EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A carefully structured move towards a more market based forest industry could achieve an improved balance of environmental and economic goals. By allowing the owners of forest resources to trade-off competing forest uses at prices which reflect real market values, including values placed on environmental amenities, Australia could have both a more efficient timber industry and more environmental benefits.
From late in the last century, State Governments in Australia have pursued a policy of public ownership and management of native forests. Political allocation of the native forest resource was largely motivated by perceptions of possible timber shortages. Today, 73% of Australia's 41.3 million hectares of native forests are owned and managed by state departments and forestry commissions. Less than 30% of the public inventory of native forests are commercially logged; however, these represent almost all the hardwood forests managed for timber production.
In recent years there has been an often acrimonious debate over the continued logging of these state owned hardwood forests. A number of the forests are listed in the National Estate by the Australian Heritage Commission. The Tantwangalo and Coolangubra state forests in south-east New South Wales, and the forests of East Gippsland are notable examples. Various conservation groups, such as the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and the South-East Forest Alliance (SEFA), have advocated a total ban on logging in the National Estate areas. In pursuit of their objectives the environmental groups have engaged in vigorous protest actions, including blockading of logging operations. By focusing on all or nothing choices the debate has lost sight of the gains available from trading-off competing forest uses, including environmental and recreational amenities.
The goal of forest management should be to balance competing forest uses by factoring community valuations of timber, leisure amenities and other needs into decisions. Outcomes should not be restricted to one hundred percent timber production or one hundred percent forest preservation. Instead, each forest or stand within the forest should be put to its highest valued combination of uses. The problem is finding policies which will generate the incentives and information necessary to move towards this goal.
In this chapter, different management strategies and institutional arrangements for Australia's publicly owned native hardwood forests are evaluated against the ideal of an efficient balance between timber production and forest preservation. I focus on the forests which are currently open to commercial logging. The strategies and policies evaluated include:
- traditional "sustained-yield, even flow management", as commonly practised by the forests services;
- economic management for timber production alone;
- "scientific" multiple-use management with public ownership;
- vesting of private rights to forests in conservation groups and the timber industry, and the use of market based prices.
It is found that, compared to sustained-yield management, economic management for timber production alone could lead to fewer forests being logged, but with the remaining forests being managed more productively. Even though they are an improvement on sustained-yield, recent moves towards multiple-use management by the state forest services also have little hope of determining community valuations accurately. As with other economic activities, it is the vesting of private ownership in the forest, and the use of market based pricing mechanisms, which generates incentives to discover the combination of uses which best suit the economic and other needs of individuals in the community.
Chart 5.1: Native forest areas by forest type, 30 June 1986
Source: 1988-89 Year Book, Australian Bureau of Statistics
THE NATIVE FOREST RESOURCE
Native forests currently cover 5.3% of Australia's land area or 41 million hectares (NAFI, 1989). As can be seen in Chart 5.1, the predominant forest ecosystem in Australia is the hardwood, eucalyptus forest, which makes up 28 million hectares or 68% of total native forest area. The remaining forests are classified as tropical eucalyptus, paperbark, cypress pine or rainforest.
Eucalyptus forests are "ecologically robust". The trees are peculiarly adapted to ecological disturbances such as drought, fire and logging. Dormant buds, at the base of the tree and along its branches and stem, enable rapid regrowth when the foliage or the trunk is destroyed. Seed germination usually requires old growth to be cleared away and the creation of a nutrient rich seed-bed from fire debris. When disturbances to the forest ecosystem are managed, a range of diverse species' habitats are created with timber stands of different ages. In contrast, a forest subject to uncontrolled wild-fire tends to have uniform age classes. Some forms of wildlife, such as the Leadbeater's possum, flourish best in an environment consisting of both old growth and new growth forest. Logging practices can mimic natural disturbances to the ecosystem in a controlled fashion, and there is a strong propensity for timber harvesting in eucalyptus forests and ecological values of the forests to be mutually reinforcing. Forest management has improved the condition of some old growth forests harvested since the early 1900s. Dr Ross Florence, comments:
... these same forests are more dynamic, more structurally and biologically diverse and to many people more aesthetically attractive than the old-growth forests they replaced. It is a testimony to the resilience of the forests that after 100 years or more of logging, they are willingly incorporated into national parks or actively sought for inclusion on the Register of the National Estate (Florence, 1989: 4).
Dr Tim Flannery of the Australian Museum has expressed the view that much of the ecological damage to native eucalyptus forests in the last 200 years has occurred because Aborigines discontinued their limited "forest management" practices of "fire-stick" fanning (Flannery, 1989).
Unfortunately, our perceptions of timber harvesting are shaped by images from the past which are often distorted. Since European settlement in the 19th century, 50% of native forests have been cleared. From our vantage point, with native forests relatively scarce and wildlife and wilderness values increasingly important, the early clearing of native forests appears wanton. Much of the blame is apportioned to an unfettered, "free market", timber industry, but such a conclusion is unwarranted for the following reasons:
- The major portion of timber felling was to clear land for agriculture. At the time, agricultural land was scarce relative to wood, wildlife, and wilderness, which were in abundant supply. Clearing the land was often a rational management choice, given relative valuations of the alternative uses.
- Property rights to forest resources were inadequately defined. Consequently, some valuable forest resources were destroyed -- for example, red cedar in the Hunter Valley and the Huon pine in Tasmania (see Fogarty, 1991). However, rights to these timber resources were either vested entirely in the crown -- which was powerless to police them -- or else, valuable privately owned timber stands were cut out by timber gangs before the settler physically occupied his land.
- The early settlers had little information about an unfamiliar environment on which to base management decisions. Problems such as salination, destruction of biotic diversity, and the importance of forests for combating greenhouse effects never entered the decision-making process. Here, governments were as ignorant as markets, as evidenced by the subsidies and taxation incentives later provided for land clearing.
The appropriate policy response to a perceived failure in the timber market should have been a more adequate definition and monitoring of private rights to forest resources. Then, as timber became more scarce, an increase in the price would have created the incentive to expand long run timber supply. As we argue later, private management of the "ecologically robust" eucalypt forests would have provided a more productive and less wasteful timber harvesting regime. A case could have been made for government subsidising research to increase knowledge of the forest ecosystems, and for the setting aside of National Parks for preserving particularly outstanding examples of natural beauty; however, the Australian state governments went much further than this.
Anticipating a long run timber shortage and ignoring the role of price, the various state governments in Australia followed the European and US pattern and set aside state forests for commercial timber production. Forest services were set up to manage the resource, and a strong precedent for state management of forest resources was established. Today 73% of the native forests are publicly owned (see Chart 5.2). Less than 30% are managed for timber production, but these represent almost all of Australia's commercial hardwood forests.
Chart 5.2: Native forest areas classified by ownership, 30 June 1986
TRADITIONAL SUSTAINED-YIELD, EVEN FLOW MANAGEMENT
Public management of the Australian native forests followed the traditional European sustained-yield, even flow model. The principal of sustained-yield has to be clearly distinguished from the more contemporary term "sustainable development". Sustained-yield is a structured timber harvesting programme which is designed to yield the maximum annual volume of wood from a forest in perpetuity. It takes no account of price, alternative uses of the forest, or the interest and other costs of investing in fixed assets such as timber. There is no a priori reason for believing that a forest managed for sustained-yield will maximise the social benefit of forests for either present or future generations.
The concept finds its roots in European feudalism. Dowdle (1981) gives us an interesting insight into these feudal origins. For centuries forest resources in Europe were owned by the local Lord or Duke. While timber was plentiful, the forest was usually made accessible to all for firewood and timber. However, without some system limiting access to the common timber resource, there was no guarantee of a perpetual supply of fire-wood, or timber, once supplies became scarce. Hence, a system of timber management evolved which closely followed the feudal answer to diminishing wildlife populations. To preserve game for the King's chase, bag limits were defined and enforced by forest-gamekeepers. In a similar fashion, "bag limits" for trees were enforced to ensure perpetual supplies of timber. Eventually these evolved into the sustained-yield, even flow management strategy which early Australian and North American foresters imported from Europe.
Under sustained-yield, even flow, the land base for timber harvesting is taken as given. No economic criteria are used to evaluate the forestry returns from land with different levels of fertility and accessibility. Forests with negative net returns are harvested alongside forests with positive net returns. Decisions relating to the extent of the land base are inherently political.
Chart 5.3: Sustained yield harvest age
Once the forested area available for harvesting is determined, the goal is to create a regulated forest which yields the highest possible, constant volume of timber each year. First, the timber harvest age is determined by calculating the age at which the mean annual increment to timber volume peaks. Chart 5.3 graphically illustrates the correct harvest under sustained-yield management. I assume that timber follows a typical S-shaped growth curve, with timber volume growing slowly at first, in the young forest, then rising rapidly before tailing off as the forest reaches maturity. The slope of a straight line extending from the origin to a point on the yield curve measures the average rate of growth or mean annual increment. When this line is steepest, at point A on the yield curve, mean annual increment is at its peak and the required harvest age is TS. Maximising mean annual increment for each growing cycle ensures that, on average, the highest possible volume of timber is harvested each year; but, as we explain in the next section, only when real interest rates are zero will it correspond to a rational, economic, harvesting decision.
Having maximised sustained-yield, all that remains is to ensure that the timber comes in an even flow. To achieve an even flow of timber, foresters work towards creating a regulated forest which has a relatively even distribution of timber stands in every age class. If we assume equal productivity over the whole forest, dividing total forest area by harvest age, TS, gives the forest area required for each age class. It also tells us the area of forest that should be harvested annually for an even flow of timber volume. Variations in productivity may require some adjustments to the harvested area; however, once the forest is fully regulated, an even distribution of age classes of roughly the same productivity is created, and the volume of timber harvested is equal to the maximum annual growth rate. Foresters call this the annual allowable cut.
In the "un-regulated" state, forests do not have an even distribution of timber stands of every age class. Old growth forests, such as those in East Gippsland or South East New South Wales, include many stands of timber over the maximum sustained-yield harvest age, TS. To create a "regulated" forest, the annual allowable cut is set equal to the current average annual growth rate for the forest as a whole. Timber is harvested from the slower growing excess inventories of over-mature timber first; therefore, the average rate of growth for the whole forest will increase over time. Eventually, the forest will approach a "regulated" state, and annual growth will be maximised. However, the harvesting of old growth forest is not linked to economic criteria. It only serves to maximise the volume of timber cut under the sustained-yield, even flow constraint. The economic costs of harvesting old growth forests do not enter the management decision.
In some senses the above presentation of sustained-yield management is too stylised. In practice, the theoretical maximum wood volumes generated by the sustained-yield model are reduced to take account of nature reserves, habitat trees for wild life, limits to logging near river banks and other general provisions of The Forest Practices Code. However, these reductions can tend to reflect bureaucratic, rather than economic, judgements.
Sustained-yield remains a guiding principle for the various state government departments which manage Australia's native forests. Professor Ian Ferguson, who conducted the Board of Inquiry into the Timber Industry in Victoria, called it a sensible management tool in the 19th century, but quite inappropriate now.
Sustained-yield embodies a physical and static objective, being based on the maximisation of average wood production at a constant rate in perpetuity. Wood, however, is an economic good with many substitutes, there are many alternative uses for these resources and not enough of them. It cannot be assumed that more wood via maximisation is desirable, or that a constant amount is sensible. There is ample evidence that a constant amount is an unworkable, or at least an inefficient, solution because markets are in a perpetual state of flux rather than a steady state (Ferguson, 1987: 35).
ECONOMIC MODELS OF TIMBER PRODUCTION
Economic modelling of the timber production decision has a long and rich history. As far back as 1849, Faustmann formulated the basic equations for calculating the optimal economic harvest age. He assumed a single stand of timber, managed in perpetuity, with known and unchanging prices, interest rates, costs, and timber yield curves. The Faustmann model, as it came to be known, was the building block for a range of increasingly complex and diverse models, which considered other aspects of the management decision, such as optimum thinning age, and multiple-use management for recreational and amenity value as well as timber production. The mathematics of these models are beyond the scope of this chapter. (For those interested in a more in depth presentation, Samuelson (1976) gives a detailed discussion of the Faustmann model, Nguyen (1979) discusses an application of the model which incorporates optimum thinning ages, Hartman (1976) generalises the model to include non-timber services on a single timber stand, and Bowes and Krutilla (1985) develop a multiple-use management model which considers a number of timber stands with varying age classes.)
The simplest case of efficient economic management considers timber production alone. Both the theoretical results and some empirical evidence from the US indicate that, compared to economic efficiency, managing for sustained-yield leads to:
- a longer growing period with older and slower growing timber stands;
- more harvesting of old growth forests than is justifiable economically; and
- over investment in new growth forests.
The timber harvesting decision involves maximising the net present value of an asset which is going to be sold at some time in the future. For a single harvest cycle, consider the S-shaped growth curve shown in Chart 5.3. As a stand of timber approaches maturity, its rate of growth begins to taper off. If payment is made in proportion to biomass or volume of timber, a point will be reached where harvesting the timber and investing the money at market interest rates, will give a higher return than waiting a year and selling a slightly higher volume of timber. The sensible thing to do is to harvest the timber when the rate of increase in revenue from selling an increased timber volume falls to the market rate of interest.
Extending the analysis to multiple harvest cycles introduces an added complexity. Delaying harvest by one period now has two opportunity costs. Harvesting timber a period earlier not only allows money to be placed in the bank, but also enables an earlier planting for subsequent timber harvests. For the complete picture, timber should be harvested when the value of an additional increase in timber volume, from the next period's growth, falls to the level of the interest income obtained from banking the proceeds of timber harvested in the present period plus the interest benefit of bringing forward all subsequent harvest cycles. The Faustmann model is a mathematical solution to this problem.
It can be shown that the Faustmann model almost always leads to an earlier harvest age and a higher return than under sustained-yield harvesting. The one exception is when interest rates are zero. In this case harvest ages and returns will be equal. If timber production is economically viable and interest rates are positive, harvesting for economic efficiency will usually lead to younger stands of timber. However, when costs outweigh benefits at every harvest age, timber harvesting will not be carried out at all. Economic management for timber production alone could lead to abandoning timber production in some areas of the forest, while increasing returns in more productive areas through shorter harvest ages. In contrast, sustained-yield management will always lead to timber harvesting, because prices and the opportunity costs of investing the returns are not considered.
The sustained-yield even flow model can also lead to incorrect evaluations of forest investments such as planting seedlings, thinning and fertilising. Dowdle (1981) discusses how the model makes returns from one part of the forest justify investments elsewhere in the forest. Consequently, forest managers are led to accept investments which more conventional financial models would reject.
PUBLIC TIMBER MANAGEMENT --
A RECORD OF ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY
Managing for timber production alone could lead to greater forest preservation in some areas, and more intensive and efficient production in other forest areas. In the absence of a market for wildlife and wilderness, the efficient economic solution for timber production approximates the free-market solution. The difficulties and implications of managing forests for multiple-use will be discussed later. First, we examine some of the evidence which supports the claim that a free market for timber could result in a more productive timber industry and better environmental management than under traditional systems of political allocation.
There is some compelling evidence from the US that political allocation of forest resources has created an inefficient forest industry and over-emphasised timber production. The Australian evidence is more circumstantial and somewhat less rigorous, and it seems clear that studies similar to those in the US need to be conducted. These would be a valuable contribution to the debate over Australia's more controversial forest management issues -- for example, the East Gippsland National Estate Forests.
PUBLIC FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The US Forest Service is the largest natural resource agency in the federal government, with an annual budget of around $2 billion and roughly 39,000 full-time employees. It oversees natural resource use on 191 million acres of national forests; and is required by law to manage its lands for multiple-use -- which includes timber production, livestock grazing, mineral and energy production, fish and wildlife production, wilderness protection, and public recreation. In the past two decades the agency has come under a barrage of criticism both from environmentalists (see the National Audubon Society, 1986), who feel that the agency has over-emphasised commodity production at the expense of environmental amenities, and from commodity based interests who feel that wilderness values are receiving too much attention.
Compounding environmental concerns are fiscal concerns. Virtually every aspect of national forest management loses money. For example, the seven national forests surrounding Yellowstone National Park had losses from their timber programs ranging from $241,000 per year to $2.2 million per year from 1979 through 1984 (The Wilderness Society, 1987: 22). Less well recognised are the losses on recreational services. The millions of people who fish, hike, and hunt on national forests generally do so at zero cost to themselves. On the Gallatin National Forest alone, expenditures surpassed receipts by nearly $2 million, approximately twice the deficit from timber production, and this is typical throughout the public forests (See Anderson et al., 1990: 23).
Until recently, forest service management decisions were primarily based on the sustained-yield even flow model outlined previously. Analysis of forest service management decisions, using economic models of timber production, has shown that forest service agencies have been harvesting too much timber in previously unharvested forests and inefficiently managing timber production in existing commercial timber forests. Hyde (1981) examined forest service timber harvesting from the San Juan National Forest in Colorado -- a forest which covers 1.85 million acres. First, Hyde considered the economic viability of a forest service plan to bring approximately 400 thousand acres of marginal old growth forest into timber production. He concluded that the timber price necessary to bring this land into production would need to be at least $45.45 per board feet in 1976 dollars. Average sale prices in that year were only $2.65 and the highest average over the previous was only $23.15.
Next, Hyde used the Faustmann model of timber production to analyse perpetual timber harvesting on currently managed forests. He calculated the price that would be necessary for the forest service to achieve a positive return from perpetual harvesting of the forest lands in question. Some adjustments were also made for compatible uses of the forest. Even when these were taken into account, the required price was $26 per board feet at a 7% discount rate. As average annual sale prices had not risen above $23.15 over the previous six years, only highly valued timber sales were justifiable. Hyde concluded that:
... under current practice, more land is used than can be justified by a free timber market. Environmental destruction and foregone recreational opportunity result (Hyde, 1981: 200).
STATE FOREST SERVICE MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA
In aggregate, Australian state forest management agencies have been making substantial operating losses for the last 50 years. Bruce (1985) estimated that average annual receipts amounted to 61% of expenditure or less from June 1966 to June 1982. These aggregate estimates did not separate capital from current expenditure, nor expenditure on commercial timber production from that on other non-wood values. However, Walker (1984) went a step further and attempted to assign expenditures to their appropriate categories using Tasmanian Forest Service Budgets. His analysis indicated that, in the four years to 30th June 1982, taxpayers' contributed 16% of total receipts of the Commission -- which was twice the estimated cost of recreation and wildlife conservation services. When discussing the provision of market goods such as timber from Victorian State Forests, Ferguson commented:
To date, these goods have been supplied with little reference to the economic viability of the use of those resources. Indeed, the previous accounting/budgeting system of the Department of Conservation, Forests and Land did not even enable such matters to be evaluated properly (Ferguson, 1987: 37).
In recent years there is some indication, at least in some states, that the operating losses of forest services are being turned around. In New South Wales, however, this may be illusionary. The Forestry Commission 1987-88 income was $63 million and its expenditure $50 million. According to the Public Account Committee (1990) this maybe due to subsidies, or, more importantly, an effective interest forgiveness of $14 million. The Committee also gathered persuasive evidence of considerable cost padding in the New South Wales Forestry Commission.
Traditionally, forest service agencies have followed sustained-yield management in most state forests managed for timber production. The theoretical analysis of sustained-yield management discussed in the previous section, the large budgetary deficits of the state forest services, and the analogous situation in the US, all point towards wasteful investment in timber production from Australian native forests. Two empirical studies support this view.
One study, used by the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) in its advocacy of discontinuing logging in native forests, indicated that investing in a representative 100 hectares of native forest yields a negative net present value at any discount rate above 4% (Cameron and Penna, 1989). Chart 5.4 summarises net present values of native forest investment for a range of discount rates. The ACF used this data to argue for an almost complete ban on logging in native forests. There are at least two pit-falls in such a conclusion. Firstly, the data are averages and represent a summary of a range of investments with variable net present values. While the average indicates that new investment should be scaled back, there are still likely to be some investments with positive net present values at closer to market rates of return. Secondly, the new investment calculations do not consider the value of harvesting the standing stock of timber. In Chart 5.4, this value is shown by the line A-B. It is positive at any discount rate. In contrast to Hyde's conclusion for the San Juan forest in Colorado, it appears economically viable to harvest at least some of the standing stock of timber from Australia's native eucalyptus forests. However, the figure is, once again, an average intended to be representative of all native forests in Australia. Logic dictates that there will be some productive and accessible native forests in Australia which currently have economically harvestable standing stocks of timber; but there will also be some marginal forests which careful economic analysis could reject for timber harvesting.
Chart 5.4: NPV of new investment in native forest at different discount rates and the value of current native timber stocks (100 representative hectares)
Source: Base data from INFM (1987)
Another interesting view on Australian native forest timber management is given in the IC's recent report on Recycling (IC, 1990: 141-156). An appendix to this report calculated the optimal harvest age for a range of eucalyptus forest types in various locations. A variation of the Faustmann model was used which allows for thinning of the timber stand at various ages. The unambiguous conclusion from the analysis was that the optimal harvest age for all forests analysed was considerably less than those adopted by the forest services concerned. For example, Ash forests in Victoria are currently harvested at around 80 years, while the optimal harvest age from a wood production perspective is 20 years. At this age timber would only be harvested for wood pulp. To ensure a supply of sawlog timber, prices for sawlogs would need to be higher or more closely related to timber volume. The study indicates that there is considerable potential for increasing the economic viability of timber production from some Australian native forests if harvest ages are reduced. Such a conclusion is consistent with our previous theoretical comparison of sustained-yield and economic harvesting ages.
In sum, the 1C evidence conclusively shows that the sustained-yield timber management has lead to over-mature stands of some commercially logged timber in Australia. The representative model of native forest investment cited by the ACF lends support to the contention that there is considerable over-investment in native eucalyptus forests. Practices such as thinning, seeding and fertilising need to be assessed on economic criteria, not on the basis of sustained-yield models. Evidence from the US shows that sustained-yield management can lead to harvesting timber from too much of the forest. Therefore economic management, for timber production alone, can lead to both a more productive timber industry and more forest preservation, because productive forests are harvested earlier, while logging is discontinued in unproductive forests. Currently, however, there are no studies which have tested this suggestion rigorously for marginal forests in Australia.
MANAGING FOR MULTIPLE-USE
In recent years some forest service agencies have moved away from sustained-yield management plans towards more "scientific" multiple-use planning procedures which incorporate the methodologies of theoretical economic models. However, these models are calibrated and estimated in an informational vacuum. Without information about people's valuations of environmental amenities, solving for optimal outcomes becomes extremely difficult. The only reliable way we know of eliciting information about people's preferences is to charge a price. Currently, environmental amenities are supplied at minimal or zero price, but rational allocation based on such prices is an impossibility.
The simplest form of a multiple-use model is that proposed by Hartman (1976). This model forms the basis of the US Forest Service, harvest-scheduling model, FORPLAN. Use of FORPLAN and related multiple-use planning procedures have been advocated in Australia (see Turner, 1987). Attempts have been made to apply the approach in forests such as the Coolangubra State Forest, east of Bombala, New South Wales.
The Hartman model is very similar to the Faustmann model for timber production. It solves for the optimal harvest age on a single stand of timber but adds a flow of non-timber values which is related to the age of the stock of timber. The solution requires that any change in environmental benefits be added to the value of increased timber volume from delaying harvest one period. Optimal harvest age comes when the combined value of increased timber volume and any change in non-timber benefits just equals the costs of delaying current and future harvests. Readers are referred to Bowes and Krutilla (1985) for a detailed discussion of the effects of differing rates of increase in environmental benefit on the model's solution. In brief, when recreational and amenity values increase consistently over time, the Hartman harvest age will exceed the Faustmann harvest age. However, not all amenity values increase with harvest age, implying that a later harvest age need not always be the case.
In the "ecologically robust" eucalyptus forest, some environmental values decrease over time. For example, a mature forest will have a lower level of biological and structural diversity. Carbon dioxide fixation adds a further complication. Young growth forests fix more carbon dioxide (through photosynthesis) than old growth forests. Carbon dioxide is considered one of the principal greenhouse gases (see Chapter 10). Trees play a major role in removing the gas from the atmosphere through photosynthesis. The amount of carbon dioxide removed (or, more correctly, fixed into cellulose) is directly related to the growth rate of the forest. Chart 5.5 shows the growth rate for a typical eucalyptus timber stand. Florence (1989) states:
If fixation of atmospheric carbon were an important objective of forest management, it would best be achieved by clear-felling, using mechanical site disturbance to create a seed-bed, thinning regularly to maintain large tree crowns and vigorous growth, and harvesting on a relatively short rotation (Florence, 1989: 3-14).
Chart 5.5: Growth pattern for Eucalyptus globulus on a high quality site
This "current annual volume increment" also serves to indicate the rate of fixation of atmospheric carbon dioxide. All fast-growing eucalypt species have growth patterns of this nature -- though for some, peak production will be earlier (e.g., E.tereticomis, E.grandis) and others somewhat later (e.g., E.regnans, E.Pilularis). Slower growing eucalypts -- including those better adapted to infertile or dry sites -- may not have a sharp production peak (e.g., E.obliqua) -- though maximum volume increment (or carbon fixation rate) will still occur by age 30 to 40 years.
Source: Florence (1989: 13-14) (Data from Goodwin and Candy, 1986)
Cutting a forest does decrease the store of carbon locked up in old growth forests. However, unless the timber is burnt, it moves from a natural carbon "bank" to a man-made carbon "bank" in areas such as house and furniture construction. Arguably, with the aid of preservatives and other decay inhibitors, this man-made carbon store could hold carbon longer than an old growth forest. The contribution forests can make for fixation of greenhouse gases is, however, easily exaggerated. Beckerman (1990: 21) estimates that even if the whole world's tropical forests were to be immediately burnt, the concentration of CO2 would rise by only 5-10%.
Forage for wildlife, prevention of wildfire, and increased water flow are other amenity values that may decrease with stand age (see NAFI, 1989: 8-16). Obviously some amenity values, such as wilderness or the value individuals place on undisturbed ecosystems, will increase. However, no prima facie case can be made that harvesting on a sustained-yield harvest age either increases or decreases environmental quality.
Bowes and Krutilla (1985) further refine the Hartman model and develop a theoretical model of multiple-use which allows harvesting or preservation decisions on one timber stand to affect timber and amenity values on other forest stands. The added level of complexity only reinforces the conclusion that sustained-yield, even flow management does not optimise either timber production or amenity values, even when amenity values are taken into account.
Long even flow rotation, far from being the desirable compromise policy for multiple-use management, may simply provide both uneconomic timber and a poor balance of age classes for non-timber use. Perhaps most importantly we see ... that the harvesting decision can be extremely sensitive to factors about which we have little empirical knowledge. (Bowes and Krutilla, 1985: 567)
Unfortunately, scientific multiple-use management by political agents is no alternative to sustained-yield management. The theoretical models of multiple-use point to a problem without proposing a practical solution. Without prices and markets for amenity values from the forests, we cannot know what the optimal rotation or harvesting decision is. How can we know how much individuals truly value recreational opportunities and wilderness values, other than by observing how much they are willing to pay for those activities? Merely asking them is unlikely to produce an accurate answer, given that they are not required to pay the cost of their stated preference. For multiple-use management to be effective, the role of markets must be extended to encompass areas which traditionally have been untraded goods.
MARKETS FOR WOOD, WILDLIFE AND WILDERNESS
When examining the prospect of diminishing wilderness value in National parks because of open access to all, Garret Hardin asked the question:
What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off to private property. We might keep them as public property but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think are all objectionable. But we must choose ... (Hardin, 1968: 21).
We face a choice in regard to Australia's native timber forests. At present, use of the resource is administered politically. The past record of public sector management in these forests is not one of efficient management for either timber or amenity values. The question is could markets, private ownership, and an allocation system based on price do better?
Charging a price for wood does not go against anyone's sense of propriety, but charging a price for wilderness tends to sit uneasily in our collective Australian consciousness. A nation, cushioned by years of open access to beaches, forests and the bush, reacts somewhat uneasily to suggestions of charges, private ownership and fences.
Nevertheless, as population grows, and a more affluent society generates higher demands for scarce recreational and amenity resources in the forest, the role of market mechanisms (such as ownership vesting and market-based prices) needs to be carefully considered.
A common argument for leaving amenity values unpriced is that people who enjoy these values cannot be excluded from their enjoyment, even if they do not pay. It is argued that it is much easier to exclude the logger who does not pay for the tree than it is to exclude the hiker who does not possess a trail pass. But finding ways of charging a price to those who enjoy benefits from assets is precisely the role of the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurial imagination is crucial to a market approach. Where environmental entrepreneurs can devise ways of marketing environmental values, market incentives can have dramatic results. What is important is that any case of external benefits or costs provides fertile ground for an entrepreneur who can define and enforce property rights. A timber owner who can devise ways of charging bush-walkers benefiting from the resource can internalise the benefits and costs. By receiving payment from those who enjoy the bush-walking, the new owner has an incentive to maintain or improve resource quality. A conservation group which can enter the bidding process for the rights to a transferable forest resource can capture the preservation value of the resource and utilise limited timber production, compatible with non-timber uses, to finance other bids. Creative marketing of forest resources and wilderness values, through sale of hunting, bush-walking and observation rights, would again internalise costs and benefits and overcome supposed free-rider problems.
It is not even necessary that all goods provided by a forest be marketable. Often the ability to market associated goods or services will enable the entrepreneur to capture adequate benefits from providing what appears, on the surface, to be a non-marketable commodity. For example, when visiting a famous art museum, patrons are often happy to pay a premium for lunch, because they believe "it's in a good cause." In effect, the museum can charge indirectly for having great works of art on public display. Similarly, a hiker on a forest trail maybe willing to pay a high price -- relative to the costs of providing the trail, keeping it clean and so on -- because he knows his payment will contribute to the preservation of the forest, its wildlife and genetic resources. If many bush walkers are willing to make such payments, more forests will be supplied by entrepreneurs than would be the case if hiking opportunities alone were in demand.
The idea that entrepreneurs would exclude potential consumers when such consumers could be allowed to consume at zero cost also needs some scrutiny. So long as there are potential consumers who could be served at a cost less than the price they are willing to pay, entrepreneurs have an incentive to make further deals. In particular, an almost endless number of price discrimination mechanisms and non-linear pricing schedules (such as volume discounts, annual fees or multiple-site access fees) can be devised to ensure that all who wish to consume are allowed to do so at a price which compensates the owner for losses from consumers previously paying higher prices. Once property rights have been defined, and can be defended and transferred, the owners have a great and personal interest in doing all they can to help all interested parties obtain benefit from the resources under their stewardship.
EXISTENCE VALUES
Values associated with existence of a resource are the most difficult to capture using market mechanisms. By existence value we mean the value individuals place on knowing that somewhere there are areas of forest reserved from logging. It is a value which implies vicarious enjoyment of forest preservation even if the forest is never visited. Here, one person's enjoyment cannot exclude another's, and, theoretically, market mechanisms cannot always provide a social optimal allocation. While we recognise the problem, there are a number of factors which minimise its importance. First, if there are wide differences in the strength of peoples preferences for forest conservation then many of the externalities will be irrelevant. Chart 5.6 demonstrates this for a simple case of two people with different valuations of forest preservation. Person A sets a high value on forest preservation. Line AB represents his demand for preservation. Person B sets a much lower value on forest preservation. His demand curve is represented by CD. In contrast to an apple or orange, which can only be enjoyed by one person at a time, each extra unit of forest preservation gives value to both person A and person B. In the terminology explained in chapter two, forest preservation (for existence value alone), is a non-rival or joint good. To determine the socially optimal level of forest preservation, the individual demand curves should be summed vertically (Samuelson, 1954) as the total benefit to society of each additional forest preserved is the sum of the benefit to both person A and person B.
Chart 5.6: Equilibrium level of preservation with differing valuations
Line EF shows the opportunity cost of forest preservation. Curtailed timber production, with its associated benefits, becomes a lost opportunity when a forest is preserved. This cost to society should be balanced against any benefits from forest preservation. The costs increase as forest preservation increases, because more valuable timber stands are put aside for conservation reserves or national parks. The socially optimal level of forest preservation is point P, where the increased benefit from setting aside another forest is exactly equal to the social cost of preservation. The key point to note is that, because person B's valuation of the forest resource is markedly different from person A's, person B's valuation has no effect on the final optimal outcome. In a free market, even if B free-rides on A's forest purchases, the outcome will still be socially optimal; the externality is irrelevant. The presence of "free-riders" on other peoples' consumption purchases does not always lead to socially undesirable outcomes, particularly when preferences differ by large magnitudes, as is likely to be the case when considering the existence value of a forest.
The second factor affecting the free-rider problem is the presence of other counter balancing externalities. Existence values associated with forest preservation are not the only relevant externalities that need to be considered. Timber production also has associated externalities, especially when factors of production cannot be employed elsewhere. NAFI (1990) has estimated that a 10% reduction in exports of sawmill products would lead to a $27 million reduction in GDP in 1987-88. Only part of this reduction in GDP would impact on forest and sawmill product related industries. For example, although 430 jobs would be lost in timber related industries, 270 jobs would also be lost in the wider economy through linkages with the timber and forest product sector. (However, these job and income "losses" would not amount to sustained "losses" if resources adjust into other activities over time).
The above arguments are not intended to support increased government intervention to subsidise the timber industry! In the first place the magnitude of the relevant externalities is not known. Attempts by central planners to regulate, subsidise and scientifically optimise are fraught with difficulty. However, one cannot argue that existence values create an externality and then not consider externalities on the timber production side of the equation. One counteracts the other and the best approach may be to ignore both rather than bear the additional costs of government intervention.
RECENT N.S.W. EXPERIENCE
As an example of how a market based system using private ownership might work, consider the recent decisions by the New South Wales government in relation to the South-East NSW forests.
In late 1990 the New South Wales and federal governments agreed to turn 60% of the disputed National Estate forests on the NSW coast into national parks while leaving the remaining 40% open to timber harvesting. The decision was projected to result in the loss of 11.5% of timber supply from the area, 112 jobs and one sawmill. 56,000 ha were turned into National Parks. Neither the timber industry nor the conservation groups appeared happy with the decision. A timber industry spokesman said "the plan was a compromise which favoured conservationists". Conservation groups such as the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Wilderness Society were also concerned, describing the agreement to "gut" the Coolangubra wilderness as "contrary to community opinion and ecologically irresponsible" (The Australian, 9th Oct, 1990).
Given the decision to withdraw this quantity of land from wood production, a market approach to the problem could have been to vest the land in recognised conservation groups. They would have had full rights to the parks with responsibility for their on going management. The remaining timber forests could have been vested in the timber industry groups which previously had logging rights in the forest. Once the initial allocation was made, forest owners could have traded their assets to achieve a more mutually beneficial outcome. If conservation groups felt the preservation value of Coolangubra was much higher than other forests they owned, agreements with the timber industry could have been negotiated to allow logging elsewhere in return for preservation of Coolangubra. Alternatively, funds could have been raised to purchase Coolangubra outright. Where restricted logging was compatible with environmental values -- for example, in the case of preventative fire management -- conservation groups would have had an incentive to allow logging in these areas, but under more stringent environmental guide-lines if desired. Funds raised could have been used for the purchase of other conservation areas. Timber industry groups would have had an incentive to consider a wider range of values in their decision making; prices charged for environmental amenities would no longer have been under-cut locally by free government provision.
As long as rights were vested on a long-term basis, both the timber industry and the conservationists would have benefited from increased resource security. Rights could have been allocated as long term leases or perpetual but tradeable utilisation rights. The decisions on forest management would no longer have been dictated by the three year time horizon of political parties; but, instead, by the longer investment profiles of the timber companies and speculators; amongst the latter would be conservationists concerned for future generations.
In this context it is important to note that National Parks, World Heritage areas and State reserves presently reserve 70% of native forests from timber getting whilst the timber industry has only tenuous security in the less than 30% of native forests open to commercial logging.
PRIVATE PROVISION OF AMENITY VALUES
In the remainder of this chapter, we put some practical flesh on the theoretical bones, and show how entrepreneurial imagination can, and has, generated markets for the amenity values of forests. As mentioned above, groups from both sides of the forest conservation debate could benefit from such a market approach. Some of the examples cited are not directly forest related, but they demonstrate the ability of private markets to provide wildlife and wilderness values. Such market propensities could equally well be generated in a forest resource context.
Timber Industry Perspective
The International Paper (IP) Company's wildlife program in the south of the US is a prime example of how a firm can benefit from using forest resources to provide non-wood services. IP employs specialists to oversee wildlife and recreation on its lands, including the 16,000-acre Southlands Experiment Forest located near Bainbridge, Georgia. There, research is carried out to develop forest management practices that enhance wildlife population as well as profits. White-tailed deer, turkeys, rabbits, bobwhite quail, mourning doves and other species are beginning to reap the benefits of new management techniques. Habitat is improved by controlled burning, buffer zones along streams, and tree cutting practices that leave wildlife cover, and plenty of forage (The Council on Environmental Quality, 1984: 426).
According to company officials, investing in wildlife research and habitat production makes sound business sense. On its 1.65 million acres in the mid-South region (Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas), IP in 1988 charged an average of 83 cents per acre for hunting clubs and 62 cents per acre for individual hunters. Company officials see a good possibility that the return could be as high as $10 per acre in the future as more hunters seek better hunting conditions available on IP lands. (Blood and Baden, 1984: 11)
North Main Woods, Inc. offers another interesting example of industry groups responding to recreational demands. A non-profit association formed by 20 landowners, North Maine Woods Inc., manages recreation on 2.8 million acres of mostly private commercial forests. The area includes two of the wildest rivers in New England. It also has abundant wildlife, including huntable populations of moose, white-tailed deer, black bear, partridge and excellent fishing.
Access to the area is controlled through 17 checkpoints and access roads, where visitors are required to register, pay fees for different types of use, and obtain permits for campsites. Visitor days have grown from 121,000 in 1974 to 189,000 in 1984. In 1984, the fees ranged from $2 per day to $17 for an all season permit and were used by the association to construct and improve campsites, run a rubbish collection system and run public education programmes on use of the woods. Though the initial efforts were resisted by those who were accustomed to free, unrestricted access, the less crowded, clean, well-organised system of recreation management is promoting cooperation between landowners and recreationalists. (The Council on Environmental Quality, 1984: 381, 384)
International Paper, North Maine Woods, Inc., and other timber companies and land holders in the south and east of the US face less competition from public lands than do timber companies with large land holdings in the west. Companies in the western US must compete with zero prices set for most recreational activities on government owned lands. As a result, timber companies in this region spend little or nothing to enforce their property rights in amenities and tend to ignore these values in management decisions. This is similar to the situation in Australia, where most native forests are state owned. The creation of an efficient market for recreational and wildlife values in state forests would need to be preceded by implementation of a pricing system on state lands or by the selective sale of forest lands to private interest, whether they be industry or conservation groups. Despite the zero-priced competition from state owned forests, timber companies which own forest lands in Australia have provided some recreational values.
Associated Forest Holdings, a division of APPM Forest Products, is Australia's largest private forest-owner. Holdings are primarily in Tasmania and supply 70% of the APPM's regional requirements for timber products. AFH has been following a programme of eucalyptus plantation development since the 1970s and, with a planned 60,000 ha of plantations for pulp production, is a fore-runner in this field. However, the production of timber products has not superseded non-timber values. Forests are managed according to a plan which alternates cutting between selected coupes and leaves wild-life corridors and sanctuaries. A small area of virgin rainforest has been declared a reserve in perpetuity and access to the forests for local fisherman and bushwalkers is allowed on a permit basis (Higgins, 1990).
Conservation Group Perspective
Efforts by conservation groups provide a different twist on markets in that they are used as a means to protect the environment rather than make pecuniary profits. Indeed, such examples run counter to the assumption of some critics that voluntary markets will not work because the natural environment forever remains a "public good".
Using primarily volunteer initiative and private funds, private organisations have grown rapidly in the US during the past three decades. In 1950, only 36 conservation organisations existed in the US, but by 1975 there were 173 and by 1982 there were 404 groups representing over 250,000 members. Local conservation organisations in 1982 controlled over 675,000 acres of valuable resource lands (more than 60% of it was in the New England and Mid-Atlantic states, where private land ownership dominates). Land conservation trusts are generally established with tax exempt status for the purpose of preserving land for its amenity values and for keeping land in agricultural uses. Funds are raised by soliciting members who pay a small annual fee and by soliciting grants from foundations and corporations. With these funds, land trusts can purchase land in fee simple title or purchase conservation easements. These organisations have an incentive to charge fees because the revenues can be used to further their conservation efforts.
In sharp contrast, government resource agencies fail to capture the returns that would be available if they charged realistic user fees for recreation on public lands, and thus fail to protect or enhance recreational values. Speaking for the Trustees of Reservations in Massachusetts, Gordon Abbott Jr. stated:
We are also fortunate that user demand enables us to raise 35% of our operating income from admission fees and that these can be adjusted within reason to catch up with inflation. We're great believers in the fairness of users paying their way (Abbott, 1982).
At the national level in the US, The Nature Conservancy leads the way in private land preservation, being responsible "for the protection of 2,916,819 acres in 50 states in the US, Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean" (Dodge, 1987: 2). The Conservancy is also a pace-setter in devising innovative ways of raising money to cover operating expenses on each preserve it runs. On the 13,000 acre Pine Butte Preserve in northwestern Montana, for example, Conservancy co-managers Dave and Cindi McAllister offer nature tours through the last lowland grizzly bear stronghold in the lower 48 states. They oversee cattle grazing on select areas of the preserve where grazing fees netted $10,000 in revenue in 1986. In addition, the McAllisters started a guest ranch business offering guided nature tours and access to hiking trails, fishing, and horseback riding. The revenues from the ranch help to offset the cost of operating the preserve.
Although such a market orientation has not as yet been taken up by many forest conservation lobby groups in Australia, an Australian precedent for such an approach can be seen in the purchase of buildings with historic value by the National Trust. This private organisation funds its own purchases of buildings with conservation value. Once purchased they are managed by the Trust on an on going basis, primarily for their conservation not their rental value. Nevertheless, the Trust can benefit from such rents when occupancy does not conflict with preservation. Purchasers' of forest lands for conservation value could easily follow a similar approach.
Private initiatives in conservation can be found at the more local level too. In South Australia a large landowner, Mr Tom Brinkworth, has established several areas of wetland in association with other local property owners. These are financed by charges ($20 per gun) for private duck shoots. Revenues are paid into a "Wetland Trust" to enhance existing wetlands and create others (David Hawker MP, 1990, pers. comm.). Rather more ambitious is a $15 million venture being planned by Mr Barry Cohen, the former Minister for the Environment. Mr Cohen intends to open an environment park on 170 acres of native bushland next to the Hawkesbury River and on the central highway. The plan is to have a sanctuary for animals, giant aviaries to allow free flying birds, an artificial wetland and enclosures for some animals like koalas and possums and for some reptiles. The project is to be financed by a charge of $12-14 per head along with a kiosk and arts and craft section. Some conservation groups have also taken initiative in purchasing areas of conservation value. The Tasmanian Conservation Trust recently purchased a private block of native forest in the Tasmanian midlands. (Kevin White, North Broken Hill Ltd., 1990, pers. comm.)
A more colourful example was reported in the Australian in March 1990. Mr Lloyd Bird purchased a former brick-works 30 years ago and has now converted it into a miniature rain-forest. About 40 endangered plant species are included in his inventory and some have now grown to 30 metres in height. European pharmaceutical companies have contacted Mr Bird with requests for plant species that could help in medical research. (MacArthur, 1990).
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A carefully structured move towards a more market based forest industry has the potential to achieve an improved balance of environmental and economic goals. In the "ecologically robust" eucalyptus forests, market based management for timber production alone would create a more efficient timber industry, with less wasteful investment in the native forest, a better timber harvesting decision, and possibly a reduced area of logging. Extending the role of markets into the less traditional area of providing amenity services in the forest has the potential to improve the outcome still further.
State forest services in Australia currently provide non-wood forest values at a zero price. Queuing and rationing are the result. Market provision of such values is under-cut and out-competed, so there is little incentive for either public or private resource managers to provide non-timber uses such as wild-life and recreation. Because rights to forest resources are publicly held and not transferable, conservation groups do not bid for forest lands and have no incentive to consider timber values in their political vote-seeking.
Under a market alternative, forest lands would become saleable with both the timber industry and conservation groups entering the bidding process. Examples from the US, such as the International Paper Company and The Nature Conservancy, illustrate how this can lead to provision of more amenity values. The Australian examples cited illustrate a local capacity for similar developments, but government subsidisation of recreation and environmental amenities under-cuts this potential for private provision. Selective sale of Australian native eucalyptus forests would encourage more private provision of conservation services and values, without the extreme of a total moratorium on timber production. The presence of "free-rider" problems means that the outcome still may not be the theoretically optimal trade-off between wood, wildlife and wilderness. In the absence of detailed information about peoples' preferences, political allocation of the forest resource also has real deficiencies involved in it; and it is my view that the problems of political failures are far more significant than market failure. Market based allocation of forest resources may not be ideal or perfect but there appears to be no superior alternative!
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