis foreign investors under customary international law. (29)  Multilateral and bilateral International investment instruments -- including those signed by Australia -- allow a degree of freedom for governments to judge their national security requirements for themselves. (30)

All countries, however, have an interest in limiting the restrictions on foreign investment to those cases where their security and other essential interests are clearly at stake.  Excessive impediments will impose significant costs on both countries, including the one responsible for imposing them, and could lead to retaliatory action by the others, which would simply exacerbate the economic losses for both parties.

OECD governments have agreed that sound policy is based on the principles of regulatory proportionality, predictability and accountability. (31)  Any restrictions on foreign investment should be no more costly or no more discriminatory than is absolutely necessary and should not duplicate other regulation that could do the job better.  While both foreign investors and governments should protect commercially sensitive information, any restrictions need to be as transparent as possible.  Finally, comprehensive parliamentary oversight and/or judicial review are essential for accountability.


Implications for Australian business, the economy & the community

On the face of it, this category is "catchall" to provide the Government with an excuse for refusing a investment without having to disclose its real reasons for doing so.

Every investment project can be expected to have a negative impact on certain groups in the community, regardless of its impact on the community as a whole.  New investment bid resources away from some businesses and increase competition with others.  The purchase of an existing business can lead to legitimate and economically sensible cutbacks in labour or other resource use to improve profitability.

To avoid this trap, each and every impact of a proposed investment would have to be assessed before the Government approves it.  At a practical level this is impossible.  No person or organisation could possibly know the nature and the extent of every impact an investment might produce or could acquire that knowledge.

In any arms length transaction between a willing Australian seller and a willing foreigner buyer -- regardless of who owns or controls that entity -- Australian policy should focus solely on the implications for the welfare of the community as a whole, to the exclusion of every other consideration.  Given the severe information constraints, all transactions should be allowed to proceed in the absence of a clear and precise demonstration that:

  • it would reduce community welfare compared to what would otherwise have been the case;  and/or
  • preventing the transaction from proceeding or requiring its terms to be modified would increase community welfare.

CONCLUSIONS

The OECD rates Australia's foreign investment regime as is the sixth most restrictive out of the 43 economies it monitors:  only China, India, Russia, Iceland and Mexico are worse.  We estimate the regime costs the Australian economy around $5.5 billion a year (0.6 percent of GDP).  The OECD has estimated that the removal of these restrictions would increase Australia's stock of inwards foreign investment by nearly 50 per cent over the longer term

Reforms since the 1980s have opened the economy and underpinned unprecedented economic growth.  While the tariff wall has been effectively dismantled, however, the moat against foreign investment remains intact:  the Australian Government can decline to approve any significant foreign investment "in the national interest"without constraint.

Concerns are rising about investments owned or controlled by foreign governments.  When such investors lack appropriate standards of business conduct or enjoy unfair advantages, there are legitimate concerns about the state of the global playing field.  On the other hand, discrimination against foreigner business strikes at the heart of the global trading system on which Australia depends for its prosperity.

The principles announced by the Australian Government to address this issue are likely to further restrict foreign investment, raising the costs to the Australian economy without getting to the nub of the issue.  This is how to tap the foreign savings essential for Australia's economic development, while minimising the risks to its economy and its national security.

The economic risks are that such investors would create monopolies, evade taxes, or ignore business regulations in Australia.  The legislative means to address such problems are well-established and non-discriminatory.  All foreign government owned and controlled businesses are subject to all Commonwealth and State laws but there is no basis to expect more of them.

While Governments need to protect national security, a generally agreed approach has yet to emerge.  Any restrictions on foreign investment should be no more costly or more discriminatory than is absolutely necessary, should not duplicate other regulations, and should be as transparent as possible with comprehensive parliamentary oversight and/judicial review.



ENDNOTES

1.  NG Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900 (Canberra:  Department of Economic History, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1976)

2.  Officially FDI is any equity interest of 10 per cent or more in an enterprise.

3.  The Treasury, "Trends in Foreign Direct Investment Inflows", Economic Roundup (Canberra:  Department of the Treasury, Spring 1997, pp. 19-25) cited on 13 August 2008

4.  IanW McLean, "Australian Economic Growth in Historical Perspective", Economic Record 80:250 (September 2004, pp. 330-345)

5.  SG Butlin, Foundations of the Australian Monetary System 1788-1851 (Melbourne:  Melbourne University Press, 1953)

6.  The Treasury, "Foreign Investment Policy in Australia -- A Brief History and Recent Developments", Economic Roundup (Canberra:  Department of the Treasury, Spring, 1999, pp. 63-70) cited on 13 August 2008

7.  The Treasury 1999

8.  Ted Evans, "Economic Nationalism and Performance:  Australia from the 1960s to the 1990s", Ninth Colin Clark Memorial Lecture, Address by Secretary to the Treasury (Canberra:  Department of the Treasury, 4 June 1999) cited on 13 August 2008

9.  The description of Australia's foreign investment policy is from The Treasury, Summary Of Australia's Foreign Investment Policy (Canberra:  Australian Government, 2008) cited on 13 August 2008

10.  Most of the rejections are in the real estate sector (FIRB 2008)

11.  As the FIRB recently changed how it reports the outcomes of the review process, the data published prior to 30 June 2000 are not comparable with those published since (FIRB 200?).

12.  FIRB 2008

13.  The latest results are to be found in OECD, 2007a, International Investment Perspectives:  Freedom of Investment in a Changing World (Paris:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007a) cited on 20 August 2008.  A detailed discussion of the methodology is to be found in Stephen S Golub, 2003, "Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct Investment for OECD Countries", OECD Economic Studies, 36:1 (2003, pp. 85-116)

14.  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the US.

15.  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia

16.  See Alexis Hardin and Leanne Holmes, Service Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper (Canberra & Melbourne:  Productivity Commission, 27 November 1997) and Alexis Hardin and Leanne Holmes, "Measuring and Modelling Barriers to FDI", in Bijit Bora, (ed.), 2002, Foreign Direct Investment:  Research Issues (London:  Routledge, 2002)

17.  Giuseppe Nicoletti, Stephen S Golub.  Dana Hajkova, Daniel Mirza and Kwang-Yeol Yoo, "The Influence of Policies on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment", OECD Economic Studies, 36:1 (2003. pp. 7-83)

18.  For the purpose of this analysis, the baseline capital stock level was defined in terms of 1998 (see Nicoletti et al 2003)

19.  Wikipedia defines the national interest as "a country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural".  In the process it observes that "As considerable disagreement exists in every country over what is or is not in "the national interest”, the term is as often invoked [in international relations] to justify isolationist and pacifistic policies as to justify interventionist or warlike policies." (Wikipedia, "National interest", The Wikipedia Foundation Inc, cited on 20 August 2008)

20.  The FIRB had two requests under the Freedom of Information Act in 2006-07 and five in 2005-06.  In one of the former cases, the applicant sought a review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of the FIRB decision to refuse the information sought.  The appeal was eventually settled out of court but the terms of settlement were undisclosed (FIRB 2008).

21.  Most of the insurance against sovereign risk is underwritten by government in most developed countries, and even then, only in respect of certain exports by their nationals to developing countries, which are considered to represent the highest sovereign risks.

22.  Kim R Holmes, Edwin J Feulner, and Mary Anastasia O'Grady, 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, (Washington, DC and New York, NY:  The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company Inc, 2008)

23.  See Paul Murphy, "Rio Tinto, Chinalco and the road to 'cast magnificence' ", Financial Times (1 February 2008) cited accessed on 25 August 2008;  Dexter Roberts and Chi-Chu Tschang, "Why Chinalco's Buying Into Rio Tinto", Business Week (5 February 2008) cited on 25 August 2008;  and Michael Sheridan, "Beijing shows its hand in Rio Tinto grab", The Sunday Times, (10 February 2008), cited on 25 August 2008

24.  Gabriel Wildau, "Albatross turns phoenix", China Economic Quarterly, 12:2, (Beijing:  Dragonomics Advisory Services Ltd, June 2008, pp. 27-33)

25.  Wildau 2008

26.  Wildau 2008

27.  OECD, OECD Economic Surveys:  China, (Paris:  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005)

28.  Barry Naughton, "Profiting the SASAC way", China Economic Quarterly, 12:2 (Beijing:  Dragonomics Advisory Services Ltd, June 2008, pp. 19-126) and Arthur Kroeber, "Where the state is still king", China Economic Quarterly, 12:2 (Beijing:  Dragonomics Advisory Services Ltd, June 2008, p 24)

29.  OECD, 2007a, "Essential Security Interests under International Investment Law", International Investment Perspectives:  Freedom of Investment in a Changing World, (Paris:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007a, pp. 93-134)

30.  OECD 2007a

31.  OECD, 2007b, "Freedom of Investment, National Security and 'Strategic' Industries:  An Interim Report", International Investment Perspectives:  Freedom of Investment in a Changing World (Paris:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007b, pp. 53-63)