Wednesday, April 30, 2003

The Good Reputation Index:  A Tale of Two Strategies

Backgrounder

Summary

A fundamental objective of measuring corporate reputation is to regulate corporate behaviour.  Faced with vocal constituencies who want to divert the corporation from its commercial objectives, the corporation can choose one of two strategies:  to play the reputation measurement game, or not.  The danger in playing the game is to be ensnared by new regulation.  In its 2002 questionnaire to Australia's top 100 corporations, the Australian Conservation Foundation asked for assurance that, "the company's environmental performance is beyond the minimal standards set by environmental legislation and other forms of regulation". (1)  The ACF and other NGOs who participated in the same exercise would prefer a far more extensive level of corporate regulation across the entire spectrum of corporate activity than is currently expressed in Australian law.

In the debate about the proper relationship between corporations and society, often coined "corporate social responsibility", NGOs are non-state or civil society regulators. (2)  This Backgrounder reviews the Fairfax-published Good Reputation Index, and argues that the Index should be construed in terms of a competition between the state as the regulator of "acceptable" corporate behaviour, and advocacy NGOs and the media as regulators of "good" corporate behaviour.  It concludes that corporations who played the game were rewarded with a good label, those who refused were labelled as bad.

The Index is poorly administered, lacks objectivity and confuses reputation with performance.  The Index is a tool in a campaign against the corporation and its freedom to promote its commercial objectives, consistent with the rule of law and the objectives of its owners and other significant contracted parties.  Fairfax and participating corporations should abandon the Index forthwith.


INTRODUCTION

Corporate reputations are a serious business;  corporations strive hard to ensure that their reputation is maintained in the best condition at all times.  Presumably they do so because it is a component of business success.  Which component is difficult to ascertain.  Indeed an entire academic journal, the Corporate Reputation Review, is devoted to that question.  The rationale for the interest in reputation measurement is, it appears, because reputation "is a growing factor in maintaining corporate competitive advantage".  Apparently, because factors such as "media congestion" and "fragmentation" and "the appearance of ever more vocal constituencies" (3) make it so.  These factors place pressure on corporations to differentiate themselves from their competitors and to examine their actions and "stakeholder perceptions" of them.  If one accepts such reasons, then it follows that, "[t]o be managed, corporate reputations must be measured". (4)

There is little doubt that corporations use non-commercial dimensions of performance to gain a commercially competitive advantage.  Corporate philanthropy is an early example of this proposition.  The corporation will want to compete in dimensions that have widespread acceptance, low compliance costs, and provide maximum benefit.  If the dimensions expand to a point where they interfere with the commercial purpose of the corporation, however, and grant new players the power to direct the corporation, corporate involvement in such ventures must be seriously questioned.

The Good Reputation Index was published by The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald newspapers in 2000, 2001 and 2002.  The Index purported to examine, "through the perceptions of community stakeholders and experts", the ability of the top 100 corporations operating in Australia, (5) to manage those activities "which directly contribute to their reputations as socially responsible organisations". (6)  In fact, the Index does no such thing.  The Index begins with preferred definitions of goodness and expands these, for example by measuring financial performance, to capture the whole reputation of a corporation and labelling the result "social responsibility".

The Index was based on performance across six major categories -- Management of Employees;  Environmental Performance;  Social Impact;  Ethics and Corporate Governance;  Financial Performance and Management and Market Focus.  In each of these categories, Reputation Measurement Pty Ltd, a private company, selected a range of "community based experts" and "stakeholders" (called research groups) to provide their opinions on the performance of each company.  Each research group was responsible for its own questionnaire, and for the rating of each corporation.

Westpac was ranked number one on the Index in 2002.  It rated well in every category. (7)  By contrast, Flight Centre was ranked number one on financial performance, but 47 overall. (8)  It was in the doldrums in every other category, including being ranked 99 on environment.  On the surface this seems very strange, given that Flight Centre manages shopfront travel agencies!  At its AGM on 31 October 2002, the managing director announced a 37 per cent increase in profit on the previous year.  Was this achieved in some socially unacceptable way?  It appears not.  Not only was there no suggestion that Flight Centre transgressed any laws, it seems to have satisfied its two principal "stakeholders".  Shareholders received increased dividends, "with payments rising from 27.5 cents a share in 2000-2001, (excluding the special dividend), to 37.5 cents in 2001-2002." (9)  The rise in profits was achieved on a 20 per cent increase in revenue, and shop and business numbers grew from 778 to 975.  No suggestions of mass redundancies.  In fact, when the growth of the business placed pressure on the recruitment and training of new staff, the company responded with the acquisition in New Zealand of a training college specializing in travel.  Moreover, a share ownership scheme is available to facilitate employee participation, as is a Business Ownership Scheme for managers.  In two recent years, Flight Centre was named Australian Employer of the Year by the management consultants Hewitt and Associates of Sydney.  That rating was not based on the attitudes of NGOs, but on the responses of employees to a questionnaire.

Toll Holdings, the Melbourne-based logistics and transportation corporation was in the top 10 financially, but ranked 65 overall on the Index. (10)  Toll Holdings announced substantial increases in earnings and profits at its AGM on 31 October 2002. (11)  Toll has an integrated management system which incorporates Environmental, Workplace Health and Safety, Government and Legislative requirements and the pursuit of continuous improvement.  Their Occupational Health & Safety Policy states that, "[i]t is unacceptable for any individual to observe non-compliance with safety standards without immediately addressing and correcting that non-compliance with the personnel concerned."  Their Environmental Policy states that,

Legal compliance is regarded as a minimum standard and actions beyond statutory regulations, which conserve or protect the environment and support business goals are encouraged.  The company participates in recycling programs, and promotes conservation of natural resources such as, electricity, fuel and gas.  On all company premises, particular attention will be given to the storage and transport of Dangerous Goods, containment of run off from workshops and washdown areas, and the safety and integrity of underground fuel tanks. (12)

In the face of all this, why is Toll in the bad books?

The answer for Westpac, Flight Centre and Toll lies in one fact.  The extent to which each was prepared to accept the agenda of Reputation Measurement.  In establishing the Index, Reputation Measurement argued that "there is increasing evidence to suggest that companies seeking to demonstrate their worthiness as socially responsible organizations are most successful when they widen their traditional business stakeholder base to include community stakeholders."  Further, "[i]nvestors and consumers are increasingly making decisions based on longer-term issues linked to a company's capacity to contribute to a sustainable future for all." (13)  In other words, the Reputation Index is an instrument for advancing a number of political agendas:  corporate social responsibility, stakeholder capitalism, and sustainability.  Each corporation that participated in the Index needs to be able to justify the three agendas to its shareholders.


SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The key question in the discussion of corporate social responsibility is, "what is good?" Does good mean commercially successful, long-lived, popular among workers or consumers or investors or the community at large?  Indeed does any measure of goodness have anything to do with the commercial purpose of the enterprise?  This is the first hurdle at which the Index stumbles.  It establishes a method which implies that a corporation needs to be something other than a commercial entity in order to be good.  It assumes that the corporation needs to be a model citizen.  Further, it loads the concept of the good citizen with far higher expectations than it would for individual citizens.  Is a good citizen one who earns a lot of money, but then, after paying taxes gives a lot of it away?  Does a good citizen account for all of their deeds as they may affect the environment?  As parents are they fair to their family, and do they have to account for this?  What of citizens' dealings with their neighbours and workmates?  The notion of corporate social responsibility suggests a relationship between, for example, a corporation's output and the community's perception of whether a corporation does good work in the community.  The suggestion is seductive, it suggests a parallel between corporate reputation and democracy.  There are two parts to the seduction.

First, in a democracy the electorate votes on the basis of performance and perception of performance.  Perception may belie actual performance.  Corporations that cannot rely on actual performance alone to make business gains may have to rely on the perception of performance.  Unlike the politician, however, the corporation is selling a more well-defined product than the "competence to govern".  The political consumer is far less able to make up their mind on whether to purchase, than the corporate consumer who can do so simply on the basis of a product or service.  Nor do governments come with a money-back guarantee!  Perceptions no doubt play a role in corporate reputations, but they are hard pressed to overcome the more readily measured commercial performance and compliance with legislative and contractual obligations.

Second, the eligibility to vote for corporate performance is far more restricted than universal adult suffrage.  And so it should be.  Those with a real interest in a corporation are not the community at large but particular individuals who have a specific relationship with the business.  Each of these individuals and groups will make their assessment on whether to purchase from the company, work for it, work with it or invest in it.  They will do so less on the basis of a broad "competence to govern" than on factors such as price, quality, wages, prompt payment and rates of return on investment.

In a democracy, the rules by which corporations carry out their activities are set by consensus.  The consensus determines rules across a very wide spectrum of financial and non-financial criteria, but it determines not so much what is good, but what is and what is not, acceptable behaviour.  The law also provides penalties for unacceptable behaviour.  The Index, on the other hand, is an exercise among civil society activists who wish to appropriate the resources of corporations for their own purposes.  It has little to do with corporate goodness, it has a lot to do with increasing the power of NGOs to impose their agendas, which include the appropriation of property (corporate reputation) and the further regulation of corporations.

The Index is extraordinarily arrogant in its assumptions about knowing what is good.  It is possible to measure corporate performance so as to enable those interested to assess whether and how they will deal with a corporation.  But "measures" of reputation by groups (some of whom have an adversarial relationship), and others who seek a commercial relationship with the corporations, is at best subjective.  To produce a single figure of which corporation is good and by implication, which corporation is bad, is heroic.  Although each research group disclosed its direct relationship to a corporation, it was reported that some of the research groups had touted for work by offering their services to corporations in filling out the questionnaire.  These approaches were not disclosed.  (Incidentally, the Index is published by Fairfax, but the Fairfax reputation is not measured.  It may not be in the top 100 corporations, but it should subject itself to the same bias to which others are subjected.)

Goodness, when not defined in a consensual manner, is an act of rent-seeking.  No amount of moralizing about goodness has been known to revive a commercially unviable corporation.  When a corporation ceases to exist, it does so because it can no longer pursue its intended commercial objectives.  Without the commercial objectives -- and these may include profits, growth, market share -- there is no possibility of pursuing good corporate citizenship.  Goodness cannot be allowed to threaten the commercial viability of a corporation.  On the other hand, "acceptable behaviour", when based on a widespread political consensus is less likely to interfere with the real contribution that corporations make to society.


STAKEHOLDER THEORY

Stakeholder theory suggests a model of the corporation in which all interests in an enterprise compete to obtain benefits from the enterprise, but that none has a priority.  This simple proposition is very confronting, because it is in effect posing the question, "in whose interests should the enterprise be run?" (14)  It also assumes that society grants an enterprise the right to exist.  Those whose business it is to advise corporations on social responsibility are fond of arguing that corporations have a licence to operate in the community.  This is accurate at one level only, the community through its law-makers may grant licences and certain privileges in return for the enterprise complying with the law, it does not license the activities of stakeholders at large to impose their views on the corporation.

Nor does the theory satisfactorily answer the question of who, or what, produces economic value.  Instead "its focus is on the distribution of outcomes, the harms and benefits, and not on who produced the harms and benefits.  It assumes value is produced by the enterprise itself and that stakeholders have a claim on some of this value because the enterprise is a creature of society." (15)  It radically overturns the social contract for business which includes obligations to obey the law, honour contracts and agreements and respect the rights of others.  It ignores the fact that economic value is produced by owners who make their savings available to other member of society to put them to use in productive ways.  The owners have an exclusive moral claim to the benefits produced by their activities, as others have a moral claim for the benefits produced by their labour or other contracted services.

Those with a contractual relationship with the corporation have rights.  The breach of contract with a supplier, the dangerous product sold to the consumer, the accident that befalls the worker, the investor who is misled by a prospectus -- each is entitled to pursue the corporation for the recovery of losses.  Indeed, the corporation can also pursue any of these individuals for breaches of agreement or misrepresentation and so on.  Ultimately, the managers, on behalf of the owners, are responsible for all of these actions.  Poor management may result in losses all around -- workers lose jobs, suppliers lose contracts, investors lose money.  But only the owners through the managers decide the nature of the enterprise, its purpose and direction.  Whom they choose to deal with and how, within the bounds of law and custom, is a matter for them.  Which is not to say that "stakeholders" will not have a say, but only in the course of settling matters to the satisfaction of the owners.  To assume that everyone starts with an equal say is to assume there is no ownership.  There is a suspicion that this is precisely the assumption underlying stakeholder theory, the denial of the rights of ownership.

A second strand of stakeholder theory focuses less on equating the interests of stakeholders with shareholders, and more on their ethical treatment.  This means that stakeholders, employees, customers, suppliers, owners, financiers and the community should be treated fairly and justly. (16)  This thinking is consistent with those who regard the corporation as no more than a process for grievance settlement in society at large.  For example,

One of the most significant things that companies could do to make themselves good "stakeholder corporations" is to ensure they give ... rights to external review, to stakeholders (and stakeholder groups) with legitimate complaints about the company.  The right to access justice -- to be able to make claims against individuals and institutions in order to advance shared ideals of social and political life and to rectify relations that have gone wrong -- is an essential part of citizenship in a contemporary democracy. (17)

And further,

We are unnecessarily constrained by the belief that the representative institutions and legal system of the state should be the exclusive or even the primary, home of political deliberation. (18)

Fortunately, stakeholder theory has no basic recognition in Australian Corporations Law.  There is no current case law or provision that requires directors to take into account the interests of stakeholders, or the sometimes touted concept of "the interests of the corporation as a whole". (19)  While there is no prohibition on directors from considering other interests they can only do so provided there is a prospect of commercial advantage for the company.

One of the principle dangers of stakeholder theory is that it can be invoked by managers who can claim to be serving the general interests of society in the name of the public good.  Such claims are not within the powers of managers.  Only those with a mandate from the public, like politicians, can make such claims, and they only do so cautiously, in the knowledge that if they do so wrongly, they will be punished.


SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability refers to ecological sustainability, and ecological sustainability is premised on the notion of limits to growth, based on limits to resources.  It argues that natural resources are becoming scarcer.  It ignores the history of technological innovation, often promoted by competition between corporations, and that such innovation has extended physical resources in ways untold.  In fact, judged by price, physical resources are becoming more abundant over time.  For example, the environment category of the Index contains questions about the level of corporate electricity and water consumption.  It is highly unlikely that conservation and/or recycling will assist in any problems that arise from some future shortage of these resources.  Pricing for externalities or to take full account of infrastructure costs is sensible, but pricing for conservation is very unlikely to produce sensible choices among alternatives.  The solution to the so-called limits to resources will be found in technological innovation.

One obvious innovation with clear and positive implications for resource use is genetic engineering in food production.  Unfortunately, the issue is raised in the questionnaire in such a way that it carries the clear implication that this is environmentally harmful.  There are questions as well about greenhouse gas emissions, but elsewhere about nuclear energy production, also with the clear inference that this is forbidden.  The environmental agenda is not broadly shared, nor without controversy, it assumes no trade-offs and that abstinence rather than adaptation or innovation is the cure.

The questions in the Index are based on an ahistorical view of sustainability.  They represent a very narrow concept of sustainability, an insular and frozen view of human ingenuity.  One of the main principles of sustainable development is intergenerational equity, the achievement of which assumes that this generation knows the needs of future generations.  Conserving what are considered resources today does not ensure the future is secure, and using them today does not necessarily mean that tomorrow is in jeopardy.  Petroleum was not considered a resource 150 years ago, but today it is vital.  Consider the following conundrum:

If the choice to draw down resources is held exclusively by future generations, then we, being the future generations of previous generations, have been deprived of that right.  Does it make sense for us to condemn our ancestors, who were poorer and much less secure than we are, for using resources to support themselves?  Does sustainable development really imply that no generation has the right to use resources, no matter how urgent their needs will be? (20)

The research groups who want to judge the performance of corporations on the environment and other dimensions have a very particular view of what constitutes good.  There is no reason why corporations or the rest of the community should share it.  It is clear that NGOs are seeking greater regulation by incorporating a wider array of factors.  The Australian Conservation Foundation wants to "amend the Corporations Act to ensure that Australian companies report fully on their environmental and social impacts, on material risks (such as greenhouse liabilities) and on breaches of environmental or social standards";  and, "create 'open standing provisions' within the Corporations Act that would permit any person to commence enforcement provisions for breach of the Act". (21)

Those corporations who choose to use the language of sustainability, as well as corporate social responsibility and stakeholder as a way of forestalling tougher regulation may find that their strategy of "ingenuine compliance" simply keeps misleading concepts alive longer than they deserve.  Better the regulation debate be placed in a consensual forum such as the Parliament.


THE DATA

The Index is published as a single rank as well as in six categories.  This minimizes the criticism that one figure can describe a corporation's performance on so many contradictory dimensions.  Who would use the combined figure suggesting one overall rating?  Clearly, no-one who has actual business with the corporation.  The Index is designed for "society at large", in fact for no-one in particular, so it is really for professional moralists who have no interest, literally or figuratively, in the corporation, or indeed its suppliers, investors or workers.

For specific users, however, the data are available in each category and may conceivably have some utility if the data were relevant.  Ideally, it would enable the worker to be informed about wages, training, promotion prospects, safety and other work conditions and so on.  It would enable the supplier to know about the record of timely payments, contract conditions, and the investor to know about returns, or perhaps some moral aspects of investments.  Further, they may assist a worker to evaluate a trade-off between wages and training, a consumer between price and quality, an investor between returns and investing in desirable industries.

Whether the data are sufficiently informative for each of these users is doubtful, because the Index uses perceptions rather than performance data.  Where performance data are available they are useful, but they need to be disentangled from other measures -- for example, shareholder return versus shareholder satisfaction with returns.  The over-riding aim seems to be to provide a headline-grabbing list of goodness.  This raises the broader issue of whether a corporation can really satisfy all stakeholders equally.  It may, in the procedural sense of listening to their demands, and that is useful, but at the end of the day when trade-offs are to be made, can the Index predict which corporation will be the best at adjusting to the external environment, the first to cut its workforce, the most likely to sell a product that is faulty, the most likely to go broke?  There is much in the measurement of what corporations do, so much so that measures of perception of vague notions of goodness simply get in the way.

Presumably, the promoters of the Index argue that it is possible to be good in all dimensions, that trade-offs can be made without detriment to anyone's position.  Should there be an inverse relationship between environmental performance or any of the five dimensions and financial success, or a positive one?  These hard issues of cause and effect, of contribution and trade-offs are all avoided, they are all assumed away.  Let this analysis proceed on the assumption that the primary measure of performance of a corporation is its financial success.  Each category is compared with the financial rank of the corporation and the results discussed.


FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

In the first instance, is the Index's measure of financial success valid?  The Financial Performance category consists of eight measures undertaken by three research groups.  These measures were combined to create a single rank.  The Australian Shareholders Association surveyed its members on satisfaction with shareholder returns, quality of information to shareholders and their assessment of the skills of directors and management.  The weakness in this method is that it turns a potentially objective and comparable measure such as shareholder returns into a matter for shareholder perception.  Why not just list the returns?  An assessment of the quality of information could validly be carried out among shareholders, though there is no detail to suggest that the Shareholders Association did so.  An assessment of the skills of directors and management is too broad and unfocused to be credible.  Again, there is no detail of the questionnaire, but even a highly-rigorous assessment of the skills and experience of management carried out by means of a study of the actual personnel may have some use (although some would argue that the proof is always in the results they generate).  But a survey of shareholders' perceptions of such matters reduces the measure to the level of tea room gossip.  Moreover, as the survey involved 1,500 members and comments were asked of 100 companies, it is highly likely that there was little or no information on a number of corporations.  In these instances, corporations were given a mean (that is, average) score.

The measures employed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants appeared valid.  They consisted of two measures of return on shareholders' equity based on published financial statements.  The Securities Institute of Australia ranked corporations on the credibility of financial performance, credibility of senior management and volatility/risk.  Survey questions were sent to participants for information on audit committee, risk management and compliance.  The problem was that 42 corporations did not respond.  The fact that most were ranked at the lower end of financial performance suggests that non-cooperation was a significant factor in the rating.  A panel of "professionals" assessed the credibility of senior management, but no detail is provided as to how this was achieved.  The volatility/risk scores were based on financial data.

The financial performance rankings have some weaknesses, with a bias on the basis of participation.  At least some of the criteria were objective and related to the commercial purpose of the corporation.  There are, of course, many acceptable and readily available measures of financial performance of Australia's top corporations.  These are available for publicly listed companies at the Australian Stock Exchange and regularly announced at AGMs.

In addition to its relationship to the commercial purpose of the corporation, the Financial Performance category has one strength, it is well differentiated.  A few corporations share a rank, but these are spread across the full range of rankings.  It therefore provides some basis for comparing the performance of corporations on all other categories.  The validity of each measure is discussed below, as is its relation to the financial performance measure.  Two charts are presented for each category.  The first chart (Chart a) plots on the horizontal axis each corporation's financial rank, starting with the highest at the bottom left corner.  On the vertical axis each corporation is ranked on a second category.  The second chart (Chart b) plots the performance of a number of corporations that are ranked either very high or very low on the two categories.  This creates a typology of corporations characterized as follows.

"Bad Rich Corporation"
Toll Holdings
"Bad Poor Corporation"
George Weston Foods
Westpac
"Good Rich Corporation"
Sydney Water
"Good Poor Corporation"

Using this typology, the Index suggests that Westpac, one of Australia's four major banks is a "good rich" corporation.  Toll Holdings, the Melbourne-based logistics and transportation corporation is a "bad rich" corporation.  George Weston Foods, one of Australia's largest food manufacturers, is a "bad poor" corporation.  Sydney Water, a statutory corporation owned by the NSW Government, is a "good poor" corporation.  Why and how they and many other corporations came to be categorized like this is discussed below.


EMPLOYEE MANAGEMENT

The Employee Management criteria consists of 10 measures undertaken by three research groups.  These measures were combined to create a single ranking.  Employers First is the new name for the NSW Employers' Federation.  By way of survey or referring to its "own data base", Employers First sought to rank corporations on their contribution to "substantial levels of direct employment"!  To this inane question, all of Australia's largest 100 corporations scored well.  Except, that is, for the 43 for which a nil score was awarded because they did not respond (nor apparently did Employers First have anything in their database).  The second question was whether the corporation had a fair and reasonable approach to the settlement of industrial disputes.  There was no indication of how the judgement about what constituted fair and reasonable could be made.  For those who responded or were in the database, all scored top marks.  Again, 43 received a zero score.  The third question was whether an effective human resources management system was in place.  Again no indication as to how such a judgement could be made, again perfect scores for all, except the 43 non-responders who scored zero.  In short, the Employers First contribution to the state of knowledge about Australia's top 100 corporations was useless.

Diversity@Work is a Commonwealth Government-funded organization whose job is to assist corporations diversify their workforce.  The essence of the four questions it asked was to establish whether corporations recruited people from diverse backgrounds and whether they could substantiate the fact.  These questions created considerable differentiation among those who replied, but 42 corporations did not reply and were given a zero rating.  The Australian Council of Trade Unions asked three questions on industrial relations.  The questions were founded on measurable factors such as the formal recognition of union representatives, whether the corporation responded to awards and had a comprehensive equal employment opportunity policy.  The ratings, however, were judged by individual affiliates which may have caused problems in the comparability of the standards measured.  In all, 25 corporations were not able to be assessed and were given an average score by the ACTU.

Overall, on the Employee Management measure, 17 corporations had the same rank of 92.  These 17 were awarded a medium score by the ACTU and a zero score by the other research groups.  In other words, these 17 were awarded this low rank on the basis of no evidence.  Further, these occurred in the bottom 30 corporations which suggested that not only was the measure poorly differentiated, but that the same poor rank was awarded to a large number of corporations which adversely affected their overall rank.  Chart 1a suggests the paucity of the differentiation, due mainly to a lack of response, reflected in a weak positive relationship between financial performance and employee management.

Chart 1a:  Financial Performance and Employee Management

Chart 1b reflects the scores on the two dimensions, finance and employee management.  They indicate stark differences in corporation performance, apparently sufficient to suggest that some were good and some were bad.  The trouble is that the difference between corporations in this typology is that the "bad capitalists" did not respond to the survey and the "good capitalists" did.  In terms of the efficacy of the Index as a research tool, can it be said that poor employee management is the cause of the poor financial performance in some cases, or that good employee management performance is the cause of a good financial performance in others?

Chart 1b:  Financial Performance vs Employee Management


SOCIAL IMPACT

The Social Impact category consisted of 16 measures undertaken by four research groups.  These criteria were combined to create a single ranking.  None of these groups asked questions that involved impact on the local community, nor sought to ascertain whether permission was obtained by shareholders for any philanthropic causes undertaken by a corporation.  Amnesty International asked whether the corporation was committed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights!  This is an extraordinarily arrogant question that implies that a corporation that does not run its operations according to this declaration is bad.  Moreover, as the only aspect of human rights that corporations control are working conditions and remuneration, and poor practices are proscribed by Australian law, the question, in effect, seeks to invoke a lower standard of human rights than is the experience in Australia.  Unless it seeks to further damage its reputation, Amnesty International should not participate in the Index in future.  This opinion was in all likelihood shared by 47 corporations who did not respond to its questionnaire.

The Australian Business Arts Foundation sought evidence that corporations gave money to cultural activities.  There was no question as to whether the giving bore any relationship to the commercial purpose of the corporation.  Forty-seven corporations did not respond to the questionnaire, although AbaF used other sources to give a score to every corporation.  As their four questions were of a yes/no type, scores could only be awarded in 25 percentiles.  World Vision sought a corporation's impact on global poverty.  The assumptions behind the World Vision questions are heroic indeed.  Basically, World Vision, and the aid lobby in general, discount the poverty alleviation that corporations make by creating wealth, instead mistaking the corporation for a citizen or a government.  In addition, it makes the highly contentious assumption that wealth transfer eliminates poverty.  Many corporations agreed that World Vision was asking the wrong questions and 46 did not respond.  Of those who did respond or agree with World Vision, there was no evidence presented that the managers obtained permission from their owners for such use of their funds.

The Enterprise and Career Education Foundation was established by the Commonwealth Government in 2001 to enhance the prospects for students to make a successful transition from school to work.  The questions were based on measuring a corporation's involvement in such activities.  These questions were somewhat related to the commercial purposes of the corporation, but only 56 corporations replied.  Of those that did, the scores were well differentiated.  Those that did not were given a nil score.

Overall, on Social Impact, 18 corporations had the same rank of 91.5 and 17 of these occurred in the bottom 30, again suggesting poor differentiation and a penalty effect in the overall rank.  Chart 2a suggests a weak positive relationship between financial performance and social impact, not a surprising result given the level of non-response and the irrelevance of the agendas attached to many of the questions.

Chart 2a:  Financial Performance and Social Impact

Chart 2b reflects the scores on the two dimensions, finance and social impact.  They indicate stark differences in corporation performance, apparently sufficient to suggest that some were good and some were bad.  Like the previous category, the difference between corporations in this typology is that the "bad capitalists" did not respond to the survey and the "good capitalists" did.

Chart 2b:  Financial Performance vs Social Impact


ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE

The Environmental Performance category consists of 14 measures undertaken by five research groups.  These measures were combined to create a single ranking.  The Environment Protection Authority Victoria sought answers on three aspects of the corporations' management of environmental impact, including the transparency of corporate activity and whether it complied with all legal requirements.  The number of non-responses was not disclosed, those corporations which did not respond were ranked anyway on the basis of publicly available information.  The positive aspect of the Authority's survey was that it acknowledged the importance of compliance with the law and therefore the standards set by legislators as being the appropriate standards to determine good behaviour.  The same was not true for the three advocacy NGOs who sought to rate the corporations.

Chart 3a:  Financial Performance and Environmental Performance

The Wilderness Society, Greenpeace and the Australian Conservation Foundation each surveyed corporations with a view to finding out if corporations were complying with the NGO campaigns.  In this venture, the Wilderness Society acknowledged that it "had a limited understanding of many of the companies environmental strategies and performances".  This did not stop them from rating each corporation.  Greenpeace was very aggressive in its attitude to corporations, "To enable us to verify your responses, please provide us with further supporting documentation.  If this is not provided and we are unable to verify your response, we will default your response answer to a 'don't know' which will be marked and downgraded accordingly".  Neither Greenpeace nor The Wilderness Society indicated how many corporations refused to comply with their questionnaire, but the Australian Conservation Foundation indicated that only 50 corporations responded.  Non-respondents were nevertheless rated on the basis of publicly available information and other NGO sources.  The Monash Centre for Environmental Management sought answers to three sets of questions seeking whether a corporation had identified environmental risks, developed appropriate management tools and was able to measure its performance.  These questions were less prescriptive than the NGOs, concentrating on process and self-identification of risk, as opposed to the Greenpeace type of question, "are you a producer of greenhouse gases?" MCEM did not disclose the number of responses to their questionnaire, and used "supplementary sources" to rate each corporation.

The Environmental Performance measure is well differentiated suggesting no undue influence by non-response -- apart, that is, from the deliberate penalty for non-response awarded by some research groups.  This means that the non-responses do not overtly weigh the distribution toward the poor achievers.  There is also a verification problem because many of the groups used their own sources to judge performance.  The trend line for environmental performance is very flat, which indicates no relationship between financial performance and environmental performance.

Chart 3b reflects the scores on the two dimensions, finance and environmental impact.  They indicate stark differences in corporation performance, apparently sufficient to suggest that some were good and some were bad.  Like the previous categories, the difference between corporations in this typology is that the "bad capitalists" did not respond to the survey and the "good capitalists" did.

Chart 3b:  Financial Performance vs Environmental Performance


ETHICS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Ethics and Corporate Governance category consists of 14 measures undertaken by four research groups.  These measures were combined to create a single ranking.  The Ethics Network, a private consultancy of business ethics specialists surveyed corporations on a written code of conduct and efforts at meaningful audits.  Forty-seven corporations did not respond and these were punished by being awarded zero points.  The Brotherhood of St Laurence surveyed internal ethical systems and external relations.  Forty-four corporations did not respond and these were rated at zero.  The Institute of Corporate Governance and Accountability surveyed the inclusiveness of ethics and governance standards and the integrity of methods.  Despite using public sources of information there was no response from 45 corporations, who were rated zero.

Chart 4a:  Financial Performance and Ethics & Corporate Governance

Oxfam-Community Aid Abroad sought evidence in these areas:  the right to a sustainable livelihood, to basic social services, to life and security, to be heard, and, to an identity.  These questions are an embarrassment.  They imply a standard of "human rights" far below that experienced by any Australian employed by any of these corporations.  For example, the criterion for a "living wage" is positively Third World and ignores the legal and economic reality of Australian working conditions. (22)  Questions that ask if the corporation gives to the relief of humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world or contribute to social services in the local area are, as for individuals, a matter of choice, not public policy.  Forty-nine corporations seemed to take similar umbrage and did not respond.  There is also a clear case of doubling up in the survey, as many of the Oxfam questions were asked under the social and employee management sections.

The Ethics and Corporate Governance criteria is extraordinarily undifferentiated, with 43 given the same rank of 79, fully 41 of whom are ranked in the bottom 41 overall.  In other words, all the research groups have decided to penalize the non-respondents, all of whom are placed at the same poor rank.  The result is that there is no credible relationship between financial performance and ethics and corporate governance.  It should also be made clear that the questions which implied that giving is good are not a dimension of ethics or of morality.  Rather, they are a dimension of values and a particular ideology that affects the aid industry.  As with so much of the survey, the answers only serve to expose the agenda of the research groups, the advocacy NGOs and attendant interest groups.

Chart 4b reflects the scores on the two dimensions, finance and Ethics and Corporate Governance.  As in earlier charts, they indicate stark differences in corporate performance, apparently sufficient to suggest that some were good and some were bad.  The difference between corporations in this typology is that the "bad capitalists" did not respond to the survey and the "good capitalists" did.

Chart 4b:  Financial Performance vs Ethics & Corporate Governance


MANAGEMENT AND MARKET FOCUS

The Management and Market Focus category consists of 11 measures undertaken by three research groups.  These measures were combined to create a single ranking.  Standards Australia sought to establish the level of commitment to formal management systems, continuous improvement and risk management.  On all four criteria, scores out of 7 only varied between 3.5 and 7, and 43 corporations did not respond.  The non-respondents were awarded zero.  The Australian Institute of Management sought information on four criteria:  business and employee leadership, employee training, customer satisfaction and commitment to innovation.  Corporations were asked to self-assess, though 43 declined to respond.  The non-respondents, in contrast to almost all other research groups, were nonetheless awarded a mean (average) score.  While this does not punish the non-respondents, it does by default rank the corporations on the basis of questions by other research groups in this category.

Chart 5a:  Financial Performance and Management & Market Focus

The Consumers' Federation of Australia sought answers on three criteria based on consumer rights, complaints resolution, and on the needs of customers, suppliers and contractors.  The Consumers' Federation questionnaire had a very high response rate, which may indicate that it was asking corporations to report on matters that were germane to their purpose.  The scores, however, measured in the range of 1 to 7 did not fall below 4 and a 7 was rare, which allowed for little discrimination between rankings.  Eighty corporations received a rank between 67 and 76 on the Federation's score.

The Management and Market Focus measure is poorly differentiated with 27 corporations receiving a score of 80, 26 of whom occur in the bottom 40, and 7 which received a score of 97, also suggesting an undue influence on overall performance by an undifferentiated measure.  There is a weak positive relationship between the two measures as indicated by the trend line.

Chart 5b reflects the scores on the two dimensions, finance and Market Focus.  As in earlier charts, they indicate stark differences in corporate performance, apparently sufficient to suggest that some were good and some were bad.  The difference between corporations in this typology is that the "bad capitalists" did not respond to the survey (except that of the Consumers' Federation) and the "good capitalists" did.

Chart 5b:  Financial Performance vs Management & Market Focus


DID THE INDEX INFLUENCE CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR?

The research groups and Reputation Measurement, and indeed The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald have engaged in the exercise of corporate reputation measurement presumably in the hope of changing corporate behaviour.  One way of testing such a proposition is to look at the change in the rankings of corporations between 2001 and 2002.

Chart 6, Major Changes in Rank 2001–2002, displays those companies whose rank changed most dramatically from the 2001 survey to the 2002 survey.  Five corporations rose between 40 and 60 places in the ranking in this period, and four corporations slid between 40 and 60 places.  How did they achieve these feats?  Each company was contacted for their answer.

Chart 6:  Major Changes in Rank 2001–2002

Western Power Corporation, owned by the Western Australian Government, rated much better on the second occasion because it began participating in the United Nations-inspired Global Reporting Initiative.  This meant that the survey was more readily completed, but the rise in the ranks was more a measure of effort in filling out the form than from any change in behaviour.

Sigma rose dramatically between the two surveys, apparently on the basis of a combination of a rise in its share price, which gave it a sharp rise in investor relations, and the fact that it took the time to fill out the questionnaire more thoroughly on the second occasion.  Despite this intention, however, the work on filling out the survey on the second occasion was stopped two-thirds of the way through because it was taking up too much time.  This was a common complaint among respondents.  Apparently, the second survey occurred at a time of cost-cutting and declining staff morale, which did not show up in the survey.  In essence, the company was rewarded for participating in the survey, but there was no change in its behaviour in response to the survey.  Business proceeded as usual.

Tattersalls rose dramatically in the rankings for the very simple reason that they participated in 2002, but not in 2001.  In 2001 they were ranked without their participation.  Their reward for playing the game was to receive a good reputation, but their behaviour as a corporation, other than to cooperate with the reputation regulators, did not change.

Mitsubishi increased it rank by 42 places because it filled out the survey on the second occasion.  Mitsubishi did not participate in 2001 but were nevertheless ranked on the basis of the opinion of the NGOs and expert groups.  Because of their poor performance in 2001, the company decided to participate in 2002.  Again, the reason for the steep rise in the rank was the same -- they cooperated.  They reported no change in their behaviour between 2001 and 2002.

Boral did not perform well in the first survey, a matter which was raised by a group of shareholders at its 2002 AGM.  Boral resolved to put a great deal more effort into responding to the survey in 2002.  They did so, and were rewarded with a jump of 56 places.  They did not, however, change their business behaviour.  Their reputation was enhanced, their business behaviour was unchanged.

The companies that slid down the ranks provided answers just as enlightening.

Telstra participated in the 2001 survey and scored a middle rank.  They were not happy with the nature of the survey, however, and declined to participate in 2002.  They were punished in 2002 with a drop of over 40 places.

Fosters participated in 2001 and declined in 2002.  They seem to have been punished with a series of zero rankings and a drop of nearly 60 places.

Telecom NZ participated in the 2002 survey, but only in the parts where they thought the questions were relevant to their business.  They were not confident that some of the research groups were competent to judge their performance, indeed that they understood anything about their business operation.

Goodman Fielder did not participate in any aspect of the survey.  Not participating on either occasion raises the question of whether the strategy of Reputation Measurement was to punish the non-respondents.  Certainly the decision by most groups was to award a zero, as opposed to a mean rank for a non-response.

It seems clear that participation in the survey did not change corporate behaviour.  This means that the survey failed to achieve one of its aims.  Perhaps it had an impact on one of the key stakeholders, the shareholders?


DID THE INDEX INFLUENCE STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOUR?

A further test of the impact of Index and corporate behaviour is to look at the change to the share price of the corporations which were subject to large variations in their rank between 2001 and 2002 (Chart 6 corporations).  The Index was published on 28 October 2002, shortly before the AGM season for many corporations listed at the Australian Stock Exchange.  It appears that the research groups intended their work to influence shareholders and thus corporate behaviour.

Although it is difficult to suggest any direct relationship between share price changes and the Index, there is undoubtedly a view shared by the non-state regulators that they should use the power of publicity to alert shareholders to change their corporation's behaviour for the better.  Indeed, as Boral reported, the shareholders at the 2001 AGM "waved the Index in front of the Board" seeking answers to Boral's poor rating.  Were Boral and the others whose reputation rose rewarded by the shareholders?  It appears not.

Western Power, Tattersalls and Mitsubishi are not listed on the ASX, but Sigma and Boral are.  Sigma's shares rose at the time and immediately following the publication of the Index, but this was very much in line with the All Ordinaries Index.  They rose appreciably sharper than the All Ordinaries Index, however, when the Managing Director made a presentation to the Securities Institute, but made no mention of the Index result.

Boral experienced a similar rise in its share price.  The Boral AGM took place on 25 October 2002 and the Annual Financial Report had been released on 26 September 2002.  There was a rise in share prices following both events.  The chairman noted at the AGM, "At the time of the 2000 Annual General Meeting, Boral's share price was $1.94 (30 per cent below net tangible asset backing).  At the time of last year's AGM, the share price had increased to $3.51, ... 36 per cent above NTA backing.  Since the merger, Boral's share price has increased by 80 per cent.  Over the same period, the ASX100 index has decreased by 4 per cent. ... the share price ... is now around $4.10". (23)  There was no mention of the Index rating, although the Chairman praised the company's efforts in environmental management and occupational health and safety issues.

What of those who crashed in the Index rankings?

Telstra shares were steady following the release of the Index, although they fell a week or so later in line with the All Ordinaries.  The probable cause of the fall was the announcement on 5 November 2002 by Moody's Investor Service of a change for the worse in the rating outlook for Telstra.  This disappointing result was not relieved by the Board's report to the AGM on 15 November 2002, after which shares continued to fall. (24)

The Fosters Group's shares changed little at the time of the Index's release.  The only large changes to the share price occurred in early September and early October, which were probably caused, as the Fosters Chairman explained in his AGM address on 28 October 2002 by two other factors.  "The Dividend Reinvestment Plan, or DRP, was also amended in June 2002.  At the AGM last year, shareholders were advised that we would remove the 5 per cent discount that applied to shares purchased under the DRP.  This took effect from 5 September 2002."  In October 2002, more than 76,000 Foster's shareholders elected to participate in the DRP and as a result 8.7 million ordinary shares were issued. (25)

The shareholders of the Telecom Corporation of New Zealand seemed similarly unaffected by the Index's release.  Share prices fell slightly after 28 October, but they fell a great deal after the announcement on 4 November 2002 of a substantial change in shareholdings of the corporation.  They had risen a similarly large amount in the months prior to the announcement of the buy-up. (26)

Goodman Fielder shares fell somewhat in the week prior to the Index's release.  Interestingly, at the AGM on 8 November 2002, the Chairman remarked, "While I don't normally place too much store on surveys, it's interesting to note that in a recently completed study on corporate governance practices conducted by the University of Newcastle, Goodman Fielder ranked tenth out of 250 Australian companies."  No mention of the Index.

In terms of the immediate impact of the Index on shareholder behaviour, it appeared to be ineffective.


CONCLUSIONS

The results of the analysis of the Good Reputation Index are clear and stark.

  • The entire exercise was marred by the imposition of a political agenda not widely shared by the community.
  • The agenda, if successful in changing corporate behaviour, is probably injurious to the contribution that corporations make to society through their commercial activities.
  • Success in the rankings was determined by survey participation, not performance.
  • The exercise had no apparent impact on the behaviour of the corporations.  In that regard, it failed to achieve its objective.
  • The disclosure of interests on the part of research groups was marred by reports that some had touted for business in helping corporations to fill out the questionnaire.

It is important to all those who have an interest in the success of corporations to have access to accurate information about them.  The relevance of information will depend, however, on the relationship between the corporation and the enquirer.  The investor will want to know about returns and good financial management.  The worker will want to know about pay and conditions.  The supplier will want to know about contract details and timeliness of payment.  The consumer will want to know about products and services, their price, availability and quality, and guarantees sold with the product.  The local community will want to know about the impact on their amenity.  A myriad of government authorities will want to know about all of these things and more.  Governments will establish rules from time to time that will apply to all corporations which will include requirements to disclose certain information.  Beyond those requirements and the many that arise from contractual obligations and in the course of building relations with any groups a corporation chooses, there is little point to the Reputation Measurement exercise.  No-one changed their behaviour, no-one much took any notice, but those corporations who did choose the method to enhance their competitive edge should ponder the climate of regulation they help encourage.

Reputation Measurement, the NGOs who pose as experts, and The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald who pose as keepers of the truth, should ponder what good they are doing in the exercise.  Their agendas are flawed, their techniques are flawed, their answers are preposterous.  They should give the game away.


ENDNOTES

1.  Australian Conservation Foundation, 2002.  "Corporate Australia:  Stuck In-Reverse The Environmental Performance of Australia's Top 100 Companies 2002", 14.  Accessed 17 February 2003.

2.  See Johns, G. 2002.  "Corporate Social Responsibility or Civil Society Regulation?"  The Harold Clough Lecture, Perth, 19 August 2002.

3.  Gardberg, N. and C. Fombrun, 2002.  "The Global Reputation Quotient Project:  Steps Towards a Cross-Nationally Valid Measure of Corporate Reputation."  Corporate Reputation Review 4(4):  303.

4Loc. cit.

5.  As listed by BRW magazine, based on financial indicators.

6.  http://www.reputationmeasurement.com.au/2002ReputationIndex.pdf.  Accessed 28 January 2003.

7.  It had the lowest average deviation across all performance categories.

8.  It had one of the highest average deviations across all performance categories.

9.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 11 February 2003.

10.  It appears on every chart in this analysis.

11.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 11 February 2003.

12.  http://www.toll.com.au/index.asp Accessed 13 February 2003.

13.  http://www.reputationmeasurement.com.au/2002ReputationIndex.pdf.  (Emphasis added) Accessed 28 January 2003.

14.  Weiss, A. 2002.  "Cracks in the Foundation of Stakeholder Theory", 1.  Accessed 27 August 2002.

15Ibid., 6.

16.  Corfield, A. 1998.  "The Stakeholder Theory and its Future In Australian Corporate Governance:  A Preliminary Analysis."  Bond Law Review, 10:  218.

17.  Parker, C. 2002.  The Open Corporation:  Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy.  Melbourne:  Cambridge University Press, 227.  Emphasis added.

18Ibid., 7.

19.  Corfield, op. cit., 221.

20.  Mitra, B. and R. Gupta, 2002.  "Sustainable Development Versus Sustained Development."  In R. Bailey ed. Global Warming and other Eco-Myths.  Roseville, California:  Forum ,134.

21.  Australian Conservation Foundation, 2002.  "Corporate Australia Stuck In-Reverse:  The Environmental Performance of Australia's Top 100 Companies 2002", 11.  Accessed 17 February 2003.

22.  See Oxfam/CAA Accessed 17 February 2002.

23.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 19 February 2003.

24.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 12 February 2003.

25.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 13 February 2003.

26.  http://www.asx.com.au Accessed 19 February 2003.

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Outside Objectives not Needed in Iraq Revival

French statesman Georges Clemenceau once said "war was too important to be left to the generals".  In a similar vein, development aid in Iraq is too important to be left to the foreign aid non-government organisations.

The most pressing short-term task is to get basic infrastructure systems, including electricity, water, hospitals and police system, running again.  Aside from the Iraqis, this is best done by organisations that build and run such systems -- commercial private contractors.  Foreign aid NGOs have little to contribute.  Iraq also has little need for Western aid workers.  It is no East Timor.  It has a large indigenous pool of skilled people on which to draw.

An influx of well-paid aid workers will only breed resentment when there are many Iraqis capable of performing such duties.  The long-term task is to help the Iraqis establish an open, democratic, constitutional, federal political system based on the rule of law and religious tolerance as part of the global capitalist system.  In short, we need to help them develop a political system similar to ours.

This won't be easy, given that the Middle East is a region of dictators, with only one real democracy (Israel).  Perversely, this is the country in that part of the world that Australian foreign aid NGOs dislike the most.  For example, the so-called regional fact-finding report and public education campaign of Union Aid Abroad-Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad, the ACTU's overseas aid organisation, are little more than Israel bashing.

Foreign aid NGOs have little to offer and a great capacity to do harm.  When Prime Minister John Howard recently met Megawati Sukarnoputri, he was keen for assurances that Indonesia did not regard Australia as anti-Islamic over its stance in Iraq.  The Indonesian President's primary concern, however, lay with the actions of Australian aid NGOs and their active support for separatist movements in Indonesia.  Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA is a case in point.

Its annual report states that although acting as an Australian-funded aid NGO in Indonesia, the West Bank and Gaza, it "campaigns in support of independence in West Papua [and] Palestine".  Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA is not alone.  Oxfam Community Aid Abroad has a history of playing politics while acting as a foreign aid agency.  Years ago it was given a choice by the Indonesian government to choose between delivering aid and political activism.  It chose the latter.  As a result, it was persona non grata in Indonesia for the best part of a decade.

What this reveals is that OCAA regards political activism as its core function, not delivering aid.  OCAA's political activities have not been confined to Indonesia.  OCAA has had links with a long list of insurgent groups, including the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.  Foreign aid NGOs have come to be preferred deliverers of aid on the claims that they are cost-effective, have links with "civil society" and are effective in mobilising money and people.

All these claims are at best questionable, particularly in Iraq.  Arguments about cost-efficiency are irrelevant when foreign aid NGOs contracted by government go out and become involved in politics, contrary to the wishes and interests of the Australian Government.  The sector's near unanimous condemnation of the recent liberation of Iraq illustrates its lack of links with Iraqi civil society and reveals that its understanding of the aspirations of the Iraqi people is weak and distorted.

Money is not a long-term problem for Iraq.  It would be one of the richest countries if not for Saddam Hussein.  All that needs to be done is to get the oil flowing with the assistance of private contractors and to ensure that the payments are used to help rebuild Iraq rather than repay Hussein's debts to his Russian and French arm suppliers.

It does not need the foreign aid NGOs' money.  Post-Hussein Iraq will be a fragile and volatile political environment.  It does not need Western political activists pushing Western activist agendas and getting involved in Iraqi politics.

If the behaviour of foreign aid NGOs in Indonesia is any guide, it is not in Australia's or Iraq's national interest to have them involved in rebuilding Iraq.


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Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Hey, Big Spender

Four years of big spending by the Bracks Government is finally coming home to roost and we are going to pay.

Mr Bracks' decision to break a core commitment -- indeed a commitment crucial to their winning power -- and levy tolls on a Scoresby "freeway", is just the first of many taxes to come.  And it is a tax, not a levy.

While the Government blames the tax hike on the Commonwealth, the war in Iraq, Mother Nature, Mr Kennett and John Howard, the truth is that it is alone responsible.

The Bracks Government, since winning government in 1999, has been showered with money.  It inherited a massive $1.5 billion surplus.  On top of this, it has watched revenue flowing in at an unprecedented rate.  In 1999, Victorian Treasury forecasted, based on best estimates of inflation, economic growth and tax rates, that in 2002-2003, State Government revenue would total $21 billion.  The reality is much higher.  In its latest Mid-Term review, published in February of this year, the Government forecast total revenue of $25 billion, representing an unexpected windfall of $4 billion.

The Bracks Government has now spent the lot -- the whole $5.7 billion windfall.

How?  While some has been spent on capital, most has been spent on consumables.

Since 1999, the Bracks Government has increased recurrent spending above forecast spending by $6 billion, or by 29 per cent.  A large share of this expenditure has gone on higher wages (which have been growing by 5.5 per cent per year over the period) and more public servants.  The total wages bill is now over a $1.1 billion above forecast.  Public sector superannuation costs have also blown out by $700 million, largely due to plummeting equity markets.  Contracting-out of goods and services, of which the Labor Party was so critical in opposition, has grown by 23 per cent or $1.6 billion.  $1.4 billion has been added to recurrent grants paid to a raft of government and non-government agencies.

This growth does not include the huge increase in spending committed to in the last election.

Contrary to the Government's recent announcements, revenue has not stopped flowing.  Revenue is currently growing at a rate of 10 per cent per annum.  The housing boom continues;  the economic outlook is good and fines and other sin taxes are flowing like wine.

The problem is that expenditures are growing faster and at a rate of 11.8 per cent -- growth rates not experienced since the days of Cain and Kirner.

The Bracks Government is investing heavily in infrastructure, but again it is exhibiting a lack of financial control.  The blow-out in the Scoresby "freeway" is due to the construction of an unnecessary and costly tunnel.  Moreover, as the Cole Royal Commission recently outlined, the Government's sweet heart deals with construction union is adding around 30 per cent to construction costs and resulting in the loss of Commonwealth matching grants.

The Bracks Government has to date been able to act as a responsible Santa Claus.  The inheritance is now gone and its real nature will be exposed.  Is it "old tax-and-spend Labor" or "new, fiscally responsible Labor"?


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Thursday, April 10, 2003

Petroleum Refining:  Rationalisation or Atrophy?

Backgrounder

Summary

The Australian petroleum refining industry provides the fuel without which our economy and society could not function.  It is an industry in trouble.  It is fragmented and badly structured.  It makes a totally inadequate return for its investors.  In this weak state it operates in a completely open Australian market, competing with the best of the overseas refineries.  These are often several times the size of the biggest Australian refineries.  In addition they often enjoy more favourable tax regimes, have a growing excess capacity and generate surplus gasoline for sale in our region, including Australia.

This is a challenge we have to meet.  There is no possibility that substitute fuels will make a dent in the demand for petroleum, let alone supplant it, at any time in the foreseeable future.  The challenge is to create the conditions in which the industry can restructure so as to respond to the fierce and growing foreign competition.  In this endeavour the main task is for the industry to optimise the use of existing and new investment.  To do this requires the cooperation of government in Australia mainly by ceasing to obstruct its efficient operation.  State governments have a plethora of inconsistent regulation on fuel standards, additives and pricing, which breaks down the small Australian market into even smaller units, the size of tiny overseas countries.

Competition law retards or prevents potential rationalisation which would allow the industry to reform into more competitive units.  A sensible and cooperative effort by Commonwealth and State governments could clear away the regulatory mess.  At the same time it could provide the competition authorities with clear guidance as to the public benefits to be derived from reform.  The alternative is continued poor returns and functioning of the industry and slow inevitable decline.


INTRODUCTION

If we were to set the rules of boxing so that Australian lightweights competed against heavyweights from overseas, we would think it irresponsible.  But this is a reasonable metaphor for the current public policy applied to the Australian petroleum refining industry.

We have a fragmented and stunted petroleum-refining sector.  It survives by abjuring profit and mortgaging its future.  The question we face is how to change the rules to concentrate this lightweight team, which is taking a battering, into a few refinery heavyweights that will match the international competition in the years ahead.


THE INDUSTRY NOW

AUSTRALIA IS A SMALL PLAYER

Australian output of refined petroleum products roughly matches domestic demand.  Both are very small in world terms.

The most recent international figures show that our total production in the third quarter of 2002 was 8.9 million tonnes, compared with OECD production of 486 million tonnes, including US production of 202 million tonnes.  The relatively small size of our industry reflects our small local market and our inability to develop major export markets.

As for our region, Australia has about 4 per cent of current Asia-Pacific refinery capacity and accounts for less than 5 per cent of regional production.

Total Australian refinery capacity is shown in Table 1.  Capacity has been virtually unchanged for the last five years.  Our total capacity of 870,000 barrels per day (bpd) compares with the figures for China (5.3 million), Japan (4.7 million), South Korea (2.6 million), India (2.4 million) and Singapore (1.1 million).

Table 1:  Australian Refinery Capacity

Barrels per day
Caltex Lytton (QLD)105,000
Caltex Kurnell (NSW)120,000
BP Kwinana (WA)138,000
BP Bulwer Island (Qld)83,000
Mobil Altona (Vic)135,000
Mobil Port Stanvac (SA)78,000
Shell Geelong (Vic)125,000
Shell Clyde (NSW)86,000
Total870,000

Source:  Industry estimate.


Total Australian refinery inputs and production are as shown in Table 2.

Table 2:  Refinery Input and Production (Megalitres)

InputProduction
YearTotalPercentage
Indigenous
LPGGasolineAviation
Fuel
DieselFuel OilOtherTotal
1999-0044,50039.81,67418,6525,68912,7361,8382,90043,499
2000-0144,70838.31,79417,8865,96313,2121,9512,67243,490
2001-0242,91034.41,71817,9995,53613,0641,6842,42542,427

Source:  Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources.


Some important facts emerge.  First, there is a sharp decline in the indigenous contribution to refinery inputs.  This is a trend that is likely to continue with the peaking of local crude production in the fields close to the refineries in the South East of Australia.  Second, total output of products levelled off.  Third, reduced gasoline production accounted for a large part of this shift.  It is too early to say that we have reached a plateau, but the recent production trend looks more than a blip and possibly represents the beginning of a slower growth era.

Total regional refining capacity and production continues to grow despite declines in some countries.  In the five years to 2000, regional output grew by 22 per cent.  In the next few years, Chinese capacity is forecast to increase by more than the total existing Australian capacity and there will be large increments in Taiwan.  Middle East refinery capacity is also forecast to grow strongly.

Any decisions we make on the future of the industry will not influence our international environment.  Decisions will be made for and by ourselves.

The Structure of Our Refining Sector Is Out of Date The dispersed geographical distribution of our refining sector reflects its historical development, with each State capital city supporting one or more refineries.  The location of Australian refineries is as shown on Figure 1.

Figure 1:  Location of Refineries in Australia

The industry has restructured radically in one sense by expanding production to accommodate steadily growing domestic demand for fuel as the total population and vehicle ownership have increased.  Motor vehicle numbers were just over five million in 1971 and close to 13 million in 2002.

Despite this growth, over the last two decades the number of major oil companies operating in Australia has shrunk from nine to four.  Esso, Amoco, Ampol, Total and HC Sleigh have all left the field.  In each case, low returns and the potential for rationalisation of production were factors.  Although the number of players has more than halved, the number of refineries has reduced by only two, from ten to eight.

We suffer disadvantages of scale.  The average capacity of Australian refineries is around 100,000 bpd and none is much larger than the average.  New refineries in the region, particularly those engaged in export, are generally significantly larger.  Singapore's largest has 375,000 bpd, South Korea, 819,000, Taiwan 524,000 and Thailand 277,000.

The refinery capacity utilisation figure for Australia is generally estimated to be around 85 per cent.  This does not necessarily suggest very substantial overcapacity, even allowing for slower growth in demand.  The pattern of relatively small scattered refineries, however, is no longer optimal in a free market with large overseas players and continuing pressure to invest in cleaner fuels.


REFINING COSTS ARE RELATIVELY LOW

Despite its sub-optimal structure and odious comparisons with overseas operations, the Australian refining industry is not grossly inefficient, rather the reverse.  Nor did it sit on its hands as the competition became more intense.

Production efficiency has improved.  One indicator is the 9 per cent reduction in employee numbers over the four years to 2001.  Another is the value added per employee, which stood at $293,000 per employee in 2000-01.  This places the industry in the top five performers in the Australian manufacturing sector.

There has been $2.4 billion of new investment over the five years to 2001.  The new investment, however, would not all have added to productivity.  Much of it would be to satisfy new fuel standards.  The industry estimates that 28 per cent of its new investment in the five years to 2001 could be classified as environmental.

The cost competitiveness of Australian products is indicated by relative retail prices (see Chart 1).  This Chart shows that we have the cheapest ex-tax price of petrol in the OECD.

Chart 1:  Petrol Prices and Taxes in OECD Countries June Quarter 2002Source:  International Energy Agency

The cost/price performance is not all due to production efficiency, although this is undoubtedly a factor in the ability of the industry to maintain its position.

More detailed performance comparisons with the rest of the Asia-Pacific, where our main competition is found, are more relevant.  These suggest that while Australian refineries do not have the extremes of performance that occur across the region, nevertheless, we lag the average efficiency.  This includes factors such as capacity utilisation, energy intensity of production, labour productivity and operational availability.  Perhaps, more importantly, the best performers in the region are superior to our best.

Given the open Australian market, ex-refinery prices are virtually set by the major exporters in the Asia-Pacific region who are also operating on very narrow margins.  The proportionately heavy demand for diesel in South-East Asia tends to generate a persistent surplus of gasoline.  This surplus is available for export to Australia at discounted prices.  It is virtually a by-product.  The high public profile of retail petrol prices also exerts restraint.

All these factors have been instrumental in keeping pressure on costs.  The sum of them has not been sufficient to yield a satisfactory profit margin.


BUT ITS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IS POOR

Gross annual revenues for the whole industry, including marketing, were $32 billion in calendar year 2001, little changed on the previous year.  Marketing and production costs for the industry, excluding one-off factors, however, increased by 11 per cent -- well above current inflation rates.  Over the four years to 2001, the fixed asset base of the industry declined by almost 6 per cent to $12 billion, even after $2.4 billion of new investment in the period.

For the five years to 2001, the return on assets for refining and marketing averaged 3.8 per cent and was negative in the last two years.  The return on shareholders' funds was little better.

In the calendar year 2001, the refining sector lost $472 million -- a significant turnaround from the previous year.  Even allowing for stock gains, the sector just broke even.  The indications are that 2002 may have been a better year for the industry, but that the return on assets remains well below the cost of capital.

Shell has asserted that the refining and marketing margins that it achieves in Australia are lower than in any other country in which it operates.  Comparisons of profitability within the Asia-Pacific region support this statement for the industry as a whole.


ALTHOUGH NO-ONE IS LEAVING THE GAME

If there has been such sustained under-performance, why has no-one pulled out of the industry?  There are perhaps four main reasons.

First, the industry has engaged in continual productivity improvement.  Successive company programmes kept pressure on costs and operational efficiency, allowing them to keep within range of prices.

Second, everyone hopes that someone else will blink first.  The existence of huge sunk costs and significant possible gains may mean that the waiting could pay off.  This is not the same as the gambler who faces zero-sum or certain long-term loss -- there is the potential to hit a sustained winning streak if one or more players leave the table.

Third, the costs of leaving the table, the exit costs, are very high because of the nature of the product and the long occupancy of most sites.  The player doesn't just lose his stake, but pays a substantial penalty to leave.

Fourth, even while profitability is low, the industry has generally been marginally cash-positive.  So, each player can sit it out without going into death throes, even though they are all making a very poor return on capital.

These add up to a big "first mover disadvantage".  There is some incentive to stay and a powerful disincentive to leave.  The ongoing situation is not in the public interest but it is internally self-sustaining.

To conclude, we observe an industry that is making the best of the conditions in which it operates.  Its structure is historically determined and inappropriate but rigid.  It is ill-adapted to the future it faces.


THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The future the industry faces will be different from what now exists but probably less changed than some would expect or prefer.


PETROLEUM IS AND WILL REMAIN OUR MOST IMPORTANT ENERGY SOURCE

Petroleum products are 52 per cent of Australia's final consumption of energy (see Chart 2).  Nor is this likely to change in the next decade or so.

Chart 2:  Final Energy Consumption Market Shares 1998-99Source:  Australian Institute of Petroleum.

In 2019-20, the projection is for it to supply 50 per cent (see Chart 3).  Projections that far out in time are unreliable, but they indicate the absence of any major, foreseeable influences that will change the existing pattern dramatically.

Chart 3:  Final Energy Consumption in Australia 1998-99 and 2019-20Source:  Australian Institute of Petroleum.


Liquid petroleum fuels provide more than 95 per cent of Australia's transport needs and there are no forecasts of dramatic change here.  Industry forecasts indicate a slow growth in demand -- perhaps 1 to 2 per cent annually in volume, mainly driven by gasoline and diesel.

Are these reasonable scenarios?  Are there factors external to the industry that could dramatically change the outlook?  Can we reduce our demands for energy and/or for petroleum?

The three answers are "yes", "maybe" and "no" for the foreseeable future.

It is possible for us to be more fuel-efficient.  There have been major advances in fuel economy and these will no doubt continue, although possibly at a slower rate.  But more than counterbalancing this are two great socioeconomic developments of the post-war period -- the inexorable growth in demand for personal mobility and a parallel desire for traded goods from distant parts.

The causes of this are sufficiently powerful and enduring for us to conclude that, although growth in energy consumption may slow in Australia, we will not be reducing our consumption to any significant degree in the foreseeable future.

The significance of this is that there will be a permanent role for a substantial Australian refining sector.


SUBSTITUTES WILL MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE

Alternative energy sources, whether domestic or overseas-produced, will not be credible substitutes for petroleum.

First, there will be no shortage of cheap oil.  The spectre of declining world oil reserves has been comprehensively exorcised.  OPEC production capacity grew by 1 million bpd in 2001 alone and world crude production capacity is forecast to grow by as much as 1.5 million bpd pa for the next five years.  There is also potential for a massive further increase in world production if the price warrants it.  Furthermore, any significant sustained rise in the price of oil could bring in huge reserves of lower grade deposits, a burst of new exploration and, with a lag, a strong fuel-economy response.  This indicates a continuing downward pressure on the price of both crude oil and refined products and the relative unattractiveness of alternatives.

Second, the substitutes for petroleum are not promising.  Gas looks the most promising of the substitutes.  It offers an opportunity for some transport fuel substitution.  But very substantial new investment is needed just to avoid looming shortages, let alone allow for large-scale substitution.

Gas-to-liquids is another of the more promising of the technologies.  Its commercial prospects are clouded by gas/oil price relativities and the premium that consumers are prepared to pay for this alternative (which is generally not much).

Most other substitutes are much more expensive (and hence require substantial subsidies), are more adapted to stationary than transport uses or need significant further technology breakthroughs and development to become viable.  The solar car is still a long way off.  Electric vehicles have a long history but in very limited applications.  Solar domestic water heating has become an alternative but it is still subsidised, it has not made major inroads and it mainly substitutes for electrical, that is, coal-powered, energy.

Biofuels owe their existence to their exemption from the tax regime applied to petrol and have made little impact.  The penetration of biofuels is only really significant in countries such as Brazil where their use is mandated.

Although much publicised, alternatives constitute a very small and slow-growing presence.  In the OECD, renewables increased their share only from 2.1 to 3.4 per cent of primary energy supply between 1973 and 2000 -- despite two major oil crises in that period.  Nuclear power increased from 1.3 to 11 per cent.  It is worth noting that although the petroleum share declined over the same period, in absolute terms it still grew almost twice as fast as renewables.

Chart 4 shows the global picture from 1971 to 2020.  It illustrates the continuing dominance of coal, petroleum and gas.  Currently, alternative fuels supply no more than 1 per cent of the market for petroleum products in Australia.  Attempts to enforce significant further substitution would be at heavy economic and financial cost to the community in return for uncertain gains.

Chart 4:  Total World Energy Supply to 2020 -- by Fuel
(Millions of tonnes of oil equivalent)Source:  International Energy Agency.


On any level playing field, petrol wins hands down.

This is treated at greater length here than is justified by the promise of alternative fuels because there is always a vocal group of activists who can see the promised land of biofuels, gas, solar, wind and wave power, where all the problems of petroleum and other carbon fuels will be solved by doing away with the need for them.  This eco-smokescreen can encourage policy makers not to tackle those problems in the vain hope that they will magically disappear.


THE EXPORT POTENTIAL FOR REFINED PRODUCTS IS LIMITED

The pattern of Australia's trade in refined products is partly geographically determined.

Northern Australia imports the bulk of its product requirements from Singapore, which is a shorter transport haul than from the Australian refineries.  Therefore, this is not entirely a pattern of generalised import penetration.

The geographical offset is in the pattern of exports, where the major refineries supply Pacific destinations.  Exports of products are not insignificant.  In 2001-2002, they were twice the volume of imports, although this was unusually high.  The principal destinations were New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, with China and Singapore also major customers.  Actual Australian export volumes have tended to be steady over recent years at around 7,000 megalitres, but one quarter of this is LPG sold mainly to Japan and China.

New export potential for petroleum products seems likely to be niche and minimal.

China and India used to be major importers of product until two years ago and are now major exporters, particularly of gasoline.  Refinery capacity is planned to continue to grow strongly in the region even though there is already significant excess.

An estimate of capacity utilisation average for the Asia-Pacific region in recent years is shown in Table 3.  Although the absolute figures for Australia appear high, the important point is the decline in utilisation in major exporters such as Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  Increasing our output significantly in the face of greater overcapacity in the region looks a very difficult task.  Also, several of the biggest and fastest growing players, China, India and Taiwan have regulated markets so it will not be a question of open competition in those markets but more one of individual marketing deals.

Table 3:  Asia-Pacific Refinery Utilization (Percentages)

1998199920002001
Australia1071029394
China 164667575
India106918995
Indonesia91899390
Japan85848585
Malaysia83878384
Pakistan103948695
Philippines86858084
Singapore85807269
S. Korea88949592
Taiwan85918581
Thailand93868482
Asia-Pacific 285858585

1 Based on all refineries
2 Only the countries listed here


The demand outlook remains weak.  Singapore margins are very narrow -- below 2 per cent.  Historically, Asian margins were the best, followed by Europe and the US.  In recent years Asia has changed places with the US and now has the worst margins.

Any company contemplating investment in export capacity in Australia would consider our locational disadvantage, on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region, which implies high sea transport costs both for products and for the increasing proportion of feedstock we will be obliged to import in the years ahead.  This is compounded by the general investment disincentives discussed below.

Furthermore, it is expected that product specifications in Asia, the US and Europe will converge in the coming years, leading to globalised product markets and the elimination of niche opportunities based on fuel specifications.  No-one in their right mind would consider setting up a new export-dedicated refinery in Australia to exploit niches.

Overall, it's a tough environment in which to export, the outlook is not for major export surplus, nor are we geared up for it without massive investment, which the industry is most unlikely to attract.


SO THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST IS NOT STRONG

While there are strong pressures for the industry to restructure, there is little incentive to invest for this purpose.  Investments in the Australian industry have to compete with many alternatives across the globe and we are a small market.

Lack of sufficient return is the single biggest deterrent to investment in the industry at present.  There are other investment deterrents.  Surveying the prospects in Australia from a distant boardroom, the global executive would see:

  • There is no prospect of strong growth in demand to offset the substantial risks that are associated with the large blocks of new investment that typify the industry.
  • The corporate taxation regime is now less favourable than hitherto after the substitution of effective-life for accelerated depreciation.  The competing Singapore option offers a three-year write off.  The reduced corporate tax rates are not an incentive where returns are low.
  • The regulatory cost burden is growing.  This applies to all Australian industry but is potent in overseas comparisons.  Tighter fuel standards, environmental restrictions, intervention in prices and industrial law are some of the factors.
  • There is increased sovereign risk stemming from inconsistent regulations.  This arises from the existence of eight parliaments, which enact inconsistent laws.  Current examples are the higher fuel standards applied in Western Australia, the separate South Australian fuel standards, the use of methyl-tertiary-butyl-ether (MTBE) in fuel in NSW and Victoria (banned in Queensland and WA) and the interference in prices in WA and Victoria.  The already small fuel market is further fragmented by regulation.
  • The sovereign risk also arises from uncertainty in the regulatory process.  There are unpredictable changes of direction (the deferral of the diesel sulphur excise differential [DSED]) and uncertainty in the face of conflicting interests (will the Government act on ethanol content -- will the ATO further attenuate effective life?).

All the factors listed above enter into the risk/reward calculation.  When the rewards are minimal, the risks take on an extra dimension.

The last factor in the list is particularly worrying as it suggests a systemic failure of government process.  This is often a feature of governments that have been in office for an extended period.  Sound and thorough consultative processes and announced policy are supervened by last-minute lobbying.

This seems to be what happened with the DSED.  Meanwhile, millions of dollars had been spent on the basis of the announced policy.  The proposed change was stalled with substantial costs to anyone who relied on the Government's promise.

The result is not only an increase in current sovereign risk.  It treats the industry partners with contempt.  It also undermines future processes.  With moves towards cleaner fuels, the wise strategy now would be for refiners to wait until regulation is enacted before investing.  This way they can be sure of the change.  The unfortunate corollary would be sharp, destabilising price-spikes.

The market for petroleum products in Australia will remain competitive.  Competition among oil producers and refiners alone would ensure this.  Also, it is clear that free trade in products will continue, so the persistent refinery capacity overhang in our region will also overhang our market, keeping sustained pressure on margins.

The prospect for the refining sector is a slow-growing domestic market and no blue-sky opportunities in the export markets.  This is not an environment in which the required investment will take place.


WHERE TO FROM HERE?

With restructuring, the industry will not expand much.  Without restructuring, the industry is likely to slowly contract, necessitating increased importation of products.

The clean fuels regulations, which are gradually emerging from national jurisdictions and converging internationally, could well be the catalyst for change in Australia.  They will require heavy new investment with uncertain returns.


WHAT INDUSTRY STRUCTURE DO WE NEED?

The short answer is:  we cannot know in detail.  The best structure has to be worked out in the light of relative efficiencies, market developments and broad policy.

Refineries are expensive to construct or to alter, so we are to some extent stuck with past decisions on refinery location and scale of production.  But the industry has demonstrated a capacity for both incremental and more radical changes in structure, given the right conditions.

We are also "stuck" with some important elements of policy which will partly determine the structure.  The open door to imports forces the industry to remain efficient and ultimately will force it to consolidate.

There are differing opinions on what the structure should be.

In the Downstream Petroleum Industry Framework 2002, the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources set out key tenets to guide the future framework:

  • A preference for market-based solutions.
  • A strong, efficient, environmentally responsible industry supplying most of the nation's needs for products.
  • Regulation only for market failure or national interest objectives.
  • Regulation to be transparent and consistent.
  • Reform and regulation to maximise longterm community benefit.

This industry vision has some prescriptive elements, although the Government has made it clear that it will not nominate an optimal number of refineries or a pattern of production.  This is in the context of the present reality, where the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) can determine the actual number of refineries in a negative fashion by forbidding mergers.

The Industry Framework is a mixture of economic and strategic objectives.  The references to market-based solutions and efficiency are economic criteria.  The reference to supplying the majority of Australia's needs is strategic and potentially in conflict.

One could infer from the key tenets that government has a vision for the industry but that it will not be "dirigiste" in effecting that vision.  At its most simplistic, the vision is little more than a wishlist with no new policy to back it up.  It is certainly not a preferred industry structure.  The current review of the industry by the Prime Minister's Energy Task Force may produce a more definitive policy and result in some pressure on the industry to ensure that the refiners take action to restructure within the framework of the vision.

The Australian Institute of Petroleum has argued for an industry policy for the refining sector to give all stakeholders some guidance and increased certainty about the future direction of the industry.

The general public would probably opt for a structure that guaranteed lower, more stable automotive fuel prices.  Unfortunately, they cannot have both in the short term.  A better industry structure would deliver lower average prices than continuation of the current structure.  A reduction of volatility would not, however, be guaranteed.  It is ironic that the intense political attention to this industry stems from a pricing characteristic which government interference has made worse.

One might argue that the investors in the industry are the ones entitled and best suited to determine its future.  In the extreme, they will do it anyway -- either by persisting or walking away.  At the very least, they ought to be able to redeploy their capital within the industry if they so wish.  Generally speaking, they will seek to maximise their returns and thus promote the most efficient use of the nation's resources.

At the public interest level, the value of government guidance is questionable.  Even if it were possible to confer increased certainty from the government level (which history teaches us to doubt) is this legitimate when the implicit outcome is to preserve the current level of activity and protect the current industry participants?  Attempts to achieve particular industry structures often lead to the preservation of inefficient, protected species.

For example, we might be better off as a nation importing more of our refined product needs from efficient refineries overseas and reallocating our resources to activities we do better here.  After all, self-sufficiency in refined products is limited without self-sufficiency in crude oil, which we expect to decline dramatically.

Australian refineries are not inefficient.  They no doubt compare well with many overseas refineries, especially where such refineries are in a protected market.  But they are not as efficient as they could be.  And, anyway, that is not the point.  Our market is open, so the competition we face is the best of the overseas, often with more favourable tax and subsidy regimes.  We want our refineries to be able to match them as viable entities.

This is not simply a question of closing the smallest refineries.  The Port Stanvac refinery in South Australia has a specialised lubricants capacity.  The Clyde refinery in Sydney has recently been upgraded to meet higher diesel fuel standards.  Also, any closure involves a very large investment in cleanup on which there is no commercial return.

A better approach might well be to allow refining companies to concentrate on what they do best.  Thus, in Brisbane, the Bulwer refinery might focus on diesel production where it has invested to meet higher diesel fuel standards, and the Lytton refinery on petrol.  The Altona and Geelong refineries could co-operate so that they were not both investing to meet cleaner fuel standards in all fuels.  Refinery alliances are not unprecedented.  Caltex and Shell have co-operated in this way in Thailand.

When considering the best structure for the industry, what it should be contemplating is a fairly defensive long-term strategy of:

  • Improving what it already does;
  • Containing costs rigorously;
  • Investing in efficient technologies;
  • Increasing the scale of production within the existing market parameters to fully exploit the geographical protection it has;  and
  • Taking full advantage of the sunk costs inherent in existing refineries.

To do this it requires a supportive framework.

What is apparent is that it is unreasonable to simultaneously open our markets to international competition, Balkanise the industry and restrain it from putting together the best structure to compete.

The fact is that the detail of the decisions can only be made by the industry, relatively free of government direction of investment or divestment decisions.  The series of detailed decisions will then, as always, determine the overall structure of the industry.


THE CONTEXT IS A CONSISTENT ENERGY POLICY

Reform of the refining sector has to be conducted in the context of an efficient energy sector.  This, in turn, means consistent energy policies.

This paper will not attempt to deal with policies for the sector as a whole, but it is worth noting that no other sector has been subject to such conflicting policy objectives and instruments as energy.  There is total confusion as to what the various governments and agencies want of the sector and what they see as its future.  Energy policy is therefore piecemeal and the handmaiden to other policies -- social, regional, environmental and consumerist.


THE GOVERNMENT IS HERE TO HELP

Government intervention specifically aimed at the petroleum industry is extensive and detailed at every step -- from the moment the crude oil comes out of the ground to the point where it is emitted as exhaust from the tailpipe of a car.

The public interest is purportedly served in a number of ways by such interventions.

There is an obvious public interest in specifying standards for the production, transport and storage of petroleum given its volatility and potential flammability.  Related matters such as the cleanliness of fuels have gradually supplemented these health and safety standards.

A further refinement of such standards, which places heavy cost burdens on the industry currently, is environmental improvement.  For example, the massive shift to unleaded petrol, which has taken place over the last 15 years, is now taken for granted, although it represented a very significant structural adjustment.  By 31 March 2002, 69 per cent of the total motor vehicle fleet of 12.8 million vehicles were manufactured to use unleaded petrol compared with 51 per cent in 1997 and 27 per cent in 1991.  The current move to lower sulphur levels in diesel will cost the industry well in excess of $100 million.

Then there is the last resort of failed economic policymakers -- price control -- which, except in WA and Victoria, has thankfully disappeared from this sector after many wasted years.

The relevance of the regulatory burden is that it is often a drag on operational efficiency.  It also can act as a barrier to entry and to exit, limiting the flexibility of the response to changing prices and supply and demand conditions.


AND COMPETITION REGULATION CAN IMPEDE MORE EFFICIENT STRUCTURE

Competition regulation sounds like an oxymoron, but the intent is to foster competition by preventing or regulating market imperfections.

For the structure of the refining sector the crucial powers of the ACCC are those which regulate mergers and acquisitions (Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act) and those which permit authorisation of mergers that might otherwise breach the Act (Section 88 of the TPA).

The relevant provision of Section 50 prohibits mergers or asset acquisitions:

that would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market.

It is potentially an extremely restrictive provision.  The ACCC is comfortable with this.  Moreover, the ACCC interpretation of what is "substantially lessening" and what is a "market" embraces conduct that might be seen as trivial and markets that appear quite small.

The ACCC has had an abiding and intense interest in the petroleum industry, which is thought to represent a special competition policy risk.  The level of concentration, with just four major domestic competitors, is high.  This, combined with consistent media attention, has provided justification for the ACCC to restrict rationalisation under Section 50.

The ACCC leans heavily on the "perfect competition" model involving numerous buyers and sellers and reliable price information.  It is reluctant to allow sellers to cooperate in anything, particularly where they are few in number and where their co-operation might lead to the adjustment of one or more of them out of the market.  Unfortunately, such adjustment will often take place anyway, with the bloody death of one or more competitors.

The ACCC's concerns are exaggerated.  But they are complemented by a persistent public misperception about petrol prices.  A large section of the public believes that the industry makes massive profits out of the wide retail price swings.  In fact, it barely breaks even.  This perception that price swings equals profits has been so exploited for political advantage and media excitement that it is now almost impossible for the truth to emerge.  The appointment of a shadow federal minister with responsibility for petroleum prices is just the latest manifestation of the enduring fairytale.

The industry regularly beats itself up for not convincing the public of the reality of petrol pricing and profit, but sadly there are currently far too many groups with an interest in the falsehood for the truth to prevail.

The future intensity of competition in this industry, if it is allowed to restructure, should not be in doubt.  Any rationalisation would in all likelihood still leave strong domestic competition in each major product category, with the industry operating perhaps at fewer sites but more efficiently.  In addition, there would be numerous potential importers and many independent retailers.

Concentration of ownership is a furphy.  The High Court has recently ruled in the Boral case that the market reality is more important than the perception of anti-competitiveness.  It noted that financial strength did not equate to market power and that meeting a competitor's prices would not be predatory action.  This decision could have been designed for the refining sector where the competitive reality of the market is regularly misrepresented, where the few local producers are treated as dominant despite never being able to exploit their position and where their pricing is regarded as predatory even though it yields little profit.

This is a market with few local producers but it is contestable.  Sustained high margins would be unlikely to occur given domestic competition, but if they did, they would be rapidly eroded by imports of product.

Proposed mergers have been permitted in the past.  Generally speaking, vertical mergers such as the Ampol/Solo merger have been less problematical than horizontal ones such as the Ampol/Caltex merger.  In any case, the process is slow and permission is generally only granted with severe conditions on divestiture.  There seems to have been no evaluation of the impact of the ACCC on the structure, competition and prices in the industry.  There are strong arguments for allowing greater flexibility.


AUTHORISATION COULD BE THE KEY

If Section 50 is an impassable barrier, the authorisation provisions of the Trade Practices Act ought to be the way to greater efficiency.  The tests under these provisions require a public benefit which outweighs the competition detriment.  The ACCC lists fostering business efficiency, industry rationalisation and import competitiveness as important public benefits.  These must outweigh the detriments for authorisation to be granted.

There is a strong prima facie case that rationalisation of this industry could satisfy these tests.  It would allow greater scale of production, economies in distribution and closure of the least efficient production units.  But the satisfaction of the tests comes through a negative, slow and difficult process.

Without going into whether the ACCC interpretations are reasonable, they are nonetheless applied and, in practice, it is extremely difficult to challenge them.

Likewise, the authorisation process can prove to be a blind alley.  To be authorised the proposed conduct must demonstrate sufficient public benefits.  The onus for demonstrating the benefits lies with the applicant.  Again the process depends crucially on the ACCC's consideration of the merits of the case and slow process can amount to rejection.

Any merger of the few companies that operate refineries in Australia or any reorganisation involving closure and/or joint operation of refineries or other facilities will immediately be subject to these processes.  The processes are slow and there are strong arguments for allowing greater flexibility here too.


POLICY OPTIONS

If government cannot help the industry to adjust, it should allow the industry to adjust.  It should put in place policies that support sensible change.  This would involve both improving the operating environment through deregulation and altering the balance of competition regulation so that the industry could restructure voluntarily.  The Commonwealth Government has already indicated a willingness to support both but has not yet delivered.

The ACCC has always regarded mergers or cooperation in this industry with distrust.

Any change to the Act to ease the provisions would be unlikely to succeed, given the stated attitudes of the Opposition and Democrats in the Senate.  Short of this, the option seems to be a more flexible use of the authorisation provisions in Division 1 of Part VII of the Act.  This would allow mergers and/or asset acquisitions that would comprise restructuring.

Under the authorisation criteria relating to efficiency, rationalisation and competitiveness, it would be possible to make a substantive case for restructure of the refining sector.

Joint operations that did not reduce production capacity might be seen as preserving sufficient competitive presence.  The continuing growth of imports and the presence of strong competition at the retail level would also be factors to be taken into account.

There is also an opportunity for governments generally to clean up the mass of energy tax/subsidy distortions which have accumulated over the years.

The ball would then be in the industry's court to bring forward new proposals if a new policy environment could be created.  This should not mean divestiture undertakings that artificially create new protected operations.

This could all happen within a very broad strategic framework, agreed with the industry, whereby Australia continued to be sure of sufficient refining capacity to meet a severe international fuel shortage.  That might not mean retention of the existing level of refining capacity, but some minimum that ensured the continued functioning of the economy in an extended emergency.


PRACTICAL STEPS

This Backgrounder recommends that:

  • The Commonwealth government should provide explicit indications to the ACCC of the public benefits it sees from the rationalisation of the refining sector.  In particular, joint ventures should be contemplated.
  • The ACCC give sufficient weight to the public interest benefits of restructuring to allow rationalisation of production facilities.
  • All governments reduce distorting fuel subsidies and taxes that favour particular sectors or fuels.
  • The State governments act immediately to harmonise their regulation of the industry.  This should happen as soon as practicable and not at some distant date after one or more elections.
  • Each State should agree not to issue any new regulation inconsistent with other States.
  • More specifically, that they should have a single set of fuel standards with which refiners can reasonably comply, withdraw from all forms of price regulation, and refrain from thwarting or distorting the rationalisation process.
  • Governments generally not introduce new regulation mandating use of alternative fuels.

It would also help if the Government were to scrutinise more critically the claims of consumers, farmers, environmentalists, truckies, etc., within the Framework.  This would provide a more consistent view of the public interest and mitigate the potential for last-minute "raids" on impending regulation.


CONCLUSION

The choice for the industry appears to be between accelerated rationalisation and atrophy.  The process of change is something which the industry must plan and effect.  It cannot do this, however, without the active support of governments in Australia and the tacit support of the regulatory agencies.

The task is not impossible but it will require the States, in particular, to sink their differences and their special agendas and allow adjustment to take place.  It will also require greater open-mindedness at the ACCC.  For the time being, there is an expressed willingness at the Commonwealth level but no real solutions.  At the State level, all is still in disarray.

If nothing is done, atrophy is certain.  The refiners will continue to stumble along in a regulatory fog and will invest only when obliged to do so by changing fuel standards.  They will become increasingly vulnerable to low-priced imports and eventual closure.



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Asia Pacific Databook 2.  Refinery Configuration and Construction, FACTS/EWCI.

Australia Country Profile, The Petroleum Finance Company -- Downstream Monitoring Service, June 2002.

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Downstream Petroleum Industry Framework 2002, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, November 2002.

Downstream Petroleum Products Action Agenda 1999, Industry/Government Working Group, February 1999.

Energy Insights, The Australian Oil Industry, April 2002, FACTS INC.

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Petroleum Refining and Marketing in Australia -- Changes Ahead, Department of the Parliamentary Library.  Current Issues Brief 11, 2002.

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