1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign affairs and defence are joined in this chapter because they are two extremes of a continuum. Australia's diplomats, intelligence officers and foreign ministers are our first line of defence. This is no literary affectation. Diplomacy is preferable to war as a means of resolving international conflicts; and, the other side of the coin, Australia's ability to deter or defeat attack is dependent on the collection and assessment of, and, especially, the response of our politicians to, information about other countries' capabilities and intentions.
2. FOREIGN POLICY
The prime object of foreign and defence policy is national security. This means much more than the protection of Australia from invasion. Australia is a free, open, democratic, and still prosperous country, whose people readily accept the legitimacy of their governments and institutions. The task of government is to maintain and improve this state of affairs. Our foreign policy must be directed at promoting a world environment conducive to this goal, and our defence policy must accord with our foreign policy.
Security requires looking towards the future; like other kinds of investment, it means forgoing present satisfaction in order to increase the chance of achieving a desired goal in a largely unpredictable future. The time-scale is in years or decades, not weeks or months. This makes national security policy very difficult for politicians in democracies, who find it hard to give security the priority it needs when electoral pressures favour the more immediate gratifications of welfare increases or tax cuts.
2.1 REASONS FOR ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST
The President of the United States of America has to justify and explain, and is exposed for doing the sorts of things he has done, such as sending arms to Iran. The first time that that sort of public discussion takes place in the Soviet People's Congress, I will join the honourable member in his defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (1)
Australia is a liberal democracy and a member of the world's community of liberal democracies. The values (human rights, personal, political and economic freedom) to which these countries subscribe and which they variously attempt to implement in pluralist, largely market-based ways are those to which the vast majority of humanity subscribe when given a chance. Peace and civilisation depend on them. They are worth defending.
No amount of talk about "kicking commie cans" or "reds under beds" can dispose of the current and fundamental reality of east-west tension, if only because the interests of the Soviet Union are different from those of the West.
A major reason for the difference is that, as Kolakowski and others have demonstrated, the Soviet state's claims to legitimacy rest on its own Marxist-Leninist ideology, according to which it is a superior and culminating stage in the process of history. It is not legitimised, as are most non-communist governments, by democratic elections and/or an inheritance of constitutional tradition. The ideology is thus essential, and must be maintained as the centrepiece of the state whether anyone believes it or not: there is no other possible justification of the hardships, the repression, the slaughter, and the lies imposed on the peoples of the Russian Empire since 1917. The Soviet Union is still controlled by the heirs of Stalin, who have from time to time denounced his crimes but have not disowned the system he created. Although now largely in disuse, the apparatus of terror still exists. Economic reform is required to achieve growth rates sufficient to stop the living standards of ordinary citizens falling further behind the West, but it cannot be achieved without a retreat from the ideology and a loss of power and prestige for the nomenklatura, the Soviet establishment.
Meanwhile, the continued, stable and prosperous existence of the liberal democracies daily contradicts Marxism-Leninism: our very existence is an affront and a danger. As Robert Conquest puts it:
The way the Kremlin leaders treat a Soviet citizen who wishes to propagate any unorthodox idea is a clear indication of the way they regard such ideas, wherever found. It is a declaration that if we were in their power, they would do the same to us ... It is a denial of our right to exist. Why anyone should imagine that the Soviet attitude to foreign affairs has any different motivation is a mystery. It is in this sense that, as President Kennedy said, "Peace, in the last analysis, is a matter of human rights." ...
The central problem for Moscow seems to be this: the maintenance of the present political system will mean the gradual deterioration of the USSR into a second-class power. In principle, the rulers must either accept this or change their system. Neither option seems plausible. But a third possibility remains -- to embark on an expansionist foreign policy. This seems to have been the choice made in the mid-sixties, with the enormous investment not so much in the strategic missile force, which could, according to certain arguments, be considered a necessary match for that of the US, but in a huge navy, whose sole role is to export Soviet influence and apply Soviet pressure in hitherto virgin territory. (2)
Recent developments in the Indian and Pacific oceans accord with this suggestion. Another reason for an assertive foreign policy is that the leadership can present its successes as evidence of the correctness of the ideology and the inevitability of its triumph, thus both legitimising the regime and discouraging potential opposition. In the absence of a free press, failures are easily concealed from the regime's subjects.
It is worth reminding ourselves that none of the above is true of the authoritarian regimes so reviled by the Left. (3) Their dictators "legitimise" themselves, if they bother, with rigged elections or ad hoc justifications. Although they suppress "political" activity and violate human rights these regimes seldom seek and never achieve the total control of society that is the Marxist-Leninist goal. Authoritarian regimes of the right can be transformed into democracies (Portugal, Spain, some Latin American countries), and corrupt democracies can be salvaged (including, with luck, the Philippines), but no communist government has ever given way to a democratic successor.
To sum up, there can be no question of "moral equivalence of the superpowers": the United States is a free and democratic country in the same way that Australia is, whereas the Soviet Union is not. A totalitarian regime in the USA would be a catastrophe; a pluralist one in the USSR would be a triumph. On the broadest scale of world politics, our interests and those of the USA converge; ours and those of the Soviets do not. (Obviously there are all sorts of ways in which Australian and US interests will conflict at different times. The successful resolution of these differences will largely depend on the perception which each country has of the other's basic strength of commitment to the beliefs which unite us, and on the skilled and sophisticated management of the alliance relationship by both parties.) Acceptance of the difference between the USSR and USA does not mean that Australia cannot maintain what are diplomatically called friendly relations with both, but it does mean that the quality of the friendships must be very different.
An analogous situation exists when one of your neighbours has a record of fraud and violence: outwardly cordial relations may be maintained but the trust and respect of true friendship are out of the question. Even if the neighbour says he is reformed and becomes and remains outwardly a model citizen, except that he still beats his wife, trust and respect remain impossible. The analogy is not perfect, especially considering the Soviet leadership's exploitation of foreign policy successes to dishearten potential opposition at home.
Australia should be unequivocal about its commitment to freedom and democracy. We have a long-term national interest in the survival and strength of all the democracies: for one thing, if the others collapsed -- particularly the USA -- Australia could not long survive. Another reason is that, as President Kennedy and others have recognised, liberal democracies are among the strongest forces for peace. They are countries which regard military aggression as the last resort in international disputes. They do not start wars, least of all with each other.
Of course liberal democracies do get involved in wars. One of the first duties of a democratic government is to defend its people and their way of life. The values embodied in our democratic society are so important that in the last resort they are worth fighting to defend; for a democracy to submit to aggression would be to deny the importance of these values and undermine its own legitimacy.
One clear lesson of modern history is that dictators tend to misjudge the resolve of democracies and embark on what they believe will be easy conquest (Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin and, on a small but significant scale, Galtieri). A principal reason for this is that liberal democracies faced with no obvious threat allow their defence preparedness to diminish. Si vis pacem, para bellum is no less true now than in Roman times.
Against this it is often asserted that armaments add to international tension and increase the likelihood of war. This argument is used especially against Western nuclear weapons, but sometimes also against all defence preparedness on the part of the West. It is always misleading, for three main reasons. First, it ignores the difference between being prepared to use armed force to defend the nation against aggression and being prepared to use military aggression in pursuit of what is thought to be the national interest. Second, it ignores the fact that countries usually build up their arsenals in response to growing international tension; the exceptions are aggressors' preparations for aggression (for instance, the German rearmament of the 1930s). Although armaments may increase tension they did not cause it in the first place. Third, it equates defence preparedness with the possession of large armaments. Things are not so simple, and the resolve to use them is as important as the armaments themselves. For example, a lack of French national resolve or confidence was a major factor in the stunning success of the 1940 invasion by German forces inferior to the Allies in numbers of men, tanks and aircraft; this can be contrasted with the Finnish response to Soviet invasion the same year. Defence preparedness is perfectly compatible with genuine arms limitation agreements and other ways of reducing international tension (short of Munich-style appeasement).
The advent of intercontinental nuclear weapons and the balance of terror has horribly raised the stakes but has not changed the principles. The basic question is the same: in the last analysis, are the freedom and human rights and open society of Australia and the other Western democracies worth fighting for? If the answer is No, then no armaments will avail, for we shall have lost the will to use them; if the answer is Yes, then the democracies must have armaments sufficient to deter their adversaries, and the will, in the last resort, to use them.
Opponents of nuclear weapons ask, is it worth fighting to defend freedom and democracy if the price may be the end of civilisation or even of the human race? The answer is a grim paradox: we can only ensure their survival by facing the possibility. Soviet military doctrine asserts the possibility of surviving and winning a nuclear war, and the Soviet regime has often in the past shown its willingness to accept or impose huge numbers of casualties among its own subjects when the stake is its own survival; and, as we have seen, this survival can seem threatened by the mere existence of countries such as Australia, which show to its subjects the possibility of a preferable and more human way of life. As long as the Soviet regime responds to domestic pressures in ways quite alien to pluralist political experience., it cannot be relied upon to accept the comity of nations, and the rest of the world must be on guard.
The Government should make it clear that Australia is and will remain |
2.2 THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE
Australia can remain aligned with the West without any specific treaty commitments such as ANZUS, but to do so would in practice mean becoming self-reliant in defence. Unless we do so, which would be prohibitively expensive, we must to some extent depend on American protection and must offer something in return for it. The US communications facilities, port facilities for American warships, and the rest are little enough, but as long as we provide them we are playing some part in the Western alliance. They are approved of by most Australians, despite the scare tactics of the vocal minority opposing them and its generous media coverage.
One of the most important everyday practical aspects of the American connection is the exchange of intelligence. If this were ended -- as it probably would be if we made the Americans go home -- our capacity to monitor the offensive capabilities of regional powers and the capabilities in our region of other powers would be much diminished, with grave implications for our defence. The everyday benefits of the alliance also include access to military technology, information on weapons, tactics, interoperability and standardisation, joint exercises with large, high technology forces, and more. Also important is priority in supply and logistic support for weapons systems.
The alliance, however, is not founded on narrow matters of defence cooperation, and it is a mistake to speak of it as if it were. It is founded on the common interest of the democracies in maintaining a world order in which democracy can thrive and people enjoy the freedom and prosperity it can bring.
The American alliance should be maintained and strengthened. |
The Government should put considerable effort into countering the anti-American propaganda of the left and of much of the "peace" movement. Great care should be taken with the tone and phrasing of Ministers' speeches and other Government statements: for instance, to speak of "the two superpowers" invites the audience to equate them.
2.3 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Australia, a minor power, has been made to look foolish in recent years as its politicians and diplomats have strutted the world telling the big boys how to behave. This is an especial risk if what they say is directed as much at sections of domestic opinion as at its ostensible audience.
As explained in section 2.1, the nuclear arsenals are much more a product than a cause of East-West tension, and such tension will always exist in the absence of fundamental changes in the Soviet system (or, of course, Soviet achievement of world hegemony). The tension cannot be eliminated but may be reduced.
Australia should welcome and assist moves to reduce international Australia should oppose unilateral nuclear disarmament by the West. |
The Government should not establish a disarmament bureaucracy of the kind recommended by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. (4) Diplomatic pressure on the French to stop nuclear testing in the region should continue, partly in response to opinion in Australia and other regional countries, partly for possible use as a bargaining counter in negotiations over European Community agricultural export subsidies, and partly because the greater the diplomatic cost of testing, the more hope there is that the French will do it as seldom and as carefully as possible.
2.4 "NUCLEAR SHIP" VISITS
As a member of the Western alliance, Australia should welcome friendly visits by units of other members' armed forces. The port facilities we provide for US Navy ships operating in Pacific and Indian Oceans are significant parts of our contribution to the defence relationship with the USA and it is important that they continue. (A minor reason is that contributing more in other ways would be much more expensive: the US visits are a not-to-be-despised source of foreign currency.)
Nevertheless, protests against visits by ships which may carry nuclear weapons and/or which are nuclear powered must cause concern, not so much because of the number of the protesters but because of their increasing willingness to court injury and break the law, their exaggerated and emotive public statements and, above all, the disproportionate media coverage they gain.
The chances of a nuclear weapon being discharged in port by accident are fantastically remote. Radiation could conceivably be released if a warhead suffered physical damage in a handling accident, but the chances of this happening, and happening in such a way as to cause lasting contamination of part of a port or to expose any Australians to significant doses of radiation, are extremely remote.
Much the same is true of reactor accidents. Chernobyl showed how difficult it is to make a serious accident happen (the reactor was running under manual control and abnormal load conditions with all safety systems deliberately put out of action). At the time of writing, the US Navy had never had an accident in any port that resulted in a release of radioactivity.
As well as scare-mongering exaggeration of these dangers, opponents of "nuclear ship" visits allege that the presence of US Navy ships in an Australian port turns it into a "nuclear target" for the Soviet Union. Two points are relevant here. First, if the USA did take the initiative in starting a third world war (which is extremely unlikely), its ships would be needed on station and not in foreign ports. Second, the USSR has promised that it will not make first use of nuclear weapons (and the protesters are inclined to credit its good intentions); if the war began with a conventional attack in Europe by the Warsaw Pact, the US Fleet would be at sea before any nuclear exchange began.
Continue to welcome visits of ships of the US and other friendly |
Some measures must be taken to counter the protests against such visits: It is especially important to get the facts about the safety record of nuclear-powered ships and nuclear weapons across to the public to offset the scare-mongering and exaggeration of the protesters. Every opportunity should be taken to engage their leaders in rational debate; if the Government's spokesmen are well-informed and skilled in argument the protesters will be forced back on to irrational and hysterical assertions and the more easily discredited.
The Government must encourage and assist the States in controlling demonstrations against visiting warships. The ordinary law, including collision-at-sea and port regulations, should be enforced and Commonwealth Police and service personnel should be available to assist the State authorities. The popularity of the visits is adequately demonstrated by the reception given visiting warships at the RAN's anniversary; but it is worth a lot of effort to avoid television film showing foreign servicemen manhandling Australia civilians, or a demonstrator on a surfboard being swept into a ship's propellers.
2.5 REGIONAL POLICY
Though a minor power in world terms, Australia is a significant force in its South-East Asia/ South-West Pacific region. Our regional foreign policy goals may be described quite simply as peace, freedom and prosperity; but, as ever, the path from broad goals to specific policy objectives is not straightforward.
The region ranges from the dynamism of Singapore through the oppressive communism of Vietnam to the poverty-stricken micro-states of the Pacific. The fall of Marcos did not end instability in the Philippines and democracy there is at risk; Vietnam maintains huge armed forces for such a small and poor country; the USSR is expanding its base at Cam Ranh Bay and rapidly increasing its diplomatic and commercial influence in the Pacific.
We are a significant force in our region but not a dominant one. Australia and New Zealand are the only countries in the region that pass all the tests of a stable liberal democracy, although most countries in the region enjoy constitutional government in one form or another. Australia's relationships with most of its neighbours are therefore complicated by the fact that we do not believe their forms of government are quite good enough for Australians. The neighbours in turn can point to Australia's social problems and lacklustre economic performance, and to their own records on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, many of which are better than the world average.
Australia's policy must therefore tread a narrow path. On the one hand we want to minimise international tensions; on the other we want to promote our ideals of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. In the long term, if the ideals are worth anything, there is no conflict between these desires, but in the short term too much insistence on the ideals will offend our neighbours, and too much chumminess will compromise the ideals.
Australia also creates trouble for itself in the region with its trade and protection policies. As the economies of our neighbours have developed, we have tended to close our markets to their goods by tariffs and quotas as governments came under pressure from management and unions in affected industries to "save jobs". The policy has been self-defeating at home and counterproductive abroad. Jobs were saved in some industries, but at a great cost in lost job opportunities in other industries, less economic growth, and higher prices for Australian consumers; abroad, Australia has increasingly been viewed by our Asian and Pacific neighbours not as a friendly, generous and non-colonialist country, but as a selfish and self-centred nation which, for all its moralising, cares little about the needs of its less wealthy neighbours. In the Trade and Industry chapter we present policies for a move to free trade which will benefit ourselves and our neighbours.
A prime objective of the Government should be to assure regional |
This is particularly important in view of the suspicions our allies have of the implications of the Dibb Report for regional defence cooperation (see section 4 below). In particular, the Government should establish permanent consultative machinery with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and make it clear that it does not regard the Five Power Defence Arrangements as a dead letter.
2.5.1 New Zealand
Not long ago relations with New Zealand could have been mentioned in passing in a discussion of the western alliance and ANZUS, and otherwise taken for granted. This is no longer the case. New Zealand's effective withdrawal from the alliance (although not from the ranks of the liberal democracies) necessitates a re-examination of Australia-New Zealand relations.
Sentiment apart, an isolationist New Zealand is simply the largest of the Pacific Islands and a major trading partner, but less important to Australia in some ways than countries such as Indonesia and Singapore. On the other hand, a New Zealand committed to the alliance is a valuable assistant in countering Soviet moves into the Pacific. The Government should do its best to persuade New Zealand to rejoin the alliance. Otherwise, the New Zealanders will be on their own.
2.5.2 Indonesia
Indonesia is the most populous country in the region and the one with which relations at present offer the greatest chance of trouble. Although firmly aligned against communism, Indonesia is not a liberal democracy, and differing attitudes to debate and dissent in the two countries offer much scope for misunderstanding, exploited by sections of the left and of the media which have not forgiven Indonesia for pre-empting a communist takeover of East Timor in the vacuum after Portuguese withdrawal.
The Government must take great care to treat Indonesia as the important neighbour it is, and not as the tin-pot dictatorship it is sometimes painted as. Genuine understanding between countries with such different politics and cultures does not come easily, and Australians should worry if their politicians seem too pally with oligarchs or autocrats of any kind: but it is very important to regain a good working relationship with Indonesia after the ups and downs of the last decade, and, without jeopardising that relationship, to encourage movement towards democracy.
One of the reasons for the importance of good working relations and trust between the two countries is that Indonesia is better situated than any other country for military action against Australia and has useful forces of her own. Another is that the seabed between northern Australia and Indonesia contains valuable oil reserves and there is scope for conflict over where each country should be allowed to drill. A third is the possibility of conflict between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea over Indonesian policy in Irian Jaya, which would put Australia in a difficult position.
2.6 CHINA
The experiment with economic liberalisation in China is one of the most important world developments in recent years, not least because economic freedom creates a demand for political freedom. Despite the warning in section 2.3 about over-estimating Australia's influence in the world, Australia is well placed to assist and encourage the Chinese in small ways: Chinese economics and management students at Australian universities, Australian lecturers at Chinese universities, other exchanges. Our advantage over Japan and the USA in this regard is that Australia poses no threat, military or economic, to China. The Government should take steps to increase the number of Chinese postgraduate students coming to Australia, which has sharply dropped since imposition of a visa fee.
The Chinese communist party retains totalitarian political control, however, so tension between an economy that permits individual enterprise and a polity that suppresses individual dissent will grow until there is either political liberalisation or an economic crack-down. It is much too early to count China as one of the free nations.
2.7 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Australia's membership of most international organisations is inexpensive and, on balance, useful. Despite its profligacy and inadequacies the United Nations is a useful forum for international relations and Australia should continue to be an active member (although our votes should reflect our interests and those of our allies, rather than a desire to curry favour with non-aligned nations). The World Bank is one of the strongest forces for sensible development and economic policies in the Third World, and its International Development Association usually makes very good use of aid money.
Not all UN agencies give Australia value for money, however, either as forums in which our national interests can be advanced or protected or as effective conduits by which we can aid people in developing countries. The case against UNESCO, for example, is clear and there are more effective ways of spending taxpayers' money. Australia should leave UNESCO and assess the cost and benefits of Australian membership in other international organisations. The test should be whether the money we spend on the organisations could be used more effectively elsewhere. Some of the savings should be used to increase other forms of aid.
2.8 BILATERAL AID
The biggest bilateral aid item is "budget support" for Papua New Guinea, currently amounting to about 30 per cent of PNG budget outlays. Other aid given by Australia to individual countries can be roughly divided into two kinds: disaster relief and development aid. Total bilateral aid for the year is estimated at $724 million including $304 million PNG budget support.
Disaster relief includes blankets and tents and medical teams for victims of flood or earthquake, and food (or Hercules aircraft) for famines. There are many examples in the history of aid of the delivery of forms of relief which have for technical or cultural reasons been of no use to the people they were meant to help, but aid agencies learn from experience and these are now less common.
An important remaining problem is the way in which many of the third world's food problems have been caused or worsened by misguided government policies. For example, government-controlled low food prices in many African countries (an attempt to ensure cheap food for city-dwellers) have destroyed the incentive for peasant farmers to produce more than needed for themselves and their families. Inefficient and corrupt government marketing, storage and handling organisations waste much of what is produced. In some countries, farmers who attempt to build up reserves of food and seed for bad seasons have been accused of hoarding and speculation and their grain has been confiscated. Food production has been disrupted by forced resettlement for ideological reasons (e.g. Tanzania) or military ones (e.g. Ethiopia).
Where there is reason to believe that famine in a developing country is |
Development aid is longer-term aid intended to assist economic development of recipient countries, and is also available as a tool of foreign policy. It should be used as such: in allocating the aid it can afford to give, Australia should visibly discriminate in favour of friendly countries, especially those that show their friendship by supporting Australia in the UN and elsewhere.
Much development aid has been wasted on unnecessary prestige projects or on projects which turned out almost useless because not properly integrated into the country's economy. Particularly in the "old third world" -- South America and Asia -- much foreign aid has been appropriated by corrupt elites for their own use. It is apparent that government-to-government aid for large or technologically-intensive projects is more likely to encounter these problems than less ambitious projects organised at a lower level. Development aid should only go to projects which will increase the useful productive capacity of the recipient's economy.
In many ways the best way of helping third world countries to develop is to establish normal trade relations with them. It is wasteful and immoral to help establish a new industry in a poor country and at the same time to use tariffs and other trade barriers to keep its products out of the Australian market.
Conversely, if markets are open to new goods from new suppliers, it will be easier for poor countries to attract commercial investors, reducing their need for aid.
Aid to Pacific Island nations should be increased so as to counter Soviet initiatives. In giving aid, Australia should discriminate against countries that consistently oppose Australia and the West in international organisations: friendly poor countries have a stronger claim on our help. We should also discriminate in favour of countries which show themselves to be efficient users of aid and those that allow foreign investment in commercial projects.
Australia should concentrate on helping poor countries to develop by Development aid should be used as a tool of foreign policy. |
2.9 CULTURAL DIPLOMACY
Cultural diplomacy can play an important part in fostering understanding of and friendliness towards Australia among neighbouring peoples. Among the most important aspects of cultural diplomacy are provision of places for overseas students in our universities and colleges, and broadcasts by Radio Australia to countries in the region. An example of the potential of the latter is the success of English broadcast lessons to China, influencing millions in Australia's favour; another, less happy, is the trouble Radio Australia has caused in relations with Indonesia: see the Communications chapter.
The Government should continue to support cultural-diplomatic activity, but it must ensure that the views expressed or the values implicit in projects it supports are not inimical to Australian interests. This is not censorship so much as editorial control. People have a right to hold differing beliefs and to express those beliefs; but there is no reason why the taxpayer should pay for their dissemination if the consequences on balance harm the national interest.
3. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Our national security goal is to be prosperous, at peace, free of attack or the threat of it, and to maintain the quality of life in a free, liberal society. So broad an ambition can obviously be adversely affected by a wide range of developments at home and overseas, by no means all of which are matters traditionally considered the province of foreign affairs and defence policy.
One example is our public sector borrowing requirement and overseas debt: high borrowing in peacetime for the ordinary operations of government makes it harder for Australia to finance a military build-up to counter any threat developing from another country, and the present level of foreign debt will restrict our ability to borrow abroad for such purposes. Another example is the whole question of national morale: do Australians believe their country and their way of life are worth defending? No matter how well armed a nation is, its security depends crucially on morale, and it is unfortunate that the groups in Australian society who now most strongly urge the need for the development of national identity and spirit find so little to be proud of in Australia's past and present.
Even where only the traditional concerns of foreign policy are involved, national security can be threatened by developments that bear no warlike aspect. (On the other hand, domestic-based terrorist activity does not of itself gravely threaten national security. It has seldom flourished except in societies where a significant minority does not accept the legitimacy of the government, and is more a symptom than a cause of diminished security.)
Some conceivable threats to Australian security simply could not be deterred or countered by Australian resources alone. If a major power turned its attention to Australia we would have to rely on a combination of alliance and non-provocation.
Our alliance with the United States does not require automatic commitment of combat forces. If a threat arose from a regional power we would, at least at first, have to meet it with our own forces; but we could rely on the Americans continuing the vital exchange of intelligence and supply of weapons. These, and the mere possibility of US combat forces being committed, form an important part of Australia's deterrent ability.
3.1 PRESENT AND FUTURE THREATS
Australia has no land frontiers, (5) and its main centres of population and industry are separated by sea from potentially hostile powers. In this way it is in a strong strategic position. It is on reasonably good terms with its neighbours.
These advantages have not made Australian national security planning a straightforward matter. It has not been possible to say, in effect, "P, Q, R and S threaten our national security; we need policies X and Y and defence capability Z to counter or deter them". This remains the case. There is no immediate, direct military threat to Australia, and no very obvious one in prospect. In particular, examination of likely threats and the strategic environment does not provide clear guidance for the development of Australian defence force structures.
When considering potential threats, we must distinguish between intentions and capabilities. At present, no power in the region is capable of mounting an invasion of southern or eastern Australia; however hostile the intentions of any such power this is not a potential threat against which we must guard. It would take years for any of our neighbours to acquire the capability to mount such an invasion without massive support from a major ally. Once the capability existed, however, the threat could come into being with no more than a change in policy on the part of the other country. This could take place very rapidly, certainly faster than Australia could expand its forces.
These are among the matters addressed by the Dibb Report of 1986. (6)
4. THE DIBB REPORT
At the time of writing, the Government's White Paper on Defence had not been published. The White Paper was expected to contain a response to the Dibb Report as well as a plan for the defence forces lasting into the 1990s.
Since its publication in the first half of 1986 the Dibb Report has provided a fixed point in the defence debate. It has been subjected to much criticism of varying quality and motivation, and the extent and variety of the criticism has tended to conceal the substantial agreement even of the critics with much of what the Report has to say. What follows gives a necessarily oversimplified account of a usually well-argued and always plausible document.
4.1 SELF-RELIANCE
The Report argues that our national security interests demand a considerable degree of independence and self-reliance in our defence planning and force structure:
The security interests at stake in the range of more credible [i.e. low-level] threats facing us are primarily Australian interests. We owe it to ourselves to have the independent capacity to defend those interests. Nor can we expect the respect or support of other states if we do not possess the appropriate military capacity and the will to use it if necessary. This is not to argue that we can be completely independent -- very few nations can -- but we can aim for a higher level of independence in our military capabilities ...
Our close relationship with the United States is significant for our security and the development of our defence capability, but for over a decade we have recognised that the United States is a global power with a variety of interests, none of them centred on Australia. There are potential situations where we would not expect the United States to commit combat forces on our behalf and where we need a demonstrably independent combat capability.
4.2 A STRATEGY OF DENIAL
The Report's defence strategy is based on the proposition that "Australia must have the military capacity to prevent any enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our soil, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force". From this is developed a "strategy of denial":
The Review proposes a layered strategy of defence within our area of direct military interest. Our most important defence planning concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap.
This emphasises the need for good intelligence and surveillance capabilities and air and naval forces capable of denying the sea and air gap to an adversary, thus preventing any successful landing of significant forces ... To the extent that lesser enemy forces might land we will need highly mobile land forces capable of dispersed operations and having the ability to protect our military installations, infrastructure, and civilian population in the north of the continent.
A strategy of denial would be essentially a defensive policy. It would allow our geography to impose long lines of communication on an adversary and force an aggressor to consider the ultimate prospect of fighting on unfamiliar and generally inhospitable terrain ...
Dibb stresses:
the need to concentrate force structure priorities on our area of direct military interest, where we should seek to exert direct military power. This area stretches over 4000 nautical miles from the Cocos Islands in the west to New Zealand and the islands of the South West Pacific in the east, and over 3000 nautical miles from the archipelago and island chain in the north to the Southern Ocean. It represents about 10 per cent of the earth's surface.
He also recognises:
a sphere of primary strategic interest encompassing South East Asia and the South Pacific generally. Developments here can affect our national security, but any military threat to Australia would be indirect. Our defence activities and projection of military power in this wider region should not determine our force structure, as they do in our area of direct military interest.
4.3 DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND FORCE STRUCTURE
From the considerations outlined above, and the principle that "priority should be given to more credible low-level conflict, which would be limited because of limited regional military capabilities", Dibb develops the set of defence capabilities he considers necessary in current circumstances. From these in turn he develops proposals for the actual structure and equipment of the Australian Defence Forces.
Broadly, these are for continuation much as at present, filling in the obvious gaps in present capability (mine clearance capability, battlefield helicopters, aerial refuelling...). Emphasis would be on preparation for low-level operations on the Australian continent and surrounding seas. Compatibility of equipment and cooperation with allied forces would be given much less attention than at present.
4.4 CONSTRAINTS
Dibb was of course constrained by his terms of reference, which include the significant restriction "in the light of the strategic and financial planning guidance provided by the Government". The Report is isolationist in tone and concentrates very much on defence of the continent of Australia and the nearby seas. It is not clear to what extent the isolationism results from the Hawke Government's strategic guidance or from Dibb's appreciation of the need to produce a report acceptable to the ALP Caucus, and to what extent from unconstrained analysis.
Dibb is explicit about the financial constraints, and assumes that politicians will find no more for defence than the 3 per cent or so of gross domestic product that they have provided in the past. The force structure recommendations have been designed to suit this limit.
5. FLAWS OF THE DIBB REPORT
This is not the place to examine in detail the weaknesses of some of the Report's arguments and proposals, or the criticisms of them. (7) Some deserve mention:
- The policy of self-reliance is presented in a way that allows it to be equated with isolationism, and in particular with disengagement from the vital region to our north. Australia is still party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the UK), the Manila Pact (the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty, including the USA, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines) and the Radford-Collins Agreement (with the US, on control of allied shipping in our region). These agreements are old, but obligations remain; they (or successors) are important parts of the network of interests which countries in this region share. The Dibb Report, however, treats these as dead letters: "their continued existence is a political rather than a military consideration" which should not influence our defence capability requirements.
- The Report expresses support for the American alliance but does so defensively, even grudgingly. Full implementation of its force structure proposals would significantly reduce Australian forces' ability to cooperate with the Americans and/or regional allies.
- Little attention is paid to current, active, Soviet naval and commercial moves in the Pacific and to their implications for Australian, regional and US interests.
- A frequent error in military thinking is to over-stress one's own difficulties and to ignore the enemy's, but the Report appears to overcompensate for this and over-stress Australia's advantages. For example, it assumes that Australia can rely on receiving satellite intelligence from the USA but does not contemplate the USSR supplying it to a regional adversary of ours. Satellite surveillance of ships at sea would render nugatory the "evasive routing" the Report recommends for protection from regional powers threatening our ocean links.
- For the above and other reasons, the assessment of the scope for and economic effects of action by a hostile power against our maritime trade is over-optimistic.
- The "strategy of denial" is too readily embraced and its difficulties understated in relation to those of a "strategy of deterrence". It is obviously preferable for our forces to deter a threat rather than to have to repel it; but by limiting Australian forces to a reactive role a strategy of denial limits their possible responses to threats and therefore their deterrent effectiveness. A strategy of denial does not provide guiding principles for that essential part of defence, the counter-attack; nor does it address the whole question of defeating rather than merely repelling hostile forces.
Criticism such as this, going to the heart of the strategic assessment and doctrine of the Dibb Report, has come from distinguished and experienced commentators, and cannot be ignored or dismissed as party-political point-scoring. By the time of writing it appeared that both Dibb and the Minister for Defence had accepted some of these criticisms and that the policy presented in the White Paper would be less reactive and isolationist than the Dibb Report.
There has been little complaint that the Dibb proposals would involve acquisition of unnecessary defence capabilities. Most of the critics (8) insist that greater capabilities are needed, but do not face up to the essential question: where will the money come from to pay for the larger forces? Even to implement the Dibb proposals requires substantially greater expenditure than the 1986-87 Budget allocation.
6. WARNING TIME AND CORE FORCE EXPANSION
A further criticism which can be made of both the Dibb Report and actual defence policy since Vietnam relates to the concept of "core force expansion" to counter developing threats and particularly to whether adequate warning time to allow expansion can be assured.
Since the early 1970s, Australian defence policy has relied on any serious threat developing slowly and being detected early, so that there will be time to expand our defence forces to achieve the necessary capabilities to deter or defeat the threat. The present forces are therefore to some extent to be considered as the core on which expanded forces will be built. In theory this justifies keeping a wide range of skills and equipment in the forces for which there is no present need; in practice it has been, as Dibb puts it, "something of a rationale for a force structure based on equipment decisions made in the 1960s in quite different strategic circumstances, and the automatic 'follow-on' replacement of this equipment".
It can be argued that the policy has served Australia well: no significant direct military threat has in fact developed, and by maintaining only a core force we have saved billions of dollars. But there are reasons to doubt whether the concept will work in practice.
Force expansion times are measurable in years, (9) and the present policy is based on "no major threat within ten years". The trouble is that we can expect considerable delay between the first signs of a major threat and the decision to counter-arm. Only the most unambiguous evidence of a threat is likely to produce a rapid decision, but the evidence of the last half-century is that to wait for such evidence is to wait too long, and that preparation times of several years are seldom granted. The two years between Australia's decision to mobilise after the invasion of Poland and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour were exceptional.
In short, there is cause to doubt whether the present reliance on core force expansion is safe, partly because of the sheer time it takes to expand forces and partly because of the priority the expansion is likely to receive among all the other pressures on democratic governments.
No country can be permanently on a war footing and no civilised country would want to be. If our present force expansion capability is insufficient, the alternatives are expansion along present lines but from a larger core, or an increase in "surge capacity" achieved by building up large, well-trained and well-equipped reserves integrated with our regular forces. These matters should be considered in any future defence review.
7. COMMON GROUND
The justified criticism of the Dibb Report must not be allowed to mask the facts:
- Dibb proposes a coherent strategic doctrine and a force structure consistent with it, something that the Department, and successive Ministers, of Defence have seemed unable to do in the last decade.
- The capabilities that Dibb argues are necessary are admitted to be necessary by most of his critics.
- It is universally agreed that the nation lacks some of these necessary capabilities.
- Current expenditure is not enough to provide even these capabilities.
- The Dibb proposals which involve early reductions in capability (e.g. mothballing tanks and armoured personnel carriers, reducing and deferring F-111 modernisation) can be reversed without much difficulty in the next few years.
- Most of the equipment that the Dibb proposals would require in the next few years would be needed whatever the strategic doctrine.
One thing that is clear from the above is that defence expenditure needs to be increased; by how much depends on what capabilities are required beyond the Dibb proposals and on what savings are achievable in other areas.
The recommendations below will not be universally acceptable, but they are based on the facts set out above and take advantage of the ground shared by Dibb and his critics.
The first priority in Defence must be to find the money to increase expenditure |
More money than this seems likely to be needed. The Government may conclude that the forces proposed in the Report will not assure national security (either because of deficiencies in the Report's analysis or because of changes in the strategic environment); or the costs of equipment and personnel may increase faster than anticipated. Some large pay increases seem likely to be needed to encourage expensively-trained personnel to stay in the services. Many servicemen believe that current expenditure does not allow adequate training and that more must be spent on practice ammunition, fuel, and making good wear and tear on equipment.
Faster economic growth, which should result from policies proposed in other chapters, will make it easier to find the money.
Dibb draws attention to the especial difficulties for defence planning from short-term variations in funding caused by governments not actually allocating the money to defence that they had previously told planners to expect. Most defence outlays go on personnel and other costs which cannot easily or quickly be reduced, with the result that a small, sudden change in funding can have a disproportionate effect.
The Government must ensure that actual defence spending matches the financial guidance previously given to defence planners unless the effects elsewhere in the economy of raising the money really outweigh the effects on defence.
The doubts as to the adequacy of Dibb's strategic doctrine are partly responsible for the report's not having gained the support of the Liberal-National Party opposition. Defence planning must look much further ahead than any government can expect to stay in office, and any government's defence policy options are largely determined by decisions on force structure and equipment taken by its predecessors. It is therefore important to gain bipartisan support for defence policy, and this the Dibb Report has failed to do. The Government needs if possible to develop a strategic doctrine acceptable to both sides of Parliament (with the exception of the extremists of either side).
Another try at bipartisan defence policy is needed. |
The lucidity and coherence of the Dibb Report show the advantages of one-man jobs, but this time the Government should set up a strategic review committee, probably of five members chosen for knowledge and experience of strategic and geopolitical matters, but also so that the various interest groups feel there is someone trustworthy included (Government, opposition, services, intelligence, foreign affairs). The committee should be told to endorse the strategic doctrine developed in the Dibb Report or to agree on an alternative. The questions of core force expansion and warning time should also be examined. The committee's working should be secret but as much as possible of its report should be published.
Regardless of strategic doctrine, new equipment -- such as helicopters for the RAN frigates and the Army, aerial refuelling gear and mine clearance vessels -- is urgently needed (and was planned before Dibb).
For the time being, the Government should proceed with |
If the strategic review committee develops a doctrine significantly different from Dibb's, the work of deriving capability requirements and force structure should be left to the Department of Defence and the Services. This should not be used as an excuse for deferring acquisitions to save money: as mentioned above, most of the purchases planned for the next few years are badly needed whatever the strategy.
8. OTHER DEFENCE ISSUES
8.1 SERVICE PAY AND CONDITIONS
Democracies often treat servicemen badly in peacetime, for reasons discerned by Orwell and Kipling among others. Australia is no exception. Service pay and conditions have fallen well behind civilian equivalents in recent years, and much service housing is unsatisfactory.
The rate of resignation, particularly of officers, from the services is cause for concern (although some of it seems the simple result of the age distribution of the forces after the Vietnam expansion). There are straightforward economic reasons for concern about retention rates: some service personnel, especially commanders and warplane pilots, are the result of literally millions of dollars worth of training and experience. This makes it well worth improving pay and conditions to keep good people in the service to maximise the return on the sum invested in their training.
The Government should do its best to be fair to servicemen when it |
The Hawke Government's improvement of service housing should be continued, at an increased rate if Budget conditions allow. Servicemen and their families must accept their postings, and the Government has an obligation to ensure that decent accommodation is available. In accordance with general policy in government services, work on service housing should be contracted out to the private sector wherever possible. The policies proposed in the Housing chapter will increase the supply of private-sector rental accommodation and it will often be possible to use this to house servicemen and their families.
8.2 EFFICIENCY
Defence simply does not fit ordinary notions of efficiency. In peacetime, by definition, the armed forces' capabilities are grossly under-used. We cannot readily price the increment of security produced by an extra company of soldiers or a diplomatic note, still less by a thousand rounds of practice ammunition or tonnes of bunker fuel, or by smart uniforms, brass bands and the regimental silver: yet all these influence the effectiveness and morale of the forces.
This does not, however, mean that the Defence Department and services should be exempt from scrutiny. Although the final product may defy measurement, concepts of efficiency and waste can be applied at lower levels. It is still necessary to be careful: for instance, too much concentration on "teeth-to-tail" ratios can produce forces with lots of firepower but no way of sustaining the supply of ammunition; a certain amount of pomp and circumstance seems needed by regular services at all times and places.
8.2.1 Procurement
The Australian defence procurement system has been criticised for delay, complexity, frequent and late changes to specifications, slack project management, and other faults, with resulting cost over-runs. Reports from the Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor-General show that the criticisms are justified.
Revise procurement procedures in accordance with the |
8.2.2 The Naval Dockyards
The naval dockyards' record of poor labour relations, union domination and inefficiency means that national security can hardly be lessened by having them in private hands. (In wartime, the Defence power in the Constitution would enable the Commonwealth to control both dockyards and workforce regardless of ownership.) If they face competition they will have to improve or go under.
The naval dockyards should be transferred to the private sector. |
It would be best to do this in a way that gave the workers a direct stake in their success. Once privatised, the dockyard should have to tender for Navy work in competition with other firms. (They would also compete for private-sector and other government work).
8.2.3 Outside Contractors
The usual incentive effects of competition and monopoly do not cease to apply in defence-related activities. The Government can expect to save money almost any time it can have work done by competing outside contractors instead of by uniformed personnel or civilian public servants. The difference between service discipline and civilian terms of employment is often relevant, however, to continuity of supply: servicemen cannot go on strike and do not have demarcation disputes.
In defence as elsewhere in the public service, the Government should |
9. INDUSTRY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Australia's economic and industrial capacity is relevant to national security, but not in any simple way. The traditional argument is that we need to be able to make most of our military equipment in Australia. A principal reason advanced is that we cannot rely on supplies from overseas in time of war or international crisis. Proponents of this view generally agree that the argument justifies (a) procurement of Australian or "Australian content" equipment even if it costs more than the fully-imported equivalent and (b) protection by tariff or quota of local civilian manufacturing industries whose products or processes are allegedly of importance to potential war production.
9.1 CIVILIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
This argument is most often (but by no means exclusively) presented in defence of protection for the motor industry. A test of its virtue in Australia today would be to ask national security planners how much money they would like transferred from the defence budget to industry assistance (or whether they would prefer the transfer to be in the other direction).
The argument nevertheless contains a grain of truth. National security would undeniably be enhanced by the ability of civil industry to switch rapidly to effective defence production.
Unfortunately there is little reason for confidence that our heavily-protected and often obsolescent manufacturing industry is capable of such a switch, at any rate one fast enough to be of any use in a crisis. Military technology is now so complex that it is much more difficult than forty years ago for a factory to switch production from television sets to radars, furniture to fighter-bombers, or washing-machines to anti-aircraft shells; in fact an economy the size of Australia's simply cannot be self-sufficient in front-line aircraft, munitions, military electronics, etc. In 1939 an advanced aero-engine was basically a large car engine with a few special features, and car makers could and did build them; now, turbofan and car engines have almost nothing in common from operating principles to metallurgical detail.
In the long term, a difference may be made by the new generation of versatile computer-controlled intelligent machine tools and robots, which in principle can change production with no more than a change of computer program. In the short term, the increased complexity of military technology means that cost penalty for local procurement is likely to be greater than in the past.
A continuing consequence of the complexity of military technology is that no degree of industry protection will provide Australia with the necessary technological base. Industry protection has in fact shielded Australian manufacturers from overseas competition and reduced the pressure on them to keep technologically up to date: protection has reduced, not increased our defence capability. We will be better off with the efficient export-oriented industry and healthy outward-looking economy that will develop under the policies presented elsewhere in this volume, especially in the Trade and Industry chapter.
If the Government decides that the existence of a particular manufacturing plant or capability actually is essential to national security but that it is not commercially viable and therefore must be subsidised, the subsidy should (a) be explicit (e.g. bounty per unit produced or lump sum payment to the producer) rather than concealed in tariffs, import quotas, or over-priced defence contracts; (b) appear in the defence budget; and (c) be implemented by sunset legislation so it has to be reassessed at intervals.
9.2 AUSTRALIAN CONTENT
The advantages and disadvantages of buying Australian can fairly simply be assessed in principle. It is necessary to estimate the value of the national security advantages (if any) of local manufacture and compare this with the cost differential.
If the principal advantage is to be continuity of supply of spare parts and munitions for a one-off weapon system purchase, then it would be appropriate to compare
- cost of overseas purchase of weapons system, plus stockpile of spares and munitions sufficient for foreseeable conflict, with moderately pessimistic assumptions about problems of resupply from overseas, and
- cost of local purchase of weapons system plus local production of expendables.
The latter is likely to be high, as peacetime production will be low but factories must be equipped for rapid expansion to war production levels -- if they are not, then large stockpiles must be maintained as in (a), which rather spoils the point of local production. This assumes that maintenance and repair will be done in Australia, as must be the case for most work on most equipment, whatever the cost. Some refits can more cheaply be done overseas. In the case of one-off purchases such as the F/A-18s, which are being assembled in Australia at a significant cost disadvantage, it is also relevant to consider what else could have been done with the money: conversion of Boeing 707s for aerial refuelling, perhaps?
A coherent national security policy and consistent and straightforward procurement procedures will make it easier for local companies to compete.
Purchase defence equipment locally when and only when this can be Encourage local industry to compete for arms contracts here and |
9.2.1 Offset Work
It is common practice in large international sales of military equipment for "offset deals" to be arranged in which the vendor undertakes to contract work on the equipment in question, or on some other project, to firms in the purchasing country. These can sometimes result in useful technology transfer to and industrial development in the purchasing country, and are to be welcomed for the increased inter-dependence between countries they can bring.
But it must not be forgotten that the object of defence purchases is maintenance of necessary defence capability, not Australian industrial development. Some offset work provides industrial capability and experience directly relevant to defence needs but most does not. Overseas purchase plus offset deals is often likely to be a better bargain than local production.
All proposed offset deals should be evaluated for costs and benefits in |
9.3 GOVERNMENT-OWNED DEFENCE INDUSTRIES
Most of the munitions, aircraft and other defence-related factories came into government hands for reasons of ideology or historical accident rather than security or efficiency. They appear unable to provide any but the simplest weapons and munitions at remotely competitive cost. Most would have been closed down or sold off years ago if they did not happen to be in sensitive electorates.
The Government should transfer the government defence factories to |
Some reorganisation or capital injection may be necessary as part of the process; but the government should not commit itself to any continuing subsidy (except as outlined in 9.1).
9.4 DEFENCE RESEARCH
Jindivik, Ikara, Barra and Jindalee among others have shown that Australian defence science can be world-class, but its products often do not receive the marketing and continuing development they deserve, partly because of the small peacetime requirements of our forces. Commercial considerations should play a more important role in our defence research. Government-funded research should continue, but local or overseas defence companies should be brought in at early stages in the development of new projects or principles in order to harness commercial hunger for exports and efficiency. Except perhaps for prototypes and specialised secret components, defence production should not be done in government facilities.
10. THE SUBMARINE REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME
Australia's six Oberon class submarines will need replacing in the 1990s. The present proposal is for the replacements to be six modern diesel-electric boats not radically superior in performance, designed in Europe but built in Australia.
The decision to buy diesel-electric rather than nuclear submarines was made as much on political and cost grounds as on the relative capabilities of the different systems (one might say, cost-benefit grounds). Diesel-electric is somewhat harder to detect when moving slowly underwater, but has very limited endurance when fully submerged; nuclear is far superior in range and in speed and endurance submerged, but costs a lot more.
The submarine replacement programme should be reassessed in the The decision on where to build the replacements should accord with |
ENDNOTES
1. Dr R.E. Klugman, MHR, Hansard, 25 November 1986, p 3656. The honourable member referred to was Dr A.C. Theophanous, MHR.
2. R. Conquest, We and They, London, Temple Smith, 1980.
3. The exceptions being the aggressive foreign policies of Hitler and Mussolini, which were exploited -- for a time, at least -- in just the way described.
4. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Disarmament and Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, Canberra, AGPS, 1986.
5. Except in Antarctica.
6. Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities (the Dibb Report), Canberra, AGPS, 1986.
7. Some of the best published debate on the Report is to be found in issues of Pacific Defence Reporter for the second half of 1986.
8. Including at least one former Defence Minister.
9. R. Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1980; D. Ball & J.O. Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia, Canberra, Phoenix Defence Publications, 1980.
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