Probably no set of ideas will ever completely dominate an Australian political party, still less a government. Nor will any victory last forever. But the near 50-year history of the group known as the Dries chronicles a time when national policy came to be substantially influenced by a group of federal Liberal MPs and contains powerful lessons for today's Liberals.
A my new book, Dry: In Defence of Economic Freedom, is invaluable contemporary history: it is a fascinating insight into federal politics from the 1960s to the present era, a tour de force on the role of ideas in politics, an interesting statement of Dry principles and policies, and a practical politician's guide to what works in government-driven reform.
Its message on the importance of ideas is strong and immediate for Victorian Liberals.
Victoria has just been through an election in which the Liberal Party was routed. For those who loudly and repeatedly repudiate the past achievements of their party, I recommend my discussion of the best approach for reform-driven governments.
Ever the practical person, I acknowledge that rapid and broad fundamental reform might cost some votes but I also make the point that the Kennett government's standing was highest when its reform agenda was most active.
Government is not an end in itself; they lose power for many reasons -- not always reasons entirely under their own control.
The Kennett government's inheritance from Joan Kirner demanded radical redress. Moving on as broad a front as we could manage divided our opposition. Even formerly tightly organised groups such as the trade unions, faced with fundamental change on virtually every front, found it difficult to marshal effective opposition around any single issue. Unable to fight on one front, in fact, they found it difficult to fight at all.
I characterise Jeff Kennett as believing "better a one-term premier than a failure". Like most snapshots, this oversimplifies Kennett, but if those were the options, then I for one would make the choice I attribute to Jeff.
Much of what the Kennett government achieved is important. Much of it cannot be undone. In many cases, they gave people more power over their own lives and cut the power of vested interests. They certainly consciously set out to do so.
It is not to agree with all my analysis to concede they made mistakes -- everyone does. But I have no doubt that had the Kennett government adopted a gradualist and piecemeal approach, Victoria would be less prosperous and less free than it is today.
Those who want their community to be improved must take the opportunity they are given. To defer doing the right thing is not only to abandon the trust people give when they elect a government but to risk never having the opportunity to implement what has been delayed. Moreover, there is ample evidence that reforming on a wide front reduces effective opposition and neutralises the power of vested interests.
On the other hand, there is scant evidence that well-founded reform necessarily costs reforming governments office. Political parties are more likely to fail if they are seen not to believe in anything, don't have a clear plan and appear opportunistic.
There are governments content to do little or nothing; to attempt popularity by never risking antagonising anyone. I believe that that is not a viable long-term political strategy. The electorate has an innate good sense that sees through such abdication of responsibility and common sense. It was never an option in 1992, and perhaps it was to Victoria's long-term good fortune that its political leaders of the time probably could not have governed like that anyway.
My colourful history makes similar points as the Dries stand true to their principles through the political expediency of successive Australian prime ministers.
Prime ministers do not fare well in the book.
I found surprising credit in Bob Hawke's record but am generally scathing about the expediency of Liberals and, especially, about Paul Keating.
The Dries' battles began with Robert Menzies. I describe how, for his own ends, Menzies encouraged the Dry icon, Bert Kelly, to argue against 1966 tariff legislation, then, when his stand might have driven the Country Party from the Coalition, how Menzies "arose and descended on (Kelly) from a great height and gave McEwan the opportunity to do the same".
The political realist, I conclude "Such is politics", but neither Kelly nor the other Dries were dampened by such experiences.
I am especially critical of Malcolm Fraser, concluding two somewhat sardonic chapters thus: "On March 5 (1983), one of Australia's less satisfactory governments came to its anticipated end".
I compliment Hawke (and, as treasurer, Keating) for implementing many Dry policies (with the marked exception of labour market reform). But I am strident in my condemnation of Keating's cynicism on John Hewson's Fightback! package. I acknowledge Keating's political gutter-fighting ability but pen a pithy epitaph: "Keating traded the opportunity of a very honourable place in Australian political history for another term as prime minister".
The difference between the attitude to political principles of the Dries and that of the New South Wales Labor Right is writ large when one can easily imagine that, while Keating would want longevity and history, forced to choose, he would regard my conclusion as the better deal.
Mine is a timely warning against expediency and a powerful argument for sound policy founded in consistency to principles -- it works politically and it benefits the community.
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