Soviet Agriculture in 1989: A Third Year of Near Stagnation

CHAPTER 4

The annual report of the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) on socioeconomic development in the USSR in 1989, which was published in the press on 28 January 1990, confirms the critical state of the Soviet food economy:  sugar is rationed all over the country;  meat, sausage, and animal fats are rationed in "roughly one of every five of the 445 cities surveyed";  supplies of fish have diminished;  the demand for confectionery and tea is not being met;  supplies of potatoes and vegetable products are inadequate and of low quality "in a number of regions";  and supplies of fruit are totally insufficient.

Table 4:  Output of main agricultural products
(million tonnes, except for eggs and wool)

	1985	1988	1989	% change 1988-1989
All grains, "bunker yield"	191.7	195.0	211.1	+8.3
All grains, after initial processing		180.2	196.4	+9.0
Sunflower seed	5.3	6.2	7.0	+13.6
Potatoes	73.0	62.7	72.0	+14.8
Sugar beet	82.4	88.0	97.5	+10.8
Cotton, lint	2.78	2.75	2.66	-3.3
Vegetables & cucurbitaceae	32.0	34.5	33.5	-2.9
Fruit & berries	10.5	8.9	8.9	0.0
Grapes	5.8	5.6	4.9	-12.5
Meat, Soviet slaughter weight     adjusted to Western standards	17.1   10.3	19.7   11.8	20.0   12.0	+1.5
Milk & dairy products	98.6	106.8	108.1	+1.2
Eggs (billions)	77.3	85.2	84.6	-0.7
Greasy wool (thousand tonnes)	447	478	474	-0.8

Notes:  Sunflower seed accounts for 85-90 per cent of all Soviet oilseed production;  fruit & berries exclude citrus fruit, the output of which was 144,000 tonnes in 1985 and 448,000 tonnes in 1988 (Statistichesky ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV, Moscow, 1989, 212);  the Soviet figure for slaughter weight of meat includes fats and edible sub-products, requiring a deduction of about 40 per cent to bring it into line with Western statistics, according to A. Cherekaev (Sel'skaya zhizn', 12 October 1989);  dairy products are rendered in the milk equivalent.

Sources:  Data for vegetables and cucurbitaceae in 1985 are taken from Razvitie agro-promyshlennogo proizvodstva v SSSR, Moscow, 1989, 153;  all data for 1989 and those for sugar beet, vegetables and cucurbitaceae, and also animal products (which were revised upwards) in 1988 are taken from the Goskomstat report for 1989 (Izvestia, 28 January 1990);  all other data are taken from SSSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu, Moscow, 1989, 223 & 231.

Per capita meat consumption is said to be 67 kg, or if "fats and sub-products of the second category" are deducted, 62 kg a year.  This is a euphemism.  Actual meat consumption in the Soviet Union, if assessed according to Western statistical classification (see Table 4, including note), is barely 40 kg per head per annum, and would be only 37 kg if imports of meat were omitted.  This implies malnutrition, not for the country as a whole but certainly for some major regions -- in particular, rural areas of Central Asia.

Excess demand for the better foods aggravates the situation.  The monetary incomes of the population have been growing faster than supplies of food and other consumer goods, and the gap increased in 1989:  average wages rose by 9.5 per cent (those of kolkhozniks by 8 percent), whereas agricultural gross output (in constant 1983 prices) increased by only 1 per cent, from somewhat over 221 billion rubles to 224 billion rubles, a figure that barely exceeds the population growth of 0.7 per cent.  This means that output was only 2 per cent above the average for 1986-88, when food production almost stagnated.  Crop production actually declined in 1987 and 1988 and, although it increased in 1989, it remained slightly below the 1986-88 average, representing only a 70-90 per cent achievement of Food Program targets, whereas livestock production achieved a respectable 95-98 per cent of its target. ⁽¹⁾

As regards individual crops, production of grain, oilseeds, potatoes, and sugar beet showed quite healthy growth -- about 10 per cent above 1988 -- while that of cotton, vegetables, fruit, eggs, and wool declined moderately (that of grapes, however, steeply) or showed no growth.  Although the latter are high-priced products, their negative impact should be more than offset by the main field crops.

The "bunker" grain yield of 18.8 tons per hectare (including leguminous grains) was the highest ever, implying a harvested area (including corn for grain) of 112-112.5 million hectares.  The Soviet journalist N. Osychkin, who specialises in the grain economy, speaks of only 100 million hectares (excluding corn for grain, which can hardly have been grown and harvested on more than 5-6 million hectares).  This is almost 10 million hectares less than in 1988, when the statistical report mentioned that 5 million hectares remained unharvested for meteorological reasons, thus implying a spring sown area of 120 million hectares.  (In principle, Soviet statistics show the spring sown area, but in practice it is the harvested area.)  The report for 1989 states:  "A significant shortfall in the harvested area is to be attributed to destruction of part of the sown area as a result of drought during the summer".  This, according to Osychkin, refers mainly to the trans-Ural regions.  Assuming that the spring sown area in 1989 was only 115 million hectares, ⁽²⁾ the area destroyed by drought or unharvested for other reasons seems to have been close to 10 million hectares, three times what is considered the Soviet multiannual average.

In light of the data for individual types of produce, more than the 1 per cent growth of overall crop production implied by Bolyus Poshkus, a deputy chairman of the State Commission for Food and Procurements, ⁽³⁾ might have been expected.  There could have been a shortfall in output of feed (hay, silage, green fodder, pasture), for which no data are given, but it is more likely that there is also a statistical effect.  As distinct from physical output, the figure for overall gross output is given in monetary terms by definition.  (It is also gross of inputs and thus not diminished by rising production costs.)  Consequently, it may be assumed that poor quality of produce due to the weather (sugar content of beet, oil content of sunflower seed, starch content of potatoes, etc.) depressed the monetary assessment.

Such an assumption should not, however, apply to grain, as its yield "after initial processing" (v vese posle dorabotki) was even higher by comparison with 1988 than the "bunker" yield (v pervonachal' no oprikhodov-annom vese).  The difference between these two grain output figures (see Table 4), which was 7.0 per cent in 1989 and 7.6 percent in 1988 and, on average, in 1981-85, makes possible a better assessment of grain losses.  Not long ago, these were officially given as 15-20 million tons -- apparently an average of recent years -- or some 7-10 per cent. ⁽⁴⁾  This was said to include "losses during harvesting", but the figures of 7.0 per cent and 7.6 per cent now revealed leave an unconvincingly small margin for harvesting losses, which may therefore be ignored in a calculation of losses.  Starting with the "bunker" yield (which by definition excludes "prebunker" losses in the fields), the figure "after initial processing" would seem close to corresponding with Western grain statistics if it includes full drying and cleaning -- which may well be doubted.  This doubt is reinforced by a statement that follows in the statistical handbook for 1988 -- namely, that an amazingly large quantity of grain (another 15-20 million tons) is lost "at the stage of storage and further processing" (na stadii khraneniya i pererabotki), ⁽⁵⁾ or on the way from the elevator to final (human or animal consumption).  Thus, the percentages add up to about 13-17 per cent.  While this is not exactly the adjustment necessary for comparability with grain statistics in the West (as some losses occur there, too), an overall adjustment that knocks some 15 per cent off the Soviet "bunker" yield figures does not seem far off the mark.

Milk output has continued to rise despite a declining dairy herd, clearly as a result of increased animal productivity.  The slight fall in egg production is not alarming, as eggs are one of the few items of food that are not in short supply.  On the other hand, the decline in wool output and in numbers of sheep is certainly bad news for the planners.

As regards output of meat, Poshkus states that "the entire increase in procurements was obtained at the cost of reducing the number of stock.  This is a very negative fact that bears witness to the slow rate of growth of animal productivity".  It is true that the decline in the number of stock was too drastic in that it exceeded the increase in output of meat, but on the whole the trends in the number of stock and the production of meat may also be interpreted as resulting from rising productivity per animal and from more flexible adaptation to the availability of feed.  Over the longer term, and in terms of output rather than procurements, this "negative fact" is not evident.  Between 1985 and 1988, annual meat output increased by a remarkable 2.55 million tons while the number of cattle (excluding cows) declined by 200,000, and the number of pigs, although fluctuating over the years, increased by 370,000.  Such a decline in the number of cattle, if attributed to slaughterings, would account for an increase in meat output of only about 700,000 tons, and the increase in the number of pigs for roughly an additional 37,000 tons.  The extra 2.55 million tons must therefore have been a result of rising productivity.  In fact, the productivity reserves are enormous.  According to A. Cherekaev, only 62-63 kg of beef are produced per year and head of cattle, whereas in Western countries -- and also in Hungary -- the figure is 100-110 kg. ⁽⁶⁾

Table 5:  Livestock Numbers
(million head at end of year)

	1980	1985	1988	1989
Cows, total     of which private	43.4 13.2	42.9 13.2	41.8 13.0	41.7 13.2
Other cattle, total     of which private	71.7 9.8	78.0 10.9	77.8 10.8	76.6 10.9
Pigs, total     of which private	73.4 14.0	77.8 13.9	78.1 14.5	76.9 15.2
Sheep & goats, total     of which private	147.5 30.2	147.3 33.1	147.5 34.7	144.5 35.9

Sources:  SSSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu, Moscow, 1989, page 229;
Izvestia, 28 January 1990.

It is likely that privately-owned animals have contributed to the improvement in productivity.  Against the background of an overall decline in numbers, the share and -- particularly during 1989 -- the absolute number of privately-owned animals has risen (see Table 5).  To these should be added the unknown, but not entirely insignificant number of animals that remain public property -- and are recorded as such lor statistical purposes -- but are held on private plots on behalf of kolkhozes or sovkhozes.  (The number of tenancy "peasant farms" is still too small to have perceptibly increased the share of animals in private ownership.)

The amount of agricultural machinery and mineral fertilisers (apart from phosphates) supplied to agriculture declined in 1989, as it had indeed already done in 1988. ⁽⁷⁾  According to the statistical report for 1989, this was because of the failure of the producers to fulfil contracts or, in some cases, their refusal to conclude contracts.  It may in part also be due, as a number of Soviet authors assert, to the rejection by the farms of machines that were of inferior quality or were unsuited to local conditions, although this is hardly likely to be true of certain machinery badly needed by farms, such as cultivators, fertiliser spreaders and feed combine harvesters.  Last, but by no means least, rising industrial prices, combined with the impact of mandatory self-financing, seem to have limited purchases of producer goods by collective and state farms.  As Poshkus points out, Agroprombank was instructed to reduce credits to the agroindustrial complex in 1988-89 by 35 billion rubles, and, of the expected 32 billion rubles in supplementary payments for procurement of agricultural produce in 1988, more than 16 billion will have been taken from former fund accumulations of profitable farms.

---

ENDNOTES

1.  H.I. Poshkus, "Sensatsii ne ozhidaetsya" (Food and Procurements), Ekonomika i zhizn', 5, 1990, page 6.

2.  This was the estimate given in USSR Agriculture and Trade Report, USDA RS-89-1, Wu'thmgton, May 1989, page 19.

3.  Poshkus, loc. cit.

4.  SSSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu, Moscow, 1989, pages 224-25.

5.  Ibid.

6.  Sel'skaya zhizn', 12 October 1989, page 2.

7.  SSSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu, pages 210-211.