Wednesday, July 29, 1998

The Politics of Taxation Reform

Lionel Bowen was asked in the lead up to the 1980 election what the key issues would be during the campaign.  "Tax my boy, same as the last election, same as every election!"  Lionel was exaggerating somewhat but tax or tax reform usually feature prominently at election time.  And so they will at the forthcoming election.  Tax reform is a dangerous beast, the Capital Gains Tax scare certainly played a part in Fraser's survival in 1980, and the GST scare a large part in Keating's in 1993.  Will it lead to John Howard's demise in 1998?

Major tax reform is a rare thing.  The trouble with it is that the economy doesn't vote.  What could otherwise be a search for the most efficient form of tax becomes a game of buying acceptance.

All governments have from time to time given tax cuts which amounted to no more than reimbursement of the ravages of inflation, but that is not tax reform.

Why should John Howard attempt tax reform if it is such a risk?  The truth is he has to.  He was elected in 1996 with a platform so thin that it was exhausted in his first year.  Governments are not rewarded for doing nothing.  So he had to create an agenda, and that agenda was always going to include tax reform, the last great intellectual task that the Liberal party undertook with Hewson and the one great reform that Labor could not tackle (outside the waterfront labour monopoly) after Keating's 1985 Option C died.

Both 1980 and 1993 were instances where an Opposition had proposed a new tax at election time, and both were subject to the most terrible vilification by the government of the day.  What happens when a government does the proposing?  In this instance the electorate are being challenged to toss out a government on the basis of tax reform, not fail to elect an Opposition.  There is a difference, so the Howard government which is otherwise not in a terminal state, has an advantage in the contest.

The current system is unduly focussed on business inputs and income, and applies differently to different parts of the economy.  The Howard government can opt either to retain the main features of the personal (income, FBT), corporate (company, payroll, licenses) and indirect (WST, petrol, excise) tax mix, or replace as far as possible, personal and corporate income taxes with a consumption tax.

The Howard government has to map out a strategy for reform that, step by step, leads towards the second option, seeking a mandate for every change along the way.  For example, step one is a simple tax swap, the Wholesale Sales Tax for a GST.  Step two might be to change the mix of taxes, say raise more in indirect taxes but less in direct taxes.  Step three might be to relieve the states of their reliance on some of their sillier taxes like gambling and betting.

The best way through this is to be conservative and opt for the indirect tax replacement of one tax, the WST so as to keep the debate confined, as far as possible, to industry groups.  Where at present only a small number of wholesalers have to file tax returns, in the future all retailers would have to do so.  A WST can only fall on goods (you cannot wholesale a service) so a whole new sector of the economy has to become involved.  The only tax mix change would be at the fringes.  For example, where there cannot be a clean replacement of the revenue forgone with the abolition of the old tax, and where any compensation is due to any group because of a differential impact on incomes.

But just to make sure everyone is happy you must offer a very large apparent tax cut.  Apparent because the money will have to come (in the absence of swingeing cuts to outlays) from taxes.  This must be done not by raising new or existing taxes, but by taking them from future Budget surpluses.  Of course, those surpluses need not be available in the first place at least not for the purposes of providing a cut.  Nevertheless, that is the strategy for cleaning up the indirect tax system.  Income tax relief, which may or may not be economically warranted is politically essential.

Opponents will argue that the new tax will rise in the future.  But why is that different to any other tax, and besides a government running a surplus at a lower level of total tax take has some basis for being believed that the rate will remain steady.  More important, in time the tax should be used to buy out other taxes.  To the question, will the GST rise, Howard can truthfully answer, no, if he means not in its own right.

Modest tax reform is one step in major tax reform.  The Labor government took the first steps, the Coalition has to take the next.

I recall when interest rates hit 18% in 1990-91.  Facing enormous political pressure Prime Minister Bob Hawke let it be known that he was considering easing rates.  The moment he made his announcement the nervous-nellies on the backbench started ringing around seeking to meet and demonstrate against the Treasurer.  Paul Keating told them to hold the line.  The government did, and survived.  If Keating had shown weakness the government would have been doomed because the electorate would have asked, and quite rightly, "why did we have to go through all this in the first place?"  The electorate do not like change but they will accept it if they are convinced that it is essential and enduring.


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Tuesday, July 28, 1998

The Pace of Energy Reform in WA

An Address to the WA Power and Gas Conference
at Observation City Hotel, Perth, 27 July 1998


The means to a successful economy is small government both in taxation and regulatory dimensions, and businesses that are continuously forced by competition to seek improvements.  The difficulties in arranging for the latter in the utility markets is at the heart of many of the CoAG strictures.

In virtually all circumstances, government ownership of a supply business will offer fewer community benefits than private ownership.  A case in point in WA is that Western Power is saddled with excessive costs because it is unable to make involuntary redundancies in spite of its over-manning.  Even if an entity is corporatised, Government as an owner will eventually tend to pick as directors people who are owed favours.  Ministers will be unable to resist seeking special favours from the business and the business itself, because it is takeover proof, will not be subject to the disciplines of a firm where the market for full corporate control is open.

In respect of these matters, reform in Western Australia has lagged that of the eastern states.  There are some special reasons why this might be so.  These concern the nature of the energy market here.  Nonetheless, other states including South Australia and tiny Tasmania, have moved more resolutely on the twin areas of reform:  privatisation, and structural reforms to enhance competition.


REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS

Much ink has been spilled over the issue of establishing a genuinely independent regulatory agency to oversight the "essential facility" features of electricity, gas and other networked services.  In WA, it appears that the Government favours the key regulatory agency being established within its own Department.  This is criticised, and rightly so, because it may lead to the regulator becoming an instrument of industry policy and favouring certain directions that the Government supports rather than a policeman seeking to promote genuine competition.

That said, the early outcomes from regulatory agencies that are more detached have not been promising.  The regulators are becoming a major issue of themselves especially with the draft decisions of the ACCC and Victorian ORG to establish a low pricing structure for gas carriage.

The regulators' role is to prevent possible price gouging by businesses controlling "essential facilities".  However, the lines businesses in gas and electricity are not immune from competition.

The potential for this is already evident in Victoria where rival electricity distributors are planning to drive new lines into each others' territory.  Further evidence of the potential is observable in the skill that AGL has shown over many years in pricing their NSW pipeline charges at a level that allows them to profitably ward off rival facilities.  AGL has responded to competitive threats by reducing prices in areas where those threats have greatest potential.

The nightmare for a utility business is that if it adopts too hard-nosed an approach to pricing and service this will call forth competition and leave the existing asset "stranded".  Fear of having "stranded" assets means that little by-pass is actually likely.  But the control over excess prices that competition brings does not require that a competitor physically emerges.  Contestability for the market is quite adequate.

Competition or contestability is much superior to a regulator.  Indeed, the regulator's role is to make judgements that, in his view, correspond to those that would emerge in a competitive market.

It might be said that if the price is set low, the customer will obtain benefits.  But prices set artificially low will prove self-defeating.  Suppliers will incur only minimum expenditures to maintain and expand the facilities, which will eventually become less reliable.  Artificially low wire prices also offer unfair advantages to existing generators facing possible competition from co-generators able to locate in areas where they avoid transmission charges.  And customers will not have an opportunity to seek out an alternative wire or gas source of supply, because the regulator's decisions ensure such sources will be unprofitable.

Setting a rate of return that assumes market behaviour is impossible will therefore prove self-fulfilling.  And the wire or pipeline company would see no merit in spending money to give premium service and reliability to those customers who would pay for it.

If any price cap is to be set, this should apply only to those areas that were connected at a subsidised rate for community service reasons.  This CSO could either be funded directly by the Government or, if the business is privatised, made a condition for the new owner (which means a lower price for the privatised entity).  For the rest, prices should be established as if contracted at present levels with the discipline on incumbents provided by rival suppliers.

The regulators' role should be to ensure that there is no impediment to rival facilities.  Where there is more than one facility or the possibility of more than one facility regulatory action should be a mere formality.  Indeed, with an absence of exclusive franchises, there is no case for regulatory control over a new facility.  After all a new facility serves a market that by definition was previously unserved.  The customers of that facility can only be made better off.  And regulating a proposed new line may undermine its profitability and result in fewer pipelines being built or being built at a lower than optimal capacity.  The builder may not wish to be hostage in future to regulatory decisions over what is a fair price for carriage.  The NCC was not fully impressed with this view in its assessment of the National Gas Access Regime and seems to be arguing that it would abandon regulation only where it duplicated a very extensive range of offtake points.  It also makes the point that competition may be hindered by regulatory barriers -- a position which should surely be remedied by the removal of those barriers.

Perhaps the most egregious regulatory analysis presently underway is that being conducted by the Victorian Office of the Regulator-General into a proposal by one distribution business to push new competitive lines into the territory of another.  This is surely the most potent discipline on a business to price its services at levels that reflect cost of service.  Yet far from automatically allowing such competition, the Victorian regulator is undertaking a hand wringing exercise asking a range of questions like these:

Is the application based on an agreement with the customer(s) which covers the full costs of operating the infrastructure, including the capital costs?
  • What are the underlying factors which make the inset appointment applicanta more efficient supplier for the area than the incumbent licence holder?
  • To what extent, if any, should the Office consider stranded assets?  If so, on what basis should compensation be determined?
  • How do the proposed tariffs compare?
  • Should the Office allow more than one network service provider to distributeelectricity in the Docklands?
  • Is the development of dual (or more) networks in the Docklands likelyto be economically efficient?
  • How will the granting of Powercor's application or otherwise impacton the interests of existing and future customers in Powercor's and CitiPower's existing licensed areas as well as future customers in the Docklands?
  • How can the Office be assured, in granting a distribution licence to Powercor to supply the Docklands area, that the interests of consumers will be protected without knowing Powercor's proposed tariffs?
  • How will the approval or otherwise of Powercor's licence variation affect the financial viability of the industry?

Instead, the regulator should be simply saying, "We are in business to promote competition.  We are not about protecting one set of shareholders or second guessing whether a by-pass makes economic sense.  The ability to offer competition is the ultimate test of whether the regulated price is appropriate and the provider has every opportunity to selectively reduce price to meet competition.  An application for a new line is automatically accepted."

Similarly, instead of trying to guess what a reasonable Weighted Cost of Capital should be and specifying prices accordingly, the regulator should take as given the existing implicit transport prices, or a lower price if the Government as owner wishes to specify this.  Those prices were evolved as a form of contract between the supplier and the users.  The supplier was inhibited from engaging in serious price gouging because its owner periodically faced the judgement of the electorate.  The task of the regulator is to ensure these prices, suitably adjusted for inflation, are capped.  The regulator should ensure that any other provider is free to offer lower prices for transport and not face monopolistic interference in this from the incumbent business.

With this form of light-handed regulation, I believe we will see rival suppliers, of which there are many in Australia, trying to cherry pick the more lucrative markets.  Whether or not they are successful in this the incumbent will be forced to lower prices in the most profitable areas by force of competition.  This, after all, is the process that drives efficiency in every other market and what the ornate system of regulatory oversight purports to replicate.

Hopefully, the WA system will adopt these principles and not discourage any power plant or distribution system that sees business opportunities from pursuing these in an unfettered way.


ELECTRICITY

LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY IN WA ELECTRICITY SUPPLY

Efficiency and its improvement has varied markedly both between the states and within the states over time.  Western Australia (which refers to the south west interconnected system) has shown considerable improvement in generation over the period but the State still had a labour productivity nearly 50% below that of the Eastern States.

Productivity per employee in generation has improved in all States but Queensland.  Queensland was formerly widely acknowledged to be the most efficient state system in Australia, but has experienced stagnant levels of productivity in recent years, a factor behind the Queensland Electricity Industry Structure task Force, Chaired by Professor Anderson.  In 1996, Queensland was in fact overhauled by Victoria, easily the most improved system over the 1990s.  It is no coincidence that Victoria has also been the state system most radically exposed to competition and to privatisation.

Chart 1 illustrates the comparisons and trends (Tasmania cannot be compared with the other systems because of its hydro-based nature and previous internal construction focus).

Chart 1

Source:  Electricity Australia, ESAA.

Total costs per unit of electricity establishes the most accurate indicator of performance.  Western Australia's generation costs are the highest among Australian States and costs have tended to rise, unlike in Victoria and South Australia, two systems with comparable costs to those of WA in the early 1990s.

Chart 2 illustrates these trends.

Chart 2

Source:  Electricity Australia, ESAA

These generation costs are only part of the story.

Other matters include the quality of fuels.  WA is disadvantaged in its electricity generation by having inferior or higher cost coal to that in the eastern states.

In addition, there are the transmission and distribution costs, which account for half of the total costs.  Unfortunately the measures of efficiency in distribution and transmission available from the ESAA present less reliable comparative indicators than those for generation.

The bottom line is that electricity is expensive in WA.  Prices are 30% higher than the Australian average for household consumers and 40% higher for commercial and industrial customers.


COMPETITION POLICY:  PROGRESS IN WA IN RELATION TO OTHER STATES

Competition has been the naked flame that has transformed previously moribund electricity businesses in NSW and Victoria.  It has resulted in price reductions for larger customers of at least 12% and up to 50%.

WA is very much behind the eastern states in permitting electricity customers to choose their own suppliers of electricity.  In part this follows from the monopoly that Western Power has over generation.  Much of the nominally independent generation is tied up by Western Power;  thus, the Mission Energy operated BP co-generation plant is a contracting out process rather than a new competitor.  Other states are seeking to convert similar contracts into competitive power provision -- Victoria has done so with Mission at Loy Yang B, whilst Queensland is undertaking discussions with Comalco over the Gladstone Power Station.

Some opening up of Western Power's transmission system is presently underway.  The Government also has a policy of fostering provision of additional capacity by businesses other than Western Power.

In the retail market, the present limit of contestability in WA is the 5 MW market opened this year and the next tranche to be opened in the year 2000.  NSW and Victoria opened up the 5 MW tranche in 1994 and 1996 respectively.  By 1999, NSW will have made all customers contestable, while Victoria will have half the load free to choose.  Queensland has a program that is about three years behind the NSW and Victorian timetables.

Table 1 indicates the timetables.

Table 1:  Electricity Deregulation Timetables
ThresholdType examplesNSW VicQldSAWA
40 GWhvast sites1996199419981998
(>20GWh)
1998
(5 MW)
4 GWhlarge office blocks19971995199919982000
(1 MW)
750 MWhsupermarkets1997199620001999
160 MWhsmall office blocks1998199820002000
remainder 1999200120012001
QLD 160 MWh is above 200 MWh


There is from January 1 next year also regional deregulation for users taking more than 300 MWh per year.  This is intended to pave the way for a more competitive tariff but its success in this is difficult to forecast.

Retail contestability will mean prices become more cost reflective.  WA still has to make the hard yards on this matter.  Electricity charges are higher for small business than for households, even though the former has a better load profile.  In other words, the Government is milking small business to win votes.  Not only is this bad for the economy, it is unsustainable once competition gets underway and a reform of tariffs is a first step that is yet to be taken.

Similarly, there are massive cross subsidies to rural from urban customers, totalling some $165 million per annum and an on-going requirement for Western Power to subsidise 80% of the cost of new connections.  These measures are incompatible with a free market system.  If Western Power is loaded with de facto Community Service Obligations its charges to urban areas will be excessive.  It will be ripe for cherry picking and may be left holding only the dogs.  If CSOs are what the Government wants, these should be funded explicitly from the budget.  The alternative is a crippled Western Power.


OPTIONS FOR REFORM

There is currently some speculation that the Government may be considering an early privatisation of Western Power.  This is to be welcomed.  In such cases, Governments have options in pursuing their obligations to the community:  they can seek the best possible price or they can implement privatisation so that customers obtain dividends in lower prices from a formerly integrated system that has been placed on a competitive basis.

With the sale of the natural gas pipeline, the Government opted for the former.  It obstructed the provision of a competitive pipeline and obtained a magnificent price for the existing line.  This is not in the best interests of the State's development or of its consumers.  It is also at variance with the national competition principles.

In electricity, the national market requires the structural separation of generation and transmission.  WA, with Western Power, has one business that is vertically integrated controlling the great bulk of generation, transmission, distribution and retailing.

All three of the eastern states have also divided up their generators and retailer/distributors into competing entities which contend for retail customers.

Continued aggregation is not an acceptable option.  An integrated supplier has market power, and an unfair advantage over other providers, an advantage that would ultimately impact adversely on consumers.

Consistent with the national market approaches and contemporary views of how to obtain greater efficiency in the electricity supply industry, WA should consider means of disaggregating its generation industry and arrange for power to be bid by rival firms and be scheduled by an independent systems operator.  These firms should have independent boards and should be privatised at an early stage.

This approach presents some difficulties where there are only three main generators, each with a distinct set of costs and known position in the merit order.  It would however be possible to split the 1040 MW Muja facilities into competing stations.  In addition, the imminent commissioning of the Collie station will allow greater competitive tension.


In addition, there is co-generated power that could be fed into a pool.  If the WA Government is to privatise Western Power, it is to be hoped that some means of splitting generation can be arranged so that genuine commercial rivalry is introduced with all the stimulus this brings to lowering costs and increasing efficiency.


GAS

Efficiency of Gas Supply in WA

Gas prices in WA are low by the standards of other states.  Table 2 shows that they are comparable to those in South Australia and Victoria and considerably below NSW and Queensland.

Table 2:  Average Price to Commercial and Industrial Customers ($/GJ)
19921993199419951996
NSW5.725.765.795.595.64
Vic4.144.254.224.264.29
Qld7.227.537.567.717.9
SA3.93.963.94.014.05
WA3.934.223.894.08n.a
Source:  AGA


The low cost of gas in WA has brought it a 57% share of the non transport energy market, a share equal to that of Victoria and far higher than the 17% in NSW and 11% in Victoria.


CUSTOMER CONTESTABILITY

Announced deregulation of customer supply is less complete in gas than in electricity.  The following table shows the existing plans.

Table 3:  Gas Deregulation Timetables
TimingNSWVicQldWASAACT
end 1997100 Tj 250 Tj
end 199810 Tj500 Tj 100 Tj10 Tj
end 1999all100 Tj 100 Tj10 Tjall
end 2000 5 TJ all comm.
end 2001 allall all


Again WA is behind other states in releasing customers from the monopoly supplier.


THE DBNG PIPELINE

Transport Costs

The DBNG pipeline is the key infrastructure for the transport of gas in WA and has a virtual monopoly on transport to the south west.

WA has relatively cheap gas but its price advantage is reduced by the 1,500 km distance NW shelf gas from the must be transported along the DBNG pipeline to the south west.  Moreover, the costs of transport are higher than for comparable systems.

Operational costs can be derived from annual report data.  These show the average price of transport, excluding contributions to capital, for the DBNG pipeline is 27.4 cents per GJ, which is more than twice that of Victoria's GTC and 50 per cent above the costs of the NSW and SA transmission systems.  This is despite the fact that the DBNG pipeline in 1995/6 was operating at 81 per cent capacity, much closer to its maximum than the other major transmission pipelines in Australia.

Chart 3 illustrates the high cost per GJ kilometre of the DBNG pipeline.

Chart 3

Source:  Annual Reports Covering 1994/5 except TPA which is 1993/4


Doubtless, the new owners are already moving to wring out excessive costs, but the most potent stimulus to this is a rival facility, which the WA government has effectively foreclosed for a number of years.


COMPETITION ARRANGEMENTS AND THE DBNG PIPELINE

Detailed decisions were taken on free and fair trade in gas at the February 1994 CoAG meeting in Hobart.  Subsequent work has progressed on a National Third Party Access Code, which specifies that:

  • there should be a uniform framework for access to transmission pipelines
  • all legislative and regulatory barriers to trade should be removed
  • government owned utilities should be placed on a commercial footing
  • natural monopoly elements should be separated or ring fenced
  • distribution franchises should be reformed.
  • The Code is now being reviewed by the NCC.

    Open access also means exclusive existing distribution franchises must disappear.  Victoria has moved to implement this as has NSW.

    Acceptance of a proposal for a rival pipeline to be built from the NW Shelf was deferred by the Government.  This was notwithstanding that the easement within which the existing pipeline is located belongs to the Government (rather than its pipeline business) and presently has sufficient space to accommodate at least three pipelines.

    The Government, in effect, granted a monopoly on the existing state owned pipeline and announced it was to be sold.  It granted the monopoly to ensure that it would receive a higher price, a view masked by the usual claim that the market was not sufficiently mature and that WA presents unique circumstances which mean normal market forces will not provide efficient solutions.

    By withholding approval for a rival facility, the Government achieved a higher price for the existing pipeline.  However, that higher price merely represents a tax imposed on consumers and businesses by Government regulation.  The tax is paid by a transfer from businesses and consumers.  In the process, the market distortion resulting from the Government enforced monopoly brings about an unambiguous loss of income and development in the State.

    Higher energy prices mean a likely choking off some of the potential expansion in energy usage, including thwarting some value adding activities that the Government is seeking to foster in the south west.

    All of this reinforces the need for governments to avoid placing impediments in the way of proposed new infrastructure and to allow competitive forces to determine the wisdom of expansions.


    CONCLUDING COMMENTS

    Inside the Geraldton to Bunbury rectangle, energy policy has progressed only slowly towards competitive provision.  Progress has failed to live up to the policy aims and the liberalisation process is lagging other states.

    Although WA is not envisaged to be connected to the gas and electricity systems of other states in the foreseeable future, the State has willingly accepted the CoAG reform agenda and is an active participant in developing the national access code for gas.  But many developments proceed on the basis of State Agreements and the Government intervenes to require Western Power to offer subsidised rates to some users.

    Consistent with its CoAg obligations, the present Government has made some moves towards deregulating energy in the state but these remain tentative and are conducted within a highly prescriptive framework.  The disaggregating of the gas contract with the NW Shelf Joint Venture was a useful step.  This, the opening up of major Alinta and Western Power customers to competing supplies, the encouragement of new non government owned electricity generation, and the announced expansion and leasing out to private sector operators of the easement from the NW Shelf all set the stage for a liberalisation of the market structure.

    Thursday, July 23, 1998

    Give the Man a Break

    also published in the Courier-Mail as "Let's have a laugh on Marree Man", 23 July 1998

    Burnum Burnum would have known what to do about Marree Man.  If he were still alive he would have ridiculed the Aborigines who want to erase the 4 kilometre long earth sculpture in the far north of South Australia.  The Dieri Mitha Council claims that it desecrates significant sites, although a team from the state's Aboriginal Affairs department who went to Marree found that no archaeological sites had been damaged.

    Burnum Burnum was a cheeky Aboriginal activist who would have seen the wonderful potential Marree Man offers for local Aborigines to have a laugh, make some money, and take the mickey out of the earnest souls who suffocate them with their piety.  He knew that a people who retain a mischievous sense of humour never lose their dignity, no matter how badly things seem to be going for them.

    In 1988, rather than participate in the national wailing on the left that accompanied Australia's Bicentenary, Burnum Burnum travelled to England, where he planted the Aboriginal flag above the white cliffs of Dover, claiming Britain for his people.  He did more to make ordinary people reflect on the injustices that attend Australia's past than a hundred ATSIC officials or reconciliation committees could ever do.

    A few year later he penned a testimonial for American author Marlo Morgan's best-selling New Age fantasy, Mutant Message Down Under.  Tens of thousands of Americans seeking spiritual wisdom believed Morgan's fictional account of her travels through Australia with the Real People, an Aboriginal tribe who supposedly lived in harmony with nature and themselves, and who communicated with each other by telepathy.

    While a group of Aboriginal elders made an ATSIC-funded trip to America to protest against Morgan's "appropriation of Aboriginal culture for financial gain", Burnum Burnum wrote to tell her that Mutant Message "uplifts us Real People into a higher plane of consciousness and makes us the regal and majestic people that we are".  And in a funny kind of way, he was right.  Morgan's make-believe ennobled Aborigines, rather than denigrated them.

    Burnum Burnum would probably have told the unhappy Aborigines of Marree to lighten up.  Aboriginal cultures change.  With a little bit of Aboriginal blarney, they could easily incorporate Marree Man into their sacred lore.  Rather than stopping people from driving to the site or planes from flying over it, as the Dieri Mitha Council is demanding, Marree Man could become a significant cultural site for all Australians.

    Tell the world that it had been made thousands of years ago, but kept invisible until recently, when tribal elders decided to materialise it so as to promote reconciliation.  Or that the elders, using their ancient supernatural powers, had taken telepathic control of earthmoving equipment in order to create a symbol of all the people, black and white, who had loved this great country of ours, and whose spirits had returned to the land.

    Americans would lap it up.  Californians would flock to Marree in their thousands to gain enlightenment and to cure the great spiritual hunger that so many of them seem to feel.  A creative alliance of Aborigines and white townspeople could concoct a delightful eco-religious experience from which everyone would benefit.  And we owe the Yanks for all the stories they have been feeding us over the years.

    So some people would have to have to tell a few fibs.  But since when has that been a problem?  After all, when a group of Ngarrindjeri Aborigines pretended that Hindmarsh Island was the site of "secret women's business" thousands of years old, anthropologists, church-people, politicians and journalists stampeded to support them.  Maybe the same people could offer their services to the Marree Aborigines.

    There was a time when all Australians would have appreciated the inventive larrikinism of Marree Man.  But now, when they hear of a man with a 200 metre penis carved into the desert, the police get called in.  Is this what Pauline Hanson has done to us?


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    Wednesday, July 22, 1998

    Odd Bedfellows:  The Economic Nationalists and Why They Are Wrong

    Backgrounder

    The sudden success of the One Nation party in the June 1998 Queensland State election -- where it achieved the second highest primary vote of any political party -- has increased even further the comment and controversy surrounding this new political force.  Although its position on racial matters has excited great comment, its general outlook on economic policy is one which it shares with a range of other parties -- some of which, such as the Greens and the Democrats, seem very unlikely bedfellows with One Nation.

    Nevertheless, when one examines the economic policies of these parties, as well as those of the Advance Australia Party of Rex Connor Junior and Graeme Campbell MP's Australia First, there is a high degree of similarity.  These otherwise diverse parties all espouse what some of them call "economic nationalism" -- coined in explicit opposition to "economic rationalism" and the economic reform programme of the last 15 years.

    This economic nationalism, if adopted in whole or in part, has the potential to do great damage to the Australian economy.  It is based on a series of errors and fallacies which would greatly hamper the ability of most Australian households and firms to cope with, and benefit from, the changes sweeping the global economy.


    INTRODUCTION

    The success of the One Nation party in the June 1998 Queensland election has introduced a new dimension into Australian politics.  Most commentators focus, understandably, on One Nation's racial policies.  But its economic policies have much in common with those of other minority parties and have the potential to do Australia's economy enormous damage.

    "Economic Nationalism" (1) is the cornerstone of the economic policies of a range of smaller parties whose philosophies would generally, in conventional terms (left/right, pro/anti business or labour, politically correct/incorrect), be viewed as diametric opposites.  Yet there are large areas of overlap in the policies of, for example, the Australian Greens and One Nation, or Graeme Campbell's Australia First Party and the Australian Democrats.

    This Backgrounder discusses the components and merits of the "economic nationalism" agenda in detail.  It examines some of the common threads, causes and political philosophies which underpin it, and assesses their potential impact on Australia's economy.  Finally, it raises some issues which deserve general consideration.


    WHAT IS ECONOMIC NATIONALISM?

    As its name suggests, "economic nationalism" is a term designed to indicate an alternative to "economic rationalism".  Economic nationalist policies typically include:

    • Reductions in foreign ownership of Australian property and assets through regulation and investment controls.  For example, the Advance Australia Party's slogan is "buy back the farm", One Nation's policy is "to restrict foreign ownership of Australia".  The Australian Democrats have proposed that "property other than the family home now owned by non-Australian citizens, when sold, must be sold to Australian citizens or permanent residents" and that "family homes presently owned by non-Australian citizens may be inherited only if valued under $500,000, unless such land would be inherited in totality by Australian citizens".
    • Tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other import controls, in many cases based on a preference for bilateral over multilateral agreements, and contingent or reciprocal trade liberalisation (you cut your tariffs, I'll cut mine).  One Nation's platform is that the "... federal government must provide protection for primary (and manufacturing) industries by way of tariffs ... at least equivalent to those of our trading partners in respect of reciprocal same product trade".  The Australian Democrats' policy is that "Tariff cuts should cease immediately and any further reductions should only occur on a quid pro quo basis with our major trading partners and competitors".
    • A reduction in Australia's involvement in multinational agreements designed to liberalise trade and promote investment (in particular, all oppose the MAI and many have reservations about the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations).  However, sharp differences of opinion occur on international agreements which are aimed at non-trade issues or which link trade restrictions to social and other policies, such as the Draft UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights, and proposals to link international trade to environmental standards.  Trade restrictions based on human rights or labour standards receive broader support.
    • Beyond direct trade controls, some advocate taxing or restricting the flows of international investment (the Australian Greens want a 0.5 per cent tax on all international transactions).
    • Re-regulation of the financial sector.  The Australian Greens argue that "a deregulated financial system is incompatible with social and environmental sustainability".  Many parties also advocate introducing cheap or subsidised loans for some types of customers either through compelling financial institutions to do so (the Australian Democrats would "... direct financial institutions to provide affordable finance to certain categories of borrowers, in particular home buyers, rural producers, and small businesses"), through government subsidies (One Nation advocates "... the establishment of a government sponsored Australian national bank whose primary purpose would be low interest funding to primary producers and rural industries ...") or other mechanisms (the Australian Greens "... support the establishment and use of community controlled investment facilities which direct investments to eliminate reliance on foreign borrowings by both the public and private sectors.  Investments in ethical enterprises which emphasise both social and environmental sustainability will be encouraged").
    • Selective other industry assistance targeted variously at exporters, import-competing businesses, rural businesses, small businesses, high-tech businesses, manufacturers, "environmentally-sustainable" businesses, and "growth industries".
    • Support for some taxation changes, but not (usually) a broad-based consumption tax.
    • In some (not all) cases, antipathy to elements of competition policy, especially as it impacts either on small business or rural marketing agencies.  For example, the Australian Democrats advocate "opposing the use of Competition Policy to damage the status of small business, and the use of the regulatory review process under Competition Policy to deregulate the newsagents industry, the taxi driving industry, the agricultural marketing industry and the petroleum industry.  Regulation of these industries to protect the interests of small business is clearly in the public interest".  While on co-operatives and producer marketing bodies, "One Nation will eliminate the National Competition Policy elements which currently inhibit or prevent such structures".
    • Antipathy to privatisation, at least of some industries.  Australia First argues that "Certain public facilities must remain in Australian hands, for example, city water supplies, communication facilities, public transport facilities, emergency services".  The Advance Australia Party advocates "Return to a genuine "mixed" economy with a strong, effective & efficient public sector".  The Australian Democrats argue that "any proposal to sell off a public enterprise must be accompanied by a Consumer Impact Statement.  Such a statement would investigate questions of efficiency, what the government would do to help consumers if cross-subsidies were to be discontinued, pricing, and the maintenance of services to minority groups", while "The Australian Greens support continued public ownership and control of public sector enterprises especially services such as power, water and telecommunications".  One Nation does not appear to have a policy on privatisation, but Pauline Hanson has been critical of privately-owned prisons and of the Telstra privatisation.
    • Controls and regulation of the labour market, although parties vary widely in the degree of regulation they advocate.  All support minimum wages.  The Australian Democrats argue for "introduction of industrial democracy and democratic control over key elements of industry, and the introduction of democratic planning and decision-making processes".
    • The reduction of immigration or a policy of zero net immigration.

    WHAT'S WRONG WITH ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

    The main assumption of economic nationalism is that Australia's economic woes have two sources -- unrestrained exposure to the international economy, and the failure of its governments to exercise enough control and direction of the economic activities of Australian residents and businesses.

    But the reverse is true.  Australia's standard of living will ultimately depend on its capacity to harness the creativity and enterprise of all of its people, not just its public servants and politicians.

    We will gain most from our wealth of human and natural resources by engaging with the rest of the world, not trying to build barriers against it.

    Whether promoted by the political left or right, the major parties or the minor ones, the politically correct or the intentionally incorrect, economic nationalism could wreak untold damage.

    It is worth covering briefly what is wrong with the economic nationalist agenda:


    FOREIGN INVESTMENT

    It would be nice if Australians were less reliant on overseas savings to finance investment.  However, as Vince FitzGerald said in his National Savings, A Report to the Treasurer, it is only through our own domestic savings that we as Australians can increase our own wealth.

    There is a finite pool of domestic savings available to finance investment.  The choice is not foreign investment or Australian investment;  it is foreign investment or lower investment.  Lower investment would mean lower economic growth, lower living standards, and higher unemployment.

    Nor is it appropriate or desirable for governments to try to select the forms of foreign investment it will permit, or to direct it to certain forms of economic activity.  Restricting investors' choice will reduce the amount they invest.  It is virtually impossible to quantify how indirect investment finally affects the economy -- for example, what proportion of foreign lending to Australian banks (the largest component of foreign investment) is used to back loans to Australian small businesses.

    And of course, direct overseas investment brings ancillary benefits in terms of knowledge, expertise, access to intellectual property, and access to markets.

    Governments may have a legitimate concern about Australia's reliance on overseas investment.  But the solution is to raise domestic savings, not to implement measures which will lower investment in Australia.


    IMPORT CONTROLS

    Many economic nationalists argue that, in the "real world", other countries apply tariff and non-tariff barriers which harm Australian exporters, that internationally the "level playing field" is a myth which will never become reality.  They say that economic policies which would benefit Australia only if other countries played the game as fairly as we do are doomed to fail.

    This is entirely correct.

    However, it is entirely incorrect to say that the appropriate response is to maintain tariffs or to reduce them only if other countries do the same.

    This argument misses the point about tariff reductions.  The case for reducing tariffs in Australia does not rest on the benefits of similar reductions in other countries (real though those are) but on the benefits which it will create for the Australian economy irrespective of what other countries are doing.  That the international playing field will never be level is true but irrelevant.  The key objective of cutting tariffs is to create a more level playing field within Australia, because this will yield net benefits for the Australian economy.  If other countries choose to reduce their citizens' standards of living by imposing tariffs on them, that is their concern.

    The problem with protection and subsidies, and tariffs in particular, is that it helps some sectors of our economy at the expense of others.  Consumers lose and (some) businesses and governments win.  Inefficient producers win and efficient ones lose -- through higher taxes, higher wages, higher input costs, and lower consumer demand.

    Above all, exporters lose, because they cannot pass on the effects of higher domestic costs in international markets.

    And, on balance, the economy as a whole loses, because by transferring resources from competitive to non-competitive industries and businesses, the level of production is lower than it otherwise might be.

    Of course, Australian producers have legitimate grievances when they face "unfair" competition from subsidised exports or are denied access to protected markets overseas.  But the existence of overseas subsidies and protection, however unfair and undesirable, does not in itself mean that the Australian economy will benefit from matching those subsidies and tariffs.  By and large, it will not.

    It is worth making a couple of other points about reciprocal tariff cuts.  Australia is too small a player in world markets to exercise significant clout in negotiating tariff cuts.  The only country for whom Australia is a major trading partner is New Zealand, which already has lower external tariffs than Australia and, under Closer Economic Relations (CER), negligible trade barriers against Australia's exports.

    Secondly, it is not correct to assume that Australia applies lower tariffs or fewer subsidies than its trading partners.  This is true for some products, but not for all.  In general, tariffs are lower in the USA and Japan than here.  Of course, some of our trading partners in the newly industrialising economies have much higher (tariff and other) import barriers than Australia.  But given that most of our trading partners already apply comparable or lower general tariffs than Australia, the case for reciprocity seems somewhat weak.


    MULTINATIONAL AGREEMENTS

    Many groups across the political spectrum have expressed concerns about the extent to which Australia's participation in multinational treaties and agreements undermines sovereignty and accountability.  Concerns include:

    • it allows the Commonwealth executive to determine major policy shifts without proper parliamentary scrutiny and without regard for the implications for other jurisdictions;  and
    • treaties restricting activities whose effects are purely domestic.

    There are, however, instances where issues can only be resolved by international co-operation and agreement, principally those in which activities undertaken in one country have a direct impact on citizens of other countries.  Greenhouse gas emissions are probably one such instance -- for all of the flaws of the Kyoto Conference, it is only through such mechanisms that the greenhouse gas issue can be addressed (indeed, the key flaw at Kyoto was that it was not truly global in scope -- many countries are not obliged to reduce emissions).

    The rules of international trade and investment are similarly a legitimate case for international agreement.  Australians must consider carefully whether, for example, the benefits of signing the MAI (a greater quality and quantity of foreign investment) are worth the costs (loss of sovereignty and domestic policy flexibility), and what exemptions or conditions it might like to apply.  It should also ensure that proper debate and consultation are permitted.  But it should not refuse to abide by international rules and agreements as a matter of principle.


    INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FLOWS

    Concerns about the volatile, unpredictable and apparently irrational flows of hot money around the world are not confined to economic nationalists.  Recent events in Asia starkly demonstrate the real economic damage which can be caused by abrupt shifts in market sentiment.

    The Australian Greens' proposal for a 0.5 per cent tax on all international transactions has a respectable economic pedigree.  Such a tax (a "Tobin" tax) has been proposed as one means to dampen short-term speculative shifts of cash around the globe.  It is not a bad idea (though 0.5 per cent seems too high) -- assuming, of course, that all other countries agree to do the same (see Multinational Agreements above).

    Other proposals, for example that transactions should be evaluated on individual merit and could only proceed with administrative approval, raise the prospect of a bureaucratic and administrative nightmare for businesses engaged in trade.  Such bureaucratic discretion is an open invitation either for personal corruption -- as is the case in Asia and elsewhere -- or the worst sort of interest group politics.


    RE-REGULATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

    Re-regulation of the financial sector raises the spectre of a vastly reduced range of finance options and much lower competition which would ultimately harm all businesses and consumers.

    In effect, most proposals would compel finance companies to undertake poor commercial behaviour -- lending below cost to certain categories of customers or, alternatively, refusing to lend to viable customers.

    Subsidised loans for some customers could only be achieved at a higher cost to other people -- whether financed through cross-subsidies between banking customers (for example, from householders to farmers) or through additional taxes.

    More intrusive direction of banking activities could have even greater consequences.  A return to "command-and-control" direction of, for example, the banking sector, would be sustainable only if all minor banks and non-bank lenders were subject to the same rules -- one of the main impetuses behind deregulation was the fact that, as borrowers were faced with a wider choice of lending institutions, they could choose to borrow elsewhere.  Regulation of the banks was no longer enough to regulate the whole finance sector, and banks lost customers and competitiveness as a result.  Financial market regulation would be possible only if the range of financing options and the diversity of financial service providers were greatly reduced.

    This would do great harm to the business and household consumers of financial services, who have benefited substantially from greater competition and diversity in the financial services market.

    Events in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in Asia over the past year, have clearly demonstrated that there is a case for some government regulation of financial businesses.  But this role lies in ensuring proper prudential requirements, adequate asset backing, transparent accounting and the appropriate treatment of non-performing loans, not in directing financial institutions to cross-subsidise between customers or lend only to certain types of customer.  Indeed, this latter form of government intervention appears to have contributed to the Asian meltdown.


    SELECTIVE INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE

    Much of the economic nationalist agenda focuses on attempts to shape economic development by targeting assistance at certain industries or types of business.

    The problem with picking winners is that every business and industry not picked is a loser.  The losers carry the direct costs of providing the taxes to pay for others' subsidies, and indirect costs through the re-direction of investment funds and consumer spending towards subsidised activity.  Ultimately, the whole economy loses, unless government is better able to judge what consumers want than they are themselves.

    A business which is a viable commercial proposition should need no direct assistance from government in order to succeed, unless its success is imperilled by government itself -- for example by inappropriate taxation or regulatory regimes.  In this case, the best solution is to fix the problem, not to try to compensate for it.

    Businesses invest in what they believe are viable commercial propositions.  Financial institutions and the stock market provide money for them if they agree.  Differing degrees of risk against potential profits are reflected in different interest charges or rates of return on investment.

    Picking winners is the central role of business, lending institutions and stock markets.  If they pick losers they fail;  if they are too risk-averse to pick potential winners then they also fail.  They have greater expertise and a greater incentive to "get it right" than the government or public servants.

    In a country such as Australia with sophisticated financial markets, the chances of the government identifying and rectifying errors of judgement on the part of the stock markets or banks are far out-weighed by the risk of losing taxpayers' money in attempts to support businesses and industries which cannot attract private funding.  If the usual sources of risk capital will not voluntarily support a project, there can be no case for compelling taxpayers to do so.

    If there is seldom a genuine case in which government should pick winners;  the case against picking losers is even more clear-cut.

    A business which is too great a risk for commercial lenders and investors to support is generally too great a risk for the taxpayer to support.

    As experience in South Australia and Victoria showed, projects whose likely returns are not adequate for the risks involved get fobbed off on to the long-suffering taxpayer.  Another clear example of this is the experience of the West Australian Government of the late 1980s.  A substantial amount of taxpayers' money was committed to questionable ventures and the result after the collapse was a period of slower economic growth and an increased burden on taxpayers.  These debacles not only made the community worse off, they undermined public faith in the political process.

    Supporting industries and businesses which are otherwise not commercially viable represents a transfer of resources from efficient industries and businesses to inefficient ones.  It is also a direct inhibitor to fair competition -- the purpose of picking losers is to enable a business or industry to survive which would otherwise be uncompetitive.


    TAXATION

    While many economic nationalists advocate some measure of tax reform, none appear actively to support a broad-based consumption tax, though positions range from an open mind to outright opposition.  Those that oppose a GST-type tax usually take the view that it is regressive.  For example, the Australian Democrats have argued that "broadly based consumption taxes are inequitable because the same amount of tax is paid on the purchase of a particular good or service irrespective of the buyer's level of income.  A general consumption or value added tax will not be introduced or supported".  However, they appear to have moderated this position recently.


    COMPETITION POLICY

    Antipathy to competition policy echoes the themes outlined above -- that it reduces governments' capacity to discriminate between businesses and businesses' capacity to collude.

    The Australian Democrats seem to believe that the private benefit enjoyed by small businesses when they are treated more favourably than large ones is synonymous with community benefit.

    This misses the key point about the intent and effect of competition policy -- it is properly concerned only with promoting the interests of consumers, not of particular businesses or types of businesses.  Where taxis are licensed and regulated, there tend to be fewer taxis and they charge higher prices.  Deregulated trading hours allow consumers to shop when they want to, not when the government thinks they should.  Potatoes sold through marketing authorities are more expensive than those that are not.  From airlines to telecommunications, deregulation has delivered better quality services, greater choice and lower prices.

    This is not to say that totally free and open competition is always and everywhere a good thing.  Some of the economic nationalists' concerns about competition policy echo issues which have been raised over recent years and which contain some substance.  However, these issues are adequately addressed under competition policy guidelines, which permit anti-competitive behaviour deemed to be in the community interest.  The problem with most "economic nationalist" objections to competition policy is that they aim to put sectional interests above the community interest.


    PRIVATISATION

    Antipathy to privatisation is motivated by different rationales by different groups.  There is a fear of loss of "our" assets which echoes closely the arguments against foreign investment.  There is also a belief that the practices in which public monopoly businesses can indulge but in which competitive private businesses can't, represent a community benefit -- for example, over-manning and over-servicing (One Nation's opposition to the Telstra sale appears based on the job losses required to fit it for a competitive environment) and cross-subsidies to households and rural areas (and these can be maintained in a competitive privatised environment if the community decides it wants to pay for them).

    The Australian Democrats remain convinced that, by and large, the net revenue received for a privatised asset can never match the net present value of a publicly-owned asset because treasuries have access to cheaper interest rates than the private sector.  If this argument were correct, then all assets should be nationalised -- as they would then increase in value!  The error in the argument is that public-sector interest rates do not represent the risks involved with particular assets and so provide no useful basis for allocating capital -- which is one of the major problems with government ownership.

    There are also some legitimate concerns about which government activities are core activities and should therefore not be delegated -- for example, on private prisons.

    The case in favour of privatisation does not rest on an intrinsic preference for private ownership but on solid evidence that it delivers benefits:

    • private companies operating in competitive markets are better managed that public ones because their managers face real sanctions -- takeover or dismissal by shareholders -- if they fail to perform, and real rewards if they succeed;
    • private companies are more efficient than government-owned ones because they are free to focus on commercial objectives, rather than being subject to political interference regarding service levels and quality, pricing policies, investment strategies, etc;  and
    • private companies are free to raise capital outside of the government's capital-raising and borrowing policy framework.

    Privatisation reduces governments' conflict of interest as the owner of a specific monopoly business and the agency responsible for regulating the industry in the general interest.  As owner of Telstra, it was in the Government's financial interest to extract as much monopoly profit as possible from consumers.  But as economic manager and regulator, its responsibility was to look after the interests of consumers.

    Privatisation means that taxpayers are no longer required to underwrite commercial risk.  Shareholders investing in private banks accept the risk that the bank will fail or under-perform in the hope that it will make a profit.  Taxpayers had no choice but to pick up the costs of the losses and failures of State-owned banks and financial institutions in the early 1990s.  Taxpayers should not be obliged to underwrite the risk of essentially commercial enterprises.


    THE LABOUR MARKET

    The parties examined differed greatly in the extent to which they wished to regulate the labour market.  In essence, all see labour market regulation as a defence against wage competition and a means of maintaining living standards.  Many see labour market programmes as a means of reducing unemployment.

    The problem with this approach is that living standards are ultimately determined by productivity.  To the extent that labour market regulation inhibits productivity growth it undermines average living standards.  Further, the cost of maintaining minimum wages above levels which match supply to demand is higher unemployment -- that is, a labour market that fails to clear.  There are other, better ways of ensuring that the living standards of the low-paid are underpinned, without denying the unemployed access to jobs.


    IMMIGRATION

    All the parties examined supported greatly reduced or zero net immigration, and all justified this policy on environmental not social/cultural/racial grounds.

    The environmental case against immigration is far from proven.  At its extreme (see for instance Tim Flannery's The Future Eaters), environmentalists see sustainable population as that which can be supported by the immediate environment.  Flannery presents a persuasive case that human populations have on occasion collapsed as they exhausted available resources, and a (less) persuasive case that humans have an unavoidable tendency to exhaust and degrade new environments before reaching ecological balance.  But the reality of most human societies over the past few millennia has been that the combined processes of trade and specialisation have allowed sustainable societies to exist without reliance only on immediately available resources.  Otherwise, Japan, Luxembourg and Switzerland would be impoverished countries with low population densities.

    There is, of course, a less extreme case for population control which relates higher population levels to greater environmental stress.  But there is no definitive formula specifying how much population is too much, and if there were, it would be constantly changing as environmental practices and technology change.

    Australia has reaped substantial benefits from its relatively high immigration intake.  Migrants bring human assets (education and experience) and financial assets which contribute to Australia's economy.  Rising population brings benefits in the form of higher demand for housing and consumer goods.  This demand in turn generates beneficial spin-offs through-out the economy.  It is no coincidence that the Australian States which usually record the fastest economic growth (Queensland and Western Australia) are also the States with the fastest population growth.

    Appropriate migration policy is a complex issue which must be shaped in the context of labour market, economic, social, and environmental considerations.

    There is no proven case that Australia's current population level is environmentally unsustainable, or that migration should cease.


    COMMON POLITICAL THREADS

    It is perhaps somewhat surprising that political parties which are perceived to have widely different agendas and to sit at opposite ends of the political spectrum should have so much in common.

    Certainly, it is not the aim of this paper to underplay or discount the profound policy differences between these groups, especially on racial, environmental and social policies.

    But their common policies are more than coincidence.  They reflect a common basis of disenchantment with the economic policies of the mainstream political parties which will inevitably reflect itself in support for alternative parties.  They are based on a sense of loss of economic and political control in the face of a globalising economy, a perception that the standard of living and quality of life of many Australians is deteriorating, that governments have no solution to hard-core economic problems such as unemployment, as well as antipathy to "big business" interests and the perceived agenda of policy elites.

    The "right-wing" parties' support is a backlash against "political correctness" and further evidence of a growing rift between urban and rural Australians and between the "golden triangle" of Sydney-Canberra-Melbourne and the rest of Australia.  This latter divide in particular was highlighted at the last Federal election, when Labor won just 18 of 94 seats outside of the "Triangle".  They contain elements of nostalgia but are also rooted in deep Australian political traditions of both left and right.  They derive some credibility from the fact that the groundwork for their economic nationalist policies has been well prepared by the older minority parties and by groups as diverse as unions, sections of the ALP, charities and churches who have publicly criticised economic rationalism.  And they provide a base for a wide and perhaps unlikely range of support, such as the surprisingly high proportion of immigrants among One Nation supporters and candidates.

    Nor is the politically-correct wing of the economic nationalist spectrum entirely innocent of a xenophobic shade to its anti-internationalism.  The international trade component of the Greens' and Democrats' economic policies is based on a series of questionable or wrong assumptions:

    • that trade and international competition are zero-sum games, in which Australia can only win if others lose, and vice versa;
    • that imports are inherently bad but exports are virtuous (for example, The Australian Greens are concerned at the "erosion of local culture in the face of imports that have a strong cultural element such as films, electronic media, music and food");
    • that Australian culture and living standards are under threat from competition from low-wage or environmentally-destructive countries and that we must be protected from competition which will drive us all to a lowest common denominator of dirty industry and low wages;
    • that Australian sovereignty is undermined by voluntary entry into multinational agreements and treaties on international trade and investment (but not, apparently, on human rights, indigenous rights, labour standards or the environment);
    • that Australia has every right to damage the living standards of foreigners by imposing economic sanctions on countries whose human rights or other policies we find distasteful;  and
    • that foreigners' engagement in economic activity in Australia is intrinsically undesirable, to the extent that it is acceptable to expropriate their property.

    ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY

    Whether they originate from the political left or the political right, the policies of economic nationalism have the potential to do enormous damage to Australia.  Even though the advocates of radical economic nationalism are unlikely to win government in their own right, they could hold the balance of power in the Senate.  Further, support for "economic nationalist" policies is so widespread that it would be inappropriate and potentially damaging to continue dismissing them as too absurd to be worthy of attention.  Paul Kelly commented in the Australian (17 June 1998) that "Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party is now a parliamentary force and deserves to be taken seriously".  This is especially true as many of the policies it advocates are also central to a range of other political parties and groups, even though the various groups may believe that they advocate those policies for very different reasons.  In addition, the depth and breadth of support for these views across the community means that the mainstream political parties will be unable to ignore them.  Elements of the Labor and National parties, in particular, appear to be moving closer to them.

    The economic nationalists share a narrow and mistaken view of Australia's economic interests.  Because of their great potential to do much harm to Australia, economic nationalist ideas deserve to be criticised and opposed in their own right -- regardless of any other baggage that may be associated with them in particular cases.

    These ideas do, however, have a fairly broad currency in the general population.  It is essential, therefore, that the debate not be merely an activity of policy "elites" but be conveyed to the wider electorate.

    Economic nationalism gets much of its power from appealing to patriotic feeling and to various fears and insecurities.  Those who wish to criticise such ideas should point out that it is in fact those who are in favour of opening up Australia to the outside world who have far more confidence in the capacity and skills of Australians than those who would forgo the enormous advantages of international trade and investment because of a series of largely specious fears.  Economic nationalism also assumes a level of competence, knowledge and guaranteed honesty in public officials which seems highly inappropriate -- even dangerous.  It is ironic that parties whose support is drawn largely from voters disillusioned with politicians and bureaucrats have built their economic platforms around giving more power to, and putting more reliance on, government.  Economic nationalist ideas should be opposed because they are wrong;  and are not as difficult to argue against as many commentators seem to fear.



    ENDNOTE

    1.  This expression has been used by both Pauline Hanson and Cheryl Kernot (in her previous role as leader of the Australian Democrats) to describe their respective economic policies.



    SELECTED POLICY POSITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES SUPPORTING ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

    ONE NATION (PAULINE HANSON)

    • Restrict foreign ownership:  Restriction of foreign ownership of Australia major goal and will support measures to "curtail foreign control" and to restrict foreign ownership of land.
    • Trade protection:  Tariffs to be at least equal those of trading partners, to be sufficient to prevent "unfair" competition and to preclude competing imports from countries "which provide no reciprocal export opportunities".  Quarantine restrictions to be strengthened.
    • Reduce participation in liberalising international agreements:  Oppose MAI and require full and open consultation before any involvement in multi-lateral trade agreements and treaties.
    • Re-regulate financial sector:  Establish government sponsored national bank to provide low interest loans to primary producers, rural industries, new industry/manufacturing ventures and small business.
    • Targeted industry assistance:  Provide incentives for small slaughtering operations, aquaculture, farm forestry on private land, fuel and registration incentives for rural industries, provide funding for beef marketing initiatives, continue regulation of farm gate milk prices.
    • Oppose privatisation:  Halt privatisation of "valuable assets".
    • Regulate labour market:  State and Federal Governments to set minimum levels of wages and fundamental work conditions.  Require builder to purchase a bond for coverage of debts to sub-contractors before each job.
    • Reduce immigration:  Zero net immigration -- immigration levels to equal emigration levels.
    • Oppose competition policy:  Eliminate those elements which currently inhibit or prevent operation of peak rural industry bodies, producer contribution to decision-making, dairy supply management system and co-operatives and producer marketing bodies.

    AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS

    • Restrict foreign ownership:  Strengthen restrictions on foreign investment including a Foreign Investment Review Commission for all foreign investment to be judged for "net economic benefit".  Introduce a register of foreign owned assets.
    • Trade protection:  Impose import quotas, halt and reverse tariff cuts up to WTO/GATT limits plus higher tariffs to protected "threatened" industries and impose surcharge on luxury imports.  Ban environmentally damaging imports.
    • Reduce participation in liberalising international agreements:  Oppose MAI.
    • Re-regulate financial sector:  Government to regulate housing interest rates and to direct financial institutions to provide "affordable finance" to specified categories of borrowers.  Increased control over creation of credit by banks and building societies.  Government supervision of foreign exchange transactions.
    • Targeted industry assistance:  Government incentives for export and import-replacement industries, for high-technology industries, environmentally sensitive tourism, human services, recycling, small business, co-operatives.
    • Taxation changes:  Tax threshold steadily raised to poverty line and then indexed with rapidly increasing progressive taxation for income more than five time average after-tax income.  Introduce wealth tax for assets of $1 million or more and introduce inheritance tax.  Replace payroll tax with land tax, with additional tax for land not used for economic or conservation purposes.  Oppose broad-based consumption tax.
    • Oppose privatisation:  Privatisation is "selling family silver" and generating a net loss of revenue, oppose privatisation of Telstra and other government businesses.  Require public inquiry to demonstrate public benefit and consumer impact statement for all privatisations.
    • Regulate labour market:  Indexation of basic award components and introduce effective price controls.  Provide paid retraining at all age levels.  Introduction of industrial democracy and democratic control over key elements of industry and increase staffing of regulatory agencies.  Introduce guaranteed basic income ultimately to replace all income support measures and "ensure that people may move in and out of formal employment with dignity and without fear for their livelihood".  Require formal accounting on the status of women and disadvantaged groups in their workplaces for all bodies of 30 employees or more.  Require all enterprises to employ on the basis of equal pay for equal work and all awards to contain provisions for paid and unpaid parental leave.  Require all medium and large enterprises to provide childcare.
    • Reduce immigration:  Zero net immigration -- immigration levels to equal emigration levels.
    • Oppose competition policy:  Closely monitor operation of competition policy to ensure interests of regional areas, low income families, small business and the environment are addressed which "clearly they have not been to date".
    • Taxing or restricting flow of financial investment:  Disincentives for movement of financial funds and services overseas including small tax on foreign exchange transactions.

    GREENS

    • Restrict foreign ownership:  Foreign Investment Review Board to scrutinise all investments of $5 million or more.
    • Trade protection:  Strict monitoring of import and export prices to prevent transfer pricing.  Limit trade in goods and services produced by environmentally unsustainable or socially unjust methods.
    • Reduce participation in liberalising international agreements:  WTO and ILO to be amended to ensure "full recognition of the over-riding necessity or environmental and social arrangements".
    • Re-regulate financial sector:  Banks to be required, as part of licence, to undertake "substantial social obligations and subsidise operation of accounts with low balances without higher charges".  Restrict power of banks to foreclose, require them to take responsibility for "odious" debt and to fully inform borrowers of risks.
    • Taxation changes:  Increase tax as a share of GDP with tax system to be progressive with increased Medicare levy.  Introduce inherited wealth tax for assets of $1 million or more.  Tax to penalise environmentally destructive behaviour and reward environmentally beneficial behaviour, shift from taxing labour income to taxing capital and resource income.  Replace existing sales tax system to improve efficiency and transparency, introduce a service tax, and differential rate on luxury items.
    • Oppose privatisation:  No privatisation of essential government business enterprises such as water, electricity, roads and communications.
    • Regulate labour market:  Support maintenance of system of industrial awards and processes of conciliation and arbitration and legislation to establish a Charter of Workers' Rights.  Recognition of right of all workers to be involved in participatory planning.  Support "highest standards of workplace health and safety".
    • Reduce immigration:  Voluntary immigration program to be reduced as "part of a strategy to achieve eventual stabilisation of the Australian population".
    • Taxing or restricting flow of financial investment:  Tax system to discourage foreign debt and foreign speculation via "Tobin tax" on foreign exchange.

    AUSTRALIA FIRST (GRAEME CAMPBELL)

    • Restrict foreign ownership:  Bring foreign ownership and investment "back under control".  Certain public facilities to remain in Australian hands -- city water supplies, communication facilities, public transport facilities, emergency services.
    • Trade protection:  Hostile to free trade, sees a "legitimate role for import quotas and tariffs" and in favour of government purchasing to "buy Australian".
    • Reduce participation in liberalising international agreements:  Oppose MAI.  No treaty that "compromises our sovereignty" to be signed without the mandate of an election or referendum.
    • Re-regulate financial sector:  Re-establish the Commonwealth Development Bank as "the source of development finance for new and growing productive businesses".
    • Targeted industry assistance:  Industry policy to "identify industry sectors with growth potential and support them with sensible bounties, taxation incentives and accessible finance ... use government purchasing policy ... to give these sectors a sound domestic base".
    • Taxation changes:  Taxation system to encourage investment "in productive industry and not mere property development and speculation".  Sceptical about a GST.
    • Oppose privatisation:  Against privatisation of natural monopolies.
    • Regulate labour market:  Support traditional industrial relations arrangements.
    • Reduce immigration:  Immigration to be reduced to zero net immigration.

    ADVANCE AUSTRALIA (REX CONNOR JNR)

    • Restrict foreign ownership:  Continues the tradition of Rex Connor Snr, the man who wanted to "buy back the farm".
    • Trade protection:  Re-introduce tariffs on manufactured goods.  Stop all "unnecessary" importation of food products.
    • Re-regulate financial sector:  Re-regulate banking and financial sectors.  Low interest, long term loans for first home buyers.
    • Taxation changes:  Review all taxation scales.  Increase benefits, via tax incentives and other means, for the traditional family.  Reject any GST.
    • Oppose privatisation:  Return to a "genuine 'mixed' economy with a strong, effective & efficient public sector".
    • Regulate labour market:  Support traditional industrial relations arrangements.
    • Reduce immigration:  Temporary halt to all immigration until unemployment problems solved.

    Sunday, July 19, 1998

    Small Business Gets Energy Cut

    Business is set to get another big dividend from reform of the electricity sector.

    As of next month, many small businesses will be free to choose their electricity supplier and thereby take advantage of the lower prices offered by the deregulated market.  Judging from current prices in the deregulated market, this should reduce electricity bills by around 20% and save the small business sector at least $50 million.

    Over the last few years, large-to-medium electricity consumers have been able to reap huge gains from the deregulated electricity market.  When this market was first established back in 1994-95, the regulated price for the energy component of the bill for medium-to-large consumers stood at $40 per megawatt hour.  Although the players expected the price to come down somewhat with the introduction of competition, the general expectation at the time was for a price over the long term of around $35 per megawatt hour.  To the consumers' surprise -- and the producers' despair -- prices in the deregulated market have fallen steadily and currently average less than $20 per megawatt hour.

    How did the industry get it so wrong?  First, they underestimated the extent of over-capacity in the national grid -- both in Victoria and New South Wales.  Second, they did not adequately factor in the improvement in operating efficiency available from privatisation.  Third, the Victorian generators did not expect the publicly owned generators in NSW to fight so hard and on uncommercial terms for market share.

    Nonetheless, they did get it wrong and, according to the experts, the pressure for low prices is expected to continue for the next three to four years.  After that, who knows?

    From 1 July, firms consuming more than 160 megawatts hours per year will also be allowed to buy electricity from the deregulated market.  This group represents around 15% of the State's electricity consumption and over 8,000 -- mostly small -- businesses.

    Currently these businesses pay roughly about $100 per megawatt hour and spend between $20,000 and $90,000 per annum on electricity.  As such, electricity represents a major operating cost.  The current charge comes in two parts.  A charge for the energy which currently averages about $40 per megawatt hour and a charge for the cost of the lines, poles and retailing.

    After the end of this month, the 160-megawatt customers will still be required to pay the gazetted charges for the line and poles, but will be free to buy their energy from any of the over 30 registered electricity retailers at the market price.

    This means that most will be able to achieve savings of at least $20 per megawatt hour or 20% off their electricity bills.  This translates into savings of between $4,000 and $18,000 per firm.  There will be some variation in the extent of savings, because of the difference in line charges and effect of time-of-day tariffs.

    Not all small businesses consume enough electricity to qualify for the deregulated market.  Although the smaller customers will receive some price relief via the phased reduction in regulated prices, they will have to wait, along with households, until the year 2000, to join the deregulated market.

    Nonetheless, the reform dividend will give a boost to many firms in the new financial year.


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    Naming Rights

    Last week the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council screamed "Gotcha" to One Nation.  sing this leader -- which harks back to a London tabloid's exultant headline after British forces sank the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War -- the council published the names of 2,000 members of Pauline Hanson's party in its magazine, the Australia/Israel Review.

    A great many other Jews were angry that such a nasty and foolish deed was carried out by a group which wants to be seen as serving the interests of Jewish people in Australia.  Although it is a small private body, the council's name caused many non-Jews to believe it is a representative organisation.

    As is often the case in these matters, both sides of the argument made an immediate dash to the Nazis.  Some opponents of the Australia/Israel Review's action likened it to the lists of Jews sent to Hitler's concentration camps, a comparison which was overdone, to say the least.

    Supporters said that the list included the lead singer in a neo-Nazi band.  And a Sydney rabbi told ABC Radio that, had lists of Nazi party members been published in Germany in the early 1930s, the Holocaust might not have occurred.  But such a claim is deranged, both in its suggestion that the majority of One Nation members are comparable to Nazis, and in its total failure to understand the psychology of real extremists, who would not care whether or not they were exposed.

    It should also be realised that at different times and places over the past couple of decades the ALP, the Liberals, and the Nationals have all been infiltrated by extremists of the left or the right.  But previously, no-one ever suggested that the answer to this problem was to publish the names of all party members indiscriminately.

    The Australia/Israel Review itself offered real cant in an attempt to justify its publication of the list.  It claimed to be concerned about the secrecy pervading a party which had "emerged initially as a grass roots movement", but where members were now unable to communicate with each other.  In other words, it seemed to be suggesting that it was acting as a benefactor and helping members to make contact with their fellows in other branches.

    The magazine also claimed that it had withheld the addresses and telephone numbers of members "in the interests of privacy".  But the magazine did not care tuppence about anyone's privacy.  It is very easy to work out the details of many people on the list, especially those with less common names or who live in small towns.  Using a sample of 250 names as a test, I was able to discover the full addresses and telephone numbers for around 30 per cent in only a couple of hours.

    Given the physical violence that has already been directed against One Nation supporters, publication of the list can only be seen as intimidation -- not against extremists who have infiltrated the party, or its autocratic leaders -- but against a rather haphazard collection of ordinary people who have joined One Nation for a variety of reasons.  Had an Arabic newspaper, or a magazine of the anti-Israel hard left published a list of members of a Zionist organisation, there would have been much justifiable outrage and anxiety in the Jewish community, and the Australia/Israel Review would have led the condemnation.

    There are a couple of other interesting ironies in the Australia/Israel Review's action.  I suspect that many of those it has "outed" and left vulnerable to harassment and worse are people who strongly support Israel.

    The bulk of One Nation's members are probably people with socially conservative, rather than racist or anti-Semitic attitudes.  Such people tend to admire Israel because of its strong sense of national pride, its compulsory military service, and what they see as its uncompromising and unsentimental approach to Palestinians and the Islamic world.  And some other members of One Nation are likely to be fundamentalist Christians who support Israel because they believe that its existence fulfils biblical prophecies.

    The other irony is perhaps even more difficult for the Australia/Israel Review to acknowledge.  But by comparison with some of the groups which play a prominent and influential part in Israeli politics, such as the National Religious Party, Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party are really quite moderate.

    And Israel's immigration program, which is designed to preserve the Jewish identity of the nation, is no less discriminatory than One Nation's desire to ensure that Australia's immigration policies maintain our essentially European character.  Although there are some Jews both inside and outside Israel who would like the country to change its ethnic policies -- the so-called "post-Zionists" -- the chances of this occurring in the foreseeable future are very slender.

    One Nation's hostility to Aboriginal land rights is matched by the unwillingness of most Israeli politicians to acknowledge the property rights of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who fled, or who were expelled, during Israel's war of independence in 1948.  And while no Australian public figure, not even Pauline Hanson, attempts to deny the great injustices that Aborigines suffered in the course of our history, it is still very risky for any Israeli politician to acknowledge the similar wrongs that have been inflicted on Palestinians over the past fifty years.

    Certainly, Israel has successfully maintained its democratic institutions under the most adverse conditions.  But even though the external threats to its survival have diminished considerably in recent years, religious and right-wing extremists retain their ability to prevent the kinds of changes that would create a genuinely liberal and pluralist nation.

    Unfortunately, the Australia/Israel Review's offensive and counter-productive action against One Nation is an example of a more general phenomenon.  Members of other ethnic groups are also frequently angered and embarrassed by statements supposedly made in their name by self-serving and unrepresentative "spokespeople".  It is the price ethnics pay for the debased and politicised form of multiculturalism that has taken hold in Australia.


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