CHAPTER 6
National assertiveness by both Russians and non-Russians became Moscow's pre-eminent domestic problem in 1989. Gorbachev was put increasingly on the defensive, forced to react to events rather than to shape them, and undercut in his ability to push his broader agenda. The enormously diverse nature of the phenomenon -- which included Baltic demands for independence, bloody conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the revival of Russian nationalism in several different forms -- prevented Gorbachev from elaborating a systematic nationalities policy, despite the convening of a Central Committee plenum on the subject. As a result, Gorbachev now faces a cruel choice: whether to pursue his democratisation at the expense of control over the periphery or to maintain control at the cost of his broader policy agenda.
STILL NO NATIONALITIES POLICY
Despite a plenum on the subject of the nationalities and an explosion of academic and publicistic writing about it, Gorbachev failed again in 1989 to articulate a distinctive nationalities policy. As a result, he faced developments among all national groups that were largely the unintended consequences of his broader policies. His continued reduction in coercion prompted ever more groups to press their demands in public. His sponsorship of glasnost led them to discuss ever more sensitive issues. His attacks on Soviet history and ideology deprived the system of its legitimation, especially serious since the regime's simultaneous inability to deliver the goods deprived it of a functional justification. His tolerance of national diversity in Eastern Europe caused many groups to believe that he would allow them something similar. Most important of all, his sponsorship of the electoral process led to the mobilisation of ethnic communities large and small.
Given Gorbachev's political acumen, it is reasonable to ask why he has failed to elaborate a policy in this sensitive area. Three immediate reasons suggest themselves. First, a Soviet man himself, he would view others as Soviet citizens first and members of particular nationalities only second. While this view has some basis in reality, it is deeply offensive to many, particularly non-Russians who see it as the latest variant of the way Russian rule is imposed. Second, Gorbachev may understand that to articulate a "nationalities policy" like those of his predecessors is impossible under the more democratic conditions he seeks. Only a highly coercive system can impose an answer to this "accursed question", a more liberal system can only hope to contain it. And, third, Gorbachev simply may not know what to do, given both the complexity and the diversity of the Soviet Union's current ethnic situation. As he has come to learn, an approach that works in one region may fail in another or even make the situation worse.
Underlying these are two more fundamental problems, neither of which Gorbachev has addressed but both of which may have contributed to his reluctance to elaborate a policy. The first is one of methodology. As a Marxist, Gorbachev is inclined to consider ends rather than means and to judge individuals and groups not by how they act but what they are for. However, as an advocate of democratisation, he must do just the reverse. As his reaction to developments in the Caucasus and the Baltic republics shows, he remains caught between his two convictions. The second underlying problem, however, is demographic. If the Soviet Union moves towards democracy but remains a centralised state, the Russians -- who still form more than 50 percent of the population -- are likely to assume an ever larger role in it, and their traditional conservatism will act as a drag on his policies. But if the USSR decentralises and democratises at the same time, the Russians are likely to see themselves as the most threatened group and react accordingly. To discuss all this in the open with the scrutiny of both the West and all the Soviet nationalities is something almost any leader would prefer to avoid.
REGIONAL VARIATIONS, COPYING, AND ALLIANCE FORMATION
Two errors are commonly made in the assessment of contemporary nationality problems in the USSR. The first is to measure all ethnic activism according to a single standard -- for example, according to the extent of demands for independence. Such an approach mistakenly assumes that all groups want or will want the same thing; more serious still, it leads to a significant underestimate of the degree of national activism by groups with different problems, prospects, and agendas. Suggesting that what the small nationalities of the North should want or could obtain is comparable with the aspirations of the Estonians is clearly absurd. The second mistake -- the obverse of the first -- is to view each group in isolation, considering it only in terms of its own history and current situation. This approach obscures the extent to which some groups imitate others and the ways in which alliances among them are likely to form or break.
Crudely, one can speak of five major ethnographic regions of the USSR, each of which has its own concerns: the Baltic, the Soviet West, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian republic. In the past year, the native peoples of the three Baltic republics have continued to press for independence, taking ever greater steps towards freedom but always in a manner that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Gorbachev to respond effectively. Unlike many other nationalities, these three peoples enjoy significant outside support, and any move by Gorbachev against them would be fraught with serious foreign-policy risks.
The second region, the Soviet West, contains three quite different republics. The Belorussians and the Ukrainians both began the very difficult processes necessary to form united opposition groups to advance their agendas, but in neither case did demands for independence become a central part of their programs during 1989. Surprisingly, the Moldavians consolidated quickly, first to push through their language law against serious Russian resistance and then, at the end of 1989, to demand either independence or union with a Romania now freed of Ceausescu.
The third region has seen the most serious and bloody ethnic confrontations: the struggle between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus continued throughout 1989 without significant gains by either side. Georgia was challenged first by its own minorities and then by Moscow's bloody suppression of a peaceful demonstration in April.
In Central Asia, ethnic mobilisation seemed to lag behind, but, to a certain extent, this appearance was deceptive, Uzbeks clashed with Meskhetians and other outsiders in the early summer, other groups clashed with each other throughout the year, and incipient opposition groups emerged both as a result of emulating the Baltic peoples and as the product of electoral campaigns. One reason for this pattern is that the Central Asians have very different requirements from other groups: they too want less control from Moscow but, unlike the others, need more outside investment, a requirement that dictates very different approaches and alliances.
The most serious -- if most neglected -- nationalities problem continued to be that of the Russians. In republics outside the RSFSR, (1) Russians felt threatened by the rise of non-Russian assertiveness, while within the RSFSR itself they felt simultaneously threatened by other groups and challenged by the possibilities of advancing a variety of interests. From this hothouse environment emerged a welter of programs and organisations. The extremist "Pamyat" organisation received the most attention, but groups concerned with the environment and the preservation of culture were more important in the Russian republic itself, and Russian counter-movements in other Union republics made themselves felt. As has been the case so often before, Russians found themselves trapped between articulation of their Russianness and the maintenance of the empire. Not surprisingly, this produced diverse responses among Russian groups, which led to misunderstandings by other groups, further exacerbating the situation.
Two of the most significant developments in the area of nationalities in 1989 were the imitation of other groups and the emergence of new political alliances at official and unofficial levels. The emergence of popular fronts in many republics represented both a bow to the Baltic originators and the efforts of the Baltic peoples to spread their approach. The willingness of groups from the Caucasus, the Baltic, and the Soviet West to support one another in the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet on a number of issues put a stamp on the emerging Soviet legislative process.
NO WAY OUT
Entering 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev probably wishes he was in charge of a country with one people rather than the many who together constitute the USSR. His own frequently voiced frustrations at the nationalities, most recently heard at the Congress of People's Deputies and the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the Lithuanian Communist Party's declaration of independence, show that his patience is wearing thin. To date, he has tried to push nationality problems aside, hoping to buy time for his other goals. But the forces of nationalism and mobilisation that he has unleashed and even unwittingly engendered make that approach ever more difficult. In 1990, he is likely to be forced to choose between expanded democratisation or continued control, and his choice, itself the product of forces larger than the man himself, will profoundly affect Russians, non-Russians, and the world outside.
ENDNOTES
1. The Russian Republic.
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