Friday, May 31, 2013

Is Australia Still Riding On The Sheep's Back?

Breaking the Sheep's Back
by Charles Massy
Penguin Books, 2011, 436 pages

John Macarthur, supported by his wife Elizabeth, is rightly recognised as the father of Australia's merino wool industry ― an industry which made the colony self-supporting and, even before the gold rushes of the 1850s, provided a standard of living which was more generous than the mother country could offer.

Two commodities, wool and whale oil, made Australia important for Britain, particularly during the Napoleonic wars.  This conflict, culminating in the great battle at Waterloo on 18 June 1815, made it impossible for the English textile industry to obtain supplies of Spanish wool on which its prosperity was founded.  So Australian wool, thanks to Macarthur's energy and entrepreneurship, was able, at least in part, to fill the gap and the high prices generated a flood of immigrant squatters and a huge increase in sheep numbers.  Careful breeding (the GM of the 19th century) led to major increases in wool production per sheep.  Of course, whale oil was subsequently made obsolete by the discovery and exploitation of kerosene.

There is an extensive literature on Australia's wool industry, but no book enlightens the reader more about the rise and fall, and perhaps the inevitable demise of this once great industry, than Charles Massy's recent book Breaking the Sheep's Back.

When I was a primary schoolboy, everyone knew that Australia rode on the sheep's back.  The size and value of the annual merino wool clip, more than any other economic indicator, determined whether Australia would enjoy prosperity or suffer balance of payments difficulties which required reducing imports and belt tightening generally.

In those days Australia produced 80 per cent of the world's wool supply.  And the Korean wool boom, when wool prices reached 375 pence per pound ― way beyond the fabled "pound for a pound" of 240 pence ― caused great inflationary pressures.  Capital flows were controlled as were imports.  The tariff wall was very high.  The Australian pound was tied to the pound sterling and thus unable to appreciate.  Despite the impact of the wool boom, the Menzies government lost five seats in the April 1951 election and was only 0.6 per cent ahead (50.3–49.7) in the overall vote.  When the boom busted and wool prices halved, and would halve again by 1970, the world's textile industry had changed forever.

Charles Massy tells us that soon after the Korean War started (June 25, 1950), the US government secretly approached the Menzies government seeking to acquire the entire Australian wool clip at a guaranteed price (as the UK had done both in WWI and WWII).  Despite Roland Wilson's advice in August 1950 warning cabinet to take the American offer seriously and "not offend American opinion on this" and not "encourage them to build up their flocks or substitutes", the Menzies government spurned the American proposal and as a consequence the US textile and chemical industries, encouraged by the US government, geared up to develop substitutes for wool.  The Korean wool boom was thus a boom from which the Australian wool industry never recovered.  Massy tells us

"After the Korean War boom, therefore, the Australian wool-growing industry had two choices.  The first was to adopt the approach that had led to such success for the wool textile industry over the previous eight centuries:  meet increased competition with healthy competitive means via improving fibre and cloth quality and also production and manufacturing efficiencies, so as to meet customer needs at the right price.  However, the Australian wool industry, confronted by such a massive disjunction in competition, took the other choice with which it could attempt to meet its competition:  to seek a political path to combat competition."

Australian wool producers were divided between the graziers who ran large flocks and who mostly supported free markets and were hostile to government intervention into the wool industry;  and smaller cockies, many of whom were often trying to make livings from soldier settler blocks which were too small to be viable.  The figures are startling.  In 1923, half the sheep population lived on 3,000 holdings with an average head count of 13,298 sheep.  The remaining half lived on 75,000 holdings with an average count of 734 sheep.  It was these farmers who provided the support base for the agrarian socialists of the Country Party, notably Black Jack McEwen, and his close allies within the wool industry, the most important being Sir William Gunn and Sir William Vines.  These men wanted complete acquisition of the wool clip and total control of the wool industry by the commonwealth government.  McEwen was, in some aspects of policy, more powerful than Menzies.  Despite his unrepentant agrarian socialism, and his disastrous protectionism, he had strong supporters within the Liberal Party, and when Menzies retired as PM in January 1966, they moved strenuously to try to get McEwen in as Menzies' long-term successor.

So the agrarian socialists of the Menzies government got their Reserve Price Scheme, and with it they built a wool mountain of 4 million bales and debts of nearly $4 billion.  This all collapsed in February 1991 when then prime minister Bob Hawke refused to guarantee any further Commonwealth government backing for the debts which the Wool Corporation had incurred in defending the Reserve Price Scheme.

The fallout from this de facto bankruptcy was world-wide and far-reaching.  Many wool growers were forced off the land.  Many traders who bought and then resold to manufacturers were bankrupted.  Manufacturers who held large stocks of wool were likewise seriously affected and Australia's reputation was greatly damaged.

In 1890 wool held about 20 per cent of the world's textile market, (cotton 80 per cent).  Today Australia still produces nearly 80 per cent of the world's wool clip, but wool's share of the world textile market has declined from 20 per cent to about 2 per cent, and it continues to fall year by year.  Cotton is still in great demand, holding 40 per cent of the market, but synthetics dominate with more than 50 per cent.  It is a much bigger world market today than in 1890, and Australian wool production is approx 1,500,000 kg per annum, little different from 1890.  Textile consumption will continue to rise as living standards improve in countries such as India, China and Indonesia.  But Australia's wool industry is ill equipped to participate in this growth, and synthetics and cotton will increase their dominance.

The ghosts of Black Jack and his socialist comrades Gunn and Vines still haunt the industry.  Until they are exorcised, little can be done to bring the changes that will have to be made if wool is to survive.  Charles Massy has made a very great contribution to this exorcism.

Lincoln's Right-Hand Man

Seward:  Lincoln's Indispensable Man
by Walter Stahr
Simon & Schuster, 2012, 720 pages

There's been a rapid comeback for Abraham Lincoln on the pop culture scene.  He is in vogue, with Abraham Lincoln:  Vampire Hunter depicting his overlooked vigilante days and Steven Spielberg's recent film which was a relative hit at the Academy Awards.  Thus begins the effort to repair the fractured relationship between Lincoln and theatres.  The man responsible for the fracturing ― assassin John Wilkes Booth ― also targeted the subject of Walter Stahr's latest biography, which provides a great insight in to that turbulent time in American history through the experiences of one of its most dynamic men.

William Seward was Secretary of State during Abraham Lincoln's and Andrew Johnson's administrations.  He spent his political life fighting slavery, attempting to keep the Union together, and after the Civil War, negotiating the purchase of Alaska from Russia.  Walter Stahr's research into this biography is outstanding.  Stahr consulted every possible source from Seward's collection of letters to European diplomatic cables alluding to him in passing, and turned them in to an enjoyable read.

Though one feels he could, even should, have run for President, Seward never received a nomination.  A Republican, his best chance was for the 1860 election.  Seward led the first two ballots at the Republican National Convention that year by a slim margin before losing decisively to Lincoln on the third.  After being Secretary of State, a position filled back then by the party's "next-in-line", Seward knew he could not run again because of the enemies he had made.

Seward's enemies came from his complete commitment to his own ideals.  He once remarked that he "care[d] not ... for party" and often went against his Republican comrades if his conscience demanded it.  On election to the US Senate, Seward was suspected by many of being an abolitionist due to his outspoken stand against allowing any new state in to the Union to practice slavery.  The radical Republicans in Washington saw him as their new hero, but Seward actually favoured a gradual end to slavery and argued existing states should decide for themselves.  So, Democrats hated him for his anti-slavery philosophy while some Republicans hated him just as much because he wasn't anti-slavery enough.

Similarly, Seward stood against the wishes of many Republicans when, after the Civil War, he argued against military rule over the South to curb the racial violence and secure civil rights legislation dictated by the North.  Again, he argued that each state should be left alone.  He was also one of the few people in Washington to stand by the deeply unpopular Andrew Johnson through his impeachment trial.  Johnson was a northern Democrat who personally disliked Seward, but Seward stood by his belief that impeachment would have set an unwelcome precedent for the security of the Presidential office.  His commitment to his own conscience was one of his most admirable qualities.

That commitment is part of what attracted Lincoln to Seward.  The cover presents Seward as "Lincoln's indispensable man", due to the tight bond formed through Lincoln's administration.  Lincoln sought Seward's counsel on so many complex issues that many politicians felt his power over the president was too strong, leaving Seward to fight off calls for his sacking.  Lincoln, however, saw Seward as one of the sharpest political minds in the country, and was rewarded.  Seward was able to both prevent any European power from recognising the South as an independent nation despite their desire for cheap, slave-picked cotton, as well as prevent a war with Britain after rogue Northerners had captured an English ship suspected of smuggling Confederates.

Seward's achievements go beyond slavery and the Civil War.  He is most famous for the purchase of Alaska in 1867, an accomplishment of which Seward himself was especially proud, but felt "it would take the people a generation" to agree with him.  Seward was certainly an expansionist and committed himself in his time in office to the acquisition of new land for the United States, with the well-intentioned hope of creating a new, glorious "empire".  As Senator, Seward championed the Guano Islands Act, which allowed the U.S. to colonise any uninhabited island for the purposes of mining guano ― extremely effective fertilizer generated by the waste of seabirds.  Though guano was a valuable commodity at the time, today over 100 islands, including the famous Midway Islands, have been claimed under this still-active legislation.

Seward was a fascinating man operating in fascinating times, and this book not only does him justice but expertly conveys the anxieties and political landscape of a defining time in America's history.

It's The Economy, Stupid

Bad Economics
by Peter Smith
Connor Court Publishing Pty Ltd, 2012, 240 pages

In 1971, Richard Nixon announced the final end of the gold standard with the line "we are all Keynesians now".  Whilst there is some dispute to the exact wording of Nixon's statement, the sentiment expressed by him highlights the problem at the core of the current global debt crisis.  That problem is the prevalence of what Peter Smith calls "Bad Economics".

More specifically, the problem is the dominant role Keynesian economics has had in influencing governments and policy makers since the Second World War.  This has resulted in Western societies that are "far less prosperous than they would otherwise have been and more deeply mired in the misery of debt and dependency".

In Bad Economics, Peter Smith uses logic and common sense to target and expose the foundational flaws in Keynesian economics, before calling for a return to the classical economic theories that preceded it.

There have been some recent economic theories that have challenged, and to some degree, moderated Keynesianism ― such as monetarism and supply-side theory.  However, these theories have been unable to surpass Keynesianism in prominence, which often experiences a resurgence in popularity when the economy goes into recession.  One such resurgence occurred in the immediate response to the onset of the global financial crisis.  In both the USA and Australia the federal governments' primary response to the crisis was to enact large scale economic stimulus plans that were straight out of the Keynesian playbook.  In Australia this stimulus was enacted by a Prime Minister who had proclaimed his credentials as an economic conservative only a year prior, and the first stage of stimulus received bipartisan political support.

The reason Keynesianism is capable of such resurgences is partly because of the dominance Keynesianism has over how macroeconomics is taught.  But there are also a number of distinct advantages that Keynesianism possesses, as Peter Smith argues, which have enabled it to be so long lasting.

The first of these advantages is simplicity.

Keynes cut through the complexity of economics by describing everything in aggregates, and reducing economics down to a simple mathematical equation that can be easily understood.  The problem with this simplicity is that it obscures the true dynamic and complex nature of modern economies, and adds to the illusion that they can be controlled.  It has also led to Keynesian ideas becoming part of a "conventional wisdom" of how an economy operates, which has little relation to the real world.

The advantage of simplicity is only outweighed by the appeal Keynesian theory has to governments and the public sector economists who advise them.

By placing government spending at the heart of how to deal with a recession, Keynesian economics makes itself especially appealing to democratic governments that want to be seen to be "fixing the problem".

As a result, policies of economic stimulus are frequently the first port of call for governments.  This is partly due to the hubris of those who seek election to parliament, but voters in democratic countries are undoubtedly also to blame.

Unless there is widespread understanding of sound classical economic principles, a politician who claims to have the ability to fix the economy is far more likely to find support than a politician who makes the argument that the economy must be allowed to correct itself.  This is due to the fact that people have a natural predisposition to prefer someone who claims to have a solution, over someone who doesn't, even if the solution is quackery.

The above advantages would not be a problem if economic stimulus were the panacea that its proponents claim.  But according to the classical economic theory that Peter Smith calls for, economic stimulus disrupts important market signals, propping up unproductive businesses at the expense of productive businesses and preventing needed economic readjustments.  In other words Keynesianism offers false hope, whilst prolonging recessions and hamstringing recovery.

Unsurprisingly, the advocates of Keynesian stimulus disagree with this analysis.  They frequently trumpet the success stimulus has had saving economies in recession, as well as preventing economic depressions.  On the surface these claims seem plausible.

An example of this can be seen when comparing the USA and Australian post GFC stimulus packages.  In the USA, President Obama claimed the stimulus was necessary to prevent the unemployment rate going above 8 per cent, yet following the stimulus it quickly went to 10 per cent.  In Australia the economy, which was far less exposed than many of its competitors, quickly recovered from a relatively brief slowdown.

And yet both stimulus packages were hailed as success stories.  One for saving the Australian economy from recession, and the other for preventing an economic depression in the USA.

What this highlights is that the claimed success of Keynesian stimulus is completely devoid of any objective measure of success.  As stated by Peter Smith "if unemployment goes up Keynesian policy has worked.  If unemployment goes down Keynesian policy has worked".  It is no surprise that such policies are preferred by activist governments.  If a stimulus package does not produce the results promised, it is either because it wasn't big enough, or economic downturn was worse than expected.

Smith's answer to the prevalence of this "Bad Economics" is to call for a return to classical (pre-Keynesian) economics, which appreciates the complex and dynamic nature of market economies.  Economics that encourages price flexibility, and which does not advocate policies that are both harmful and in conflict with basic common sense.

Such a change in the zeitgeist is not an easy task.  But Smith does see some hope in the current global debt crisis, as nations suffering from extreme debt burdens may be forced to abandon Keynesian prescriptions out of necessity.  In such a circumstance the failure of Keynesianism must be aggressively highlighted to ensure that it does not once again rise from the ashes.

The End Of Ideology

The Revenge of Geography:  What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate
by Robert D. Kaplan
Random House, 2012, 432 pages

The collapse of the Soviet Union invalidated at a stroke the foundational geopolitical models of the Cold War.  The Manichean power struggle between the competing ideologies of liberal democracy and communism had provided an obvious basis for abstracting the vicissitudes of war and diplomacy into an overarching framework.  What emerged from communism's defeat was a more complex and fragmented world.

The academic vacuum was quickly filled by new frameworks, two of which deserve mention.  Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man argued that liberal democracy had emerged victorious from the clash of ideologies, and would become the universal creed of a peaceful world, despite the inevitable decades of colour and movement as recalcitrant legacy regimes adapted or were overthrown.  Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order foresaw a different world, in which cultural conflicts would replace ideological ones, proposing a model of nine competing civilisations to facilitate analysis and prediction of world events.  The latter framework has better stood the test of the intervening years.

In the same period, a third author rose to prominence amongst US national security cognoscenti.  Robert D. Kaplan did not proffer the same impeccable academic credentials as Fukuyama or Huntington, but something arguably more valuable:  experience on the ground.  Kaplan's background is as a foreign correspondent in Soviet-era Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Mengistu's Ethiopia, Afghanistan (where he lived with the mujahidin) and, more recently, as a traveller around the Indian Ocean rim and throughout Asia.

From the 1980s onwards, Kaplan has produced insightful books and essays that marry anecdotal experience with strategic analysis.  His philosophy is that, "A good place to understand the present, and to ask questions about the future, is on the ground, travelling as slowly as possible".  While he has shied away from proposing a holistic Fukuyama/Huntington-style framework, Kaplan has increasingly used historical works of geostrategy (many predating the coining of that term) to add theoretical perspective.

His latest work, The Revenge of Geography:  What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the battle against fate, further advances his evolution from strategically-aware travel writer to empirically-minded geostrategic theorist.  The underpinning premise of the book is that, in our 20th century obsession with ideology as a driver of human conflict and our post-Cold War euphoria, we lost sight of the importance of geography as a field of study and a basis for understanding and predicting the course of human events.

The Revenge of Geography is divided into three distinct parts.  The first is a survey of "a group of decidedly unfashionable thinkers, who push up hard against the notion that geography no longer matters".  These largely twentieth century thinkers espoused various models for analysing geostrategic power based on geographical reality, coining terms like "Heartland" (the ex-Soviet heart of the Eurasian continent) and "Rimland" (attached maritime-facing regions such as Europe, coastal China and the Indian subcontinent).

A balance of power between the controller of the Heartland, and the Rimland powers, is seen as desirable, and can be facilitated by the exercise of maritime power by the United States, protected as it is by two oceans.

As population centres spread, "the earth's political geography increasingly constitutes a closed, claustrophobic system", increasing the likelihood of conflict on the Eurasian landmass even as technological developments increase the severity of its consequences.

While some of these intellectual models appear overly simplistic, and some of the attempts to retrofit them to history can feel contrived, they have the merit of facilitating practical analysis of overwhelmingly complex events.  Kaplan himself recognises that some of his chosen thinkers can appear too crudely deterministic in their approach, seemingly denying the impact of human agency on world affairs.  He acknowledges this point repeatedly, and encourages a less rigid interpretation.  For instance, "we delude ourselves in believing that we are completely in control of our destinies;  rather, [geostrategic scholar] Braudel leads us to the attendant realisation that the more we are aware of our limits, the more power we have to affect outcomes within them".

Having provided the reader with a set of theoretical frameworks, the second part of Kaplan's book purports to apply them to the contemporary map, in chapters focussing respectively on:  (i) Europe and the concept of Mitteleuropa;  (ii) the rationale for Russia's obsession with hegemony beyond its western and south-western borders and its paranoia over its south-east;  (iii) the geography and history underpinning a resurgent and increasingly assertive China;  (iv) India's potential and the geographical challenges that may constrain it;  (v) the significance of Iran to Islam and the prospects of a revitalised Persian cultural imperialism;  and (vi) the divergence of Turkey from the West even as its economic and political power grows.

This is Kaplan at his best:  melding historical and geographical facts, geostrategic theory and anecdotal observation into a compelling overview of the present state and likely future scenarios of each significant region.

For instance, Russia is a largely flat landmass with no natural defences and a consequent history of invasion across its exposed land borders:  hence, it seeks security through hegemonic control of buffer states in Central Asia and Central Europe, even as it fears Chinese demographic expansion into resource-rich but lightly populated Siberia.

China's transition to projecting hard power mainly through its emerging blue water navy may lead it to become "benevolent in the way of other maritime nations and empires in history, such as Venice, Great Britain and the United States;  that is, it should be concerned mainly with the free movement of trade and the preservation of a peaceful maritime system".  But in the short to medium term, as an "immature power, obsessed with the territorial humiliations of the past two centuries", it "thinks territorially, like an insecure land power" about the sea, viewing Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia as "archipelagic extensions of the Chinese landmass".

Successful rule over the Indian subcontinent, or at least the Gangean plain, has historically conformed to a geographical logic which drives Indian policy elites to regard Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh as part of their immediate sphere of influence.

True, Kaplan's collection of regional perspectives lacks the holistic elegance of the overarching theoretical framework of a Fukuyama or Huntington.  His attempt to leverage the theoretical survey in the first part of the book as an analytical toolkit for the second is, at times, contrived;  at times, half-hearted;  occasionally forgotten.  He frequently calls upon the historical consciousness of a people to explain its strategic obsessions, without always linking the borders of the historical empires for which they supposedly yearn to the discipline of the relief map.  Geography's revenge seems far from complete.

Yet his willingness to put theory aside and explore idiosyncratic detail, rather than trying to stuff all facts into the straitjacket of theory, lends his analysis greater accuracy at the cost of simplicity.  For the geostrategic practitioner, if not the academic, this is the right trade-off.  It may not yield an easily applicable theoretical framework, but in a world with a finite number of regions, the most significant of which Kaplan analyses in detail, this shortcoming is not critical.  And the macro-thesis is still vindicated:  geography is a far more significant factor in human affairs than most contemporary commentators suggest.

The third and shortest part of Kaplan's book is a reflection on the geostrategic priorities of the United States.  Kaplan argues that "America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas:  a chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico".  While the first two of these are addressed earlier in the book, it is the significance of the Mexican issue that Kaplan seeks to emphasise in its conclusion.

Kaplan shares in part the view of Huntington, who, in his last book, Who Are We?  The challenges to America's national identity, argued that cosmopolitan US policy elites were wilfully blind to the largest post-Cold War geostrategic issue facing the country.  "Truly," Kaplan writes, "Mexico registers far less in the elite imagination than does Israel or China, or India even.  Yet Mexico could affect America's destiny more than any of those countries."

Yet where Huntington's book was a call for a more muscular assertion of traditional American nationalism, based on the British and Protestant values of the founding fathers, Kaplan's experiences as a long time traveller in the world's worst regions make him both more pessimistic about the sustainability of the cultural status quo, and less deferential towards national borders, which, as he has learnt abroad, are frequently porous and ephemeral.

Kaplan describes "northern Mexico's ongoing, undeclared, substantially unreported, and undeniable unification with the Southwestern United States, and consequent separation from the rest of Mexico", while noting the appalling levels of violence in the northern Mexican narco-states.  But, drawing on Arnold J. Toynbee's analysis of the failure of Roman "limes", Kaplan concludes that attempts to build an impervious, static boundary between two contiguous states with such different levels of affluence are doomed to failure by the reality imposed by the map, and the incentives of traders and adventurers to breach the border.

Thus Kaplan believes that "... the preservation of American nationalism to the degree that would satisfy Huntington is unachievable unless Mexico reaches First World status". In his view, the optimal policy is helping northern Mexico eliminate its drug cartels, using US military power allied with Mexican forces, and helping to build an affluent Mexican state.

This is not a means to preserve the border, so much as to render its obsolescence less threatening as a larger North American polity emerges.  It is a bold and radical vision, but one which seems daily more realistic compared with the long-term preservation of the late Professor Huntington's America.

All three parts of Kaplan's book are an intellectual treat for the geostrategic dilettante.  For those of us not willing to risk our lives in the badlands of the AfPak border, Kaplan is as good a substitute for experience on the ground as one can acquire.  A careful reading yields insights that add deeper context and meaning to the frenetic daily news cycle of world affairs.

Kaplan exhorts, "Just as Stephen Dedalus affirms 'his significance as a conscious rational animal', in effect resisting fate, we must never give in to geography, but must fundamentally be aware of it in our quest for a better world".  Kaplan's book is a good place to start.

The Legacy Of The Iron Curtain

Iron Curtain:  the Crushing of Eastern Europe 1945-1956
by Anne Applebaum
New York, Doubleday, 2012, 608 pages

Anne Applebaum's massive study ― 468 pages plus another 140 pages of notes ― analyses the tragic history of Eastern Europe under communism and its post Hitlerian prelude.  Her tome delves into the antecedents of the post war communist leadership and the forces behind the frequent shifts in communist ideology and its practices.  For this was a political system unlike any other.  It was in perpetual war against all non-communist states and even against fellow communists as became the case from 1947 with Tito's Yugoslavia and later with Mao's China.

Applebaum uses her fluency in Polish and Russian to colour the historical narrative with personal recollections derived from hundreds of interviews.  She pays particular attention to the massive personal costs of expulsions in response to border changes, matters that have received little attention falling as they did under the shadow of the holocaust.  Under this ethnic cleansing perhaps a million people were killed and some 20 million moved either forcibly or to escape retribution.  Among Germans, these included Eastern European colonies of volksdeutsch and those from the 37 per cent of pre-war Germany plus the Czech Sudetenland that went to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Soviet republics.  Poles, Ukrainians and Belorussians, Hungarians, Moldavians, Serbs and Romanians plus a host of smaller national groupings all moved amidst sometimes fractious recriminations.

For the most part the Communists thought it unlikely that they would win power through elections.  But they considered their cadres of committed supporters counted for more than the ballot box and that eventually the populace at large would recognise the vanguard's views as being correct.

All the east European national leaders and their ministers were imposed by the Soviets.  All were loyal Stalinists (Tito differed only in being a non-imposed leader).  The key ones, Ulbricht in East Germany, Bierut in Poland, Rakosi in Hungary and Dimitrov (one time head of the international propaganda organisation, Comintern) in Bulgaria, spent the World War II years in Russia.

The single-minded pursuit of the socialist Nirvana of these leaders and others, like the Western spies Burgess, Maclean and Harry Dexter White, required massive confidence in the system's merits.  All were able to overlook the Soviet Union's massive crimes during the purges and with the Gulag out of a deep belief that the socialist economic system would surpass the efficiency of capitalist systems.  The reality is illustrated by comparing Poland and Spain, two nations with similar GDPs in 1950 but 30 years on Spain's was five times that of Poland.

But this begs the question:  why were so many people, not only national leaders who saw personal benefits, utterly convinced of the merits of communism.  Applebaum points to fellow travellers like Sartre, whom she calls "the towering intellectual figure of the period", who, notwithstanding knowledge of Communist evils, still preferred its system to the bourgeois west.  But she considers the docility for the most part of ordinary apolitical people on accepting the system to be more troubling.  Ordinary people, she says, "succumbed to the constant, all-encompassing, everyday psychological and economic pressure.  The Stalinist system excelled in creating large groups of people who ... knew the propaganda was false but who felt, nevertheless compelled by circumstances to go along with it."

Among the privileged beneficiaries of the system, many remained supportive even after having experienced its brutality first hand.  Some even were nostalgic and claimed economic success for the regimes.

One person interviewed by Anne Applebaum was the East German author Elfreide Bruning, a secret Communist before the war who welcomed the Red Army.  The new regime gave her a position of privilege and affluence and, while critical of some aspects, she worked assiduously for its success.  At their first meeting, Bruning continued to offer support for the then displaced Communist regime and to reject the stories of excesses and of Red Army atrocities.  Later she recontacted Applebaum to relate first hand experiences of corruption that had cost her her husband, and mass rape.  She also revealed how she had been aware that terror was used to facilitate thefts of property to which she was a beneficiary.

Bruning and others who the regime pampered, had a vested interest in shutting out of their minds the overwhelming evidence of its mediocrity and cruel destruction of liberty.  But most others, at least for most of the time, also tolerated it.

Nonetheless dissatisfaction simmered.  A popular uprising in East Germany (1953), continuous unrest in Poland and the 1956 Hungarian revolution demonstrated the unpopularity of the regimes that had brought income levels visibly lagging behind those in Western Europe.  Even so, almost until the end, few saw the implosion of 1989, such was the governing class's stranglehold over all the institutions.

The Communists in Eastern Europe mainly recognised their unlikeliness in gaining power through the ballot box.  Although they polled one third of the vote in the initial elections in Czechoslovakia, aside from self-liberating Yugoslavia, nowhere else in Eastern Europe did the Communists have such popularity (and in Czechoslovakia they were going backwards by 1947).  Ironically, the Communists and left-wing socialists got a higher share in Italy (39 per cent), while the Communists got 28 per cent in France (and the then semi-Trotskyist socialists got a further 18 per cent).

Electorates in 1945 especially in Eastern Europe did not accept the Communists' promises of gain for the many at the expense of the rich.  This may be partly attributable to excesses widely, though not universally, recognised in the Soviet Union of the 1930s and also to the brutality of the Soviet conquest of Nazi occupied Europe.  Communism's defeat was however not because it destroyed political freedoms but because it failed to deliver the living standards it promised.

When Everything Was Going Wrong:  Britain In The Seventies

State of Emergency:  The Way We Were: Britain 1970-1974
by Dominic Sandbrook
Penguin, London, 2010, 768 pages

Seasons in The Sun:  The Battle for Britain 1974-1979
by Dominic Sandbrook
Allen Lane, London, 2012, 992 pages

Almost everything in 1970s Britain seemed to be failing.  Its industrial economy was in steep decline, crippled by strikes and excessive wage demands.  Inflation peaked at over 30 per cent and unemployment reached its highest level since the War.  The "Troubles" in Northern Ireland escalated out of control and spread to the mainland, rates of crime increased drastically, football hooliganism raged, radical teachers ruined many schools and the nation itself appeared in danger of splitting, as devolution movements gained strength in Scotland and Wales.

Both the Conservative and Labour Parties had turns at addressing these problems and historian Dominic Sandbrook uses the terms of those governments to divide his work on the decade into two meaty volumes.  Ted Heath's Tory Government, which came to power after an upset election win in June 1970, was "by conventional standards ... a total failure".  Yet Sandbrook has some sympathy for Heath who, despite his manifest personality flaws, had been "incredibly unlucky" with the range of problems which assailed him.

On the other hand, Sandbrook has little sympathy for Labour leader Harold Wilson who began his second Prime Ministership in 1974 with none of the zest he had shown when first taking office a decade earlier and it is hard to disagree when Sandbrook writes that Wilson's two years of governing from 1974 to 1976 "was probably the worst in modern British history".  Rather than taking actions to address the nation's problems, Wilson took comfort in too many glasses of brandy and wasted countless hours dealing with his private secretary Marcia Williams (who was obsessed by issues such as who got to lunch with her boss).  Such was her malign influence that some other staffers semi-seriously discussed the idea of having her murdered.

One who took the idea of committing murder a little further was the leader of the Liberal Party Jeremy Thorpe.  Thorpe was seen as a rising star when the Liberals did well in the February 1974 general election, but he lived in fear that his former lover Norman Scott would one day expose their affair.  A bizarre plot to kill Scott came to light when the bungling would-be assassin, hired by an intermediary, managed to shoot Scot's dog on Dartmoor, but failed to even fire a shot at Scott.  Thorpe was eventually cleared of criminal charges, but the credibility of the Liberals and the political class in general was further damaged.

In the first half of the decade, under both Heath and Wilson, almost all politicians remained addicted to Keynesian economics.  Sandbrook observes that "Heath's ministers still believed that the proper role of government was to administer a gently expanding welfare state, with more money being spent every year on health, education and social benefits", a fact which was most clearly exhibited in the highly expansionist 1972 budget.  This unleashed what became known as the "Barber boom", named in honour of the Chancellor who delivered it, Anthony Barber.  It contained both big tax cuts and large spending increases with the expectation that this massive increase in demand would produce sustained growth.  The strategy was of course doomed to failure, even before the Oil Price Shock hit in late 1973, the year in which incidentally the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC).

By 1975, the Government share of GDP reached 60 per cent, funded by extraordinarily high tax rates (including a corporate tax rate of 52 per cent, a top marginal rate of income tax for "earned" income of 83 per cent and a top rate on investment income of 98 per cent) and debt.  The country's productivity levels were appalling.  Each car worker was making a third as many cars per year as their American counterparts, and each steel worker a third as many tonnes of steel as those doing the same job in Germany.  Yet, they still demanded more money and went on strike to get it, driving up both inflation and unemployment, a combination that the Keynesian consensus had thought to be impossible.

Sandbrook includes an excellent summary of the role of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), "probably the most influential think tank in modern British history", in driving the intellectual mood away from Keynesianism.  He traces how some of the ideas which the IEA floated in papers in the early 1960s gradually moved from being seen as radical to the mainstream.

The Wilson government stuck with failing policies in its first year in office, but then the penny dropped for Chancellor Dennis Healey who began to take steps to cut spending, commenting later that he "abandoned Keynesianism in 1975".  Fortunately, after Wilson's departure, new Prime Minister Jim Callaghan shared Healey's view, telling the 1976 Labour Conference that the option of the country spending its way out of recession no longer existed, pointing out that "paying ourselves more than the value of what we produce" ultimately led to both inflation and unemployment.  To underline the crisis point the economy had reached, Britain had to be bailed out by the IMF in late 1976.  The tough medicine led to significant declines in real incomes, but inflation began to come under control, at least until there was an explosion of strikes in what became known as "the winter of discontent" in 1978-79.

So widespread were the strikes in that bitterly cold winter, it reached the stage that if you got sick you could not go to hospital because the hospital workers were on strike, but dying was not a viable alternative as the grave-diggers were also out.  However, before any Australians get too smug, Sandbrook notes that Britain was not actually the most strike plagued nation in the western world in the 1970s ― Australia and Canada were both worse.

Sandbrook argues that while militant left-wingers were obviously an important factor in the industrial chaos, an equally important factor was a materialistic desire of different categories of workers not to fall behind others in a newly affluent society.  Hence, whether you were a coal miner, factory worker or civil servant, if a neighbour had a new car or was able to take a holiday in Spain, you could easily feel that only militant industrial action would ensure that you would get these things too.  And the more often employers and governments caved in to excessive demands, the more that seemed the only viable approach.

Another Seventies British curse, which Sandbrook ascribes to increasing affluence, was football hooliganism.  Sandbrook takes a machete to the arguments of both the right (product of the permissive society) and left (working class rebellion against bourgeois values) as to its causes.  Instead, he persuasively argues that it was caused by the fact that many older married men stopped going to matches but stayed home with the new products of affluence, gardens and cars, leaving young men unsupervised on the terraces.  Further, the greater affluence of these young men meant they were much more able to travel to away games.

The other great failing of English football in the 1970s was an inability to qualify for the World Cup Finals.  Of England's inability to beat Poland at Wembley in October 1973, Sandbrook writes that "even in an autumn of inflation, bombings and strikes, there were few more compelling symbols of England's national decline".

Football hooliganism was not the only type of crime increasing rapidly in the Seventies.  Across the decade, the number of serious crimes in England and Wales rose from 1.6 million in 1970 to 2.8 million in 1980.  Then, there was the threat of IRA terrorism, which early in the decade spread to the mainland.  It is now more remembered for the miscarriages of justice in relation to Guildford and Birmingham, but should not disguise the degree of fear which the atrocities generated at the time.  Similarly, while Heath's handling of Northern Ireland is most remembered for Bloody Sunday, Sandbrook points out that his Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 foreshadowed much of the Good Friday agreement of 1998, but it needed another quarter century of killing for the extremists to see the need for compromise.

Sandbrook's great skill is to effortlessly combine political, economic, social and cultural history and also to recognise that amid all the gloom, people enjoyed events like the Queen's Silver Jubilee and everyday life was often more comfortable for ordinary citizens than it had ever been before.  There were lots of excellent novels written and a lot of brilliant British-made television to watch, although one might challenge his description of the classic comedy series Man About The House as one for "the less discerning viewer", when it was clearly superior to several of those in his long list for the "discerning viewer".

He effortlessly integrates television and other popular culture with the political narrative.  For instance, he uses the television series The Good Life (which features a couple trying to live sustainably on a suburban block) as an introduction to a chapter on the rise of environmentalism, while a chapter largely devoted to the politics of Scottish Nationalism begins with the Bay City Rollers and ends with Scotland's ill-fated performance at the 1978 World Cup Finals.

He manages to write extensively, and with authority, on a topic like punk music, particularly the Sex Pistols, while still concluding that it was "just wrong" to see it as the sound of the Seventies, as its following was tiny compared to that of acts like Abba, Boney M and the Bee Gees.  Of course, rock music writers loved to paint punk bands as a working class response to alienation from bourgeois society, but only managed to do so by failing to mention facts such as the lead singer of the Clash being an ex-boarding school boy.

Sandbrook's previous books, Never Had It So Good and White Heat, took the British story from the mid 1950s to the end of the 1960s.  He is now apparently working on a volume on the 1980s.  Already in his volumes on the Seventies, Sandbrook has demonstrated that the term "Thatcher's Britain" is one of the most profoundly misused phrases in public discourse.  Sandbrook time and again shows that so many of the elements of industrial decay, resultant unemployment and social problems, which the phrase is meant to conjure up, were already strongly in evidence.

Yet, in Sandbrook's nuanced approach, we also are reminded that Thatcher was part of the ministerial consensus during the Heath government and as Education Minister vigorously pursued the policy of closing grammar schools.  He also documents how her leadership was often under pressure in her time as Opposition leader and how Callaghan outperformed her in the House of Commons.  One of the great counterfactuals of British political history is what would have happened if Callaghan had gone to the polls in the autumn of 1978 when the economy was performing moderately well and before the winter of discontent.

However, the winter of discontent demonstrated that while the Callaghan-Healey approach was an improvement on what had gone before, something much more radical was required if Britain was not to degenerate into a semi-failed state.  And that something was certainly not the old-style consensual Tories.  When one of their leading figures, Willie Whitelaw stood for the party leadership in 1975, one backbencher told him that he needed to stop agreeing with the last person to whom he had spoken.  Whitelaw nodded vigorously and said "I agree, I agree".  By the dawn of the 1980s, Britain desperately needed someone to disagree.

Explaining The Success Of The ''Angloworld''

Replenishing the Earth:  The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939
by James Belich
Oxford University Press, 2009, 592 pages

The term "Anglosphere" is often used as a convenient heuristic device to group peoples, economies and societies which are apparently linked only by the language they speak, English.  James Belich, however, convincingly demonstrates that English-speaking societies have a multiplicity of linkages that go far beyond a mutually intelligible language.

Belich, a former New Zealand Rhodes Scholar and now Beit Professor of Commonwealth History at Oxford University, sets out to answer one key question:  why did the Angloworld expand to dominate world trade and politics?  At the time he begins his study, the late eighteenth century, the Anglos were in no better position to do so than the French or the Spanish, neither were the Chinese or the Russians, for that matter.  The population of Mexico, for example, was greater than that of the newly independent United States.  Yet in what Belich terms "the long nineteenth century" the Anglos came to dominate the world.

The key factor was that the Angloworld became a mutually reinforcing economic, social and political system.  The Anglos came to stay.  When the English emigrated to the United States of America, they maintained linkages with their source society.  This formed an active link that promoted their new home.  The Anglos preferred to settle where they were the dominant group, reinforcing their new home with fresh capital, fresh ideas and new skills.

Other potentially dominant groups were sojourners rather than settlers.  The French were of the opinion that they already lived in the best country on earth ― why should they emigrate?  Where the French were dominant, for example in Quebec, there were few settlers to reinforce the founding population.  Quebec remained an intensely conservative society until the "Quiet Revolution" of the 1960s.  Other societies tended to produce sojourners rather than settlers.  The Nanyang Chinese, as demonstrated in Singapore's National Museum, initially had no intention of remaining in Southeast Asia.  They frequently took local women as wives as Chinese women did not emigrate.

What set the Anglos apart was that women emigrated alongside men.  Women, who in this era were frequently in a condition of semi-permanent pregnancy, were not only homemakers and mothers but also laboured on the small farms that formed the basis of the settler economy while their men were away.  In the establishment phase of settler economies, men often worked off the farm as timber fallers, miners, road makers, canal diggers and in other labour intensive occupations, particularly after the harvest.

When the United States asserted its independence from Britain in 1776 it had, within a short time, the counter-intuitive effect of strengthening the economic links between the dominant Anglo powers.  America, still a frontier society, had yet to break through the Appalachian Mountains that barred settlers from the rich Ohio Valley.  When the United States began to industrialise in the 1820s, it was following in the footsteps of Great Britain, the world's first industrial nation.  The United States' north east, the world's second industrial power, industrialised using British capital and British technology.  The next nation to industrialise on the British model, Belgium, did not do so for several more decades.

Britain was America's main market for many years.  The loss of American exports to Britain, as with cotton during the American Civil War, caused havoc in both economies.  British capital not only helped build Virginia's tobacco-based economy, it also promoted growth throughout America west of the Appalachians.  British settlers, notably the Scotch Irish from Ulster, proved to be the equal of any American Indian in hardiness and ruthlessness as the frontiersmen breached the Appalachian barrier.

Belich has a rather neat heuristic device that allows comparisons between what he terms the British and American "Wests".  The American "West" is self-explanatory.  The British "Wests" consists of those societies which mirror the settlerist characteristics of the American West, such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  Some British Wests, such as South Africa and Argentina, never quite reached take off point.

The American and British Wests shared common characteristics.  This was no accident, because the American and British Wests were mutually reinforcing.  London acted as a clearing house for exports of capital.  Another key British export was people.  Britain became overcrowded and was unable to feed itself.  It took a century and a half from the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 before Britain was able to achieve self sufficiency in food again.  Ships carried timber from Canada and returned filled with emigrants.  Wheat from the Canadian Prairies and the American Midwest was milled into flour and baked in London.  London itself, with its seemingly insatiable appetite for top quality meat, including Australian beef and New Zealand "British" lamb, was itself a mighty magnet for Angloworld trade.

The Angloworld was built around a circulation of people and goods.  Take for example our own "Marvellous Melbourne".

Melbourne was a boom city;  it attracted immigrants from all over the Angloworld.  The population of Melbourne grew from virtually nothing in the 1850s to almost 500,000 in 1891, when Melbourne's bubble burst.  Melbourne, at its peak, was bigger than Sydney, bigger than San Francisco and far bigger than Los Angeles.  Melbourne took almost 20 years to recover from its bust in the 1890s, but although it might never have been as marvellous as it once was, Melbourne did recover.  Many people simply moved on to other parts of the Angloworld.

Melbourne was characteristic of Angloworld boom cities, and booms were a characteristic of the Angloworld, as were the accompanying busts.  Cities such as Chicago regularly reinvented themselves on the backs of new industries and new markets.  Chicago's early days were characterised by multiple conflagrations that consumed much of the city, so it could be said to have truly recreated itself.

Chicago had a rich hinterland and was the strategic transport node that connected the eastern and western United States.  Thus its status as a boom city seems to be readily explicable.  Los Angeles, on the other hand, was a boom in search of a purpose.  Los Angeles had no natural harbour, no water and no industries apart from growth itself until fruit and vegetable growing took off in the Central Valley.  The Bank of Italy (now the Bank of America) backed the first film producers and became handmaiden to the twentieth century's dominant popular art form, the motion picture.  If Los Angeles had a defining characteristic, it was that if had the best boosters.

The Angloworld's booms often left little more than ghost towns, but booms did mobilise people and capital rapidly to exploit emerging economic opportunities.  The aftermath of the boom was the economic rescue, where new industries emerged to make use of under-utilised resources following the boom.  Belich argues, for example, that booms often lacked economic logic and that so-called "export booms" were in fact no such thing, as in the early stages these booms produced substantial trade deficits.

The mobile population that provided the manpower in boom times could do two things ― settle down, or move on.  In construction, transport and mining, a male "crew culture" emerged, characterised by high alcohol consumption, episodic violence, transience and bachelorhood.  Once these men lost their physical strength, they were frequently regarded as expendable.  Whereas an unmarried woman could often cobble together a living or was supported by her family, older unmarried men often had little utility.

The favoured form of social and economic organisation in the Angloworld Wests was an independent yeomanry ― that is, independent small and medium farms and business enterprises which allowed a family to support itself without the intervention of the government.  Schemes such as "closer settlement" meant that landed magnates had their holdings broken up, allowing yeoman farmers to cultivate the land more intensively.  Where the magnates persisted and the farmers were tenants rather than owners, as in Argentina, the result was political and social instability.

Belich prefers the term "Angloworld" to "Anglosphere", which he says has connotations of triumphalism.  The analysis is similar.  His seminal idea ― that there is far more to the Angloworld than a commonality of language ― is comprehensively demonstrated.  The Angloworld is a mutually reinforcing system for the exchange of people, capital and ideas.  Where the primary values of the Angloworld are marginalised, as in Argentina and South Africa, the outcomes are less than desirable, a case of the exceptions proving the rule.  The dual capitals of the American and British Wests, New York, and London, have maintained their supremacy for two centuries.  They were the first modern megacities.

What of Australia?  No amount of boosting the "Asian Century" will alter the fact that Australia remains in origin and orientation a member of the Angloworld.  The United States has been a melting pot for centuries, but retains its Angloworld orientation.  Membership of the Angloworld constitutes a substantial part of Australia's appeal to new settlers, not least settlers from Asia.

The United Sates has been a melting pot for centuries.  Britain has become a multiethnic society in recent decades, but does anyone seriously believe in times to come it will no longer be "Anglo"?  The Angloworld is more than a matter of language.  "La Francophonie", the French attempt to bind its former colonies to the French mainland, has nothing like the adhesion of the Angloworld.

What made the Angloworld the globe's most influential social, economic and political force for two centuries was not that the Anglos left home ― other Europeans did that too ― but they came to stay, and they brought with them a unique set of values.  They were settlers, not sojourners.

Answers to Australia's challenges are closer than London

If you think Julia Gillard's got problems, spare a thought for the British Prime Minister David Cameron.

Ms Gillard only has to endure another 15 weeks until her near-certain election defeat.

Mr Cameron has to battle for another two years until the British general election in May 2015.  His Conservative Party is polling 30 per cent, against UK Labour's 34 per cent, the Liberal Democrat's 10 per cent, and the UK Independence Party at 17 per cent.

Because of history, Australian politicians and especially conservative ones have an emotional affinity with Westminster and they like visiting 10 Downing Street.  The reality is though there's not much Australian MPs or policymakers can learn from the British — and it's been like that for some time.

The last good Tory leader was Margaret Thatcher — and she was deposed by her colleagues more than 20 years ago.  On the Labour side Tony Blair is regarded as a hero for reconciling a party of the left to the benefits of the free market.  This feat was not insignificant, but Bob Hawke had done the same thing a decade earlier.

Australia's challenges over the next few years are not those of Britain.  We have to face the consequences of the end of the mining boom and a cost structure that is unsustainable.  In Britain, the two issues the Conservatives are tearing themselves apart on are Europe and gay marriage.

A fortnight ago, a third of Conservative MPs rebelled against Cameron when they voted in parliament to express their regret that his promise to hold an in/out referendum on whether to be in the European Union had not been written into legislation.

A week ago he stared down an even larger rebellion from MPs over his plan to introduce gay marriage.  Meanwhile, unemployment in the UK is 7.8 per cent and youth unemployment is 21 per cent.  Nearly every Conservative Party activist in the country got to be seriously annoyed earlier this month after they were allegedly labelled as ‘mad, swivel-eyed loons' by the co-chairman of the Party — who also happens to be a close friend of the Prime Minister.

Cameron followed the lead of the left when he talked tough about restricting bankers' bonuses and when he introduced government censorship of the press in Britain for the first time since the 17th century.

The sad fact is that Britain and the European Union probably deserve each other.  David Cameron might be nominally a conservative, but it's increasingly difficult to distinguish him from Europe's social democrats.  His idea of democracy is to give the electorate a say on the biggest issue in British politics — namely, whether to stay in Europe — sometime in 2017.  That's the sort of approach to managing popular opinion that any European politician would be proud of.

In contrast to London, there's a place where Australians could go if they wanted to learn something — it's a lot closer.  It's Wellington in New Zealand.

As the editor-in-chief of The Australian Financial Review pointed out in these pages on Thursday, if there's somewhere Tony Abbott and Joe Hockey should study, it is New Zealand.  In this country there's talk about increasing the rate of GST.  But there's been no corresponding discussion about cutting personal income tax in return — which is what they've done in across the Tasman.  The top marginal rate of personal income tax in New Zealand is 33 per cent and their GST is 15 per cent.  If there is to be a conversation about the GST it has to be in these sorts of terms.  The idea that a newly-elected Coalition government should in September revisit the Henry tax review is a little bit alarming.  The working assumption of the Henry review was that taxes would need to go up to meet society's increasing demand for social services.  Anything that the Coalition does should be based on an alternative assumption entirely — namely that Australia's tax system should aim to make the country as economically productive as possible.

As the retiring Labor MP Martin Ferguson has put it:  ''We need to grow the pie to share it''.  It's statements of truth like that which reveal why Ferguson will be such a loss to the Parliament.


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Thursday, May 30, 2013

Subsidies are unfair to the motor industry

Car industry workers need certainty and security about their future.  That's why the Gillard Government should declare the current $5.4 billion in automotive industry subsidies ending in 2020 will be the last.

Ford's closure of its Geelong and Broadmeadows facilities is devastating for those communities.  Workers, families and other businesses have built their lives around the plants continuing to operate.  For its part, the Government has thrown about $1 billion over the past decade to keep the facilities there and given false hope to those who rely on Ford staying put.  Subsidies are harming the situation, not helping.

Reports suggest the Gillard Government's Industry Minister, Greg Combet, signed off on Ford's most recent round of subsidies knowing they were likely to close in 2016.  He would have calculated it was better to pay the $34 million to Ford in the hope that the company's announcement would have been after the election.

That way it'd be the Liberal Party's fault, and not Labor's.

It shows how political interests dictate subsidies, not what is good for workers.  Most people wrongly think government protection of industries, such as subsidies, ''save jobs''.  They don't.

First, protection keeps inefficient industries alive and stops money being used to create jobs in sustainable, efficient industries.  Cars are the perfect example.  In the mid-1980s, the peak tax rate on imported cars hit 140 per cent.

As economist Henry Ergas argued that meant ''each $1 of value added in the (car) industry was costing the economy $1.40''.  That was $1.40 being taken from supporting sustainable jobs to support unsustainable ones.  We all lose.

Second, workers are the ones hardest hit by subsidies.  Workers may enjoy a short-term reprieve as factories temporarily stay open, but in the long-run they continue to develop their skill-base in an unsustainable industry.  When it goes bust, so do their futures.

Ford's Baby Boomer workforce is now being told that in October 2016 they're out and they will probably struggle to find a new job.

If Generation Y enters the car industry on the false security of subsidies, the government is equally complicit in the impact on them should the industry go belly-up.

We can't let another generation be harmed when the problems the industry faces are so well known.

According to the Productivity Commission, the industry has received about $10 billion in direct assistance between the mid-1990s and 2011.  If you add the $5.4 billion leading up to 2020 and the preferential government purchasing arrangements for locally produced cars, the support the industry receives is staggering.

But despite the support, the industry has had longer-term problems.  Between 2003 and 2010 the total sales of passenger vehicles has sat around 600,000.  But in that time the share of imports has risen from about 60 per cent to nearly 85 per cent.  The industry isn't selling the cars people want.

Ford has drawn a line in the sand of October 2016.  It's time the government did the same.  Announcing the end of subsidies in 2020 will give workers, communities and the industry certainty.  The industry will have seven years to assess their operations, adjust their business models and decide whether they can be competitive.  The businesses that supply car manufacturers will also have certainty and be able to manage the risk of supplying to existing manufacturers, finding new markets and diversifying.  Communities that rely on car manufacturing can also plan how they will develop new industries and pathways for workers.

But the big gain will be for workers.  Those looking to enter the workforce can choose whether they want to start in an industry with an uncertain future.  They'll also be able to decide about whether they need to retrain to keep alternative options open.

A subsidies deadline is fair on everyone, but most importantly the workers and communities that depend on the car industry for jobs.


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Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Insane obsession:  Australia's auto industry waste

In his foreword to the 2008 A New Car Plan for a Greener Future, Kevin Rudd observed that half a century had lapsed between the first demonstration of a horseless carriage in South Australia and the debut of the Holden FX in 1948 — the first truly Australian car.

Rudd was trying to say that the car industry is worth saving.

But anybody familiar with Australian protectionism in the 20th century would have recognised in Rudd's observation less a story of triumph and more a long story of failure.

Ford is leaving Australian shores in 2016.  It's time to write the car industry's obituary.

When we first started protecting the automotive industry against foreign competition, cars were a luxury item.

In August 1917, prime minister Billy Hughes announced an absolute prohibition on selected luxury imports.  Car bodies were on the list, beside fur apparel, jewellery and (strangely enough) biscuits.

In part the government said this prohibition would keep currency from being sent overseas during the war, and would free up space on cargo ships that was being wasted on bulky and unnecessary imports.

But most of all Hughes wanted to encourage Australia's existing horse-drawn carriage manufacturers (and their 7,000 or so employees) to make car bodies instead.

Cars were a luxury, but they were a high-tech sort of luxury.  Founding a car industry in Australia was to politicians of the early 20th century as founding a ''Silicon Valley'' is to politicians of the 21st.

The Hughes prohibition on car body imports was immediately controversial.  Now Australians wanting a car would have to order a chassis from overseas, and then, once it arrived, wait a few months for the body to be built domestically.

Industrial delegations filed into the office of the Minister for Trade and Customs.  The importers and traders protested that cars would be more expensive.  Furthermore, there was no way the domestic industry could fill orders already on the way.  Their delegation was closely followed by an alliance of leatherworkers, sheet metal workers, glass bevellers, and parts makers who urged the government to stick to the embargo.

The importers and traders lost.  After the war, the ban on car body imports was converted into a very high tariff.

For the next century, the car industry would be governed by ministers rather than markets.  Even deep in the era of protection-all-round, cars were a special case.  Both Labor and non-Labor parties fell over each other to support the car industry.

Protectionism distorted our automotive sector in all sorts of perverse ways.

The modern American car industry was really born in the 1930s.  It abandoned its cottage manufacturing roots and became the large-scale, industrial enterprise that it is today.

But as the United States was taking advantage of economies of scale brought about by industry consolidations, the tariff kept Australian car companies sheltered and small.  In the late 1930s, the average automotive parts company employed just 11 people.

And the tariff slowed the introduction of new technology.  Closed-body and all-steel body cars were only available in Australia a decade after they were available in the United States.

In 1938 the Tariff Board — hardly a bastion of free market thought — concluded it was ''unwise'' to encourage Australian manufacturers to produce an all-Australian car.

This advice didn't bother Ben Chifley.  Chifley wanted a native Australian car to be the lynchpin of Australian manufacturing after World War II.

That car ended up being the Holden FX, launched in 1948.  Henry Holden was one of those horse-drawn carriage makers who'd taken advantage of Billy Hughes' ban on car body imports.

Australians tend to be pretty nostalgic about the early Holdens.  But they couldn't have been built without government assistance.  They were never competitive in their own right.  Holden still receives government subsidies.  It wants even more.

We've been trying to spark a self-sustaining car industry for a century now.  Every side of politics has tried their little hearts out.  Low tariffs with high subsidies.  High tariffs with low subsidies.  Every side has failed.  Every side tries again.

On Sunday the Coalition's industry spokesperson, Sophie Mirabella, was talking up ''strategic investments'' on the Bolt Report, and calling for the Productivity Commission to provide a ''clear path for a viable industry going forward''.

The next time you hear that it is markets which are irrational, recall the definition of insanity:  doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.

Not even Ford — the world's most historically prestigious car company — closing down its Australian operation can apparently break this insane obsession.

But then again, Ford had to be enticed to come to Australia in the first place.  Only after government negotiators promised the company assistance did Ford set up shop in Geelong in 1925.  Since then it has been protected by a tariff that has gone as high as 57.5 per cent.  Australian consumers have paid for that tariff in higher car prices.  And the company has received around $1 billion in direct taxpayer subsidies over the last decade.

Yet after all that, the supposed party of free markets still can't recognise automotive protectionism for the waste of money that it is.


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Tuesday, May 21, 2013

When does mission creep become censorship?

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is completely out of control.

The corporate regulator is an independent government agency.  It is not directly accountable to a minister.  It is only partially accountable to parliament.

And over the past nine months ASIC has been ordering internet service providers to censor websites it suspected of hosting fraudulent investment material.

To do this, ASIC has been utilising an obscure section of the Telecommunications Act usually used to prohibit extreme cases of child pornography.

The outrage only came to light because 1,200 other websites were accidentally censored as well.

Renai LeMay at the technology website Delimiter has the full story.  In the Drum last week, the convenors of Melbourne Free University — one of those innocent websites taken down by ASIC's actions — explained what happened when they were blocked.

It's an almost perfect illustration of regulatory mission creep.

Legislative provisions designed to only deal with the most extreme crimes are eventually used to pursue lesser offences.  Given that this involved full-blown censorship — and censorship without oversight or appeal — ASIC's actions are incredibly reckless.

Censoring the internet is a gross abuse of its status as an independent regulator.

Perhaps we could forgive an abuse of power if it was a one-time thing.  But it's part of a pattern.

In September and October last year the federal government was pushing hard for a data retention scheme to govern the internet.  Such a law would have compelled internet service providers to retain the browsing habits of their customers for two years, on the off-chance law enforcement agencies wanted to have a look at them later.

The data retention proposal was both vague and authoritarian.  Senior ministers claimed the policy was to protect us against the worst of the worst:  terrorists, paedophiles, the most terrifying cyber-criminals.

When I appeared in front of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to oppose data retention, I was informed by one Labor backbencher, Michael Danby, that ''extreme civil liberties'' placed Australia at risk of another terror attack.

But as the hearings progressed it was revealed that one of the biggest advocates within Canberra for data retention wasn't the security agencies or the Federal Police, but ASIC.

And not only did ASIC want the internet metadata to be retained — information like date and timestamps — but the corporate regulator even wanted our content to be retained too.  That is, it wanted internet providers to store every single word in our emails, and every website we've ever visited.

Such an extreme breach of our privacy was not to protect us against terrorists, but insider trading.  (The details, such as they are, are on pages 26 and 27 here.)

It's not like ASIC doesn't have any draconian powers already.

Judges have repeatedly slapped ASIC down for its approach to regulatory enforcement.  In one case ASIC was condemned for being oppressive, for abusing process, and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

In another, the judge admonished ASIC's lawyers for alleging dishonesty without any basis in evidence.

Judges often question ASIC's motives.

One of the key insights of the public choice school of economics is that bureaucracies often act in their own interest.  They want a bigger share of the government budget, more public profile, and greater powers.

ASIC is hardly the only example of a rogue agency.  Under Allan Fels, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was similarly unchecked.

At Catallaxy Files, Sinclair Davidson has pointed out that ultimately the federal parliament is responsible for ASIC's actions.  Politicians write the laws under which the regulator operates.  Politicians grant them their powers.  But by deliberately setting them outside the political process — by giving them statutory independence — they've made them unaccountable, and allowed them to get out of control.

So politicians have to reign ASIC in.  But there's a more fundamental problem.  The sort of abuse of power we are seeing out of ASIC is endemic to the regulatory state.

The logic is as follows.

The relationship between a regulator and a regulated organisation (let's say a company operating in a marketplace) is like a continuous game of cat and mouse.  A regulator makes a rule.  A company changes its behaviour to comply with the rule.  But, assuming the rule imposes some sort of cost on the company, the company will look for loop-holes to minimise the cost.

The frustrated regulator will write another rule to close off the loop-hole.  The cycle continues.

The economist Edward Kane calls this relationship the regulatory dialectic.  ASIC is a perfect case study.

Caught up in its never-ending battle with the companies it regulates, it has been lobbying for powers which no free society ought to grant even to its national security services.  It has been trying its hand at censorship.  And it's launched legal crusades to raise its profile and its political and financial support.

Lawyers and economists like to talk about the content of regulation.  What does a regulation permit?  What does it prohibit?  Nobody wants to legalise fraud or theft.

But ASIC's extraordinary abuses of power reveal how regulation plays out in the real world — not on the clean page of legislation, or the tight confines of an economists' model, but when self-interested bureaucrats are asked to enforce uncertain laws against an unwilling private sector.


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Monday, May 20, 2013

Commonwealth Reform:  Negative Value Adding Components

PROGRAMS IDENTIFIED WITH NEGATIVE BENEFITS

As a result of interventionist policies built up over many years, many functions undertaken by the federal public service provide negative value-added services.  These entail costs to businesses and individuals in responding to them, diversion of resourcesto accommodate their requirements and the effect of them in displacing commercial activities where such activities perform useful tasks.

Savings are available from eliminating or drastically pruning such activities.  The savings identified below comprise those from the program expenditures themselves, net of public servant costs and the numbers and costs of the public servants employed.  They amount to an annual $22.5 billion in program costs plus $2.4 billion in staffing costs.

Except where duplication with state spending is concerned and where funds are spent on social research, the savings identified exclude the major Health, Education and Welfare programs which account for some 60 per cent of government spending.  Nor do they include “off budget” expenditures like the grants being made by the Clean Energy Finance Corporation.


COMMONWEALTH PROGRAMS

$b 2013/4
Foreign affairs and economic
All foreign aid excl.emergency5.1
Internat Ag R&D0.1
Internat orgs (40% cut)0.1
General research
Cut by 40%1.6
NDIS
First stage assistance0.2
Housing and community amenities
Abolish entire program involving housing ($3b);  Urban and regional ($0.7b);  Env. Protection ($5.2 b)9.0
Recreation and culture
Privatise ABC, SBS1.2
Broadcasting and digital abort NBN0.2
Fuel and energy
CCS and ethanol0.4
ARENA0.3
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Abolish all programs (Cost excludes admin savings)2.0
Natural resources development
Water programs0.6
Other0.2
Industry development and investment
Industry subsidies0.7
Other economic affairs
Reduce spending on IR related activities excl personnel0.2
Trade development EMDG, Innovation Industry (excl personnel)0.6
TOTAL22.5


THE COMMONWEALTH BUREAUCRACY

Public sector resources are normally far less productive than those of the private sector for a number of reasons.  These include an absence of profit driven discipline on their growth, difficulties in terminating unnecessarystaff, costs entailed in raising revenues for their remuneration.

Some 23,500 public servant positions have been identified as being in these classes.  They cover 14 portfolio areas.  The positions classified as surplus to need include the following:


Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry

Abolish the R&D corporations covering sugar, fishing, wine etc and three divisions covering sustainable development, climate change and trade and market access, which are either counterproductive or duplicate other bureaucracies.


Attorney-Generals

Abolish Australian Commission for Law enforcement Integrity, the Human Rights Commission the law reform commission and one of the divisions (“Social Inclusion”).These bodies have a track record of excessive and counterproductive meddling


Broadband, Communications and Digital

Privatise the ABC and SBS which should be able to finance themselves alongside other media businesses.  Abolish the unnecessary universal service management and the NBN


Climate Change and Energy Efficiency

Abolish


Education Employment and Workplace

Abolish the Curriculum Assessment Authority, the Institute for Teaching and Leadership, Fair Work Australia, Safe Work Australia.  All of these add nothing and in the case of the “Fair Work” agencies clearly contribute to lower productivity.


Families Housing Community Affairs and Indigenous

The Aboriginal Land Councils are a clear “make work activitythat distracts some of the better minds from productive work.  The Institute of Family Studies is one of the many failed agencies and the Equal Opportunities for Women in the Workplace if it ever had a function is now redundant.  Housing policy is little to do with the Commonwealth and gambling and parts of indigenous program support should be downsized.


Foreign Affairs and Trade

This agency is heavily overstaffed given Australia’s role in the world and should be severely pruned.  The initial candidates are Austrade, which should be made commercial and left to whither if it proves unsuccessful and branches in the department covering non-proliferation and tobacco plain packaging should go.


Health and Ageing

THE activities covered by the Institute of Health and Welfare are covered in universities and elsewhere.  There is no need for Australian radiation protection and nuclear protection and Health Workforce Australia is a joke.  The Food Standards authority has overgrown its modest usefulness whilethe hospitals pricing agency isunnecessary.


Infrastructure and Transport

For the most part this agency duplicates responsibilities at the state level.  Where it does it should at least be severely pruned leaving it largely with the international, air and interstate responsibilities.


Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education

This large department contains considerable fat and cost imposing activities.  Its Institute of Aboriginal Studies duplicates many such study functions and should be abolished.  Similarly, so too should its Australian Skills Quality function, Tertiary Education Quality Standards and eight of the mainline departmental divisions (AUsindustry, Innovation, EBusiness, Enterprise Connect cannot as bureaucracies possibly add value; while international education quality and other higher education functions are best assessed by the providers of these services themselves).


Regional Australia, Local Government and the Arts

With responsibilities for film energy and environment, sportand the National Capital Authority, this department has considerable scope to be trimmed.


Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism

This relatively small department largely attempts to duplicate state agencies which have the responsibility for on-shore mining and has tried to create a niche in the interface with the environment.  Over half the department proper should be abolished plus some proportion of its Geoscience agency.


Sustainability, Environment Water

An agency that has been created to support fashionable notions that without a body ensuring that the law is doubly protected severe damage will follow.  Mainly the department needlessly duplicates state agencies and in doing so adds needless costs.  Its activities include the Murray Darling authority and the National Water Commission, both of which should be abolished.


Treasury

Unfortunately the Department has been excessively politicised and has suffered both in the advice it has been giving (climate change, MRRT, budget policy).  It will need to be restructured but several aspects of the portfolio should go anyway.  These include most of the ACCC, and the NCC.  Among the functions that need to be abolished are the divisions covering older Australians and the competition and consumer division.  Massive savings should be made in the international finance and Investment and trade divisions and while there is no need for many overseas posts given modern communications those in Jakarta, Paris, Manila, New Delhi and Tokyo serve no purpose.

The Attachment provides some quantification of savings across portfolios.

The average cost of the bureaucrats identified as surplus including on-costs is around $100,000 per annum.  Hence an annual saving of $2.35 billion



PROGRAMS IDENTIFIED WITH NEGATIVE BENEFITS

As a result of interventionist policies built up over many years, many functions undertaken by the federal public service provide negative value-added services.  These entail costs to businesses and individuals in responding to them, diversion of resources to accommodate their requirements and the effect of them in displacing commercial activities where such activities perform useful tasks.

Savings are available from eliminating or drastically pruning such activities.  The savings identified below comprise those from the program expenditures themselves, net of public servant costs and the numbers and costs of the public servants employed.  They amount to an annual $22.5 billion in program costs plus $2.4 billion in staffing costs.

Except where duplication with state spending is concerned and where funds are spent on social research, the savings identified exclude the major Health, Education and Welfare programs which account for some 60 per cent of government spending.  Nor do they include "off budget" expenditures like the grants being made by the Clean Energy Finance Corporation.


COMMONWEALTH PROGRAMS

$b 2013/4
Foreign affairs and economic
All foreign aid excl. emergency5.1
Internat Ag R&D0.1
Internat orgs (40% cut)0.1
 
General research
Cut by 40%1.6
 
NDIS
First stage assistance0.2
 
Housing and community amenities
Abolish entire program involving housing ($3.0b);
Urban and regional ($0.7b);  Env. Protection ($5.2b)
9.0
 
Recreation and culture
Privatise ABC, SBS1.2
Broadcasting and digital abort NBN0.2
 
Fuel and energy
CCS and ethanol0.4
ARENA0.3
 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Abolish all programs (Cost excludes admin savings)2.0
 
Natural resources development
Water programs0.6
Other0.2
 
Industry development and investment
Industry subsidies0.7
 
Other economic affairs
Reduce spending on IR related activities excl personnel0.2
Trade development EMDG, Innovation Industry (excl personnel)0.6
TOTAL22.5


THE COMMONWEALTH BUREAUCRACY

Public sector resources are normally far less productive than those of the private sector for a number of reasons.  These include an absence of profit driven discipline on their growth, difficulties in terminating unnecessary staff, costs entailed in raising revenues for their remuneration.

Some 23,500 public servant positions have been identified as being in these classes.  They cover 14 portfolio areas.  The positions classified as surplus to need include the following:


Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry

Abolish the R&D corporations covering sugar, fishing, wine etc and three divisions covering sustainable development, climate change and trade and market access, which are either counterproductive or duplicate other bureaucracies.


Attorney-Generals

Abolish Australian Commission for Law enforcement Integrity, the Human Rights Commission the law reform commission and one of the divisions ("Social Inclusion").  These bodies have a track record of excessive and counterproductive meddling


Broadband, Communications and Digital

Privatise the ABC and SBS which should be able to finance themselves alongside other media businesses.  Abolish the unnecessary universal service management and the NBN


Climate Change and Energy Efficiency

Abolish


Education Employment and Workplace

Abolish the Curriculum Assessment Authority, the Institute for Teaching and Leadership, Fair Work Australia, Safe Work Australia.  All of these add nothing and in the case of the "Fair Work" agencies clearly contribute to lower productivity.


Families Housing Community Affairs and Indigenous

The Aboriginal Land Councils are a clear "make work activity that distracts some of the better minds from productive work.  The Institute of Family Studies is one of the many failed agencies and the Equal Opportunities for Women in the Workplace if it ever had a function is now redundant.  Housing policy is little to do with the Commonwealth and gambling and parts of indigenous program support should be downsized.


Foreign Affairs and Trade

This agency is heavily overstaffed given Australia's role in the world and should be severely pruned.  The initial candidates are Austrade, which should be made commercial and left to whither if it proves unsuccessful and branches in the department covering non-proliferation and tobacco plain packaging should go.


Health and Ageing

THE activities covered by the Institute of Health and Welfare are covered in universities and elsewhere.  There is no need for Australian radiation protection and nuclear protection and Health Workforce Australia is a joke.  The Food Standards authority has overgrown its modest usefulness while the hospitals pricing agency is unnecessary.


Infrastructure and Transport

For the most part this agency duplicates responsibilities at the state level.  Where it does it should at least be severely pruned leaving it largely with the international, air and interstate responsibilities.


Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education

This large department contains considerable fat and cost imposing activities.  Its Institute of Aboriginal Studies duplicates many such study functions and should be abolished.  Similarly, so too should its Australian Skills Quality function, Tertiary Education Quality Standards and eight of the mainline departmental divisions (AusIndustry, Innovation, EBusiness, Enterprise Connect cannot as bureaucracies possibly add value;  while international education quality and other higher education functions are best assessed by the providers of these services themselves).


Regional Australia, Local Government and the Arts

With responsibilities for film energy and environment, sport and the National Capital Authority, this department has considerable scope to be trimmed.


Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism

This relatively small department largely attempts to duplicate state agencies which have the responsibility for on-shore mining and has tried to create a niche in the interface with the environment.  Over half the department proper should be abolished plus some proportion of its Geoscience agency.


Sustainability, Environment Water

An agency that has been created to support fashionable notions that without a body ensuring that the law is doubly protected severe damage will follow.  Mainly the department needlessly duplicates state agencies and in doing so adds needless costs.  Its activities include the Murray Darling authority and the National Water Commission, both of which should be abolished.


Treasury

Unfortunately the Department has been excessively politicised and has suffered both in the advice it has been giving (climate change, MRRT, budget policy).  It will need to be restructured but several aspects of the portfolio should go anyway.  These include most of the ACCC, and the NCC.  Among the functions that need to be abolished are the divisions covering older Australians and the competition and consumer division.  Massive savings should be made in the international finance and Investment and trade divisions and while there is no need for many overseas posts given modern communications those in Jakarta, Paris, Manila, New Delhi and Tokyo serve no purpose.

The Attachment provides some quantification of savings across portfolios.

The average cost of the bureaucrats identified as surplus including on-costs is around $100,000 per annum.  Hence an annual saving of $2.35 billion



ATTACHMENT

ASL
Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry
Abolish the following
Cotton R&D corp12
Fisheries R&D11
Grains R&D53
Grape and wine R&D10
Rural industries R&D28
Sugar R&D8
Wheat Exports Australia5
Wine Australia halve20
Three of the 16 Divisions abolished (SustainableDevelopment, Climate Change, Trade and Mkt Access).  Two others (ABARE, Govt.) reduced by 20%.  Net 25% Staff reduction1108
TOTAL1255
 
Attorney-Generals
Abolish
Aust. Comm. For Law Enforcement Integrity29
Austr. Human Rights Comm127
ALRC14
Office of Aust. Information Comm79
Abolish one of 15 divisions (Social Inclusion) and Associated Support100
TOTAL349
 
Broadband, Communications and Digital
Privatise ABC and SBS6491
Abolish telecoms universal service management10
Abolish 6 out of 26 line branches (4 out of 5 in NBN, merge into one Consumer and Regional, abolish Media inquiry)160
TOTAL6661
 
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency
Abolish1009
 
Education Employment and Workplace
Abolish
Austr. Curriculum Assessment Authority97
Aust. Inst. For Teaching and Leadership50
Fair Work Australia343
Fair Work Ombudsman753
Fair Work industry inspectorate155
Safe Work Australia110
Departmental resources 10%290
TOTAL1798
 
Families Housing Community Affairs and Indigenous
Reduce Aboriginal land councils by half550
Abolish Inst. of Family Studies70
Abolish equal opp for women in workplace30
Out of operational 21 divisions abolish NDIS, part of Families, part of housing policy, part of gambling part of indigenous programs 4 in all560
TOTAL1210
 
Foreign Affairs and Trade
Austrade Phase out Yr 2 saving500
With Dept two branches abolished (non-proliferation and tobacco plain packaging) plus general savings300
TOTAL800
 
Health and Ageing
Abolish
Aust Inst Health and Welfare308
Aust Radiation Protection and Nuclear148
Food Standards ANZ (half)60
Health Workforce Aust.135
Independent Hospitals Pricing Policy59
Departmental pro rata100
TOTAL810
 
Human Services
 
Immigration and Citizenship
 

Infrastructure and Transport

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Halve)61
National Transport Commission (halve)23
Abolish three out of 7 operational divisions (Infrastructure coordination, Policy and Researchand Major Cities)420
TOTAL504
 
Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Ed
Abolish
Aust Inst Aboriginal Studies124
Australian Research Council (halve)104
Australian skills Quality208
CSIRO (halve)2780
Tertiary Ed quality standards90
Eight of the 17 operational divisions should be abolished (AusIndustry, Innovation, EBusiness, Industry policy, Enterprise Connect Fully;  and parts of International education, tertiary quality and higher Education1630
Total4936
 
Regional Australia, Local Government and the Arts
Abolish
Austr. Business Arts Foundation25
Australia Council122
Austr. TV Film and Radio School146
Australian Sports Commission (halve)360
National Capital Authority56
Screen Australia110
Department pro rata staff reduction40
TOTAL859
 
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism
Abolish
Australia Solar Institute8
Abolish Energy and Environment Division and Part of Resources Division and some part of Tourism over half of dept240
Abolish about 10% of Geoscience63
TOTAL311
 
Sustainability, Environment Water
Abolish MDBA (leaving 15 staff)290
Abolish National Water Commission44
Abolish climate change functions in BoM15
Dept staff. Largely state duplication Exc Antarctica. Reduce by 80%1800
TOTAL2149
 
Treasury
Abolish
ACCC (Exc energy reg)700
NCC11
Divisions:  Ec. Potential of older Australians;  Comp and Consumer Policy Halve:  Ind, Env, Defence;  G20;  Internat. Finance and Dev pol;  For Inv and Trade;  O/S posts Jak, Man, N, Del, Paris, Tokyo Equive of 4.5 of 27 operational divs 17%156
TOTAL867
TOTAL IDENTIFIED23518